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ABSTRACT 
 
Sarah R. Workman: THE STRANGE PLAY OF TRAUMATIC REALITY:  
ENCHANTMENT IN JEWISH AMERICAN LITERATURE 
(Under the Direction of Erin G. Carlston and Heidi Kim) 
 
 
 This project analyzes the play of narrative worlds in the work of Bernard Malamud (The 
Magic Barrel), Michael Chabon (The Yiddish Policemen’s Union), Nicole Krauss (Great House), 
Jonathan Safran Foer (Everything Is Illuminated), Nathan Englander (“The Tumblers”), and the 
Coen brothers (A Serious Man). These texts self-consciously dramatize the question: How do we 
know what we think we know about Holocaust history? The serious play of fantasy registers a 
historical shift in Jewish American literature towards metafictional approaches to mediating 
Holocaust history, exposing the unconsidered intersections between speculative fiction and 
historiography. This work flouts interpretive conventions of narrative ontologies to problematize 
meaning-making in Holocaust studies, subverting assumptions that this history is either 
knowable or not knowable. In addition to showing the limited ability of historical realism to 
incorporate Holocaust representation in an American literary context, the project highlights the 
ways in which fantasy genres—long discarded to the bottom of the critical dustbin—mediate 
history, absence, and loss. To conceptualize this contemporary turn to genre-mixing, I develop a 
critical schemata entitled enchantment. This framework encapsulates the strange 
commensurability between the fantasy mode of storytelling and its representation of traumatic 
history. Reflecting the third generation’s lack of first-hand experience, enchantment 
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defamiliarizes historical narratives, producing a critical apparatus that enables new discussions of 
how aesthetic play structures the intergenerational transfer of Holocaust memory. 
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INTRODUCTION 
  
MEANING-MAKING AND FANTASY MODES: HISTORY, GENRE, AND 
ENCHANTMENT IN POST-WAR JEWISH AMERICAN LITERATURE 
 
“Fantasies have become literally true—a principle, as we shall have occasion to see, that was to 
have a profound shaping effect on the writer’s conception of his world.  Fantasy, of course, had 
been employed for centuries by artists, for its own sake and to offer commentary on the human 
scene—Bosch populated his canvases with creatures of fantasy; and the records of myth and 
literature, from the Minotaur to the Houyhnhnms and beyond, are crowded with comparable 
distortions of reality—sometimes comic, sometimes tragically earnest—and though the reader or 
observer is often absorbed by these universes of the imagination, he never mistakes them for 
literal reality. . . . But when fantasies become literally true, the artist, the writer, must record a 
reality that has become an expression of the impossible, at the same time convincing his 
audience that whatever distortions he employs do not negate, but clarify reality and subject it to 
an illuminating metamorphosis” –Lawrence Langer, The Holocaust and the Literary Imagination 
(1977) (23-25)  
 
As Lawrence Langer remarks, when writers and artists employ fantasy to represent the 
Holocaust they face complicated issues of rhetorical strategy.  But when the human scene is 
something of the incomprehensible and inhuman in nature, when the reality of the Holocaust 
“transcends” the imagination as Elie Wiesel1 and others contend, what does fantasy illuminate?  
In other words, when reality becomes fantastical, how does literature respond?  Does recourse to 
the fantastical merely add to the mythology of the already incomprehensible?  In Nathan 
Englander’s short story “The Tumblers,” (2000) the narrator tells us that this story is “an absurd 
undertaking.  But then again. . . No more unbelievable than the reality from which they’d 
escaped, no more unfathomable than the magic of disappearing Jews” (99).  The elements of the 
                                                
1Elie Wiesel has famously argued that “the Holocaust as Literary Inspiration” is a contradiction 
in terms (7).   
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fantastic are disturbingly commensurate with the degree of unbelievability of lived historical 
experience. “The Tumblers” imagines a series of events and a community that emphasizes the 
impossibility of recreation.  The turn to fantasy in Englander’s work, and how it illuminates the 
absurdity of historical trauma, presents the interconnection between genre, history, and aesthetics 
that is characteristic of third-generation Jewish American writing.  In this interrelationship, the 
commensurability of a non-rational or fantastic literary mode as an apt approach to fictionalizing 
the history of an “event at the limits” (3) as Saul Friedlander famously declared—at the limits of 
comprehensibility and representation—results in the “delight and disturbance” of enchantment 
(Enchantment 5). 
I begin this study with the short stories of Bernard Malamud published in the 1950s, 
which I consider an early precursor to the contemporary trend, before I turn to the fiction of 
Michael Chabon, Nicole Krauss, Jonathan Safran Foer, and Nathan Englander, as well as a film 
by the Coen brothers.  These writers draw on the fantastic to make commensurate otherwise 
incommensurate historical experiences—for Malamud, it is the experience of American post-war 
Jews and European Jews; for Krauss, it is the experience of Holocaust survivors and third-
generation Jews across the diaspora.  As I use the term throughout my project, enchantment 
refers to the strange commensurability of the fantasy mode of storytelling and historical 
representation that “delights and disturbs” as it defamiliarizes specific historical narratives and 
larger questions of historiography (Enchantment 5).  That is, these works play with fantastic and 
fantasy tropes to reframe particular historical events alongside larger questions of historical 
interpolation.  For example, the question, how do we know what we think we know about 
Holocaust history? is central to the works that are specifically entangled with the Holocaust.  
Although film critics argue that the Coen brothers’ film A Serious Man (2009) does not engage 
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in any way with the Holocaust—whether directly or indirectly—my reading of the film shows 
that it does engage with the Holocaust indirectly; the film deepens the question of how aesthetic 
play and uncertainty mediates history by framing the quasi-nihilistic question, how is it that we 
know anything at all?  All along, this project asks what happens when the fantasy mode of 
storytelling, premised on the impossible, is utilized to represent a historical event that exceeds all 
comprehension of what was possible in historical reality—an event that in and of itself 
constitutes a “transgression of reality”?  On the one hand, it may seem both unlikely and 
ethically problematic to pair fantasy tropes with Holocaust representation.  But on the other, and 
as my project argues, we may think about the conditions structuring comprehension of fantastic 
genres and seemingly fantastic historical trauma as similarly “absurd,” “unbelievable,” and 
“unfathomable,” as Englander’s text instructs, and moreover, as a way to illuminate the dark 
reality of the past.  In these texts, loss conditions the impossible nature of aesthetic codes and 
historical recreation.   
Both “fantasy” and “the fantastic” have been used to designate effects within texts 
(modes2 of storytelling) and the work containing these effects (genre).  Following Tzvetan 
Todorov, I use the “fantastic” to refer to uncertainty about reasons for and causes of events that 
violate the laws of reality.  This paradigm is most useful as I think about Bernard Malamud’s 
short stories and Nicole Krauss’s novels, textual universes set in “our world” that share our 
reality-oriented ontologies. “Fantasy,” however, refers to the literature of the impossible and the 
                                                
2As Fredric Jameson argues: “for when we speak of a mode, what can we mean but that this 
particular type of literary discourse is not bound to the conventions of a given age, nor 
indissolubly linked to a given type of verbal artifact, but rather persists as a temptation and a 
mode of expression across a whole range of historical periods, seeming to offer itself, if only 
intermittently, as a formal possibility which can be revived and renewed” (“Magical Narratives” 
142).  
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mode of storytelling employed by that literature.  In this context, impossible indicates those 
elements that refuse a rational means of explanation; that is, such elements are irreducible to 
reason as it exists in “our world.” Departing from Todorov’s formulation, I agree with the 
consensus of contemporary critics that “fantasy” literature need not be set in the reality of “our 
world” in order to violate or transgress principles of reality.  I favor John Clute and John Grant’s 
definition in The Encyclopedia of Fantasy (1999): “a fantasy text is a self-coherent 
narrative.  When set in this world, it tells a story which is impossible in the world as we perceive 
it. . . when set in an otherworld, that otherworld will be impossible, though stories set there may 
be possible in its terms” (80).  The texts I include in this project traverse narrative geographies of 
“this world,” “otherworlds,” and play with the in-between or “no man’s land” of textual realities 
and impossibility; in this way I expand Clute and Grant’s definition to include postmodern 
fantasy, those texts that play with fantasy as a mode of storytelling.  The turn to aesthetic play, 
like metafictional tropes, and generic play, like the mixing of distinct generic formulas, extends 
the sense of uncertainty in already fantastical narratives to problematize specific historical 
narratives as well as broader questions of historiography.        
Thus, as I employ these terms, fantasy literature encompasses literature of the fantastic, 
but fantastic literature does not necessarily include fantasy.  To clarify this distinction, I 
differentiate the way the impossible works in fantastic versus fantasy literature.  In fantastic texts, 
the possibility exists to explain away the magic, wonder, or reality transgressions by rational 
means—a character may be hallucinating for example, and thus the cause of the ghostly 
apparition is psychological (Todorov 46).  In this way the uncertainty is resolved.3  Or, if no 
                                                
3Todorov refers to this type of story as fantastic-uncanny: “in works that belong to this genre, 
events are related which may be readily accounted for by the laws of reason, but which are, in 
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psychological explanation exists, then the uncertainty is resolved through the acceptance of the 
supernatural (Todorov 51-2).4  Here there is a tendency toward explanation and resolution—to 
resolve the duration of uncertainty in one direction or another.  In fantasy literature, impossibility 
will always already be irreducible.  Furthermore, as I theorize the function of enchantment 
across both fantastic and fantasy modes, even if the possibility exists to explain away the 
impossible, the open-endedness of the text’s generic codes and playfulness refuse to privilege 
this explanation; the impossible—as a source of wonder, mystery, or magic—may not be wholly 
explained away or understood by rational means.  Whether due to the sense of historical or 
aesthetic impossibility, these texts resist the proclivity to tie up or resolve the “duration of 
uncertainty.”   
In his foundational essay for the high fantasy genre “On Fairy-Stories,” Tolkien 
elucidates how impossibility functions in fantasy and describes his theory of enchantment.  
While Tolkien’s schemata is helpful to discern the function of impossibility—and thus, how we 
are going about defining fantasy—I am employing the term “enchantment” more broadly and as 
a way to describe the affective and aesthetic play of genre, history, and estrangement.  I do not 
mean that these texts are part of the “high fantasy” genre initiated by Tolkien’s Lord of the 
Rings; rather, they are characterized by a postmodern sensibility (they contain critiques of 
metanarrative; disrupted chronology; they are highly intertextual and metafictional) and play 
with ontologies of realism and fantasy, and thus, distinct models of narrative estrangement.  I 
differentiate my own concept of enchantment from Tolkien’s, and to clarify, I refer to Tolkien’s 
                                                                                                                                                       
one way or another, incredible, extraordinary, shocking, singular, disturbing or unexpected, and 
which thereby provoke in the character and in the reader a reaction similar to that which works 
of the fantastic have made familiar” (46). 
 
4What Todorov refers to as the fantastic-marvelous (51-3).  
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enchantment as an aesthetic concept that indicates the irreducibility of wonder that structures 
belief in the world of the text.5  Tolkien writes that enchantment creates a Secondary World into 
which author and reader enter, and whose purpose is “the realization, independent of the 
conceiving mind, of imagined wonder” (19).6  For Tolkien, enchantment refers to the nature of 
belief in the Secondary World where the wonder or impossibility is irreducible.  And while the 
term enchantment as I use it is not synonymous with Tolkien’s formula, I purposefully mean for 
the enchantment—as a mode of defamiliarizing history—to recursively reflect a sense of 
performativity and magic.     
It is this concept of irreducibility that influences my own schemata (Tolkien 60-1).  If the 
fantastic is related to the uncertainty about reasons for and causes of events, enchantment 
emphasizes the irreducibility or the open-endedness of the irrational phenomena in a text that 
may not necessarily inhabit the fantasy genre in a strict sense of the term—it may occur in “our 
world” or a world that looks nothing like our own.  Because these texts flout more than just 
reality-oriented possibilities and play with generic conventions, the attribution of impossible 
phenomena to structural conventions is insufficient; that is, the impossible exists in excess of 
generic codes and cannot be explained away by rational means.  While the narrative and 
affective strategy of enchantment is possible in both fantasy and realist texts, it is not realizable 
                                                
5While my conceptualization of fantasy and enchantment necessarily draws on this idea, terms 
like “wonder” and Tolkien’s concept of enchantment as he develops it in “On Fairy-Stories” are 
not interchangeable with my own expansion of the term.  
 
6Tolkien explains the “enchantment of the effective fairy-story” in the following terms: the 
Primary World is considered “reality.”  Therefore, “In the Secondary World, what is “true” does 
not mean “reality,” but that the artist makes a successful Secondary World which your mind can 
enter and “inside it, what he relates is ‘true’: it accords with the laws of that world.  You 
therefore believe it, while you are, as it were, inside.  The moment disbelief arises, the spell is 
broken; the magic, or rather art, has failed. You are then out in the Primary World again, looking 
at the little abortive Secondary World from outside” (60).  
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without the open-ended possibility for the non-rational interpretation of key textual elements, or 
the irreducibility of elements that include but are not limited to settings, behaviors, apparitions, 
relationships, or plots.  
 In third-generation Jewish American literature, behind the strange combinatory power of 
fantasy and reality is a double enchantment; that is, enchantment highlights both the “impossible” 
nature of the original event coupled with its historical removal from “authentic” experience in 
the present.  Double enchantment is an aesthetic expression that shapes the loss of “authentic” 
experience of the Holocaust, serving as a kind of substitute or at least mark of the lack.  These 
texts present an array of characters and narrators with various connections to Holocaust trauma.  
Some characters, like George Weisz in Krauss’s Great House (2010), have survived the 
Holocaust.  Approaching death, these characters are aligned with the grandparents of the younger 
characters whose adolescence is coterminous with the contemporary present.  Yet other 
characters are displaced from this historical event because genre intervenes and overwrites or 
reimagines historical trauma.  As such, third generation Jewish American literature is not 
invested in direct representation of Holocaust trauma and does not depict the horrors of the 
concentrationary universe.7  In a recent interview, Nicole Krauss laments being labeled a 
Holocaust writer and maintains that she has “written very little about the Holocaust in terms of 
actual events” (“On Fame” n. pag.).  As the grandchild of people who survived that historical 
event, she continues, “I’m not writing their story—I couldn’t write their story.  There are 
characters in my novels who have either survived the Holocaust or been affected by it” (“On 
                                                
7The term “concentrationary” has become commonplace in Holocaust literature.  It is taken from 
the French “concentrationnaire” from the title of the 1946 book L’univers Concentrationnaire by 
former political prisoner of Buchenwald, David Rousset, and was used extensively by Primo 
Levi in his last book The Drowned and the Saved (1986). 
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Fame” n. pag.).  Rather, this literature is “Holocaust-inflected,”8 meaning that the Holocaust is 
invoked indirectly or through signifiers of Holocaust trauma (these texts include references to 
familiar narrative tropes like “Kristallnacht” or the effects of post-Holocaust dispersion and 
diaspora) without claiming direct representation of traumatic experience.  Often references or 
memories are subordinated to other narratives and themes within a given novel; that is, in third-
generation Jewish American literature narratives of Holocaust experience are somewhat 
displaced from the center of the text yet retain a haunting or absent presence.  More prevalent 
than direct Holocaust representation are themes of absence and loss that have a diffuse yet 
palpable influence.  In addition, these artists thematize their own indirection and metanarratively 
reflect on mediation and knowledge-making.  A writer like Nicole Krauss is invested in indirect 
Holocaust representation precisely because she aims to understand the intergenerational 
transmission of trauma and the “burden of emotional inheritance” of the Holocaust. 
Chronologically distanced from that event and removed from the historical realities, what 
interests Krauss “is the response to catastrophic loss” (“On fame” n. pag.).  Enchantment allows 
these authors to explore Holocaust representation without laying claim to direct experience; it is 
a narrative strategy that allows them to reflect on the struggle of their desire to make these stories 
their own.     
Like Krauss, Michael Chabon struggles with the implications of fictionalizing the 
Holocaust as a writer with “no direct personal experience of it whatsoever” (qtd. in Baer 148).    
Chabon wrestles with the question of what “right” he has to “use” the Holocaust for the purpose 
                                                
8In a more recent review of Holocaust texts, Emily Miller Budnick defines three kinds of 
Holocaust narratives: 1) “the handful of more popular, epic novels that appeared in the decades 
immediately following the war”; 2) texts that “deal explicitly with the survivor experience”; and 
3) “fictions that are Holocaust-inflected rather than about the Holocaust per se” (215-7).    
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of writing fiction.  He contemplates, “you know, is it okay for me to write about the Holocaust, 
having had no direct personal experience of it whatsoever? To what degree am I entitled to 
portray or represent it in my work?” (qtd. in Baer 148).  There are at least three implications for 
third-generation writers that we can read from Chabon’s quote.  First, Chabon is asking an 
ethical question.  “Is it okay?” implies the discourse of ethics surrounding direct experience and 
authenticity—that without such experience, it is ethically problematic for Chabon to engage with 
this material.  An important example to cite here is Cynthia Ozick’s novella The Shawl, a 
beautifully written story about the Holocaust that is emotionally and morally compelling.  Amy 
Hungerford notes that in a speech to undergraduates at Yale, “Cynthia Ozick discouraged them 
from reading her novella The Shawl. . . because she herself is not a survivor.  She advised them 
that they should read all the factual literature there is on the Holocaust before they look at her 
story, ” but as Hungerford comments, “it would be a shame if those students took her advice” 
(“Holocaust of Texts” 155).  Second, Chabon’s question implies that there is a historical problem 
at hand.  We must think about the point at which any writer can tackle a historical event when 
the alternative—to Chabon or others without “direct experience” writing about it—is is the end 
of history.  And the third implication is the use of the imagination: that there is and always will 
be a yawning gap between what happened and the imagination’s use of what happened, or 
between the “Real” and the real as deployed as literary material.  That Safran in Everything Is 
Illuminated cannot find the woman Augustine suggests “that Foer has already internalized 
something that previous Holocaust literature has intently examined and questioned: can one ever 
have an unmediated relation to the past?” (“Holocaust of Texts” 3).  These writers locate new 
ways of fictionalizing history through an aesthetics of indirection that registers the impossibility 
of making or establishing a genuine connection.  As I will go on to show, third-generation 
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writers play with gaps within and between genres in order to emphasize this breach between the 
imaginative and the historical.     
Chabon’s and Krauss’s concerns as third-generation writers highlight many of the 
complex issues that have come to comprise the double-bind of Holocaust Studies.  As Saul 
Friedlander has instructed, there is both a need for truth and a difficulty of historical knowledge 
when it comes to the Holocaust.  Michael Rothberg relays how Holocaust Studies developed two 
broad approaches to the Holocaust’s availability as an object of historical knowledge through 
“realist” and “antirealist” modes (Traumatic Realism 23).  Rothberg explains,   
  By realist I mean both an epistemological claim that the Holocaust is knowable and a 
  representational claim that this knowledge can be translated into a familiar mimetic 
  universe [. . . ]  By antirealist I mean both a claim that the Holocaust is not knowable 
  or would be knowable only under radically new regimes of knowledge and that it 
  cannot be captured in traditional representational schemata. (Traumatic Realism 3-4)  
 
The realist approach emphasizes what is nameable and what can be translated, within existing 
methodology, into the mimetic universe (Traumatic Realism 4).  As Jenni Adams points out, this 
approach risks obscuring what may be resistant to knowledge and representation, “the absence of 
the ‘Real’ of historical experience, and traumatic experience in particular” (25).9  But because 
the antirealist stance refutes the possibility that the Holocaust can be known and represented, it 
rejects the possibility of the objective dimension (Adams 25).  Neither the realist nor antirealist 
modes is sufficient in itself (Traumatic Realism 5).  As Rothberg reflects, there is “something 
                                                
9Dan Stone offers the following critique of realism for Holocaust historiography when he argues 
that the most influential narrative histories of the Holocaust “display a continued allegiance to 
concepts of attainable objectivity and totality in representations of the past” (qtd. in Adams 25). 
These narratives decline to acknowledge “the contingency, selectivity, and imposed coherence of 
the accounts advanced” (qtd. in Adams 25).  Thus, Stone attributes the realist treatment of the 
Holocaust to the therapeutic operation of “a strong desire to impose cognitive order over the 
events” (qtd. in Adams 25).  
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particularly striking about the field of Holocaust representation in which two almost entirely 
incommensurable visions can coexist” (Traumatic Realism 5).  Through the play of fantasy and 
reality, enchantment draws attention to these incommensurable visions and invokes what 
Rothberg refers to as “traumatic realism,” a hybrid representational strategy that bridges these 
incompatible approaches.  Traumatic realism “mediates between the realist and antirealist 
positions in Holocaust studies and marks the necessity of considering how the ordinary and the 
extraordinary aspects of genocide intersect and coexist” (9).  As such, enchantment engages the 
ontological multiplicity of the real and not-real in order to address traumatic realism. 
Approaching texts that play with the unreality of historical representation and narrative 
possibility, enchantment highlights the inadequacies of realist and antirealist modes and creates a 
third, hybrid space of representation.   
Enchantment addresses the double-bind of Holocaust representation and plays with the 
in-betweenness of realist and antirealist modes.  Often these writers draw on fantasy as a way to 
mark what cannot be articulated, the presence of absence, and the hauntingly real beyond the 
strange or unreal.  Remarking on the power of cinema, sociologist Edgar Morin connects 
concepts of the magical and marvelous to the inarticulable.  He writes, “what comes back once 
again. . . is the word magic, surrounded by a cortege of bubble words—marvelous, unreal, and so 
on—that burst and evaporate as soon as we try to handle them. . . They are passwords for what 
cannot be articulated” (qtd. in Felski 69).  These passwords for “what cannot be articulated” also 
inform the in-between spaces of mixed-genre narratives, an approach that I will extend through 
genre analysis of fantasy modes (qtd. in Felski 69).       
I was originally drawn to the term “enchantment” because of the way it captures the 
current spirit or mood of third generation Jewish American literature that is equally interested in 
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an oblique or indirect representation of the Holocaust and telling stories that foreground wonder, 
mystery, and imagination.  When Weber spoke about the “disenchantment of the world” in his 
1922 speech “Science as a Vocation” he was referring to the way in which scientific 
advancements now preclude the possibility of wonder and mystery, because somehow and 
somewhere we have “mastered all technical means by calculation.”  Weber divorces scientific 
knowledge from progress, which means  
that principally there are no mysterious incalculable forces that come into play, 
but rather that one can, in principle, master all things by calculation.  This means 
that the world is disenchanted.  One need no longer have recourse to magical 
means in order to master or implore the spirits, as did the savage, for whom such 
mysterious powers existed.  Technical means and calculations perform the service.  
This is above all what intellectualization means. (139)  
 
But much has been done to dismantle the disenchantment/enchantment binary and reveal that the 
contrast is not as stark as Weber made it out to be; rather than a binary logic, many theorists view 
disenchantment and enchantment on a contiguous plane.  For example, Jane Bennett’s work 
questions the conventional characterization of modernity as a world devoid of wonders 
(Enchantment 4).  Rather, she proposes an alternative view of modernity replete with wonder, 
surprise, and affective attachments.  Bennett defines enchantment in secular—not sacred—terms, 
which means that the end of divine purpose does not indicate the end to enchantment 
(Enchantment 4).  She writes that enchantment may actually be fostered through deliberate 
strategies, such as giving greater expression to a sense of play, honing what she calls “sensory 
receptivity to the marvelous specificity of things,” and resisting the story of the disenchantment 
of modernity (Enchantment 4).  Arguing that enchantment persists whenever we are “stuck and 
shaken by the extraordinary that lives amid the familiar and the everyday,” Bennett contends that 
wonder is potentially enlivening and even ethical (Enchantment 4).  Bennett’s work suggests that 
13 
 
grappling with questions of belief, as many of the texts under consideration here do, may be 
considered alongside aesthetics of enchantment.  Moments of arrest within these texts and 
practices of estrangement tied to the fantastic come to characterize the “marvelous specificity” of 
the aesthetics of Jewish American literature.  Furthermore, scholars point out that Weber himself 
noted the wondrous capacities of science, thus enchanting his so-called disenchantment 
hypothesis; as we will come to see, this paradox will substantiate uncertainty as a mode of 
mediating the past in the Coen brothers’ A Serious Man.  Regardless of the limitations to this 
binary concept, the paradigm has remained influential.   
Thus, I use the term “enchantment” purposefully to invoke the historical and social 
context in which it has come to bear meaning and incite debate beyond literary discourse.  The 
thread of disenchantment is often referenced in relation to the Frankfurt School critics’ attempt to 
grapple with the Holocaust and their suggestion that the Holocaust is an extreme example of 
disenchanted modernity, of rationalization and bureaucracy and race science brought to their 
logical extremes.  In fact, both Tolkien and the Frankfurt School critics were concerned with 
“corrosive effects of pathological modernity” (Drout 160).  This becomes clear when we note 
that Tolkien specifically reserves the term “magic” for Magicians, a term that indicates the “will 
to power, to dominate and create changes in the Primary World” (72).  Tolkien positions 
enchantment, then, as a structure of signification aimed against modernist magic.  The concept’s 
affinity with Weber’s analysis of the disenchantment of the world is intentional, just as it is 
implied in Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno’s critique of modernity as suffering from a 
deficit, rather than a surplus, of reason (Bernstein 4).  
The narrative tropes of fantasy become an intentional aesthetic mode that third generation 
Jewish American literature relies on to complicate Weber’s binary logic.  While these texts 
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confront narratives of totalitarian destruction they do so alongside narratives that beget wonder, 
whimsy, playfulness and mystery.  For example, in Englander’s Tumblers, mentioned at the 
outset, a ragtag bunch of uncoordinated, mismatched Jews pass as gentiles in the unlikeliest of 
circumstances—they pose as gymnastic circus performers—to outsmart an audience of Nazi 
officials.  Michael Chabon rewrites the defining narratives of 20th century Jewish American 
experience when he invents a Yiddish-speaking metropolis in the present of Sitka, Alaska, 
replete with a detective plot and the idioms and comedic sensibility of lost Yiddish culture.  And 
in Great House, Nicole Krauss’s mysterious, shape-shifting monstrosity of a writing desk, 
somehow reclaimed from the Nazi Gold Train, connects disparate characters and narrative 
threads across the Jewish diaspora and Holocaust histories.  
This sense of whimsy has both a narrative and affective component, an interrelation 
expressed by Raymond Williams’s “Structures of Feeling.”  Enchantment refers to the 
“structures of feeling” in contemporary Jewish American literature that makes no claim to direct 
or authentic Holocaust experience.  Rather, these texts rely on an aesthetics of indirection, or 
more specifically, in these novels narrative play generates aesthetic and affective “delight and 
disturbance” in the reimagination of the Holocaust (Vibrant Matter xi).   
Raymond Williams's term “structures of feeling” is a notoriously difficult term to define; 
critics have called it “ambiguous,” “slippery,” and “shifting” over the thirty years since Williams 
developed the idea (Filmer 199-200).  I find it useful for the ways that it is situated at the 
intersection and reflexivity of culture and aesthetics.  Williams’s concept highlights the analysis 
of structure, in particular art works and periods, which illuminates those forms but also “the 
forms and relations of more general social life” (Problems in Materialism 20).  Williams uses 
“structures of feeling” to identify “a cultural hypothesis” (Marxism 132-3) that distills the 
15 
 
interrelationship of an empirical historical specificity “most readily accessible in the art and 
literature of a period” (Filmer 201).  In what follows, Williams reflects on the “structural 
homology” between the ongoing experience of social life and its literary formulations.  He writes 
that the “underlying and formative structures” of literature are creative and imaginative acts of 
literature, which in turn constitute he community: “these creative acts compose, within a 
historical period, a specific community: a community visible in the structure of feeling and 
demonstrable, above all, in fundamental choices of form. (Problems in Materialism 24-5).  
Williams developed his own sense of method in the analysis of changes of literary form through 
which “changes in the pace of a life, an experience [Williams often used this term 
interchangeably with “feeling”] can be quite directly apprehended” (Problems in Materialism 
27).   
Enchantment is a way to describe the nexus of the reflexive experience of social life for 
third generation writers, shielded from the horrific realities of the Holocaust by grandparents and 
parents, and the literary formulations that draw on fantasy to nevertheless express the emotional 
inheritance of the past, the intergenerational transmission of loss, and their oblique or indirect 
relationship to this historical event.  This kind of shielding, which sometimes occurs via 
silencing, generates its own strange form of trauma.  Enchantment mediates the third 
generation’s need to respond to its own anguish and anxiety as inheritors of the traumatic 
repercussions of an experience that is not “their own” yet nonetheless shapes their experience.  
Thus, to draw on the term “structures of feeling” means to invoke the emotional impact of 
impossibility already built into the function of fantasy and these writers’ recourse to this strategy 
as a way to define their strange, double removal from the historical event.  As Brian Attebery 
observes, the effect of wonder on the reader structures reading and “has as much to do with ways 
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of seeing as with emotional payoff” (Attebery 16).10  As Williams attests, “literary style” 
summarizes effectively some features of the relations between aesthetic forms and conventions, 
which he invoked specifically as referents for semantic figures (qtd. in Filmer 205).  In the 
contemporary archive of Jewish American literature, “literary style” refers to those operating 
principles shared by these texts that in turn reflect the intersubjective experience of its writers 
and readers. Williams writes,  
a correspondence of content between a writer and his world is less 
significant than this correspondence of organization, of structure.  A 
relation of content may be mere reflection, but a relation of structure, often 
occurring where there is no apparent relation of content, can show us the 
organizing principle by which a particular view of the world, and from 
that the coherence of the social group which maintains it, really operates 
in consciousness. (Problems in Materialism 23)   
 
Here that “relation of structure” interrogates the double-bind of Holocaust representation from a 
contemporary vantage point.   
Instead of an utterly fractured narrative devoid of meaning, these texts leave the reader 
with a sense of “enchantment” related to fullness of affect and belief in the irreality of the text as 
a whole or elements within the text, such as the manipulation of historical events.  While the 
intersection of the fantasy mode and the fantastical reality of the Holocaust profoundly affects 
“one’s default sensory-psychic-intellectual disposition,” enchantment is not necessarily positive 
or pleasant in nature and also may be experienced as discomfort and malaise (Enchantment 5).  
In fact, this juxtaposition of negative affects and fullness or liveliness that engenders this 
                                                
10Williams’s “structures of feeling” anticipates the current turn to affect in literary theory.  
Sianne Ngai has explained, “[M]ost critics today accept that far from being merely private or 
idiosyncratic phenomena. . . feelings are as fundamentally ‘social’ as the institutions and 
collective practices that have been the more traditional object of historicist criticism. . . , and as 
‘material’ as the linguistic signs and significations that have been the more traditional objects of 
literary formalism” (25).  
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response denotes enchantment’s strangeness and ability to communicate multiple experiences at 
once.    
These texts explore trauma and loss connected to the Holocaust; alongside such 
cataclysmic loss many affirm a commitment to messianic redemption, the Lurianic Kabbalistic 
idea of “tikkun” that means “repair of the world,” or recreate via wondrous impossibility the 
richness of a lost culture and language of European Jewry.  Enchantment describes a narrative 
function, a play of the different functions of estrangement, and a mood of fullness that recharges 
our perception.  For Malamud, enchantment provides a protective means to manipulate the 
harshest aspects of reality.  Perhaps the sense of joy or pleasure that results would be 
inadmissible if not achieved by fantastic means, or as Malamud has stated, “reality may be 
manipulated because it is safely controlled by art” (Talking Horse 50).  For the later group of 
writers, it is only through the fantastic that the grim reality of this loss becomes estranged so that 
it remains an active part of Jewish American collective memory—so that it is neither forgotten 
nor absorbed into rote narratives of Holocaust experience.   In part this occurs as meaning is 
forged across generic codes and between genres, aesthetic strategies that privilege open-
endedness and construct an elusive sense of wholeness.   
Genre-mixing: Defining the Terms of Impossibility and Play   
In this section I will further clarify the terms of my analysis—fantasy, the fantastic, 
enchantment—and explain how they relate to literary theories of estrangement and 
defamiliarization.  I aim to map out a genealogy of the term “enchantment” and to make explicit 
the theoretical underpinnings that the term invokes in relation to theories of genre, formalist 
literary theory, and philosophy, as well as pinpoint how Jewish American literature resituates the 
concept.  Both “fantasy” and the “fantastic” come with a great deal of semantic baggage.  Gary 
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Wolfe reveals the common confusion among the various meanings of “fantasy”—“the innocent 
daydream, the psychotic construct, the propagandistic manipulation, the literary invention” (10).  
In the context of literary studies, “fantasy” most commonly refers to a formula that designates 
genre. But the fantastic both refers to an effect within texts and designates the work containing 
this effect.  Defined by Tzvetan Todorov, the fantastic challenges “the real”—it destabilizes the 
text’s realism and agreement with the laws of everyday reality.  Scholars of the fantastic agree 
that realism, defined as the mimetic11 representation of reality, is the dominant mode of 
twentieth-century fiction.  For Todorov and these scholars, “the fantastic” is a function or effect 
that subverts, upsets, or displaces a previously established sense of reality in the text.  But for a 
“transgression” of reality to occur, “the norm must be apparent,” Todorov argues (8).  Thus, 
Todorov’s fantastic lacks one of the defining features of the popular conception of fantasy fiction, 
the Secondary World.  Rather, fantastic fiction is set “in a world which is indeed our world, the 
one we know, a world without devils, sylphides, or vampires, [where] there occurs an event 
which cannot be explained by the laws of this same familiar world” (25).  The “fantastic” occurs 
when the supernatural and the real12 collide.  When an event occurs that cannot be explained by 
the reality of the text,  
                                                
11Kathryn Hume argues that all literature is comprised of two poles, fantasy and mimesis, where 
mimesis “is felt as the desire to imitate, to describe events, people, situations and objects with 
such verisimilitude that others share your experience” (Fantasy and Mimesis xii). 
12Rooted in Freudian psychoanalysis and the Oedipal stage, the “real” refers to one of the three 
psychological orders developed by Jacques Lacan in his triad of the symbolic, real, and 
imaginary. While it would be impossible to fully outline the contours of the term in a footnote, 
suffice it to say the term is a slippery one.  The real is distinct from yet inclusive of “reality,” 
objective or collective experience which is “perfectly knowable” (Miller 280).  According to 
Lacan, the real is that which resists representation—it is neither symbolic nor imaginary.  The 
real is precluded from analytic experience, which is defined in terms of language; as soon as the 
real is made conscious through language it loses “reality” (Miller 280).  In this way it is also 
conceived as the “fullness or completeness that is subsequently lost through the entrance into 
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the person who experiences the event must opt for one of two possible solutions: 
either he is the victim of an illusion of the sense, of a product of the 
imagination—and laws of the world then remain what they are; or else the event 
has indeed taken place, it is an integral part of reality—but then this reality is 
controlled by laws unknown to us. . . The fantastic occupies the duration of this 
uncertainty.  Once we choose one answer or the other, we leave the fantastic for a 
neighboring genre, the uncanny or the marvelous.  The fantastic is that hesitation 
experienced by a person who knows only the laws of nature, confronting an 
apparently supernatural event. (Todorov 25; emphasis mine)   
 
The fantastic is related to the undecidability about reasons for and causes of events witnessed. 
We will see this undecidability play out in the texts set in “our world”: Malamud’s short stories 
from The Magic Barrel and Nicole Krauss’s Great House.  Furthermore, “the person” in 
Todorov’s formulation collapses the distinction between reader and protagonist, where “the 
reader’s hesitation is therefore the first condition of the fantastic” (31, emphasis original), “but it 
is necessary that the reader identify with a particular character” (31).  Thus, Todorov’s 
formulation allows us to speak of fantastic effects within texts and the subsequent fantastic effect 
on readers.    
 In contrast to the fantastic, “fantasy” has commonly been interpreted to designate popular 
genre fantasy and the two terms, traditionally, do not share much common ground.  Attebery 
attests that Todorov’s fantastic has little bearing on the genre of modern fantasy (Attebery 20).  
In fact, Todorov’s definition would not include nearly all “genre fantasy.”  Describing fantasy, 
Attebery offers two preliminary definitions to support the idea that fantasy is just as much a 
narrative strategy as a genre.  The first definition adheres to the primary association of “fantasy” 
                                                                                                                                                       
language” (Purdue web psychoanalysis—find better source).  As Miller explains, the term has 
considerably changed over time, but eventually begins to appear regularly as an adjective to 
describe “that which is lacking in the symbolic order, the ineliminable residue of all articulation, 
the foreclosed element, which may be approached, but never grasped: the umbilical cord of the 
symbolic” (280).   
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with genre in a taxonomic sense.  The second refers to fantasy as a mode of storytelling.13  
Regarding the former, Attebery explains, “fantasy is a form of popular escapist literature that 
combines stock characters and devices—wizards, dragons, magic swords, and the like—into a 
predictable plot in which the perennially understaffed forces of good triumph over a monolithic 
evil” (1).  The premise of my project is that fantasy does important historiographic work, and 
thus, fantasy is not synonymous with escapist literature in Attebery’s sense, nor must it contain 
wizards, dragons, etc.  Rather, this definition seems particularly descriptive of a subset of 
fantasy—“high fantasy”—the genre inaugurated by Tolkien’s Lord of the Rings and defined by 
the criteria of being set in “Otherworlds” or “Secondary Worlds” (Clute and Grant 16).  This 
strict definition of fantasy genre combines the familiar and the impossible “within the context of 
an affirming, reordering narrative” (Clute and Grant 16).   
Moving away from definitions that align fantasy strictly with genre, most critics agree 
that however we define “fantasy,” it must chiefly deal with the impossible and that it somehow 
“deliberately violates the generic conventions of realism” (Attebery vii).  The consensus follows 
W. R. Irwin’s noteworthy definition of fantasy as “the literature of the impossible” (qtd. in Wolfe 
68).  Irwin characterizes fantasy as “antireal,” defining it as “a story based on and controlled by 
an overt violation of what is generally accepted as possibility; it is the narrative result of 
transforming the condition contrary to fact into ‘fact’ itself” (qtd. in Wolfe 4).  This idea 
dovetails with Darko Suvin’s conceptualization of the science fiction genre as that of “cognitive 
estrangement,” a genre in which the reader is naturalized into the world of the strange (12).  
Following the fact of impossibility that determines these narrative worlds, Wolfe suggests that 
                                                
13In order to distinguish “fantasy” from “fantastic,” Attebery uses the former to designate genre 
and the latter to designate mode (11). 
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first and foremost the criterion of the impossible must be agreed upon as one of the genre’s 
defining characteristics (68).14  To allow for the diversity of impossible worlds or impossibility 
at work in this group of texts, I rely on Attebery’s latter definition of fantasy as a mode of 
storytelling.  This  schemata already positions fantasy with an eye towards self-reflexivity that is 
reinforced by the texts I engage.  Attebery writes that fantasy may be considered  
a sophisticated mode of storytelling characterized by stylistic playfulness, self-
reflexiveness, and a subversive treatment of established orders of society and 
thought . . . it draws upon contemporary ideas about sign systems and the 
indeterminacy of meaning and at the same time recaptures the vitality and 
freedom of nonmimetic traditional forms such as epic, folktale, romance, and 
myth.15 (1)   
 
Genealogically this definition reflects Todorov’s earlier work on uncertainty; the concept of 
“indeterminacy of meaning” in Attebery’s definition of fantasy as a “mode” is clearly indebted to 
Todorov’s concept (Attebery 3).     
I do not use fantasy to refer to the coded norms of genre because genre is too narrow a 
concept to encompass the function of fantasy storytelling across time and place.  Similar to Junot 
Díaz’s claim that magic realism is not a genre but a narrative strategy, I would argue that fantasy 
as a mode of storytelling is a narrative method that provides a kind of reading code (Díaz n. pag.).  
                                                
14Wolfe cites the following definitions that privilege the impossible: Eric S. Rabkin (The 
Fantastic in Literature) argues that fantasy makes “a direct reversal of ground rules” and claims 
that the “polar opposite” of fantasy is Reality.  C. N. Manlove writes that “a substantial and 
irreducible element of supernatural or impossible worlds, beings, or objects” is needed for 
fantasy.  Manlove further explains that the supernatural or impossible means “of another order of 
reality from that in which we exist and form our notions of possibility.” Roger C. Schlobin 
defines fantasy “as that corpus in which the impossible is primary in its quantity or centrality” 
(qtd. in Wolfe 68).  
15In this formulation, fantasy and mimesis are the fundamental operations of the narrative 
imagination, and both are invoked to varying degrees in fantasy texts (Attebery 3).  Mimesis is 
the mode of imitation in which the “aim is to produce the impression of faithfulness to ordinary 
experience” (Attebery 3).   
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As Rosemary Jackson’s research suggests, fantasy is actually resistant to genre classification 
because the range of works is too large to constitute a single genre and includes entire bodies of 
literature also considered genres in their own right, such as fairy tales, detective stories, and 
Fantasy (13).  The propensity to categorize these contemporary Jewish American texts as fantasy 
in any sense does not stem strictly from the ways their plots or tropes adhere to the rules of the 
genre.  Rather, the texts’ recourse to fantasy as a mode of storytelling reflects a loose yet 
proximal relationship to fantasy genres, where generic ties and histories (reimagined, impossible, 
alterative) determine impossibility.  
Unlike Todorov’s conception of the fantastic, which must be set in “our world,” this 
definition of fantasy allows for a greater degree of variability in terms of the reality-oriented 
function of the text.  I favor fantasy to denote the idea that when set in this world, fantasy then 
tells a story which is impossible in the world as we perceive it (Clute and Grant 80).  And thus 
when set in an otherworld, that otherworld will be impossible, though stories set there may be 
possible in its terms (Clute and Grant 80).  As such, fantasy describes Malamud’s short stories 
(set in “our world”) and Foer’s fiction (set in both “our” and “otherworlds”) alike.  This 
inclusivity is in line with the logic of the degree of the impossible built into Attebery’s 
framework of fantasy.  He suggests that fantasy is best regarded as what logicians call a “fuzzy 
set,” definable at its center but blurring at the edges (14-15); but still, “the essential content is the 
impossible,” or, as he defined it earlier in The Fantasy Tradition in American Literature, “some 
violation of what the author clearly believes to be natural law. . . there is some general agreement 
that some such violation is essential to fantasy” (14-15).  Thus, “high fantasy” would occupy the 
center of this “fuzzy set,” while texts with some semblance of the logic and order of “our world” 
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make up the blurred edges (Attebery 14).  Throughout this project, I rely on fantasy or fantasy 
mode interchangeably to refer to the impossible as a mode of storytelling. 
All of the texts in this project crowd the edges of what Attebery refers to as the “fuzzy set” 
of fantasy literature and in this way they may be considered fantasy texts; they orbit the 
canonical center that has been established by Lord of the Rings.  But terms that emphasize play 
with fantasy as a mode of storytelling are better suited to conceptualize this group of texts; terms 
like “postmodern fantastic” (Attebery), “speculative realism” (Saldívar), or “slipstream” 
(Sterling), which I will go on to explain in-depth below, more accurately describe this group of 
texts as category or genre.  By and large these texts are engaged in some kind of play with genre 
and fantasy tropes.  According to Brian Edwards, play is “the principle of energy and difference 
which unsettles arrangements, promotes change and resists closure” (xiii).  Play thus “affirms 
freedom and possibility against restriction, resignation and closure” (Edwards xiii).  This 
definition of play allows me to consider the consequences of generic play in terms of historical 
events and ways of perceiving knowledge. 
Ramón Saldívar’s term “speculative realism” is helpful especially because Saldívar’s 
concept is rooted in mixed generic modes that combine high and low genres.  Rooting his idea in 
the late 18th and early 19th century hybrid genre of Historical Romance,16  Saldívar explains, 
“now the mixing of genres includes not just the canonic paradigms of classical, neoclassical, 
romantic, realist, and modernist origin, but also their outcast, lowbrow, vernacular, not to say 
kitschy varieties of what has come to be known as genre fiction, including the fantasy, sci-fi, 
                                                
16Mixing genres first occurred at the end of the 18th and turn to the 19th century with the 
emergent genre of historical romance.  As Saldívar explains, these texts asked, how might 
ordinary life be interrupted by uncommon incidents? How might the manners of preceding 
centuries be juxtaposed against modern ones? (5).   
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gothic, noir, and erotic speculative writings of the postwar era” (4-5).  As he defines it, 
speculative realism refers to “a hybrid amalgam of realism, magical realism, metafiction, and 
genre fictions, including science fiction, graphic narrative, and fantasy proper” (13).  Yoking 
together “realism” with “speculative,” Saldívar wants the term to highlight its own disjunction 
just as the pairing of “Historical” with “Romance” was considered an oxymoron.  Central for 
Saldívar is the way that these texts raise the formal and thematic concerns of genre itself in 
relation to matters of racial identity.17  While he cites the work of a host of African American, 
Asian American, and Native American authors, he attests, “a case can be made for including 
Michael Chabon, Gary Shteyngart, and Jonathan Safran Foer's recalibrations of Jewish and 
Yiddish ethnicity” (3).  Rather than focus on racial identity, as Saldívar’s analysis suggests, I 
focus on the way the texts play with the formal and thematic concerns of genre as a mode of 
mediating history.        
 In addition to the hybrid nature implied by the formulation of “speculative realism,” 
“slipstream” may also be relevant in certain cases to refer to texts that are in between genres, 
even purposefully resistant or invocative of particular generic codes.  Slipstream is a kind of 
fantastic or non-realistic fiction that crosses conventional genre boundaries between science 
fiction, fantasy, and mainstream literary fiction. Cyberpunk author Bruce Sterling coined the 
term in an article originally published in Science Fiction Eye in July 1989 to refer to a 
contemporary kind of writing that has set its face against consensus reality.  As Sterling writes,  
It is fantastic, surreal sometimes, speculative on occasion, but not rigorously 
so.  It does not aim to provoke a ‘sense of wonder’ or to systematically 
extrapolate in the manner of classic science fiction. . . Instead, this is a kind of 
writing which simply makes you feel very strange; the way that living in the late 
                                                
17Texts such as Junot Diaz’s The Brief Wondrous Life of Oscar Wao and Colson Whitehead’s 
The Intuitionist.  
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twentieth century makes you feel, if you are a person of a certain sensibility. (n. 
pag.) 
 
While Sterling emphasizes the strangeness of slipstream fiction rather than its emphasis on 
“wonder,” my project suggests that these aims are not so easily divorced as Sterling’s definition 
implies.  What we can take from Sterling, and what I will discuss shortly as the anti-
transcendentalist approach to fantasy, is his suggestion of slipstream’s inevitable, not bracketed, 
relationship to reality:  “At the heart of slipstream is an attitude of peculiar aggression against 
‘reality.’ These are fantasies of a kind, but not fantasies which are ‘futuristic’ or ‘beyond the 
fields we know.’ These books tend to sarcastically tear at the structure of ‘everyday life’” (n. 
pag.).  Not to be conflated with illusions or what lies “beyond,” fantasy is firmly entrenched in 
the structures of the everyday.    
More important than the labels we give to these texts is the quality of their impossibility 
and how such transgressions of reality mediate history.  By enchantment, I do not mean 
disillusion, deceit, or a spellbound state, associations that invoke the way that popular art has 
often been accused of “disorienting and bewitching its audience, calling up an association of art 
with magic that stretches back to antiquity” (Felski 52).  Rather, I am referring to the specific 
interrelation of impossibility, as it functions in fantasy literature, and alienation or estrangement, 
as these concepts have been developed in literary studies.   
In literary fiction, the normative models of estrangement and defamiliarization explored 
by thinkers like Viktor Shklovsky and Bertolt Brecht indicate the way that we become habituated 
to established habits of perception because, as Shklovsky notes, “after we see an object several 
times, we begin to recognize it” (779).  Habitual recognition in this sense means that we lose 
sight of the object because we no longer notice its presence; we cannot see what we are familiar 
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with.  But literature “dismantles established habits of perception” by making things appear 
strange so that we overcome our “blind perception” and begin to perceive anew; the point of 
estrangement is to understand the world as it really is (Shklovsky 779).  In fantasy texts and 
other genre literatures, however, the normative function of estrangement works differently than 
in literary fiction. We are in fact naturalized into a strange, alternative universe where we come 
to expect the supernatural elements.  For Shklovsky and Brecht estrangement is a stylistic device 
that can be located at specific points inside “realistic” texts, but as Darko Suvin argues, “in sf the 
attitude of estrangement. . . has grown into the formal framework of the genre” (Metamorphoses 
7; emphasis in original).  Suvin refers to the formal framework of estranged genres, which are 
comprised of sf, the fairy tale, and myth, genres that he opposes to naturalistic ones, or those 
with a mimetic relationship to reality.  
If estrangement has grown into the formal framework of fantasy texts, it does so by 
structuring our expectations for strangeness that appear no less strange once we open that fantasy 
text.  As Tolkien writes, fantasy starts out by “arresting strangeness” (69).  Attebery echoes the 
interrelation of estrangement and fantasy when he writes that “wonder is connected with the 
contemplation of . . . strangeness” (7).  Indeed, “the concept of wonder, as a key to fantasy's 
impact, may best be understood as an alternative formulation of the idea of estrangement” 
(Attebery 16).  For Tolkien, fantasy allows us to see our own world differently not by casting a 
spell on it but by breaking up the monotony of familiarity.  
In “On Fairy-Stories,” Tolkien makes explicit how the fantasy-estrangement interaction 
impacts the reader.  He reaches for the term enchantment to describe the experience of Primary 
Belief in a Secondary World and the irreducibility of the wonder experienced by character or 
reader (77).  For Tolkien, recovery is essentially another way to conceive of estrangement; what 
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is important here is the relationship between the function of enchantment, in Tolkien’s view, and 
estrangement, and the way in which these modes elucidate reality rather than obscure it.  Thus, 
Tolkien acknowledges that a function of fantasy is escape, but in his view this is a mode of 
recovering reality rather than retreating from it: “Recovery (which includes return and renewal of 
health) is a re-gaining—regaining of a clear view.  I do not say ‘seeing things as they are’ and 
involve myself with the philosophers, though I might venture to say ‘seeing things as we are (or 
were) meant to see them’—as things apart from ourselves” (77).  Tolkien is less interested in a 
realistic way of seeing (“seeing things as they are”) than a resistant way of seeing (“seeing things 
apart from ourselves”) (77).  He continues, “we need, in any case, to clean our windows; so that 
the things seen clearly may be freed from the drab blur of triteness or familiarity—from 
possessiveness” (77).  “Possessiveness” refers to rote, habitual ways of knowing that dictate a 
lack of awareness, and through Recovery fantasy frees our sense of perception from the way it 
has been appropriated (77).  Even though Tolkien claims not to want to entangle his ideas with 
the philosophy, his work intertwines formalism and genre theory to reveal fantasy’s import on 
exactly that (77).  Genre play that metafictionally arrests strangeness thus becomes a mode of 
“cleaning our windows,” so that historical narratives, moments of arrest within texts, spaces 
between genres, recalibrate our perception of historical fragments, ways of knowing, and in some 
cases, particular histories (77).     
Following Suvin’s idea that estrangement or alienation structures the genre of fantasy, 
when we reenter “reality” outside the text, we do so with a renewed sense of wonder.  This is 
essentially the argument for what Tolkien is doing in Lord of the Rings and what the genre of 
high fantasy literature performs if one considers the logic of the disenchantment binary to be 
somewhat stable: as the reader moves from fantasy world (text) to real world (beyond text), an 
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otherwise disenchanted world becomes enchanted and our habits of perception are reinvigorated. 
As Drout writes, enchantment has effects in the Primary World: “Any Secondary World 
necessarily draws its substance from attributes of the Primary, and the experience of 
enchantment feeds back into the latter in various ways and contexts—emotional, spiritual, sexual, 
political—to a powerful if usually unpredictable effect” (160).  Drout’s analysis of the 
interrelation between the primary and secondary worlds is well-constructed, yet he fails to 
account for the historical context.  Extending these theories of estrangement and Tolkien’s 
concept of enchantment, I argue that genres predicated on estrangement, or texts that foreground 
a play of estrangement, perform aesthetic enchantment in relation to history.  But texts in this 
study mix generic formulas alongside ontologies with different relationships to reality.  In so 
doing, they question this binary logic to begin with as traumatic history is estranged from reality.       
Enchantment describes the strange commensurability of the fantasy mode and narratives 
of indirect experience of the Holocaust that reshape and recharge our relationship to the past; 
they forge surprising encounters that combine sadness and loss alongside in ways that amaze and 
delight, and in this way dovetail with Jane Bennett and Michael Saler’s theoretical work on 
enchantment.  Dismissing Weber’s enchantment/disenchantment binary, Bennett describes the 
“mood of enchantment” that is possible in the modern world and similarly characterizes the texts 
my project engages (Enchantment 5).  For Bennett, the “mood of enchantment” describes a 
“surprising encounter” with something you are not prepared to engage, which contains within it 
both a pleasurable feeling and an uncanny feeling of being “disrupted out of one’s default 
sensory-psychic-intellectual disposition” (Enchantment 5).  Bennett describes enchantment as a 
strange combination of “delight and disturbance,” which is another way to theorize the aesthetics 
of enchantment (Enchantment 5).  The concept of “delight and disturbance” could refer to the 
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pairing of aesthetic play with the reality of the historical sobriety of the Holocaust as it relates to 
the overall narrative arcs of the texts—the strange pairing of fullness and loss.  The overall effect 
of enchantment according to Bennett is fullness or liveliness, having your “concentration powers 
tuned up or recharged” (Enchantment 5).  The constant play of narrative ontologies in many of 
the contemporary texts foregrounds this idea of enchantment—the reader never settles into a 
single, coherent, narrative mode with clear generic codes/rules of perception.  Rather, generic 
codes, especially those that condition realism and fantasy, are always upended and estranged 
from one another so that we always perceive things anew; thus, fullness does not refer to the 
narrative world but to our sense of perception in relation to it.  For example, in my reading of 
The Yiddish Policemen’s Union, I argue that the play of narrative ontologies results in a constant 
tension between the familiar and the strange.  The reader is denied a sense of “homeliness” in the 
text, but this discomfort results in enchantment (both aesthetic enchantment and a return to 
sincere emotion for the protagonist) and is where meaning resides.  
Other scholars like Rita Felski have used the term “enchantment” to theorize a “condition 
of aesthetic absorption” (55).  Felski explains that when we are absorbed into reading or 
watching, “enchantment is characterized by a state of intense involvement, a sense of being so 
entirely caught up in an aesthetic object that nothing else seems to matter” (Felski 54).  This 
sense of self-immersion is “soaked through with an unusual intensity of perception and affect; it 
is often compared to the condition of being intoxicated, drugged, or dreaming” (Felski 55).  
Felski is using the term to describe a phenomenology of immersion; enchantment allows her to 
reflect metacognitively on how literature and cinema function in relation to reader and audience.  
I will give a brief summary of how Felski uses the term, where it overlaps with my definition, 
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and how I am differentiating my use of the idea—as an aesthetic mode within text—versus her 
use of the term as a broad aesthetic theory.    
For Felski, enchantment is self-enclosed and marked by distinct boundaries, that is, until 
the intrusive transition back to everyday reality (54).  Even in Felski’s schemata we see how, 
conceptually, it overlaps with modes of defamiliarization that play out on the narrative level 
(even though Felski is not using it in this way).  Felski writes that such experiences of self-
surrender and enchantment are often associated with “genres that cater to escapist yearnings that 
proffer their readers or viewers the narcissistic bliss of idealized self-images,” such as the 
romance that delights and deludes in, for example, Don Quixote and Madame Bovary (62).  Even 
so, she argues, enchantment is not limited to these genres: “realism too is imbued with magic and 
pulls us into an imagined world as inexorably and absolutely as any work of fantasy” (70).  
While Felski defines enchantment as the “condition of aesthetic absorption,” her descriptions of 
why or how this effect is located within text bears resemblance to theories of defamiliarization or 
estrangement, theories that do not remain stable across different genres (32).  She writes that the 
novel “haloes the things it describes with a plenitude of meaning, endowing them with an often 
exorbitant salience as harbingers of events or totemic objects” (70), and continues, “novels give 
us the magic, as well as the mundanity, of the everyday; they infuse things with wonder, enliven 
the inanimate world, invite ordinary and often overlooked phenomena to shimmer forth as 
bearers of aesthetic, affective, even metaphysical meanings” (70).   
Resembling Shklovsky and Brecht’s ideas of defamiliarization and estrangement, Felski’s   
description of how fiction is being communicated details the way an object becomes “made 
strange” or new.  But she goes a step further, arguing, “aesthetic enchantment leads inexorably to 
ontological confusion, to a disturbing failure to differentiate between fact and fantasy, reality and 
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wish fulfillment” (53).  As my analysis of genre will show, I agree with the crossed wires of 
ontological confusion that result from Felski’s definition of aesthetic enchantment, but I do not 
think that conditions of absorption—as in reading and inhabiting a narrative world—are 
synonymous with the inability to differentiate between “fact and fantasy, reality and wish 
fulfillment” (53).  In fact, genre literatures foreground this exact ability to differentiate when 
they play with the conditions of reality to which they are inevitably interconnected.  As such, this 
condition of being absorbed in a text fails to take into account the metanarrative play of 
ontological codes and genres, play that enables both the narrative’s own reflection, 
metafictionally, and the reader’s perceptions of exactly what it is that differentiates “fact and 
fantasy, reality and wish fulfillment” (53).    
A Genealogy of Enchantment  
 
“History is not only the passing on of a crisis but also the passing on of a survival that can be 
possessed within a history larger than any single individual or any single generation”—Cathy 
Caruth  
 
“Fantasy characteristically attempts to compensate for a lack resulting from cultural constraints: 
it is a literature of desire, which seeks that which is experienced as absence and loss”—
Rosemary Jackson, Fantasy: The Literature of Subversion (3)  
 
While the texts that make up my archive inhabit Attebery’s “fuzzy set” of fantasy to 
varying degrees, all play with the possibility of wonder and mystery and participate in aesthetic 
and affective enchantment to reframe our relationship to history.  For these writers, the stakes of 
wielding fantasy to mediate history are our ability to remember and forge connections with a 
distant past.  These writers lack direct knowledge or experience of the Holocaust; as such, the 
narratives inhabit the “memory of our memories,” to borrow from one protagonist of Great 
House, George Weisz (279).  As Berger and Milbauer point out, Krauss’s Great House echoes 
Elie Wiesel’s belief that memory has “vital ontological significance”: “If we stop remembering,” 
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Wiesel declares, “we stop being” (qtd. in Berger and Milbauer 76).  Memory has ontological 
significance for the Jewish condition because it has been essential to survival and integral to 
defining narratives of Jewish experience.18  The survival of memory takes on a particular 
exigency as the number of Holocaust survivors and witnesses dwindles.  But because third-
generation Holocaust memory is already situated at the intersection of fantasy and historical 
experience, enchantment manifests the strange way that the fantasy mode is entangled in Jewish 
memorial practice for the third generation.  Regardless of the degree to which a contemporary 
piece of literature fictionalizes history, these texts will always already be fantasy literatures, a 
condition to which enchantment self-consciously attests as it interrogates its own boundaries and 
modes of meaning-making.  Enchantment forges surprising, upsetting, and strange encounters 
between fantasy and history in order to arrest the reader’s attention and make inevitable the link 
between memory and being.  It is like what Lista19 says to Safran when she exhumes a ring 
buried in the earth by a Trachimbrod victim, Rivka, before she died (192).  Jonathan assumes 
that she hid the ring as proof of her existence.  Alex translates Lista’s response in this strange 
moment: “’No,’ she said. ‘The ring does not exist for you.  You exist for the ring.  The ring is not 
in case of you.  You are in case of the ring’” (192).  In this exchange, the box of “REMAINS,” 
and the ring, maintain the strange capacity to signify (to “exist”) and bear meaning about the past 
(192).  “You,” the contemporary generation, does not make meaning, but retrieves and receives 
the material traces of the past, where a sense of inevitability is built into the intergenerational 
transfer of objects and memories.    
                                                
18In his acceptance speech for the Nobel Prize in literature, Wiesel cautions that in order to 
sustain hope for the future, one must incorporate—never reject—the past (n. pag.).   
19Lista is the sole survivor of Trachimbrod and the character who comes to stand in for the 
woman who helped Safran’s grandfather survive; literally, Safran, Alex and Alex’s grandfather 
call her “not-Augustine.”  
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Tolkien’s Recovery, Shklovsky’s ostronanemie, and Brecht’s defamiliarization are 
theoretically invested in understanding the function of literature in relation to seeing primary 
reality as it really is, to see known objects and experiences as strange, distant from ourselves and 
“penetrate the illusion of reality” (Attebery 16).  For Tolkien, Recovery mediates against the 
dangers of boredom and weariness in art (76), but it also dispels the myths that have come to 
comprise reality.  Here we are reminded of his use of the term “magic” as a comment on 
totalitarian power, and thus, “Recovery” takes on the politics of history as it unmasks structures 
of power and control that have otherwise been appropriated by familiarity.  Tolkien attests,  
Of all faces those of our familiares are the ones both most difficult to play 
fantastic tricks with, and most difficult really to see with fresh attention, 
perceiving their likeness and unlikeness: that they are faces, and yet unique 
faces.  This triteness is really the penalty of ‘appropriation’: the things that are 
trite, or (in a bad sense) familiar, are the things that we have appropriated, legally 
or mentally. (77) 
 
Recovery is necessary because the world has become trite, an illusion produced by boredom, 
habit, false sophistication, and loss of faith.  What we will come to see in the literature and film 
that comprise my archive is the way in which enchantment highlights not only the faces that have 
become difficult to perceive, but the very modes of appropriation.  The language of 
“appropriation” and “possessiveness” is epistemological in the sense that it refers to the ways we 
think we have mastered and come to “know” something by mentally acquiring it for our own 
purpose.  What then, has been “appropriated” legally and mentally in terms of Holocaust 
representation? What is it about history that these writers want to engage with and perceive with 
fresh attention? These writers are resisting something about the way history and representation 
have become “trite”—perceived as knowable or unknowable—and even the stable sense of 
categorization that previous schematas imply.  But what happens when even the “unknown” 
becomes knowable?  Because the third generation’s relationship to this event is dictated by 
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postmemory and mediation, memory is already estranged from historical experience, yet these 
writers invoke postmemory to structure enchanted experiences.  In turn, these experiences renew 
our attention to the ways that Holocaust representation has become “realist” and “antirealist,” 
and in turn, resist even the ways that this representational schemata cognitively and intellectually 
sorts and “possesses” historical representation.       
It is not just our habituated perceptions that such theories aim to reestablish, but the 
conditions of familiarity itself—the world we think we inhabit or our way of thinking about that 
world.  For Shklovsky and Brecht’s Marxist views, such ways of seeing are fundamentally 
political.  The initial sense of familiarity was itself an illusion created “by the mystifications of 
bourgeois ideology and hence must be replaced by estrangement as a preliminary step toward 
social revolution” (Attebery 308).  But in contemporary Jewish American Holocaust literature, 
the conditions of familiarity are already called into question by the trauma of the Shoah.  Here 
we are again reminded of the double-bind that plagues Holocaust literature: that on the one hand, 
the Holocaust is unknowable and unrepresentable (and this is an especially fraught statement in 
relation to literature written by non-witnesses), and on the other, there is the imperative to “never 
forget.” Enchantment is a “structure of feeling” vested in the imperative to “never forget” at the 
same time that it testifies to the strangeness and anxiety of a desire to remember an experience 
that one did not personally undergo.  In literary fiction, to “never forget” means to recapitulate 
narratives of history that transcend one’s own experience, but to remember means to “witness 
through the imagination,” to borrow from Lillian Kremer, and to somehow make that historical 
narrative part of one’s experience.  If memory is a mode of mediating historical experience for 
the third generation, its slippery, the writers invoke the fantastic to explore traumatic experience 
that is otherwise inaccessible by direct means.  
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Through the strange pairing of fantasy and dark history, these texts point to a paradox 
that is increasingly complicated by the third generation’s historical alienation.  It has long been 
the task of the novelist to fill in the gaps in documented history by invoking the imagination.  
Brian McHale refers to those “dark areas of history” that we may think of in terms of 
unknowability, “those aspects about which the official record has nothing to report,” he explains 
(87).  Furthermore, these historical dark areas are considered legitimate grounds for fabulation 
according to the ethos of the realist historical novel (McHale 87).   
By relying on open-ended strategies of the imagination, fantasy, and mystery, 
enchantment is a mode of mediating those “dark areas” of historical record, for example—the 
entire Trachimbrod shtetl is destroyed by the war yet reimagined on impossible terms in 
Everything is Illuminated; the furniture that was destroyed by the Nazi Gold Train comes back to 
life in Great House.  Playing with the boundaries of genre, mixing ontological codes means to 
examine the margins of experience and knowledge on both a narrative level and a historical level.  
These writers often examine the modes and methods of epistemological claims to history in order 
to find a middle ground between grandiose signifiers of historical experience that require 
minimal understanding (like “six million”; “Kristallnacht”; “Auschwitz”) and emotional 
investment—two conditions necessary for interpolating history.  These texts examine, often 
through a sense of play, and refresh, what have become the rote narratives that define the 20th 
century Jewish American experience.  Enchantment marks the mood or structure of feeling that 
is necessary for the third generation to create an authentic link to the past, even if that connection 
foregrounds its own inauthenticity, stresses the impossibility of recreation, and performs the 
impossibility of unmediated or direct access to the past.   
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We can think about the structures of postmodernism and fantasy as a way to double-down 
on the alienating effects of history.  “Postmodernist fiction has close affinities with the genre of 
the fantastic,” McHale writes (74).  And as Attebery notes of Kafka, Robbe-Grillet, Pynchon, 
Barth, Calvino, Borges, and Lem, these authors’ postmodern sensibility “created a lively genre 
within the fantastic mode” (36), where admirers of its “metafictional play” and “freewheeling 
inventiveness” rarely acknowledge that these characteristics are shared with what has long been 
considered the fantasy genre (36).  As Edwards suggests, since poststructuralism, the so-called 
boundaries between mimesis and fantasy have become fluid, and the “supposedly fantastic” is no 
longer distinct from the “supposedly real” (227).  
In this sense we may come to see fantasy not as escapist but both bound up in and 
resistant to the social, cultural, and historical context that produces it.  As Jackson argues in her 
work on fantasy, this literature is not “outside” time altogether nor should we think of it as 
somehow apart from or “transcending” reality (8).  Making an anti-escapist argument, she writes, 
“Fantasy is not to do with inventing another non-human world: it is not transcendental.  It has to 
do with inverting elements of this world, re-combining its constitutive features in new relations 
to produce something strange, unfamiliar and apparently ‘new’, absolutely ‘other’ and different” 
(8).  Thus, Jackson’s description of fantasy makes visible the alienating and othering effects of 
this mode of storytelling.      
Theorists have long discussed the subversive nature of fantasy; the mode exists at the 
margins of narrative and culture.  Díaz actually uses the term “genre” to discuss the way in 
which his writing is always already marked by its otherness: “everything I write is already 
considered genre,” he says, “if I write anything that is literary fiction—it’s considered genre” (n. 
pag.).  It is this marginal quality that Saldívar draws on when he argues that speculative realism 
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raises the formal and thematic concerns of genre itself as part of the politics of racial identity, 
thus rendering the aesthetics of marginalization in resistant terms (13).  Here postmodern play 
becomes important in the context of not only marginal spaces, but also what Victor Turner has 
deemed “liminal” spaces characterized by serious play and the locus of cultural transformation.  
The term limen itself stems from the Latin for “threshold,” and it is in this threshold space where 
cultural meaning tends to be generated (41).  As mixed-genre narratives, these texts engage in a 
serious play of genre to question history, thus raising the formal and thematic concerns of genre 
as part of the historical project.  In this context, positioning fantasy as a mode at the margins is 
not a dismissive strategy but rather a strategic one.  It means to engage fantasy not as a mode that 
transcends historical reality but as one deeply entrenched in the social, historical, and political 
codes of that reality—what Díaz has perhaps best referred to as “deep history,” the secret history 
of genocide, slavery, and occupation that gives rise to our present condition yet remains erased 
from public discourse and invisible to the constitution of any national myth (Díaz n. pag.).  
Echoing Jackson’s argument, Díaz points out that far from escapist, deep history has always been 
“absolutely rampant” in the genres like comic books, science fiction, and fantasy texts (Díaz n. 
pag.).  Díaz substantiates the claim that what is difficult for culture to encounter tends to be 
deposited in our most marginal narratives; it is at this periphery, where the “garbage” resides, 
that you locate “the heart of things,” he contends (Díaz n. pag.).   
The turn to fantasy and play of genre thus marks an intersection of the postcolonial 
project and contemporary Jewish American literature.  Here my project takes Díaz to task for his 
rejection of male Jewish American writers (or even white male writers like Jonathan Lethem20) 
                                                
20I would argue that Lethem’s novel Motherless Brooklyn (1999) raises the aesthetics of genre 
fiction—detective tropes—as a mode of engaging with otherness and alienation of 
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and their aesthetics as part and parcel of dismantling mainstream literatures or narratives from 
the margins of “genre.”  Incensed that Chabon was consulted to discuss the poetics of science 
fiction by an LA Times reporter, Díaz laments that fact that Chabon is too mainstream, “Chabon, 
most certainly, what the fuck is Chabon doing talking Science Fiction to the LA times? There’s 
not 500 more qualified writers than him, that can talk to them?” (n. pag.).  Calling Chabon “the 
polite Black guy who everyone gets along with,” he lambasts Chabon for capitalizing on his 
white male privilege to do something in the realm of “genre” (Díaz n. pag.) It is true that because 
of the economic and political assimilation of Jewish Americans, their literature is less likely to be 
considered marginal in the same way as Díaz’s; however, economic and political assimilation is 
not synonymous with cultural assimilation and Jewish American literature should still be 
considered in a multiethnic context (Furman 10).  When treating narratives of Holocaust history, 
as Chabon does in many of his novels, his poetics of alienation and uncertainty dismantle any 
accusations that Chabon’s white Jewish novels are unquestionably operating from a space of 
privilege.   
There are a few different ways we can think about fantasy in relation to marginalization 
in the context of this project.  As Caroline Rody suggests, fantasy is a way to make real the 
racialized elements of violence and extermination as a colonialist enterprise aimed to cleanse 
Germany of Jews or “ethnic Germans” (39).  Rody contends that assimilated, middle-class 
Jewish American writers are positioned differently from magical realism’s practitioners in a third 
world space, but they are still influenced by magic’s global rise and assert a kindred “view from 
the fringe of dominant European cultures” and use magic too “to express. . . a world fissured, 
                                                                                                                                                       
psychosomatic disease. Orphaned, overweight, outsider Lionel Essrog suffers from the 
neuropsychiatric disorder Tourette’s syndrome, which dictates the aesthetics of the first-person 
narration and is key to solving the murder plot.   
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distorted, and made incredible by cultural displacement” (39).  The problem with Rody’s 
analysis is that she fails to show the reader how the aesthetics of magic work narratively and in 
relation to history.  Instead she relies on magical realist tropes to assert a non-European identity 
politics that borders on nostalgia; she notes that these writers “can rewrite death in a vision that 
celebrates the power of love” (56).  Aside from identity politics, the turn to fantasy also allows 
us to consider how Jewish American literature expresses a sense of marginalization from a 
cogent historical narrative because cultural and historical displacement is part and parcel of the 
Jewish experience.  And finally, we may also think about marginalization in terms of alienation, 
in the present moment, from this historical experience that is overwhelming and definitive at the 
same time that it is mediated through layers of representation and known as unknown.       
  Like fantasy and the fantastic, magical realism has been used as both a designation of 
genre and the effects within genre, applied with equal vigor to a text like Toni Morrison’s 
Beloved and Gabriel Garcia Marquez’s One Hundred Years of Solitude.  In Moments of Magical 
Realism in US Ethnic Literatures, editors Lyn Di Iorio Sandín and Richard Perez anthologize 
essays that look at “how magical moments appear episodically in the otherwise realist fiction of 
contemporary U.S. multi-ethnic authors” in an attempt to de-center magical realism as a 
monolithic category in the literature of the Americas (1).  Sandín and Perez are careful to 
differentiate what it means to say that a given texts contains magical realist moments (“magical 
effects”), or even moments of the supernatural, like a ghost, from saying that a text “is a work of 
magical realism” (1).  Díaz discounts this distinction altogether when he argues that magical 
realism is not a genre, but a narrative strategy, contending that there is no evidence for its usage 
as genre even though it is widely regarded as such (n. pag.).  
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For Sandín and Perez, the mere act of labeling a text “magical realist” in the U.S. in 
practice has determined the reception of the work as magical realist, when we need greater 
attention to “the divergence between Latin American magical realism and the type of magically 
inflected realism evident in the work of US ethnic writers” (2-3).  Contrary to commonplace 
assumptions about magic realist elements, in U.S. ethnic literature the supernatural does not 
“seamlessly” coexist in otherwise realist texts. Rather, “Magical moments or irruptions21 deepen 
narrative meaning and signal breaks with the hegemonic constitution of everyday reality, which 
often hides colonial histories of race, class, and sexuality behind a realism that promises a 
straightforward representation of the myriad situations and conditions of contemporary life in the 
United States” (1).22  In this way magical realism attends to the inadequacies of realist-oriented 
narrative, where, as they argue, “It is as if the shock of magic lies in the revelation that reality, as 
                                                
21Sandín and Perez borrow “irruptions” from Caribbeanist critic Édouard Glissant’s influential 
work Caribbean Discourse.  Glissant discusses the ways multiple and contradictory literary 
effects exist in texts by Caribbean and minority writers who experiment with a multiciplicity of 
literary techniques “all at once.” For Glissant, irruption thus refers to the way diversity emerges 
against the “‘sublimated difference’ of ‘Sameness, which is ultimately saturated by sheer 
historical complexity and like a liquid overflowing its vessel, has everywhere released the pent-
up force of Diversity’” (qtd. in Sandín and Perez).  Following Glissant, Sandín and Perez remark, 
“for pent up within the realism of a narrative is a traumatic kernel that effectively curves the 
space of fictional description and tears at the very fabric of its form to reveal a series of 
identificatory, social, and historical meanings released through a seismic irruption and 
interruption, providing a deeper understanding of a violence otherwise covered over, contained, 
repressed or dismissed” (3).   
 
22“The turn to an imagery and vocabulary of so-called magic calls attention to an 
incomprehensible or difficult-to-approach aspect of reality that must be rendered in different 
terms so the diversity of experience colored by a history of violence is represented not by 
consistently magical or realist portrayal, but deformed by irruptive moments indicative of terrible 
colonial truths underlying the nature of New World realities and appearing in unexpected 
moments and locations”  (Sandín and Perez 3-4).  
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is, is an insufficient barometer of lived experience” (4).  There is another meaning that a “smooth 
realistic surface hides” (4).  
The function of fantasy as it relates to marginal genre literatures and the narrative 
strategy of magic realism foregrounds alternative, even resistant, ways of seeing.  Resistance to 
monolithic ways of seeing is similarly embedded in my concept of enchantment as an extension 
of Williams’s structures of feeling, wherein he locates “resistance and opposition to the dominant 
hegemonic practices and ideologies of existing social orders” (Filmer 205).  And while these 
texts often involve magical realist elements, I would broaden “irruption” to refer to the sets of 
ontological codes for interpreting fantasy literature and how it enables strangeness. The sense of 
play, disruption, and the texts’ self-consciousness exaggerates the irruption beyond supernatural 
presence. In Jonathan Safran Foer’s Everything Is Illuminated chapters have discrete functions.  
The reader flips back and forth among a narrative told in the style of Yiddish folklore (an 
entirely fantastic tale set in the made-up shtetl of Trachimbrod), letters, and the protagonist’s trip 
to Poland to locate the woman who he believed hid his grandfather during the war.  These are not 
wholly realist or fantastic narratives, but seem to be situated in between genres.  In my chapter 
on Chabon’s Yiddish Policemen’s Union, set in the alternative universe of Sitka, Alaska, I 
borrow the term “slipstream genre” to designate a text which is in-between genres—a liminal 
text—rather than one that seamlessly presents the coexistence of realist and fantasy elements.  
The emphasis in this text is not seamless integration of realism and fantasy, but the way in which 
narrative play ruptures different generic codes. 
As I summarized previously, the authors themselves reflect on the way their writing 
indirectly or obliquely represents the Holocaust.  In this archive, alienation, as both the condition 
of historical experience of Jewishness and an aesthetic mode, is a survival strategy.  Narratively, 
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the play of strangeness offers a fragmented sense of wholeness but an affective sense of 
fullness—a recalibration of the sensory experience, as Bennett explains.  In this way, 
estrangement is both a narrative technique and refers to the third generation’s relationship to 
history.  Alienation also describes the third generation’s estranged relationship, in time and place, 
from the past; they are somewhat stranded in the present and play with defamiliarization to forge 
the otherwise impossible links between memory and being in the present.  For example, the way 
that Jonathan Safran Foer finds himself belated is characteristic of many of the writers I study.  
As Hungerford argues, he is “belated” in two ways: first, because the story of the Holocaust and 
finding out the secrets of a parent’s experience has already been told many times, and secondly, 
because he is generationally farther removed from the experience of the events in Europe (“How 
Jonathan” 611).   
These novels are perhaps more invested in the present’s relationship to the past staged 
through postmodern playfulness rather than the representation of the past per se.  Put another 
way, these narratives perform the problem of historicity for third-generation writers that 
enchantment frames through narrative play.  As Jameson explains, historicity is more than an 
historical context.  Historicity involves “a perception of the present as history. . . a relationship to 
the present which somehow defamiliarizes it and allows us that distance from immediacy which 
is at length characterized as historical perspective” (Postmodernism 284).   Historicizing thus 
refers to a specific mode of defamiliarization that denaturalizes the “immediacy” of the present 
and moves beyond a stereotyped set of images that cater to nostalgia rather than historical 
understanding.  One of the key arguments from Postmodernism is the “crisis of historicity”: that 
this perspective is more difficult to achieve now than it was during the epoch of the historical 
novel, “when contemplation of the past seemed able to renew our sense of our own reading 
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present” (284).  In the postmodern age, the historical novel is out of fashion because we no 
longer experience history in the way of temporal narrative, “and indeed, perhaps no longer 
experience it at all” (Postmodernism 283-4).23  Analyzing a Philip K. Dick novel, Jameson 
locates the possibility for renewing historicity—“a perception of the present as history”—within 
the genre of SF: “Only by means of a violent formal and narrative dislocation could a narrative 
apparatus come into being capable of restoring life and feeling to this only intermittently 
functioning organ that is our capacity to organize and live time historically” (Postmodernism 
284).  For Jameson, there is something specific about the SF genre that reorients our relationship 
to the present.  Enchantment extends that function in this set of texts, where characters struggle 
to situate themselves in a postmodern present with known signifiers of Holocaust experience but 
no “authentic” Holocaust experience.  Narrative or aesthetic enchantment draws us back from the 
“here and now” and attempts to mark the lack of authentic Holocaust experience in the present.  
 Enchantment makes manifest the notion of imaginative creation already at stake in 
approaches to Holocaust representation that are heavily mediated, through textuality or other 
aesthetic modes.  These approaches, like Marianne Hirsch’s idea of “postmemory,”24 Gary 
                                                
23As Jameson explains, “for if the historical novel ‘corresponded’ to the emergence of historicity, 
of a sense of history in its strong modern post-eighteenth century sense, science fiction equally 
corresponds to the waning or the blockage of that historicity, and, particularly in our own time 
(in the postmodern era), to its crisis and paralysis, its enfeeblement and repression” (284).  
 
24One such theory that remains highly influential for memory studies and third-generation Jewish 
American literature is Marianne Hirsch’s idea of postmemory.  As she explains, postmemory is 
“a powerful and very particular form of memory precisely because its connection to its object or 
source is mediated not through recollection but through an imaginative investment and creation. . 
. . Postmemory characterizes the experience of those who grow up dominated by narratives that 
preceded their birth, whose own belated stories are evacuated by the stories of the previous 
generation shaped by traumatic events that can be neither understood nor recreated” (22).  
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Weissman’s “fantasies of witness,” and Alison Landsberg’s “prosthetic memory,” foreground the 
way that “imaginative investment” structures connections to both memory and history.   
Enchantment is a compensatory strategy whereby third generation Jewish American 
writers foreground the “imaginative investment and creation” in an otherwise inaccessible past 
(22).  In this way, the investment in imagination extends Gary Weissman’s idea of “fantasies of 
witnessing” into the present moment.  Gary Weissman describes the unspoken desire of many 
people who have no direct experience of the Holocaust but are deeply interested in studying, 
remembering, and memorializing it (4).  Weissman looks at persons who have no immediate, 
familial connection and no living memory but who want to feel something, who are searching for 
ways to gain access and “remember” the Holocaust that eludes us.  They reveal a desire to know 
“what it was like to be there” (4).  This desire, he explains, “can be satisfied only in fantasy, in 
fantasies of witnessing the Holocaust for oneself,” where “fantasy” functions as a stand-in for 
memory and refers to the ways nonwitnesses desire to imagine experiences of horror (4).  
Because we are living in the moment when survivors are passing away, the possibility of 
transmitting “living memory” becomes precarious (64).  In Prosthetic Memory, Alison 
Landsberg describes living memory as “memory linked to the lived experience of an individual, 
which therefore corresponds to the lifespan of the body” (64).  She explains, “when there are no 
longer survivors left to testify, when memories are no longer guaranteed and anchored by a body 
that lived through them, responsible memory transmission becomes problematic” (64).  This 
problem of transgenerational memory is as old as the concept of memory itself, Landsberg 
explains, and yet the problem posed by the Holocaust is distinct: “we are facing not only the 
absence of survivors, but the absence of tradition and ritual—of memory practices—that ground 
the event” (65).  Landsman explores the way mass cultural texts and institutions have begun to 
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imagine strategies not simply for transmitting memories, but for creating rituals and practices 
necessary for the transmission of memory in the face of such obstacles.  Landsberg calls these 
“prosthetic memories”: “prosthetic memories that circulate publicly, are not organically based, 
but are nevertheless experienced with one’s own body—by means of a wide range of cultural 
technologies—and as such, become part of one’s personal archive of experience, informing not 
only one’s subjectivity, but one’s relationship to the present and future tenses” (66).  Prosthetic 
memories refer to the production and dissemination of memories that have no direct connection 
to a person's lived past and yet are essential to the production and articulation of subjectivity.  A 
prime example of this is the way a cinematic experience, like watching Schindler’s List (1993) or 
media coverage of a historical event like 9/11, can shape the viewer’s experience and 
subjectivity of an historical event that she did not live through (66).  Landsberg calls these 
memories prosthetic because, like an artificial limb, they are actually worn by the body; they are 
“sensuous memories produced by experience” (66).  In these transferential spaces, people are 
invited to enter into experiential relationships with events through which they themselves did not 
live, and “through such spaces people may gain access to a range of processual, sensually 
immersed knowledges, knowledges which would be difficult to acquire by purely cognitive 
means” (113).  Affect is key to this memory process, where Landsberg is interested in mass 
cultural representations of the Holocaust and the sites of production of “feeling” (113).  Looking 
at mass cultural representations of the Holocaust--at the sites of the production of “feeling”—
Landsberg claims that affect might usefully complement cognition in the acquisition of 
knowledge about traumatic events of the past (113). 
Both Weissman’s idea of “memory-as-fantasy” and Landsberg’s “prosthetic memory” 
speak to the architecture of memory construction beyond living memory—whether it is made 
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possible in the museum, cinema, or comic book.  These ideas invoke something other than 
memory (fantasy; prosthesis) that performs a memory-like function for nonwitnesses who still 
maintain the desire to “know what it’s like to be there” (4).  Weissman’s and Landsberg’s 
formulations of “fantasy of witness” and “prosthetic memory” suggest how the imaginary or 
non-real stands in for authentic memory.  For Weissman, the nonwitness, never having been 
there, fantasizes what it must have been like.  For Landsberg, the prosthetic memory is a 
surrogate for a living memory that is impossible for the second and third generations.  The 
structure of the loss of authenticity is embedded in the terminology of “nonwitness” and 
“prosthetic.”  In the idea of the prosthetic, for example, Landsberg intimates something that is 
not natural.  Prosthetic memories, she explains, “are not the product of lived experience but are 
derived from a mediated engagement; like an artificial limb, they are worn on the body and often 
mark trauma” (20).  Just as a prosthetic limb performs what it cannot be, an actual limb, a 
prosthetic memory is also the thing it cannot be—a living memory.    
These concepts are helpful in envisioning the structures of mediation and loss of 
authenticity involved in intergenerational memory transfer.  They intimate a desire to affectively 
connect with the past and read this desire through spaces like the U.S. Holocaust Museum or Art 
Spiegelman’s Maus.  In so doing, these ideas pave the way for thinking about how third-
generation writers aim to forge an authentic, affective connection with the past to which they 
remain estranged and their relationship inauthentic.  Because of the play of defamiliarization at 
work in the genre-mixing of these narratives, these writers stage a self-consciously mediated 
encounter with their own estranged relationship to the Holocaust.  But at the same time, they 
express, as in Weissman’s formulation, a desire to be there, or at the very least, to structurally 
and affectively connect to and relay a collective memory of the Holocaust.  But because first- 
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and even second-generation experiences are alien to them, they must find a way to stage this 
encounter that speaks to both their remove and their desire to create authentic connections.  This 
is what I am calling enchantment:  narrative and affective enchantment brings together the desire 
to experience something and Holocaust memory with which we may not have a direct, bodily 
connection.   
While this is the first monograph-length study of contemporary Jewish American 
literature in relation to genre theory, history, and enchantment, many contemporary Jewish 
American literary theorists’ work substantiates the turn away from realism as a vital, important 
turn in post-Holocaust literature.  This work is not meant to supersede or replace those of 
survivors.  Instead, they show the kind of cultural work American Jewish writers are invested 
in—figuring out how to connect to a narrative past that defines their cultural experience yet one 
from which they remain alienated.  Not an actual account of witness, enchantment draws a first-
person or focalized narrator into an experience suspended between narratives, historical 
temporalities—even ontologies of perception—in order to highlight the desire to connect or that 
“fantasy of witnessing” that Weissman explicates.25 
Chapter Summaries  
Long before this group of contemporary writers begins to draw on fantasy to explore 
absence and loss, Bernard Malamud’s short stories in The Magic Barrel (1950s) represented the 
Holocaust obliquely.  Malamud was writing before any event that we have come to know as “the 
Holocaust” was integrated into the American historical or cultural imaginary.  Even so, 
                                                
25Jodi Eichler-Levine is also interested in the “vigorously transgressive” work she attributes to 
contemporary fantasy texts by African Americans and Jewish Americans that deal with trauma, 
especially as these texts “express uncanny desires and ‘fantasies of witnessing’ in a more explicit 
manner than do realist works” (xii). 
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Malamud’s early work relies on fantastic tropes to make commensurate otherwise 
incommensurable experiences, setting up the interrelational poetics of genre, fantasy, and history 
that the later group of writers extends and complicates through a deeper engagement with 
enchantment.  Informed by Michael Rothberg’s Multidirectional Memory,26 my chapter on 
Malamud investigates how fantastic aesthetics and multi-ethnic tropes serve as the node through 
which multidirectional experiences may pass, setting up a schemata for later writers to extend by 
exploring disparate twentieth-century experiences of Genocide.   
Following in the wake of Yiddish folklorist I.B. Singer, Malamud was considered a 
fantasist by literary critics and went so far as to theorize his use of fantasy in a series of lectures 
he delivered at Harvard.  Indeed, his stories are populated by the supernatural and share qualities 
of myth and uncertainty with the later group.  In the way that Malamud’s stories sometimes rely 
on and rewrite mythology, they are intertextual, but they lack a sense of postmodern playfulness 
and whimsy that characterize the contemporary archive.  I am drawn to them because like the 
contemporary novels, Malamud’s texts do not represent Holocaust trauma directly, but rather, 
through an aesthetics of indirection that becomes increasingly oblique in the present group.  Like 
the Coen brother’s period film A Serious Man (2009) explored in Chapter four, Malamud’s texts 
are simultaneously obsessed with history and ahistoricity as the mythic quality transcends a 
particular time and place.  
                                                
26As I will discuss in my first chapter, Rothberg positions his work against a framework that sees 
collective memory as a competitive struggle over a fixed quantity of resources (3).  Rather, 
Rothberg argues that we consider memory as multidirectional, which means "subject to ongoing 
negotiation, cross-referencing, and borrowing: as productive and not privative" (3).  He 
continues, "this interaction of different historical memories illustrates the productive, 
intercultural dynamic" he calls multidirectional memory (3).   
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At the time Malamud was writing, a chasm in historical experiences and geography 
separated the postwar American Jews who were eagerly assimilating and moving to the suburbs, 
bringing their Americanization full circle, from the total loss and destruction suffered by 
European Jews.  The fantastic allows Malamud to bridge this incommensurability and safely 
ironize the way in which his stories present American Jews who were eager to turn their backs 
on their own history and their European Jewish brethren.  Transgressions of reality that mark the 
fantastic in a Todorovian sense serve more of an instructive or moral purpose here.  These stories 
are much more indebted to mythology and the fantastic than they are interested in metafictional 
genre-play.  
 In Malamud’s work, the fantastic and the mythical function as narrative tropes to make 
the Holocaust susceptible to representation and make commensurate the otherwise incomparable 
experiences of postwar American Jews and European Jews.  In this chapter I read three stories, 
“Lady of the Lake,” “Angel Levine,” and “The Last Mohican.”  At the beginning of each story, 
the American Jewish protagonist is isolated from the recent historical events of the Holocaust 
and/or his own Jewish identity.  All protagonists are placed in “foreign” locations—Freeman and 
Fidelman travel to Italy, and the poor tailor Manischevitz finds himself aimlessly wandering 
around Harlem.  Anticipating the liminality of the later texts, these protagonists find themselves 
adrift in uncertain territory, are out of sync with their own realities, and are physically and 
emotionally displaced.  In a post-war context, Malamud inaugurates the double coding of 
alienation as a function of fantastic literature and historical experience that is again deepened in 
the later set of texts.  (These circumstances of displacement are quite similar to Meyer Landsman 
and the Jews of Sitka in The Yiddish Policemen’s Union who exist in between historical realities 
and genres and have no permanent homeland).  In fact, each protagonist is actively in denial or in 
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the process of escaping Jewish history and Jewish identity, and/or confronts his lack of Jewish 
ritual practice—in the form of prayer or mitzvot, the practice of charitable action towards others.  
Each story is modeled after the structure of Yiddish folklore where a supernatural or ghostly 
character appears to offer counsel to a character in need of guidance.  In this way, these hybrid 
stories serve as precursors to the more explicit genre-mixing of the later set.  As the names of the 
stories prefigure, both “Lady of the Lake” and “The Last Mohican” play with tropes of American 
historical experience alongside the fantastic; and “Lady of the Lake” of course refers to the 
earliest of American hybrid genres, the historical romance that undergirds Saldívar’s theory of 
speculative realism.  By the end of each story, a pivotal moment has occurred that transforms the 
character’s relationship to Jewishness.  However, the moment possibly occurs a moment too late, 
emphasizing to the reader the dangers of what happens when the Jewish American protagonist 
turns his back on history. 
In chapter two, we catapult into the present.  The play of “delight and disturbance” key to 
narrative enchantment invokes the way objects or material traces of history function in Nicole 
Krauss’s Great House and Jonathan Safran Foer’s Everything Is Illuminated, where history 
animates otherwise inanimate objects as they take on lives of their own.  Objects in these 
narratives function analogously to the ways in which magic objects in fantasy literature perform 
impossible feats.  In these texts, the strategy of enchantment reminds the reader that the objects 
of history generate meaning and narrative production; that is, objects signify history, not their 
possessors.   
In Great House disparate narrative threads cohere around a giant, monstrous, desk that 
was looted from the childhood home of one of the five narrator-protagonists.  Instead of the 
generic codes of high fantasy that dictate wonder and mystery (world-building, mythology, 
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magic), history and memory animate the inanimate and bestow a feeling of strangeness onto 
these objects or narratives.  In comparison, Safran Foer’s work is both more invested in the 
otherworldy and more metafictional. Safran Foer’s eponymous narrator Jonathan finds himself 
disconnected from his Russian guide and translator Alex, whose grandfather leads Jonathan on 
his heritage tour as he tries to reconstruct his family’s histories from material traces of the past.  
The novel foregrounds epistemologies as fantasy stories of the Trachimbrod shtetl intersect with 
the journey that inspired their creation.     
Great House is fragmented, comprised of five loosely connected narrators, and resists a 
sense of coherence as it rejects closure in favor of uncertainty.  While both texts are invested in 
questions of metafiction, Safran Foer’s narrators co-construct stories across fantasy and historical 
spaces and self-consciously pinpoint the uncertain stakes of creating a Holocaust novel from the 
space of the present.  While Krauss’s text reflects larger themes of displacement—the characters 
often finds themselves adrift or failing to belong—the desk links strangers and disparate 
narrative threads across the diaspora: Chile, New York, Jerusalem, and London.  Similar to 
Malamud’s work, Krauss is invested in the “in-between,” but here the fantastic becomes a mode 
of making commensurate the third-generation writer’s burden of inheritance and the past she did 
not experience.   
Across texts, enchanted objects indicate the strange ways in which the material or 
spiritless animate narrative and juxtapose the knowable and unknowable of Holocaust 
representation.  In realist modes of representation,27 to possess an object or a narrative is to know 
                                                
27The realist approach, explains Rothberg, characterizes the dominant scholarly methodology of 
historians and others who argue for an approach to the Holocaust through “Scientific” means that 
may be inscribed within continuous historical narratives (versus the antirealist approach, which 
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it.  In contrast, by enchanting objects (giving them agency; emphasizing their metaphysics; 
allowing them to signify) and making such objects incapable of being possessed, novelists like 
Krauss and others underscore the impossibility for third generation writers to know and possess 
Holocaust history.  Nevertheless, there is an imperative to determine the limits of knowledge and 
representation by formulating new modes of storytelling that play with fantasy and reality.   
In chapter three, I turn to the way in which genre-mixing creates an aesthetics of 
enchantment in The Yiddish Policemen’s Union, a text organized around a revisionist or 
alternative Holocaust history, a murder plot of an Orthodox Jew thought to be the messiah, and a 
terrorist bombing orchestrated by fundamentalist orthodox Jews.  As it plays with tropes of the 
hard-boiled detective novel, allohistory, biblical history, science fiction, and even romance, this 
texts flouts distinct genre conventions, plays with meaning of estrangement, and mixes what are 
usually distinct ontologies of genre: the function of the detective plot is to detect the strange; the 
function of the sf/fantasy genre is to normalize the strange; the function of allohistory is to 
estrange history.  Also called alternative history, allohistory posits changes in history to bring 
about different realities; it introduces “otherness” into known historical narratives to reveal the 
effects of appropriation and possession, raising epistemological questions so that we may “see 
things as we are (or were) meant to see them” (Tolkien 146).   
My reading emphasizes the “in-betweenness” of narratives, geography, historical 
circumstance, fiction, and reality.  Both the protagonist and the reader face the impossible 
double-bind of locating a sense of “home” amidst utter displacement.  In this chapter, 
enchantment describes the code-switching that occurs across genres and histories (for example, 
                                                                                                                                                       
radically breaks from such historical narratives).  It emphasizes what is nameable and what can 
be translated, within existing methodology, into the mimetic universe (Rothberg 4).   
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when the key markers of biblical history are the signs or clues that signal meaning in the 
detective plot), creating meaning in a liminal space.  Chabon’s novel raises aesthetics as a mode 
of defamiliarizing what have become defining fragments of twentieth-century Jewish American 
history: the founding of the state of Israel in 1948; Jewish diaspora; the novel even engages with 
9/11.  In so doing, these narratives are revisited as historical contingencies rather than pre-
conceived realities and new perspectives make room for long-forgotten or overwritten histories.    
In this chapter, I also explore the metafictional elements of the novel and the broader 
constructedness of history that postmodern genre-mixing problematizes.  Bina (Landsman’s ex; a 
fellow detective) has a “detective’s appetite for other peoples’ stories,” while Landsman has an 
impeccable memory but not emotional attachment to his cases (168).  Through these 
metafictional tropes, the novel explores epistemologies first introduced in tension through 
Fidelman and Susskind’s disparate approaches to art in “The Last Mohican.”  Through Bina and 
Landsman’s methods of detection or solving we see two contrasting ways of confronting history: 
storytelling rooted in orality (stresses interpretive freedom) and forensics rooted in his 
impeccable memory (stresses precision); perhaps emotional investment and detachment are both 
necessary to solve the crime just as they are needed to interpolate history.   
What is the point of this postmodern playfulness that disrupts what we have come to 
expect as the normal function of literary estrangement? What are we meant to sense and feel 
anew?  Through the play of fantasy and different narrative codes, the loss of Jewish culture 
becomes available to the present.  The novel raises questions of aesthetics in relation to traumatic 
histories; it inhabits an “in-between” space of forgetting and remembering (a thematic concern 
for the Jews of Sitka) as the reader confronts rote genres and familiar narratives of the 20th 
century Jewish experience in unexpected, enchanted circumstances.  As Bina and Landsman 
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remark, the Sitka Jews must not get “too comfortable” in the present and forget the past.  
Forgetting leads to the recapitulation of traumatic history: “Egypt. Spain. Germany,” Bina 
remarks (380).        
The use of non-realist forms of representation to mediate the incommensurability of an 
historical experience persists from Malamud to the contemporary archive, wherein the historical 
and cultural divide between an American Jewish present and a European past has deepened with 
time.  Even a text set at total remove from the Holocaust, such as the Coen brothers’ A Serious 
Man (2009), contributes to this project as it questions modes of knowing and interpolating the 
past.  In chapter four, I explore this text alongside Nathan Englander’s short story “The Tumblers” 
(1999).  “The Tumblers” and A Serious Man  may initially seem like strange bedfellows—their 
genres, content, and approach to narrating history could not be more distinct.  But the ways in 
which these two texts yoke together humor and the grotesque to achieve a Kafkaesque sensibility, 
play with narrative conventions of diverse genres, and rely on the Yiddish trope of the schlemiel 
to question a cosmic presence in a post-Holocaust world, provide substantial common ground to 
consider their rich intersections and how the schlemiel survives when confronted with evil.  Of 
all the texts in this project, A Serious Man is least obviously connected to Holocaust 
representation, while “The Tumblers” forges a direct representational link, yet both play with the 
Yiddish trope of the schlemiel to problematize historical narratives.  Extending my analysis of 
narrative ontology in The Yiddish Policemen’s Union (2007), and play and objects in Great 
House (2010) and Everything Is Illuminated (2002), this chapter turns to the open-endedness of 
uncertainty specifically in relationship to Jewish literary tropes as genre-mixing continues to 
disrupt historical narratives.  In the invocation of the Chelm story and its symbols, this play with 
play is important to both the trope of the schlemiel and the genre-mixing in each text.  These 
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texts explore how, in a world deprived of order and meaning, play becomes increasingly 
important as a mode of narrative as well as life.      
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CHAPTER 1 
 
THE AESTHETICS OF INDIRECTION IN  
BERNARD MALAMUD’S EARLY SHORT FICTION 
 
 “Fantasy, since it is out of bounds of the ordinary, invites the writer to take chances, to venture 
beyond habitual limits or limitations, to do things he hasn’t previously done—to play with fire 
and magic.  Fantasy, whose essence is possibility, affords the writer the pleasure of creating 
people and events reacting on each other in ways that seem original, perhaps unique.  The writer 
may readily feel that he is manipulating reality itself, yet safely because controlled by art” (50)—
Bernard Malamud, “Why Fantasy?”28  
 
“Think of me above all as an imaginative writer”—Bernard Malamud, Letter to Evelyn Avery, 
July 8, 1973   
 
 Known as a fantasist largely because of his Pulitzer-Prize-winning novel The Fixer 
(1966), Bernard Malamud’s early short fiction published ten years earlier and compiled in The 
Magic Barrel (1958) already relied on fantasy-parables to engage with reality.  However 
fantastic or supernatural, these stories tell what Malamud refers to as a moral truth: “the truth is 
of this world, not beyond, and it is a moral truth. Fantastic, symbolic, mythic, timeless, universal, 
poetic, or anything else the fantasy may be, the truth it tells is true” (Talking Horse 61).  
Malamud turns to fantasy prior to The Fixer and long before contemporary Jewish American 
novelists find their way to fantasy as a mode of mediating their relationship to traumatic history.  
His early fiction instantiates this mode as a Jewish American aesthetic indebted to the tropes of 
                                                
28Published in Talking Horse: Bernard Malamud on Life and Work. Editor Alan Cheuse notes 
that “Why Fantasy?” was possibly prepared during Malamud’s time at Harvard (1966-68) but 
stipulates it may have been prepared for one of his public appearances elsewhere (39).
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Yiddish folklore,29 one that serves as a form of philosophical reflection and social commentary 
intent on reflecting reality rather than escaping from it.   
In “Lady of the Lake,” Henry Levin, a thirty-year-old floorwalker at Macy’s, receives a 
small inheritance, quits his job and travels to Europe to find love.  After visiting Paris, he settles 
in the Italian town of Stresa on the shore of Lake Como.  Levin is “tired of the past—tired of the 
limitations it imposed upon him,” and by the time he arrives in Italy he has taken to calling 
himself Henry R. Freeman and passing as a gentile (105).  Freeman spends his days exploring 
the neighboring islands, and upon visiting Isola del Dongo he immediately falls in love with 
Isabella del Dongo, daughter of the wealthy del Dongo aristocracy.  The two share a quiet 
intimacy, interrupted on two separate occasions when Isabella inquires whether or not Freeman 
is Jewish.  Freeman denies the charge both times.  After the second inquiry into Freeman’s 
Jewish roots, it is Isabella who confesses her true identity.  Her name is Isabella della Seta—not 
del Dongo—and she is from a poor family, not the wealthy aristocracy.  In fact, she, her brother 
and her elderly father Ernesto (who has been working as a guide and shuttling Henry back and 
forth across the lake from his hotel to the island) are caretakers of the island and its palace.  
Freeman is deeply angered, especially at himself, for creating and believing in a fairy tale 
romance.  After briefly abandoning Isabella on the island, Freeman, overcome by his love, 
decides he will convince Isabella to marry him nonetheless.  He finds Ernesto waiting for him at 
the dock, but when he reaches Isabella on the island she once again asks him if he is Jewish.  
Fearing the worst, Freeman answers, “How many no’s make never? Why do you persist with 
                                                
29Malamud refers to stories like “Take Pity” (1958), “Idiots First” (1963), and “Angel Levine” 
(1955) as folk fantasies, by which he means, “except for the miraculous element, what happens 
happens to ordinary people in more or less ordinary circumstances, usually during periods of 
difficulty or stress.  To solve the trouble certain unreal or supernatural beings appear, inducing 
miraculous events. The classic Yiddish writers wrote stories of this kind” (Talking Horse 59).   
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such foolish questions?” (132).  In this climactic moment, Isabella unbuttons her blouse to reveal 
her breasts—and the blue number tattooed on her chest. “Buchenwald,” Isabella tells him. “I 
can’t marry you. We are Jews. My past is meaningful to me,” she says. “I treasure what I 
suffered for” (132).  Freeman tries to tell her the truth but it is too late—he is left groping “only 
moonlit stone” (133) as she disappears into the mist.   
 Malamud relies on fantasy in “Lady of the Lake” to affirm that an American Jewish 
future is not possible without recognition of history and memory of the Holocaust.  Invested in 
the present state of suffering rather than its history, the folk fantasy “Angel Levine” presents a 
Job-like archetype in the character of Manischevitz, an old Jewish tailor in New York, who 
suddenly loses everything.  Overnight, his shop burns to the ground, his wife becomes ill, his 
daughter elopes with a lout and his son is killed in the war.  When it seems that Manischevitz can 
no longer withstand his pain and suffering, the black Jewish angel Alexander Levine appears to 
offer his assistance.   
The story circles around Manischevitz's decision whether or not to believe in this black 
Jewish angel who has come to offer his aid.   Skeptical of the angel's divine origins, 
Manischevitz demands proof in a series of tests.  Although Levine succeeds, Manischevitz 
remains unconvinced, and the still-fallen angel departs to Harlem.  Manischevitz's suffering 
momentarily lessens before it gets worse, and he begins to doubt his own disbelief.  Was he “in 
his blindness too blind to comprehend” that God had sent him an angel? (49).  The Jewish tailor 
rides the subway to Harlem, where he is so stunned to discover a disheveled Levine in a 
honkeytonk that he returns home without entering.  After Manischevitz dreams of Levine 
“preening small decaying opalescent wings,” he returns to Harlem seeking the angel.  But instead 
of the honkytonk, he finds a synagogue in its place and watches as four “Negroes wearing 
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skullcaps” sit around the torah scroll (55).  Manischevitz listens to the men debate the meaning 
of “Neshoma” or spirit and affirm that God’s “immaterial substance” is everywhere.  The scene 
in part inspires Manischevitz’s revelation: “You are Jewish. This I am sure. . . I think you are an 
angel from God,” he avers to Levine (55).  By the time the two have traveled back to 
Manischevitz's apartment, his wife has fully recovered from her illness.  Manischevitz looks out 
the window to witness a black angel receiving his wings: “A feather drifted down.  Manischevitz 
gasped as it turned white, but it was only snowing” (56).  He runs downstairs into his apartment: 
“A wonderful thing, Fanny,” Manischevitz said.  “Believe me, there are Jews everywhere” (56).  
Evinced in his gasp, Manischevitz has sensed the divine spirit in Angel Levine.   
 Malamud returns to Italy in “The Last Mohican,” where failed painter turned 
“professional student” Arthur Fidelman travels to Rome to write a critical study of the Catholic 
painter Giotto.30  Fidelman arrives in Rome and to his disdain meets Shimon Susskin, Jewish 
refugee and schnorrer.  Susskind's relationship to the Holocaust is explicit but limited in detail; a 
Jewish refugee from Israel, Susskind wishes to stay in Italy where by contrast he “feels free” 
(160).  As “the refugee,” Susskind's particular Jewish experience reflects wider human suffering.  
“I'm always running,” he says to Fidelman, “Where else but Germany, Hungary, Poland?  Where 
not?” (158).  Fidelman barely acknowledges the geography of the Holocaust in his reply, “Ah, 
that's so long ago” (158).  But Susskind is not simply “the refugee,” he is a Holocaust refugee, 
and the lack of this distinction is an important absence that questions how American Jews 
recognize and interpolate the post-Holocaust Jewish experience.   
                                                
30Published first in 1958, “The Last Mohican” was republished as the first of the six tales of 
Fidelman in The Fidelman Stories (1969). 
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 Susskind follows Fidelman and begs him for his spare suit because he claims the one he 
was wearing fell apart after the war.  Fidelman’s response, perhaps quintessentially American, is 
to refer Susskind to a Jewish welfare organization.  When the first chapter of Fidelman's 
manuscript on Giotto disappears from his hotel room, Fidelman is convinced that Susskind is the 
guilty party, becomes obsessed with Susskind (especially in his dreams), and searches 
everywhere for the refugee.  It is at this point that he stumbles through the Jewish quarter of 
Rome and faces his own relationship to Jewish history.  After his transformative experience 
dreaming of Giotto's painting St. Francis Giving his Mantle to a Poor Man (San Francesco dona 
le vesti al cavaliere povero, 1299) Fidelman sees Giotto's painting anew and offers his blue 
gabardine to Susskind despite knowing that Susskind has stolen and burned his manuscript.    
In all three stories considered here—“Lady of the Lake” (1958), “Angel Levine” (1954), 
and “The Last Mohican” (1958)—a ghostly figure fulfills a primarily instructive role (a trope 
characteristic of Yiddish folklore) and leads the Jewish American protagonist disconnected from 
his roots on a path to self-discovery (to varying degrees of success).  The contemporary archive 
that I will go on to explore in subsequent chapters relies on fantasy as a mode of mediating 
history, self-consciously and self-critically creating moments of arrest that engage with the loss 
of authentic encounters with Holocaust history.  Malamud relies on fantasy as a means to 
indirectly engage with Holocaust history; his work turns to fantasy tropes to metafictionally 
mediate the American Jewish experience of the Holocaust, which is set at geographical and 
historical remove from European Jewry.  As Hilene Flanzbaum writes, knowledge of the 
Holocaust in America “has rarely been delivered by direct witness; it comes to us by way of 
representations, and representations of representations” (4).  In these stories, fantasy becomes a 
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means to encounter trauma alien to the protagonist’s day-to-day existence yet tied to his cultural 
history.   
These stories reveal a delusional post-war Jewish American mindset in the psychology of 
the protagonists explored through third-person free indirect discourse.  In so doing, the narratives 
focalized through the protagonists problematize the boundary between fantasy and reality.  They 
draw on fantastic tropes—angels, apparitions—wherein fantasy becomes a means of 
transcending escapism, seeing reality as it really is, and mocking the notion that there is a clear 
demarcation between fantasy and reality.  In “Lady of the Lake,” the protagonist’s obsession 
with Italy and romance reveals an American Jew out of touch with his world and suggests that 
fantasy may be a legitimate deflection of traumatic reality.  “Angel Levine” and “The Last 
Mohican” both dramatize fantasy as an interruptive trope that defamiliarizes the quotidian, 
allowing the protagonist to see what has been visible all along.  The stories imply an analogy 
between the need to confront reality within and outside the text.  The pressures of fantasy within 
the stories result in epiphanic experiences for the protagonists, suggesting that fantasy serves as a 
vital means of shocking the gentrified, often bourgeois Jewish American community out of their 
oblivion to perceive what is already visible yet remains unseen.  Thus, like the later texts, fantasy 
in Malamud’s work is used to express removal and mark a loss of direct experience; unlike the 
later texts, enchantment in Malamud’s work makes commensurate the otherwise 
incommensurable experiences of postwar American and European Jews.     
 In the two stories set in Italy31 (“Lady of the Lake” and “The Last Mohican”), sheltered 
American Jewish protagonists Freeman and Fidelman encounter a Holocaust survivor only to 
                                                
31Malamud set eleven stories in Italy, six of which were collected under the title Pictures of 
Fidelman (1969) and feature Arthur Fidelman as the main protagonist (“The Last Mohican” is 
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come to terms with their own escape from Jewishness.  Fantasy tropes reveal American Jewish 
protagonists cut off from the reality of European Jews and reflects the larger anxiety surrounding 
the problem of how to reconcile American Jewish identification with European Jewish suffering.  
In both “Angel Levine,” which is set in New York City, and “The Last Mohican,” set in Italy, 
fantasy tropes also triangulate inter-ethnic experiences of suffering between the African 
American and Jewish experience (“Angel Levine”) and Native American and Jewish experience 
(“The Last Mohican”).  Michael Rothberg’s analytic multidirectional memory becomes 
important to understanding how fantasy aesthetics, at the narrative level, becomes an in-between 
space to explore intercultural dynamics.  In so doing, these stories also engage with philosophies 
of art critical of the rational as art’s expressive mode; rather, they privilege mystery, feeling, and 
the non-rational as central to art’s communicable experience.  At a time when the historical 
conditions of poverty and war in Italy isolate the function of art, Malamud’s stories draw on 
fantasy tropes and the social, inter-subjective aspects of art to foreground its vitality.     
 Given the anxiety surrounding the divergent experiences between American Jews and the 
Nazi Holocaust, fantasy and intertextuality rely on the imaginable and the imaginary to allow for 
ways of accessing the Holocaust that are, as Alter declared, “susceptible to fictional 
representation” (Jewishness 38).  In the Italy stories, the outcome of the indirect encounter with 
Holocaust history results in the humbling or spiritual education of the American Jewish 
protagonist.  The fantasy elements that connect these characters with ghostly counterparts from 
the European Holocaust speak directly to the idea that American reticence about the Holocaust 
up through the 1960s was perhaps most motivated by anxiety about incommensurate experiences.  
                                                                                                                                                       
considered the first of the Fidelman stories). Malamud’s wife Ann De Chiara was an Italian-
American Roman Catholic, and they often visited Italy.     
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As Sundquist explains, “the relative insulation of American Jews from the Nazi menace and the 
postwar suburban security to which many aspired simply could not be reconciled with the 
unfathomable destruction of nearly 6 million European Jews” (205).  Adopting George Steiner’s 
language, Sundquist expresses that postwar American Jews lived with historical dissociation, 
“inwardly tormented about the disaster they had not been able to prevent, publicly silent about an 
event they wished to make alien to Judaism as they knew it” (qtd. in Sundquist 205).  The 
anxiety surrounding incommensurate experiences is the subject of Philip Roth’s “Eli, the Fanatic” 
(1959), a story that creates a portrait of Americanized Jews who are embarrassed when Orthodox 
refugees establish a yeshiva in their town.  For the Americanized Jews, the survivors present a 
threat to the town’s “peace and safety—what civilization had been working toward for centuries” 
and reveal the sometimes subtle, sometimes sharp line between “Jew” and American” (Sundquist 
206).  
Why Fantasy? 
As I explored in the introduction, part of the efficacy of fantasy tropes is linked to 
defamiliarization.  In Malamud’s work, moments of arrest reveal that the seeming unreal is an 
apt mode for defamiliarizing reality within the textual world and the reality of American Jewish 
oblivion towards European Jewish suffering outside the text; in so doing, these moments 
prefigure the schemata of enchantment that surfaces in the later works.  The interruption of 
fantasy into “Angel Levine” is one such moment of heightened perception and mediates against 
that automatization that “eats away at things, at clothes, at furniture, at our wives, at our fear of 
war” (Theory of Prose 5).  As Shklovsky describes, “if we should wish to make a definition of 
‘poetic’ and ‘artistic’ perception in general, then doubtless we would hit upon the definition: 
‘artistic’ perception is perception in which form is sensed. . .” (Theory of Prose 42).  In “Angel 
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Levine,” fantasy mediates against the absorption that results in seeing without perception, a 
condition that plagues the protagonist when the story opens and presents Manischevitz reading 
“but not truly reading” (44-5).  The narrator describes, “he was not truly reading, because his 
thoughts were everywhere; however, the print offered a convenient resting place for his eyes, and 
a word or two, when he permitted himself to comprehend them, had the momentary effect of 
helping him forget his troubles” (44-45).  The angel appears, actively disrupting Manischevitz’s 
automatized reading as he reports having the “shock of his life” (45).  Thus, story registers 
fantasy tropes as a legitimate mode of seeing as the narrator describes, 
Manischevitz put his paper down and looked up with the distinct impression that 
someone had entered the apartment, though he could not remember having heard 
the sound of the door opening. . . he stumbled into the living room and there had 
the shock of his life, for at the table sat a Negro reading a newspaper he had 
folded up to fit into one hand. (45) 
 
The “distinct impression” reveals that Manischevitz senses the angel’s presence; here the story 
introduces sensing-as-knowing, which will become an important trope for experiencing art in 
“The Last Mohican.”  Additionally, the angel—as a transcendent being—dramatizes that the 
mode of fantasy has the ability to transcend, meaning Levine makes visible (to Manischevitz) 
what is already present yet invisible because of automatized perception.  But Angel Levine is not 
a normal-looking angel, and in this way he registers to both the reader and Manischevitz as 
doubly estranged; he disrupts the reality-oriented function of the text (set in our world) and he is 
odd-looking: he’s black, he lacks wings, he wears a frayed suit, and he has very large feet, to 
sum up some of Manischevitz’s observations (45).      
 Thus, these stories to turn fantasy to dramatize Malamud’s central argument in “Why 
Fantasy?”: that fantasy engages with “reality itself” (Talking Horse 5).  In a series of teaching 
lectures first prepared when he was a lecturer at Harvard (1966-1968) and reprinted in Talking 
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Horse, Malamud laments the need to defend fantasy against the critics and editors who, upon 
encountering his more fantastic tales, never failed to question why he was “still on that kick” 
(Talking Horse 48).  Objecting to his own critics and those who similarly disapproved of the 
fantastical elements in Saul Bellow’s Henderson the Rain King (1959), Malamud argues that 
fantasy and serious fiction are not necessarily mutually exclusive.  “If the fantasy has meaning, 
as every work of literary art must,” Malamud writes, “. . . then the meaning need not be 
accounted unreal” (Talking Horse 59).  Of these critics who disdain fantasy, Malamud 
summarizes, “on the whole they want their fiction to be ‘real’ (although fiction is not real but 
only pretends to be); anyway they want it ‘realistic,’ and there are some critics nowadays who 
feel a man can write nothing of importance unless he is dealing with some aspect of society 
using the method we call social realism” (Talking Horse 47).   As Malamud puts it, in fantasy, 
the story becomes “too evidently a work of imagination” for some (47).  Regarding those who 
believe that serious literature is synonymous with social realism, Malamud muses that such 
critics are wary of any affronts to this realism because the perceived threat to everyday reality 
makes them personally uneasy:  
And some people don’t want ‘reality’ tampered with, particularly if it is everyday 
reality and seems fantastic to them, not because of monstrous acts of inhumanity 
or the flights of missiles through space, made to carry atomic warheads, but 
because something improbable happens: an angel appears in a story, or maybe a 
ghost; that of course is personally threatening although the death of multitudes 
and the everyday threat of the end of the world may not be.  (Talking Horse 47-8) 
 
While the unfathomable reality of atomic warfare, the apocalypse, and by extension, the 
incomprehensible event of the Holocaust, are not questioned, the intrusion of purely fantastic 
elements like ghosts and angels into everyday reality is received as a personal threat.    
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Malamud suggests that critics and readers find the improbability of an angel or a ghost 
alarming precisely because these apparitions threaten the boundary between fantasy and reality 
(in literature; also beyond the text) and the accepted literary tropes of realism and antirealism 
that accompany each generic realm.  Against the dismissal of fantasy as both untrue and 
unserious, Malamud writes that fantasy does for the reader what it does for the writer: “fantasy 
challenges him to make use of the earthly wonderful as well as the supernatural; to tie them 
together in unpredictable combinations with the commonplace, the ordinary, and out of this still 
produce a real enough truth about life” (Talking Horse 50).  Thus, Malamud’s stories do not fall 
squarely into the fantasy genre—sometimes fantasy is used merely decoratively for Malamud, 
and sometimes fantasy becomes the bones of the story structure (Talking Horse 51).  For fantasy 
to work—and to work well—according to Malamud, fantasy takes on those qualities that Darko 
Suvin mentions when he writes that in fantasy, strangeness or alienation has grown into the text’s 
framework (Metamorphoses 7).  Malamud explains, “the important thing is that in good fantasy 
the reader forgets the openness of the magic,” (Talking Horse 51).  To “forget the openness of 
the magic” means that the reader considers Malamud’s fantasy tropes part and parcel of his 
generic craft.   
 As the above story synopses reveal, Malamud’s work is unlike the works of first-
generation writers who depict the realities of horrific violence and directly represent the spaces 
of concentration camps and ghettos.  In fact, Malamud’s work does not refer to archetypal events 
in the history of the Holocaust, which will come to characterize the indirection of Nicole 
Krauss’s writing explored in chapter three.  Instead, explicit references to the Holocaust are 
limited to Isabella, the Buchenwald survivor in “Lady of the Lake,” and Susskind, a refugee 
fleeing “Germany, Hungary, and Poland” in “The Last Mohican.”  Like the mystical Lady of the 
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Lake central to Arthurian Romance, the presence of the Holocaust in “Lady of the Lake” is 
shrouded in mystery and reflects the larger impact of the Holocaust on Jewish American 
consciousness at this historical moment (Kremer 83).  Malamud does not present Isabella’s 
experience in Buchenwald, instead choosing to leave the subject, like Isabella, surrounded in 
mist.  And in “The Last Mohican,” Susskind begs Fidelman for a suit because, he says, “I haven't 
had a suit for years.  The one I was wearing when I ran away from Germany, fell apart.  One day 
I was walking around naked” (160).  The sudden image of Susskind’s nude body fleeing 
Germany solidifies Susskind’s relationship to Holocaust trauma, yet it remains ambiguous in 
contrast to a character like Isabella.  “Angel Levine” is increasingly distanced from Holocaust 
tropes.  If the Holocaust appears at all in this story it is through the Jobian character 
Manischevitz and his grappling with the question of endless Jewish suffering through his 
dialogue with God.  
In contrast to these earlier stories, Malamud’s later, and more celebrated novel, The Fixer 
(1966), is recognized and lauded for its indirect Holocaust representation based on the blood 
libel trial of Mendel Beilis, a Russian Jew accused of ritual murder and blood libel in Kiev in 
1913.  Lillian Kremer notes that “Malamud’s novels . . . are Holocaust haunted, not with 
survivors but with Holocaust references and metaphors. . . [The Fixer is] the Malamud novel 
most closely associated with the Holocaust” (95).   Sundquist remarks,  
In adapting the story of Beilis. . . Malamud created both an analogy and a context 
for an American audience still struggling to grasp the meaning of the Holocaust.  
The historical displacement served two purposes: it gave scope to the violent 
tradition of anti-Semitism that had marked European and Russian culture for 
centuries before the rise of Nazism; and it underlined the double difficulty faced 
by an American writer seeking an appropriate narrative form in which to contain 
the concept of genocide. (412)   
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Based on an earlier model of storytelling, The Fixer (1966) pays homage to Isaac Bashevis 
Singer’s The Slave (serialized in Yiddish in 1960-61 and translated into English in 1962).  In The 
Slave, Singer employed a historic narrative set against anti-Semitic violence of the seventeenth 
century to explore the millennial upheaval of the Holocaust and its devastating effects (Sundquist 
205).  As Robert Alter puts it, the Beilis story gave Malamud “a way of approaching the 
European Holocaust on a scale that is imaginable, susceptible of fictional representation”  
(Jewishness 38).32  Two fantasists, Bernard Malamud and Isaac Bashevis Singer, rely on  
indirection to fictionalize the Holocaust as they depict violent anti-Semitic histories.  Responding 
to The Slave, Sundquist suggests, “in order to confront an event seemingly without precedent, 
one might need to resort to radical indirection” (412).  But also, in Malamud’s earlier stories’ 
emphasis on morality and responsibility, their depiction of ghostly mentors and lost souls who 
navigate seemingly incommensurate experiences of Jewishness, Malamud explores the broken 
world that serves as the backdrop to The Fixer (1966). 
It was not until Malamud’s work in The Fixer that he became known as a writer 
concerned with the Holocaust; however, it is clear that these concerns plagued Malamud’s early 
stories as well.  In 1983 Malamud gave an interview clarifying the way in which he embeds the 
theme of Jewish survival into all of his work:   
  Interviewer: “Novelists have shown concern over assimilation and survival. What
 is your concern?” 
  Malamud: “Survival, of course! I am deeply aware of World War II and the
 horrors of the concentration camps.  It is a personal thing and I have been, to some degree, 
 conditioned by this experience.  Any sensitive human being who calls himself Jewish
 could not ignore the Holocaust.” 
                                                
32Malamud has stated that the novel has a relationship to the Holocaust, noting “Somewhere 
along the line, what had happened in Nazi Germany began to be important to me in terms of the 
book, and that is part of Yakov’s story” (Conversations 19). 
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  Interviewer: “This, I believe, has influenced your writing--especially the short
 stories.” 
  Malamud: “To some degree. I write about the marginal Jew who manages to be 
 influenced by the concepts of morality which, incidentally are Jewish but not only 
 Jewish.” (Conversations 70)   
 
Malamud indirectly invokes Holocaust themes and narratives at a historical moment when the 
Holocaust was not yet part of Jewish American cultural memory and when Adorno’s “no poetry 
after Auschwitz” (1949) was an accepted cultural code.  In this way his indirection problematizes 
the discourse that considers the 1950s and ‘60s as a time when few American Jews, not to 
mention Jewish American writers, addressed the Holocaust.  Writing in 1966, Robert Alter 
observed that even with all the restless examining of the implications of the Holocaust among 
Jewish intellectuals, “it gives one pause to note how rarely American-Jewish fiction has 
attempted to come to terms in any serious way with the European catastrophe,” thus discounting 
Malamud’s work engaged with the Holocaust in a “serious way” (“In the Community” 67).  
Responding much later thirty years later, Andrew Furman remarks upon the subtlety and 
pervasiveness of Malamud’s treatment of the Holocaust (n. pag).  Furman stresses that while it is 
difficult to imagine, one must recall that the 1950s and ‘60s was a time when few Jewish 
American writers dared address the topic of the Holocaust in their writing (n. pag).  Subtelty and 
indirection, especially expressed through fantasy tropes, for Malamud self-consciously 
dramatizes the distance between American and European Jewish experiences and allows him to 
“safely” engage with a not-yet-discussed trauma.  
 In the introduction to her anthology The Americanization of the Holocaust, Hilene 
Flanzbaum notes that many contemporary Americans struggle to accept that Americans, 
including American Jews, said little about the Holocaust in the decade following World War II.  
She reports, “someone always finds my statement outrageous—if not blasphemous: “How can 
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you say no one talked about the Holocaust in the 1950s?. . . We all saw Anne Frank.  What about 
Anne Frank?” (3).33  But as she explains, the “unfailingly optimistic” text that downplayed the 
dark and brutal side of history makes clear that the Holocaust of the 1950s is not the Holocaust 
of the late 1990s, when Flanzbaum is writing.34  Historians like Peter Novick, whose The 
Holocaust in American Life (1999) has become required reading on the topic, have argued that 
writers in the postwar period did not openly address the Holocaust for three reasons: silence was 
a manifestation of repression; people may have feared that discussions about the Holocaust 
would perpetuate Jewish stereotypes of Jewish victimhood; or, as Novick believes, 
“revolutionary changes in world alignments” made conversations about the Holocaust 
unadvisable amidst a Cold War climate (85).35   
                                                
33“Seeing Anne Frank” refers to the stage play, first performed in 1955, and the film, which 
premiered in 1959 (Flanzbaum 2).   
 
34Deborah Lipstadt notes that the Holocaust was not a factor in Jewish American identity in the 
1950s, and in fact, the elevation of the Holocaust in Jewish American identity from the 1990s on 
“is particularly noteworthy since throughout the 1950s and most of the 1960s it was barely on the 
Jewish communal or theological agenda” (195). But this does not mean that the Holocaust was 
totally absent from the American popular cultural agenda, and Lipstadt cites the emergence of 
early plays, books and television productions that garnered substantial attention (she offers as 
possible explanation the idea that the attention was generated from the non-Jewish community) 
(195).  Nonetheless, according to Lipstadt, the Holocaust did not emerge as a factor in the 
construct of American Jewish identity in the 1950s (195). 
 
35Eric Sundquist echoes the claim that Holocaust recognition was hindered by Jews’ fears of 
being identified with the wrong side of the Cold War and there was apprehension that the very 
act of speaking about the Holocaust would make American Jews stand out as Jews at the 
moment when they were achieving acceptance and assimilation (205).  Scholars like Novick 
argue that the emergence of the Holocaust as central to Jewish American identity occurs only 
after the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, when Israeli vulnerability at the conflict’s outset highlighted 
fears that the Holocaust was not a historically isolated event and raised the possibility that a mass 
obliteration of the Jews could be repeated (151).  Many others, however, Sundquist included, 
point to the much earlier televised trial of Adolf Eichmann (1961) and the publication of Raul 
Hilberg’s The Destruction of the European Jews the same year as the event that broke “the 
silence,” ushering in the Holocaust as a subject of study by journalists, scholars, etc. (205).  
 
71 
 
 While the arguments that privilege 1950s consensus and assimilation are widely accepted, 
it has become more fraught in recent years with the critical reception of Hasia Diner’s We 
Remember with Reverence and Love: American Jews and the Myth of Silence after the 
Holocaust: 1945-1962 (2010).36  While Malamud’s work engages with the Holocaust through 
indirection, his work substantiates, alongside Diner’s claim, that “silence” is too strong a term to 
characterize American Jewish responses at this time.37 The indirection of fantasy reveals 
Malamud as a writer attempting to find a medium or an aesthetic mode to grapple with the 
atrocity.  And while indirection is not synonymous with silence, many critics take Malamud to 
task for his “universalizing,” which they define through the work’s lack of direct representation 
of Holocaust trauma.  By and large, the critics reflect that fantasy is an inferior or unserious 
mode of representation and that it represents the Holocaust superficially and unethically.  For 
                                                                                                                                                       
Hannah Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem (1963) was also influential in awakening the guilt of 
the politically complacent American Jews in their protest to Nazism (Sundquist 205). 
 
36Commonly cited is a 1961 symposium conducted by Commentary called “The Condition of 
Jewish Belief.”  Editors asked questions of young intellectuals about Jewish values, 
Americanism, conversion, the socialism of the previous generation, and Israel.  Many scholars 
have pointed out that there were no questions specifically about the Holocaust, and few of the 
thirty-one participants spoke about it (Sundquist 205-6).  The subject was also found missing 
from a 1961 symposium of Jewish intellectuals, “My Jewish Affirmation” published in Judaism, 
where respondents who were asked questions like “What do you regard as centrally significant in 
Jewish tradition and presently viable?” made no reference to the Holocaust (Sundquist 205). 
 
36Hannah Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem (1963) was also influential in awakening the guilt of 
the politically complacent American Jews in their protest to Nazism (Sundquist 205).  
 
37While Diner’s work presents an impressive archive of literature (both popular and scholarly), 
memorials, school curricula, and Holocaust observances, documenting that many events 
occurred in public and private spaces of Jewish life that provide evidence for her argument, they 
seem to have occurred at the margins of Jewish community life and do not necessarily contradict 
Novick’s and others’ claims that the majority of post-war American Jews, as a community, did 
not engage with the Holocaust.   
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example, Lawrence Langer argues that Malamud’s figurative representations of the atrocity fail 
to present an authentic representation of suffering experienced by Holocaust victims (145).  
Lillian Kremer objects, arguing, “although Bernard Malamud does not confront the Holocaust 
experience directly, his fiction is clearly haunted by the Holocaust.  His tales of postwar Jewish 
life are informed by Holocaust consciousness” (82).38   
This larger debate plays out in critical attention to “Lady of the Lake,” and discussions of 
the story’s Jewishness. Critics like Eileen Watts have read the story as a biblical allegory of the 
Akedah, the binding of Isaac (148).  Ezra Cappell is highly critical of Malamud’s symbolic 
Judaism that is based not on any religious system or traditional values, but rather on Malamud’s 
humanistic, ethical, ahistorical system (43-4).39  Cappell argues that Malamud’s work lacks a 
Jewish content and ultimately, Malamud’s Jews “cannot sustain the awesome responsibility of 
bearing witness to the Holocaust—the actual (and not symbolic) watershed event of the twentieth 
                                                
38For Kremer, the most successful stories are those that explore an American’s encounter with a 
survivor or refugee-mentor who initiates the innocent into Jewish history (Kremer 82).  The 
Holocaust survivor becomes the spiritual or historic mentor to an American Jew, who had been 
either uninterested in Jewish history or openly hostile to Jewish identity (Kremer 82-3).  What 
critics have tended to focus on is the minor presence of these survivor-mentor characters, rather 
than their pivotal position in their influence on self-denying or marginal American Jews (Kremer 
8). 
 
39Eileen Watts in “Not True Although Truth: The Holocaust’s Legacy in Three Malamud Stories” 
argues that the perceived difference in religion in “Lady of the Lake” heightens the sense of 
needless tragedy and allows Malamud to use romantic love as an allegory of the Akedah.  But in 
the biblical story, when something else (a ram) is sacrificed in place of the beloved, in 
Malamud’s version God fails to redeem Freeman because he lacks faith and is ashamed of his 
Judaism (Watts 148).  While Watts points out interesting parallels between the Akedah story and 
Henry’s encounters, the reading fails to account for much of the reality of Malamud’s text—the 
setting of Italy, the presence of history, and the genre of romance. 
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century” (42).40  While these arguments are not explicitly directed against fantasy in Malamud’s 
work, they distill the consensus that any abstraction—here, in the form the symbolic—is an 
insufficient mode of Holocaust representation.  
  This criticism is often connected to Malamud’s interest in the way that human 
experiences (belief, suffering, trauma) define Jewishness;41 that is, Manischevitz in “Angel 
Levine” discovers that he is a Jew because he believes—not that he is a Jew, and therefore, 
believes.  Malamud’s stories are at once particular to the immigrant experience and the human 
experience.  As Jhumpa Lahiri writes in her Introduction to a recently published edition of the 
stories, “to deem this astonishing book ‘immigrant fiction’ would be inaccurate and absurd. 
What Malamud locates about the immigrant experience—a sense of loss, of struggle, of wanting 
what we cannot have—constitutes the nuts and bolts of all dramatic fiction” (x).  There are 
advantages to this kind of universalizing tied to the humanity of all dramatic fiction and revealed 
narratively through the aesthetics of fantasy and indirection.  In fact, contra to Langer’s 
argument, universalizing describes the way in which J.R.R. Tolkien abstracts his experiences of 
war to a separate narrative world as he does in Lord of the Rings.42  Inverting the relationship 
between what is perceived as “real” and “escapist,” Tolkien underscores this kind of 
universalizing move characteristic of his fantasy: “The notion that motor-cars are more ‘alive’ 
                                                
40Cappell argues that rather than centralize divine law or a covenantal or traditional Jewish value 
system that has sustained the Jewish community for thousands of years, Malamud places 
Isabella’s immediate past and her suffering at the center of Judaism (42). 
 
41Regarding his statement “All men are Jews,” Malamud explains, “I never expected anyone to 
take it literally.  It’s a symbolic way of showing how history, sooner or later, treats us all” (qtd. 
in Avery xv). 
 
42For more on this argument, please see Michael Livingston’s “The Shell-shocked Hobbit: The 
First World War and Tolkien’s Trauma of the Ring” in Mythlore.  
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than, say, horses is pathetically absurd.  How real, how startling alive is a factory chimney 
compared with an elm-tree: poor obsolete thing, insubstantial dream of an escapist!” (57).  As 
Tolkien complicates the idea that there is a definitive line between epistemologies of realism and 
fantasy, his schemata presents the aesthetics that come to characterize the same notion in the 
Malamud’s stories as well as the works of Nathan Englander and the Coen brothers that I will 
explore in chapter four.   
Building on the validity of fantasy as a mode of mediating the real of historical trauma, 
A.S. Byatt’s “The Thing in The Forest,” a short story from her collection The Little Black Book 
of Stories (2004), blends the absurd with the real to describe the experience of two little girls, 
Penny and Primrose, during their evacuation from wartime London to the safety of the country.  
Together, the girls encounter a hideous monster-dragon that is at once tubular, worm-like, and 
disgusting.  In the description of the Thing, fantasy and abstraction to embody the reality of 
death and war (14-5): “its colour was the colour of flayed flesh, pitted with wormholes, its 
expression was neither wrath nor greed, but pure misery” (14).  The Thing destroys everything in 
its path, including a child who is also an evacuee, and leaves behind “bloody slime and dead 
foliage, sucked to dry skeletons” (17).  As Alexa Alfer remarks, when the women meet as adults, 
the women’s encounter with the Thing is discussed in terms of reality, not fantasy (117).  “Well, 
we know we’re not mad, anyway” they confer, “we saw it,” and thus, fantasy becomes an 
authentic mode of expressing trauma rather than an escape from it (24-5).  This shared traumatic 
memory haunts the women well into adulthood. Penny becomes a psychologist, and returns to 
the forest certain that she can re-experience her childhood trauma, while Primrose becomes a 
storyteller and creates a children’s tale based on the encounter (in fact, it is the very story the 
reader holds in her hand).  Except, Primrose’s approach is elevated in terms of success.  
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Primrose’s tales are much in demand, as she knows how to offer the children “just a frisson of 
fear and terror that made them wriggle with pleasure” (19).  Their two career paths reflect both 
the antirealist and realist approaches to trauma as vital and valid representational analytics 
(Traumatic Realism 3-4).  
Delusions of History: The Fantasy of Italy in “Lady of the Lake” and “The Last Mohican”  
The disruptive moment of seeing—enabled by fantasy—is also central to climactic 
moment of “The Last Mohican,” when Fidelman, a self-proclaimed student of Giotto, finally 
grasps the meaning of the paintings that he has been studying all along (a moment that will be 
discussed later on in this chapter). Susskind is not characterized as an angel, but he is described 
as a man “instead of” an angel (162); mythic and ghostly tropes penetrate Susskind's character.  
In Rome, Fidelman tries to do as the Romans do, but he cannot escape Susskind, who 
miraculously knows Fidelman's whereabouts and appears out of nowhere.  One evening about a 
week after his arrival, Fidelman is immersed in work in his hotel room and is surprised to look 
up and find Susskind at the door: “and though the student, immersed in his work, was not 
conscious he had said ‘Avanti,’ he must have, for the door opened and instead of an angel, in 
came Susskind in his shirt and baggy knickers” (162).  Fidelman imagines Susskind as a “clever 
ghost,” (170) one whose miraculous appearances and disappearances are associated with the 
presence of angels or “about to burst into flight” (159).   
The tropes of fantasy intermingle with refugee aesthetics—the fact that Susskind does not 
have any documentation, for example, also makes him “ghostly.”  Appearing out of nowhere, 
Susskind’s existence is untraceable.  When Fidelman is dismayed by Susskind's refusal to seek 
charity or return to Israel, he discovers that Susskind has lost his passport:  
“Under such circumstances,” Fidelman asks, “How do you live?”  
“How do I live?” He chomped with his teeth. “I eat air.” 
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“Seriously?”  
“Seriously, on air. I also peddle,” he confessed. . . (164).  
 
Susskind embodies the luftmensch, a Yiddish term from the German luft, or “air,” that indicates 
an impractical person or someone whose head is in the clouds.  Ethereal in appearance and living 
on air, Susskind has no record at the Israeli consulate.  Fidelman also discovers that Susskind's 
address registered at the Joint Distribution Committee is impossible—the building has long been 
torn down (172).  Initially bothered by Susskind's lurking presence, Fidelman becomes obsessed 
with locating Susskind when he seems to have disappeared; Fidelman lives in a constant 
paranoia of feeling Susskind's gaze or trying to will him into existence.  In turn, Fidelman often 
thinks he sees Susskind but doesn’t; Susskind is everywhere and nowhere.   
 In addition to the ghostly Isabella of “Lady of the Lake” and Susskind of “The Last 
Mohican,” the stories’ play with irony continues to blur the boundary between fantasy and reality.  
The trope of the innocent traveler abroad, for example, invokes the trope of the American Adam 
only to thwart its fulfillment and reveal its fantastical quality.  In “Lady of the Lake,” the trope’s 
failure also foreshadows the failures of Freeman’s romantic dreams.  Freeman travels with 
excited expectancy for the future, the newness and the “possible combinations” (105) that his 
sojourn in Paris and Italy offers.  The direction of his journey from the U.S. to Europe of course 
ironically coincides with the mass exodus of Jews eager to start a new life outside of Europe.  
Malamud overtly identifies Freeman with the American Adam, the figure popularized through R. 
W. B. Lewis’s attention to the writers of the American Renaissance.  In this context, the 
American Adam is 
[T]he hero of the new adventure: an individual emancipated from history, happily 
bereft of ancestry, untouched and undefiled by the usual inheritances of family 
and race; an individual standing alone, self-reliant and self-propelling…. Adam 
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was the first, the archetypal, man. His moral position was prior to experience, and 
in his very newness he was fundamentally innocent. (Lewis 5)43   
 
However, as the outcome of the story reveals, Freeman ultimately fails as a Jewish American 
Adam “happily bereft of ancestry” (5).  Even Freeman pauses to identify the ludicrous nature of 
his dream to remake himself in Italy: “Freeman still hoped for what he hadn’t, what few got in 
the world and many dared not think of; to wit, love, adventure, freedom” (106).  Freeman 
considers how silly the notion sounds as he reflects on their seeming impossibility. “Alas, the 
words by now sounded slightly comical,” he notes, and the story reveals the trope’s limitations 
for a Jewish American protagonist as it underscores its absurd qualities.  
 Like the assimilated Freeman, Fidelman arrives in Rome as a figure of an American 
Adam dressed in new clothes and dissociated from his own culture and history; like “Lady of the 
Like,” there is something out of touch about this trope inserted into this particular landscape (in 
other words, it fails in this story as well).  Fidelman is eager to embrace the new—to a fault—
and despite the heat he perspires through his new tweed suit and refuses to wear the lighter suit 
in his luggage (156).  Also new are his “gum-soled oxblood shoes” and a “pigskin leather brief 
case” (156).  Despite his fresh appearance, Fidelman is not so easily free of his “bulky” past, 
which causes him shame (156): “His suitcase, a bulky, two-strapped affair which embarrassed 
him slightly, he had borrowed from his sister Bessie” (154-5).  When his manuscript is stolen, 
Fidelman tries to recreate the initial chapter “which he felt sure he knew by heart” in order to 
write his second, which continuously eludes him (172).  The ironic pun on “heart” (rote 
                                                
43In a 1974 interview, Malamud shared, “I’ve been ‘influenced’ by Hawthorne,” and later 
observed, “I believe that the link with Hawthorne exists” (Conversations 49).  In response to 
Malamud’s use of dark, sometimes somber morality and propensity for allegory, he has been 
referred to as the “Jewish Hawthorne” (Shechner 48). 
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memorization, passion) reinforces Fidelman's emotional distance from his work.  He cannot 
move forward “because he was lost without a beginning. . . always Fidelman needed something 
solid behind him before he could advance, some worthwhile accomplishment upon which to 
build another” (172).  Fidelman “needed something solid behind him” yet denies his past; as 
such, the figure of the Jewish American Adam that Fidelman embodies again becomes a catch-
22.  
 In addition to his characterization as an American Adam, Fidelman also voices narratives 
of individual rights and responsibilities.  Channeling an American ethos of individualism, 
Fidelman asks, “Am I responsible for you then, Susskind?” (165).  Susskind responds, “Who 
else?. . . You know what responsibility means?. . . “Then you are responsible. Because you are a 
man. Because you are a Jew, aren't you?” (165).  Wedded to his American notions of self-
reliance, Fidelman quips that he's not the “only one,” nor can he take on everybody's personal 
burden.  His journey is marked by an American mythos seemingly irreconcilable with tzedakah 
or Jewish charitable practice. Touting American ideologies of rights and responsibility, Fidelman 
says, “To my mind you are utterly irresponsible and I won't be saddled with you.  I have the right 
to choose my own problems and the right to my privacy” (168).  
As Freeman attempts to pass as a gentile and an American Adam, ultimately failing on 
both accounts, the story tries on various generic forms in an attempt to pass as something it is 
not; alongside Freeman, these tropes inevitably fail as the narrative cannot fully masquerade as 
something other than what it is—a story about the Holocaust.  When Levin changes his name to 
Freeman and leaves New York “seeking romance” (105), he embarks on a quest narrative that 
echoes those of Arthurian Romance—an explicitly non-Jewish genre already signaled by the 
story’s title.  And when he ultimately fails (or, just before, when Isabella reveals her 
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impoverished origins), “He called himself a damn fool for making up damn fairy tales—Freeman 
in love with the Italian Aristocracy” (130).  “Lady of the Lake” stems first from the Welsh 
legend “Lady of Little Fan Lake,” whose roots lie in the ancient mythology of the continental 
Celts (O’Valle 57).  Violet O’Valle speculates that since the Celts have always worshipped water 
deities, it seems probable that the Lake Lady found in the legends was, in ancient times, a 
goddess (57).  However, as time passed she was diminished, first to a supernatural being 
dwelling under the lake (the Celtic Other World) and, ultimately, to a fairy maiden (O’Valle 
57).44  The Lady of the Lake also appears in legends surrounding King Arthur, made famous by 
Sir Thomas Malory’s fifteenth-century compilation Le Morte D’Arthur, and revisited by many 
since, perhaps most notably by Sir Walter Scott in his eponymous poem published in 1810.  In 
line with the romantic heroes of the past, Freeman seeks fulfillment even if he doesn’t quite 
know what form it will take. 
The story presents a number of magical qualities surrounding Isabella, the lake, and Isola 
del Dongo.  Freeman perceives the island in terms of its sublime “awe and beauty,” and the 
narrator remarks that Isola del Dongo is most associated with an edenic paradise not of this 
world: “the vegetation lush” with “wilder, exotic birds flying around” (108-9).  “The long blue 
lake, sometimes green, sometimes gold” (106) magically changes color; it is variously described 
as “golden-blue” (110) and also appears black (109).  The presence of Isabella is part fairy tale 
and part Freeman’s imagination, resulting in a serious of impossible contradictions that reflects 
her mysterious aura.  Isabella is described as both “elusive” and “evanescent” (121), her 
                                                
44O’Valle explains that the most widely known version of the legend is the one collected by 
William Rees from various sources in 1841.  It was first published in an obscure book by John 
Pughe called The Physicians of Mydvai in 1861 and then popularized by John Rhys’s definitive 
work Celtic Folklore (1901). Malamud is indebted to the legend as it appears in Rhys’s text 
(O’Valle 57-8). 
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comings-and-goings associated with the island’s mist (108).  She appears transparent in her 
association with the fairy maiden of Arthurian legend—“Her past he could see boiling in her all 
the way back to the knights of old, and then some” (115)—yet approaches love with “opaque 
mystery” (121).   
The romantic sensibility of Freeman’s perceptions heightens the in-betwenness of this 
not-quite-fantasy and not-quite-reality world.  Reflecting on his own poem, Scott observed that 
unlike a realistic novel, romance is “a fictitious narrative in prose or verse: the interest of which 
turns upon marvelous and uncommon incidents” (qtd. in Stewart 5).  In the most important of the 
four plots in Scott’s poem that invoked sixteenth-century Scotland, King James V crosses from 
the Lowlands into the Highlands, where much that would appear abnormal in the Lowlands 
becomes natural (Stewart 5).  Supernatural overtones imply a mythological level of meaning in 
the poem; narratives of shape-shifting accompany the main adventure story as men transform 
into animals to disguise their authentic selves (Stewart 5).   
Similarly, Freeman tries his hand at shape-shifting, but does not fully succeed.  In the 
same way that Freeman fails to fully embody the American Adam trope, the narrative falls short 
of fully inhabiting the romance genre.  While he signs his real name, Levin, on the pensione’s 
ledger on the mainland, he is stopped by the lake patrol while rowing back to Stresa and is 
“compelled to show his passport” (116).  And when Ernesto catches Freeman absconding from 
the group tour of Isola del Dongo, he tellingly yells “Transgressor” (114).  But like the thwarted 
invocations of the romance genre or allusions to the American Adam, the paradigm of shape-
shifting does not successfully translate in Malamud’s version of “The Lady of the Lake”; while 
Freeman desperately rows against the rocky waves as he crosses to Isola del Dongo, he never 
fully leaves Levin behind.  The story plays with generic tropes, but unlike the contemporary set 
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of Jewish American texts, these tropes frequently fail; in so doing, “Lady of the Lake” inhabits a 
mysterious space between the American Adam and the un-American Adam, Levin and Freeman, 
romance and not-romance.  Both the uncertainty of the fantastic and thwarted tropes characterize 
the liminality of the story, as genre play raises broader questions of Jewish ethnicity and 
assimilation.     
Certain elements of the romance genre fail to transpire in Malamud’s text, revealing the 
intersection of Jewish cultural history and genre play in the story.  While romance is not a central 
trope of Judaism, it is central to Yiddish folklore.  In Unheroic Conduct, Daniel Boyarin (1997) 
describes the traditional traits of the European Romantic hero as those antithetical to the male 
ideal of the Jewish scholar (78).  Boyarin refers to all of those traits that in European culture 
have defined a man as manly—physical strength, martial activity and aggressiveness, wild 
pleasure in physicality, fierce attachment to nature and to locale, healthy body, and hard work—
as part of romance, medieval tradition, and what Jews had derisively referred to as “goyim 
naches,” meaning a mode of entertainment or pleasure favored by goyim or non-Jews (i.e., no 
Jew would it find entertaining or pleasurable) (78).  In fact, it is the romantic ideology of 
manliness that Boyarin points out as the ultimate goyim naches, the antithesis of those 
characteristics of humility, hard work, and diligent study valued in the mensch (79).  Freeman’s 
shortcomings as a romantic hero, even physically (“well-proportioned” but a “bit short” (112)), 
further establish the incongruity of the Jew as a romancer.  While at first it appears he will 
uphold the tradition through the rescue of his beloved, who is in fact imprisoned on an island, it 
is Freeman in the end who needs rescuing, not from his romantic shortcomings, but rather, from 
his lack of embrace of them, which is a lack of embrace of his Jewishness.  
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In addition to the genre mixing that characterizes “Lady of the Lake,” ironic play in both 
of the Italy stories deepens to reveal that for these failed American Adams, the task of imagining 
themselves into Italian history is in fact an absurd undertaking.  (Later chapters will extend both 
the notions of ironic play and the absurdity of history). “Imagine . . . Imagine all that history,” 
Fidelman contemplates when he arrives in Rome (156).  But what, in fact, is Fidelman 
imagining?  Is it possible to “imagine all that history” ? (156).  Later in the story Fidelman 
reflects on history’s intangible, fantasy-like qualities, as well as the wonder that he himself 
should be found within it: “it is an inspiring business” that he, a failed painter from the Bronx, 
should be “walking around in all this history” (162).  The vacant, mysterious historical 
sensibility becomes part of Fidelman’s refrain.  Again, he comments, “History [is] mysterious, 
the remembrance of things unknown, in a way burdensome, in a way a sensuous experience.  It 
uplifted and depressed, why he did not know” (162).  While Fidelman is in Italy, this sense of 
fantasy actually refers to both Italian and Jewish history.  At once “burdensome” and a “sensuous 
experience,” this is an empty reflection.  
Both protagonists’ perceptions of Italy are clouded by their delusions; Italy serves as an 
overtly romanticized backdrop in both texts.  Part of Susskind’s motivation, which Fidelman of 
course cannot see, is to help Fidelman—to enable him to see the world as it really is so that he 
can create his brilliant manuscript on Giotto.  “The words were there but the spirit was missing,” 
Susskind relays, explaining why he did Fidelman the favor of burning his manuscript on Giotto.  
When he arrives In Rome, Fidelman so desperately wants to claim Italy and Italian history for 
himself that he tries to insert a version of himself into “all that history” (156).  He sees himself, 
“outside and in, not without bittersweet pleasure; and [as] the well-known image of his face rose 
before him” (156).  The act of imagining bcomes a mode of cultural identification for Fidelman, 
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or at least expresses Fidelman’s desire to be identified with Italian culture; ironically, it is in this 
same moment of Fidelman’s “imagining” when Susskind immediately perceives Fidelman as a 
Jew.  Walter Benn Michaels’ work on cultural identity dramatizes the irony of this moment.  
Reflecting on the cultural import of slavery in African American history, Walter Benn Michaels 
argues that “cultural identities, whether African American or Jewish American, derived from 
imagined relationships with historical events are neither desirable nor inescapable” (qtd. in 
Flanzbaum 17).45  Michaels’s account creates an anti-essential Jewishness such that it is possible 
“to define the Jew not as someone who has Jewish blood or who believes in Judaism but as 
someone who, having experienced the Holocaust, can—even if he or she was never there—
acknowledge it as part of her history” (Sundquist 460).  Thus, in this opportunitisic moment to 
acknowledge the Holocaust as part of his history, Fidelman turns away: “my first hello in Rome 
and it has to be a schnorrer,” he laments (157).  
 Fidelman is quick to admire the “eternal” status of ancient Rome; however, Fidelman 
fails to recognize his relationship to Jewish history would predate that of the Roman Empire.  
While he obsessively studies the work of a fourteenth century Catholic painter, he flippantly 
dismisses the details of Fidelman’s narrative of Jewish suffering as “so long ago” (158).  
Furthermore, the story mocks Fidelman's reverence of Italian civilization through his reference to 
Diocletian, a Roman emperor notorious for his cruelty; in his religious persecution of Christians, 
he fed them to lions.  As Fidelman stands in awe of a great persecutor, Fidelman senses 
                                                
45Sundquist remarks of Michaels’s argument, “the opposite is also true: Jews who forget their 
Jewishness, like Jews who assimilate to the point of apostasy, and stop thinking of themselves as 
Jews, “are therefore collaborators in the work of Hitler” (460).  According to this argument, 
cultural genocide and physical genocide become equivalent (460).   
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Susskind’s gaze and identifies him as “a stranger—give a skeleton a couple of pounds—loitering 
near a bronze statue on a stone pedestal of the heavy-dugged Etruscan wolf suckling the infant 
Romulus and Remus” (156).  A haggardly portrait of the undead, Susskind stands by a statue of 
the Capitoline wolf, an image associated with the legend of the founding of Rome.  An outcast 
and oddly dressed in comparison to Fidelman's seamless appearance, Susskind stands before a 
sign of humanity and the birth of civilization, while Fidelman sees but fails to see what is in front 
of him as he blindly reveres one of its persecutors.  
Fidelman’s inability to see the Etruscan wolf suckling Romulus and Remus; the 
reverence he pays to the Baths of Diocletian; and the flippancy with which he dismisses the 
refugee’s historical displacement and Holocaust experience reveal an American Jew out of touch 
with reality.  It is a lot easier for an American Jew to identify with the romanticized and 
mythologized Italy than it is to recognize the present poverty of the country recovering from 
fascism and World War II, which would in turn necessitate Fidelman’s uncomfortable 
recognition of his own relationship to the destruction.  He wants to align himself with the victors 
of European conquest—with the Diocletuses of the world—and he tells Fidelman, “I express 
myself best in English,” not Yiddish, as he associates himself with the more dominant tongue 
(157).  As Kathleen Oschorn argues, Malamud’s Americans abroad appear more “sheltered, 
cushioned” from life’s hardships, especially in comparison to the impoverished Italians and their 
stratified world (59).   
Freeman and Fidelman are both guilty of failing to comprehend the reality of the 
circumstances of a people who, because of war and poverty, fail to resemble dreams of an ideal 
Italy—in Freeman’s case, his desire to join a noble Catholic family.  Isabella, the fantastic 
character in “Lady of the Lake,” attempts to get Fidelman to see what is already manifest—their 
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likeness as Jews, her poverty, the country’s suffering—but in this case the American protagonist 
is so deluded by his own fantasies that Isabella is no match for them.  As Kremer points out, 
Freeman’s aesthetic blindness corresponds to his moral blindness (83).  The Italian islands 
provide the perfect backdrop for this aesthetic and moral confusion; as Freeman observes, “the 
islands, beautiful from afar, up close were so much stage scenery” (107).  But even as he learns 
more of the true history surrounding Isola del Dongo, his perception remains clouded.  When 
Isabella leads Freeman through a tour of the estate, she begins to point out the real nature of the 
stage scenery all around him.  She explains that “no one is sure” if Napoleon really slept on the 
island as the family showcases to tourists (122).  Freeman responds, “Oh ho, a trick” to which 
Isabella explains, “We often pretend. . . this is a poor country” (122).  Freeman is dismayed to 
learn that the walls are covered in fake paintings.  “Isabella pointed out the Titians, Tintorettos, 
Bellinis, making Freeman breathless; then at the door of the room she turned with an 
embarrassed smile and said that most of the paintings in the gallery were copies” (123).  At first 
shocked, Freeman then becomes depressed: “. . . I couldn’t tell the fake from the real,” he 
confesses (123).  In this moment, Freeman’s sadness over the fake paintings anticipates his own 
shame in masquerading as a deceptively authentic version of himself.   
Even as Isabella reveals the impoverished origins of the island’s history and art, as well 
as the truth of her own background, Freeman’s reality continues to be shaped by his fairy tale 
romance.  He acknowledges the trickery but is quick to cast it aside or delude himself otherwise.  
For example, as he ponders Isabella’s question, “are you, perhaps, a Jew?” he dismisses it for 
being haphazard, “perhaps a queer thought that for no good reason impulsively entered her mind.  
And because it was queer, his answer, without elaboration, was sufficient.  With ancient history 
why bother?” (115).  Both Freeman and Fidelman are quick to manipulate the recent past so that 
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they may safely disregard it as “ancient history,” as the stories offer a subtle critique of 
assimilation and the extent to which delusion must factor in one’s blindness.  The protagonists 
worship the colossal stature of European grandeur without a second thought, blindly elevating it 
to mythic status.   
Freeman chooses not to observe or heed many of the signs that fail to align with “the 
island of his dreams” (116).  He ignores the padrona’s advice when she tells him not to get 
involved with anyone on the island, because “the family had a perfidious history and was known 
for its deceit and trickery” (117). Yet when he is startled to realize that Ernesto, the tour guide, 
was also sent by Isabella as his escort, he conjures strange, irrational explanations for Ernesto’s 
presence: “probably a major domo in the palazzo, long with the family,” Freeman thinks (117).  
He continues to take note of the rickety boat—he had expected a “ritzy launch”—but does not 
seem to think anything of it; Ernesto smelled freshly of garlic; he seemed tired; he was wearing a 
black felt hat and was bald, he looked “surprisingly old” (117-18).  Not knowing their relation to 
Isabella, he refers to Ernesto and Isabella’s brother Giacobbe as having “dark eyes and greedy 
beaks, a pair of odd birds” (118), utterly dissimilar to the “loveliness” with which he paints 
Isabella’s portrait—“the large brown eyes,” “sweet slender brows,” flowery red lips (113).  But 
when he learns of Isabella’s true origins, the same faces of Isabella and Giacobbe “were alike as 
the proverbial peas—two dark Italian faces, the Middle Ages looking out of their eyes” (130).    
Isabella is often found next to or sitting near marble or stone, elves, or other pagan statues, and 
the narrator frequently describes her inhabiting a space between art and reality, which is further 
complicated by the free indirect discourse.  When Isabella enters the text, the narrator notes “it 
had momentarily seemed as though a statue had come to life” (109), and when she exits the 
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narrative Freeman is left clutching “moonlit stone” (133).  Freeman’s desire—for Isabella, to 
escape his past—in part animates this transformation from stone to life.  
 It is not entirely clear how much Freeman senses and imagines versus sees and knows.   
Freeman first senses Isabella’s beauty rather than sees it directly.  The narrator describes how 
Freeman realizes “a woman was standing this side of a low marble wall, watching the water” 
(109), and while Freeman cannot see her face “he sensed she was young” (109).  Again, in line 
with his fantasy, “he imagined someone waiting for her lover and was tempted to speak to her” 
(109).  Even upon his second encounter with Isabella, when the haze in front of Freeman’s eyes 
evaporates and he realizes he isn’t dreaming, Isabella is described as a statue, a sexualized 
Botticelli’s Venus (112).  “Mama, what a queenly high-assed form,” he considers, noting that 
“her dark, sharp Italian face had that quality of beauty which holds the mark of history, the 
beauty of a people and a civilization” (112).  We see the same colonialist impulses in Freeman’s 
desire to both conquer this history through acquisition (Freeman sexualizes Isabella, objectifies 
her) and imagine himself into it by marrying into the Italian aristocracy.   
 Similar to Fidelman’s mediation, “imagine all that history,” Freeman considers her 
physical difference in terms of imagined history: “her past he could see boiling in her all the way 
to the knights of old, and then some” (115, emphasis mine). Each effort Freeman makes to 
pursue his “fairy tale” of falling in love with the Italian aristocracy is met with an undercurrent 
of irony: Freeman worships the art and culture of the notoriously anti-Semitic Roman 
civilization; he reads “with fascination about the del Dongos in all the local guide books” but is 
seemingly clueless and uninterested in the recent atrocity of modern Europe; and of course, he 
remains blind to the difference that actually marks his Jewish kinship with Isabella.  He is even 
thwarted when he attempts to make contact with this “reality” by touching; when Freeman 
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reaches out to touch the counterpane protecting Napoleon’s bed, Ernesto pokes him with his cane 
(110).  
It is not until the final, momentous scene that Freeman’s reality and his perception of it 
align.  Freeman finds Isabella standing in the garden: “Isabella, God bless her, was standing at 
the low wall among the moonlit statuary: stags, tigers and unicorns, poets and painters, 
shepherds with pipes, and playful shepherdesses, gazing at the light shimmering on the water” 
(131).  Freeman offers a Christian-like benediction “God bless her” (131) amidst this edenic 
setting filled with pastoral signs of a pagan past.  When Freeman lies to Isabella for the last time, 
eschewing his Jewishness, she unbuttons her blouse, and “to [Freeman’s] horror he discerned 
tattooed on the soft and tender flesh a bluish line of distorted numbers” (132).  Here Freeman 
does not dream, imagine, discount, or dismiss—he sees and groans, not at the question of his 
being a Jew, but “incensed at the cruelty, stunned by the desecration” (132).   
When Freeman responds, “—You? Oh, God, why did you keep this from me, too?” it is 
ambiguous whether Freeman is acknowledging his relationship with God, or, if it is another 
instance of his irreverence.  If the former, then he may share in Isabella’s respect for the past.  
Freeman’s delusions, his love affair with the Italian aristocracy, the instances of fantasy and 
dreaming that color his vision of the Isola del Dongo, are perhaps less an escape from reality 
than they are a deflection of his own past.  There remains an unexplained, bizarre instance in the 
story that may indicate his experience and Isabella’s are less distinct than the story presents.  
When Freeman first travels to Italy from France, he has an inexplicably anxious reaction to his 
train ride: “He boarded the Milan express, and after Dijon, developed a painful, palpitating 
anxiety.  This grew so troublesome that he had serious visions of leaping off the train, but reason 
prevailed and he rode on.  Nearing Stresa, . . . [He] pulled his suitcase off the rack and hurriedly 
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left the train.  He at once felt better” (106).  And in a story where Freeman’s rationalizations and 
musings propel the plot, this episode is curiously under explained except for the indication that 
Freeman, “being a nature lover,” was inclined to disembark (106).  Trying to abandon Holocaust 
tropes? Given this strange episode, fantasy perhaps becomes a rational deflection of Freeman’s 
own trauma, of something hauntingly real in his past.   
The confusion of aesthetic and moral blindness also plagues Fidelman, who, like 
Freeman, fails to see the reality of what is in front of him.  As it emphasizes the role of art, “The 
Last Mohican” grapples more metafictionally than the other stories with knowledge and 
intersubjective communication in a post-Holocaust reality.  Fidelman believes he can come to 
know or master Giotto through diligent study and an ambitious schedule that “made the most of 
his working hours” (161).  Thus, Fidelman and Susskind are separated not only by their 
relationship to history, but also by the gap between knowing Giotto by critical study versus 
emotional experience.  For Fidelman, knowing takes shape through a Protestant work ethic, 
whereas for Fidelman, knowledge is equal to experience.  The disconnect first arises when 
Fidelman explains to Susskind the purpose of his trip: 
“As for a project, I'm writing on the painter Giotto.  He was one of the most important—” 
“You don't have to tell me about Giotto,” Susskind interrupted with a little smile. 
“You've studied his work?” 
“Who doesn’t know Giotto?” 
That's interesting to me," said Fidelman, secretly irritated. "How do you happen to know 
him?” 
“How do you?" 
“I've given a good deal of time and study to his work.”  
“So I know him too.” (159)  
 
Fidelman equates knowing with arduous study—proof in the form of hours—while Susskind's 
telling smile intimates his knowledge need not be explained in language.  There is also a way in 
which Susskind’s retort, “who doesn’t know Giotto?,” scoffs at Fidelman’s sense that his idea to 
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arrive in Italy and study the painter is anything other than trite.  The fact that Fidelman is 
“secretly irritated” reflects his self-interest in this privileged endeavor, thus gesturing towards the 
broader insularity of American Jewish preoccupations.   
 Fidelman turns the experience of knowing art into labor: “Mornings he usually visited the 
Italian libraries, searching their catalogues and archives, read in poor light, and made profuse 
notes” and returns in the afternoon guided by “lists of frescoes and paintings he must see” (162).  
But does Fidelman actually see the frescoes and paintings?  He withholds pleasure and emotion 
when directing his course of study, even promising he could return in the spring and “look at 
anything he pleased” (161).  This detachment extends to Fidelman's relationship to history, 
which “excited his thoughts more than he thought good for him” as the narrative emphasizes 
Fidelman’s emotional repression (162).  Excitement, he thinks, is acceptable for a creative artist, 
“but less so for a critic” (162).   
 If it is the presence of an angel that shocks Manischevitz into the present in “Angel 
Levine,” over the course of the story, the ghostly presence of Susskind coupled with Fidelman’s 
dream allow Fidelman to see what is already present.  Fidelman’s first dream of chasing the 
elusive Susskind through the Jewish catacombs under the ancient Appian Way leads him to 
wander through the city streets in reality as he searches for Susskind among the peddlers.  
Weighted Jewish symbols in his dreams, like the “seven flamed-candelabrum he clutched in his 
hand,” begin to lead him astray while awake as Fidelman finds himself in the synagogue or 
reading a Jewish tombstone (170).  Instead of scheduled tours of the Vatican Museum and the 
library, his search for Susskind for the first time finds him off course and “wandering aimlessly” 
in Rome (174).  “Where in the world am I?” (174), he thinks when he stumbles into a synagogue 
on Shabbat evening service.  In this mode of awareness that eschews Fidelman’s rational 
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approach to “knowing Giotto,” Fidelman encounters a different Rome where his relationship to 
temporality and history, previously detached, begins to change.  In the synagogue, a beadle tells 
him through bleary eyes, “My own son—killed in the Ardeatine Caves” (174).  The Fosse 
Ardeatine, or Ardeatine Caves, were the remnants of ancient Christian catacombs and site of a 
brutal murder of 330 victims, including a number of Italian prisoners already sentenced to death 
and 57 Jewish prisoners held at the Roman prison of Regina Coeli, the same prison that held the 
group marked for murder (Holocaust).  Fidelman’s emotional recognition of the beadle’s trauma 
marks a turning point; instead of flippantly discounting the beadle’s experience, Fidelman 
professes empathy: “Ah, for that I’m sorry,” he responds (17).   
 He heeds the beadle's directive to “look again” in the ghetto, where he meets a “thin-
faced” boy who tells him that Susskind is sometimes found praying for the dead in the cemetery.  
In a gesture of thanks, “Fidelman bought him a quick banana” (176).  Seemingly insignificant, 
the gift reveals Fidelman’s changing relationship to charity and human suffering.  Earlier in the 
story, when Fidelman senses Susskind’s hunger, he asks if he would like a bowl of spaghetti.  
But Susskind must refuse the offer according to the premise of Jewish charity or tzedakah that 
permits him to accept only what is given—one cannot beg or request.46  But this time, Fidelman 
does not pose his tzedakah in the form of a question and his charitable act moves from language 
to experience.  Fidelman then wanders through the Jewish section of the cemetery.  He proceeds 
to read “the stained stones, of those who, for one reason or another, had died in the late large war, 
including an empty place, it said under a six-pointed star engraved upon a marble slab that lay on 
the ground, for ‘My beloved father/ Betrayed by the damned Fascists/ Murdered at Auschwitz by 
the barbarous Nazis/ O Crime Orribile’” (176).  This fantasy space begins to close the gap 
                                                
46Susskind emphasizes the distinction between peddling and begging throughout the story. 
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between Fidelman and Susskind, the American Jew and the Holocaust refugee; the “empty place” 
of mourning and the vacant space of “all that history” begin to embody a Jewish specificity (156; 
176). When Fidelman first meets Susskind, he scoffs at how “long ago” whatever it is Susskind 
is running from occurred. But as Fidelman expresses sorrow to the rabbi, wanders among the 
dead, and reads the inscriptions on the tombstones, he perceives the reality of Jewish history in 
the context of Italy and responds with empathy. 
Three months pass as Fidelman searches in vain for Susskind and his manuscript. 
Malamud marks Fidelman’s final transformation through a dream sequence that blurs the 
boundaries between fantasy and reality.  In his dream, Fidelman wanders through an empty 
cemetery when Susskind appears to him in the form of a shade, Virgilio Susskind (181).  The 
ghost asks,  
 “Have you read Tolstoy?”  
 “Sparingly.”  
“Why is art?” asked the shade, drifting off.   
Fidelman, willy nilly, followed, and the ghost, as it vanished, led him up steps going 
through the ghetto and into a marble synagogue. (181) 
 
Still dreaming, Fidelman lies down on the warm stone floor and stares at the sunlit vault above, 
which reveals a fresco.  But before Fidelman names the painting in Italian (“San Francesco dona 
le vesti al cavaliere povero”), he perceives its sense of color, warmth, and meaning; in this 
moment, Fidelman finally sees Giotto’s work for what it really is: “Strangely warm,” the fresco 
revealed “this saint in fading blue, the sky flowing from his head, handing an old knight in a thin 
red robe his gold cloak.  Nearby stood a humble horse and two stone hills” (181).  The boundary 
between dreaming and reality is further effaced as “Fidelman awoke running,” packing his blue 
gabardine into a bag and next delivering it to Susskind's door (181).   
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 Likened to Virgil of Dante's Divine Comedy, Virgilio Susskind serves as a thematic 
reminder of redemption and the soul’s journey toward God underway.  The shade’s question, 
“Why is Art?,” adapts the title of Leo Tolstoy's 1899 essay, “What is Art?,” in which Tolstoy 
argues that in order to consider art one of the conditions of human life, one must abandon the 
idea that art should yield pleasure (40).  In this essay, Tolstoy remarks that most art created by 
those, like Giotto, who would be considered great masters, is actually not great art (194).  
Furthermore, Tolstoy argues that those critics who attempt to apply rational criteria (this brings 
to mind Fidelman and his lists) to a medium that is supposed to elicit a feeling are misguided 
(95).  For Tolstoy, art is one of “the means of intercourse between man and man,” that is, art has 
a social function (47). The experience of art is thus based on “the capacity of man to receive 
another man's expression of feeling and experience those feelings himself” (48).47  It is in this 
way that the reader finds Fidelman knocking on Susskind's door, blue gabardine in hand, because 
he has finally received a transmission of feeling tzedakah through Giotto's fresco depicting St. 
Francis of Assisi giving his cloak to an old knight.   
This concept of art as part and parcel of inter-subjective experience is extended by John 
Dewey’s “Art As Experience,” wherein Dewey attempts to shift the emphasis of what is 
important about art away from its physical presence in the “expressive object” and instead focus 
on art as the development of an experience or process: “...works of art are the most intimate and 
                                                
47In contrast to the activity of understanding, for example the sequence of knowledge that 
requires one first learn geometry before trigonometry, Tolstoy explains that the purpose of art “is 
to make that understood and felt, which, in the form of an argument, might be incomprehensible 
and inaccessible” (102).  Tolstoy uses the term “infection” throughout “What is Art?” in order to 
underscore art's role as a unifier of souls: “a real work of art destroys, in the consciousness of the 
receiver, the separation between himself and the artist--not that alone, but also between himself 
and all whose minds receive this work of art. . . If man is infected by the author's condition of 
soul, if he feels this emotion and this union with others, then the object which has effected this is 
art” (153).  Without such infection, there is no art (153).   
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energetic means of aiding individuals to share in the arts of living.  Civilization is uncivil 
because human beings are divided into non-communicating sects, races, nations, classes and 
cliques” (Dewey 336).  Part of this approach is embedded in what remains outside rational 
explanation.  Dewey addresses the intrusion of the supernatural into art, mythology, and religious 
ceremony and defends the need for mystery in addition to rationalism.48 He emphasizes that the 
imagination is a powerful tool to express experience, and like Tolstoy’s critique of the critic, 
Dewey expresses that rationality alone is not sufficient to understand or allow an enriched 
experience.  Like a religious experience, art appeals to sense and the sensuous imagination (22).  
Dewey closes his chapter on “The Live Creature and Ethereal Things” by quoting the famous 
line from Keats, “Beauty is truth, and truth beauty—that is all ye know on Earth, and all ye need 
to know” (32).  Dewey parses this line by addressing divine revelation and the import of the 
imagination in experience and art:   
Reasoning must fail man—this of course is the doctrine long taught by those who 
have held the necessity of divine revelation. Keats did not accept this supplement 
and substitute for reason. The insight of the imagination must suffice...ultimately 
there are but two philosophies. One of them accepts life and experience in all its 
uncertainty, mystery, doubt, and half knowledge and turns that experience upon 
itself to deepen and intensify its own qualities—to imagination and art. This is the 
philosophy of Shakespeare and Keats. (34)   
 
The emphasis on the fantasy tropes both enables this experience of “imagination and art” within 
the story to take place, allowing for Fidelman’s transformation, and self-consciously illustrates 
the necessity for “uncertainty” or “mystery” characteristic of the fantastic as a way of revealing 
authentic experience.  
                                                
48Keats’s emphasis is on the ethereal: “the Sun, the Moon, the Earth and its contents are material 
to form greater things, that is, ethereal things—greater things than the Creator himself has made” 
(qtd. in Dewey 18). 
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 Tolstoy's treatise on art centralizes the spirit of art when the historical conditions of past, 
present, and future call it into question.  As many scholars have indicated, “art” doubly refers to 
Fidelman himself in a play on “Arthur.”  The story’s metafictional quality, embedded in 
narrative layers of dreaming and intertextuality, questions the existence of the character Art 
Fidelman, the artistic merits of the story itself, and Malamud's own role as a post-Holocaust 
writer.  At the story’s close, Malamud affirms the inter-subjective experience of art/Art, yet 
leaves ambiguous the relationship between the American Jew and the Holocaust refugee.  When 
Fidelman discovers Susskind burning pages of his chapter for warmth, he finally “recalled in 
letters of fire his entire chapter” (181).  The moment is spiritual and bittersweet as Fidelman 
watches the angel-like Susskind take flight: “the refugee, light as the wind in his marvelous 
knickers, his green coattails flying, rapidly gained ground” (182).  Running through the medieval 
Jewish ghetto, Fidelman stops, crying.  While he has a “triumphant insight,” it perhaps occurs a 
moment too late:  
 “The suit is yours. All is forgiven.” 
“He came to a dead halt but the refugee ran on. When last seen he was still running” 
(182).   
 
But Malamud does not necessarily foreclose the possibility for redemption.  While at first only 
Susskind is associated with the mythical humanity surrounding the Etruscan wolf statue 
nurturing Romulus and Remus, Fidelman, finally having experienced St. Francis of Assisi's 
goodwill through the Giotto painting, cries not over his last chapter, but for his lost encounter 
with Susskind.  By story’s end,  Fidelman has internalized the warmth of the painting and 
acknowledged the specificity of a Jewish trauma in post-war Italy.    
Fantastic Spaces and Inter-ethnic Dialogue in Malamud’s Short Fiction 
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 Michael Rothberg’s “multidirectional memory” becomes an important analytic to 
determine the import of inter-ethnic dialogue in “The Last Mohican” and “Angel Levine.”  
In “The Last Mohican,” the figure of the American Indian transposed onto Susskind’s 
character—he is described as “bronzed,” alien, and foreign—becomes a means to discuss 
European Jews who need only state the names of “Germany, Hungary, Poland” to invoke 
narratives of suffering and persecution.  In “Angel Levine,” fantastic scenes create a space where 
African American suffering and Jewish suffering commingle.  Both stories rely on inter-ethnic 
American narratives to register Jewish suffering in a context recognizable and assimilable to an 
American and Jewish audience.  In the latter, the reader opens to find Manischevitz a victim of 
fire, familial loss, and thus, human suffering in comprehensible terms and ones susceptible to 
fictional representation, where cross-racial identification opens Jewish American suffering to the 
experience of another’s suffering.  In “Angel Levine,” movement from self-recognition to 
recognition of the other crosses racial lines, where accepting the ghostly intrusion pluralizes 
Jewish and African American suffering.  In Multidirectional Memory (2009), Rothberg asks 
what happens when histories of different groups confront each other in the public sphere (2).  
Rothberg critiques Walter Benn Michaels, who argues that “collective memory obeys a logic of 
scarcity,” meaning that if the Holocaust Museum sits on the National Mall in Washington, D.C., 
then “Holocaust memory must literally be crowding the memory of African American history 
out of the public space of American collective consciousness” (qtd. in Rothberg 2).  Against a 
framework that sees collective memory as a competitive struggle over a fixed quantity of 
resources, Rothberg argues that we should consider memory as multidirectional, which means 
“subject to ongoing negotiation, cross-referencing, and borrowing: as productive and not 
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privative” (3).  Rothberg continues, “this interaction of different historical memories illustrates 
the productive, intercultural dynamic” he calls multidirectional memory (3).   
 As Karen Polster has argued, the titles alone—“The Last Mohican” and “Lady of the 
Lake”—ironically invoke Western historical literary works to describe their protagonists’ desire 
to destroy their own history (64).  The title “The Last Mohican” does not merely reflect the 
protagonist’s desire to destroy history, but also, it illustrates how the American (Jewish) innocent 
abroad, like the American Adam, wishes to overwrite the history of certain minorities in 
romantic ways.  “The Last Mohican” recalls James Fenimore Cooper’s 1826 novel (and major 
motion picture based on the book), and the notion that Susskind is the last one left of his dying 
tribe of European Jewish refugees.  G. Harrison Orian’s term “cult of the vanishing American” 
arose as soon as Europeans arrived in America, revealing the fiction that the Native Americans 
were in a state of total decline and often-total disappearance.  Brian Dippie links the “cult of the 
Vanishing American” and its success to “its appeal to the awareness of fleeting time so dear to 
the Romantic temperament,” as Dippie puts it (21).  The description of Susskind appearing and 
disappearing out of nowhere, “always running,” aligns with this overtly romanticized impulse of 
the “vanishing American,” one that is extended by Fidelman’s desire to identify with the victors 
of imperialism as he imagines his place in Italian history.   “Always running,” Susskind is 
described as having “an odd way of standing motionless, like a cigar store Indian about to burst 
into flight,” and he is still running when the story closes (159).  By aligning Susskind with the 
“cigar store Indian,” a figurine placed outside a storefront to advertise tobacco for sale within, 
the story pinpoints the American Jewish propensity to relate to European Jewry through 
stereotypes and commodification.     
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In “Angel Levine,” Malamud presents an American Jew who is clearly suffering and has 
memory only of his pain, a memory that opens to other historical experiences of suffering as the 
story progresses.  After a brief respite from his backache, “Manischevitz was profoundly 
disappointed at the return of his active pain and suffering,” which he laments because in a way it 
makes him selfish—unable to recognize or see beyond himself (48).  He wants his pain to ease 
up “long enough to have some thought other than of himself and his troubles” (48).  He thinks, 
“but all together—the loss of both his children, his means of livelihood, Fanny’s health and his—
that was too much to ask one frail-boned man to endure.  Who, after all, was Manischevitz that 
he had been given so much to suffer?” (48).  Manischevitz is living in his own pain: “day by day, 
hour by hour, minute after minute, he lived in pain, pain his only memory, questioning the 
necessity of it, inveighing against it, also, though with affection, against God” (48).  Overcoming 
Manischevitz’s privative memory of suffering in an inter-ethnic American context thus provides 
a means to consider the American Jewish and European Jewish encounters staged in “Lady of 
the Lake” and “The Last Mohican.”  Read in relation to the stories set in Italy, Manischevitz’s 
struggle with personal suffering stages broader questions of the interrelationship between 
memory and identity, pain and God’s existence.  The questions Manischevitz struggles with are 
those exact questions that define the uncertain future of post-Holocaust Jewishness.  Considering 
Manischevitz’s questions in light of the other two stories allows larger questions to take shape: 
Will one memory of Jewish pain and suffering overwhelm another—are they competing 
memories?  Multidirectional memory here applies to both cross-cultural traumas and distinct 
accounts of Jewish suffering within and outside the text. 
 At first, Manischevitz does not believe Levine.  Even though Levine recites the blessing 
for the break in sonorous Hebrew and explains he was an observant Jew in life, Manischevitz 
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cannot believe that a wingless and unsightly character could be an angel delivered from God.  As 
the narrator notes, “the tailor could not rid himself of the feeling that he was the butt of a jokester.  
Is this what a Jewish angel looks like? he asked himself.  This I am not convinced” (47).  
Manischevitz’s pain and suffering persists, so he travels to Harlem to investigate the angel’s 
story.  He sees him dancing and drinking in a honkytonk, but Manischevitz is too embarrassed to 
enter (50-1).  Later that day he dreams of Levine “standing before a faded mirror, preening small 
decaying opalescent wings” (51).  
 Like the function of the dream in “The Last Mohican,” in “Angel Levine” the appearance 
of the fantasy character, and his reappearance in the estranged dream-space, incites 
Manischevitz’s transformation.  When Manischevitz’s pain momentarily subsides, he wonders if 
it is the angel’s doing and after wavering in his doubt, he again travels to Harlem to seek the 
angel.  Without directions, Manischevitz is the proverbial wandering Jew in a symbolic Hell: “he 
wandered in the dark world.  It was vast and its lights lit nothing. Everywhere were shadows, 
often moving” (49).  But in his blindness, Manischevitz begins to see.  Even though 
“Manischevitz hobbled along with the aid of a cane, and not knowing where to seek in the 
blackened tenement buildings, looked fruitlessly through store windows,” he has an amazing 
moment of seeing: “In the stores he saw people and everybody was black.  It was an amazing 
thing to observe” (49).  He has seen these people before without seeing; now, with the aid of the 
angel, he sees what was there all along.  
 In “Literary Blacks and Jews” (1972), Cynthia Ozick treats Malamud’s The Tenants, 
work by Irving Howe and Ralph Ellison, and current black-Jewish relations; she looks at the 
natural and supernatural elements of the text and asks, “Is it the arrival of a divine messenger that 
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we are to marvel at, or is it the notion of a black Jew?” (90).  She continues, downplaying the 
miraculous quality of the inter-ethnic Jewishness:   
If this is a story with a miracle in it, then the only miracle it proposes is that a Jew 
can be found among the redemptive angels.  And if we are meant to be ‘morally’ 
surprised, it is that—for once—belief in the supernatural is rewarded by a 
supernatural act of mercy.  But the narrative is altogether offhand about the 
question of the angel’s identity: Levine is perfectly matter-of-fact about it, there is 
nothing at all miraculous in the idea that a black man can be a Jew.  In a tale about 
the supernatural, this is what emerges as the ‘natural’ element—as natural-feeling 
as Manischevitz’s misfortunes about his poverty. (91)  
 
Ozick argues that the idea of a black Jew is naturalized into the story alongside the reader’s 
acceptance of Manischevitz’s misfortune and poverty.  According to her reading, while black 
misfortune resonates in a different way than Jewish suffering, Manischevitz recognizes its 
likeness all the same (Ozick 91).  For Ozick, black/Jewish realities are commensurate; to 
Manischevitz, and to Malamud at the end of the fifties, “that black and Jew are one is no miracle” 
(91).   Indeed, when Manischevitz affirms his belief in Levine at the end of the story, “Believe 
me, there are Jews everywhere,” he reveals his surprise that the angel is a Jew sent from God, not 
his surprise over the fact that a black man can be a Jew (156).   
Just preceding Manischevitz’s realization, he visits Harlem and comes upon four black 
men in skullcaps praying together in what was formerly Bella’s honkytonk, a space miraculously 
transformed into a synagogue.  Manischevitz hears the men debate the meaning of soul as “dat 
immaterial substance” (53).  When one of the men, bubble eyes, wonders, “then how come we is 
colored?” another in the group avers, “Ain’t got nothing to do wit dat” (53).  The youngest—a 
boy—echoes, “god put the spirit in all things. . . he put it in the green leaves and the yellow 
flowers.  He put it with the gold in the fishes and the blue in the sky. That’s how it came to us” 
(53).  As in Ozick’s argument, the idea that a black man could be one of God’s creations—and a 
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Jew—is just as natural as the “yellow flowers” (53).  If fantasy disrupts Manischevitz’s 
automated perception at the beginning of the story, here it enables the strange commensurability 
of black and Jewish experiences to coalesce (53).        
Narratively, the fantastic renders commensurate these otherwise disparate inter-ethnic 
narratives of suffering, evinced in the fact that the story’s title is Angel Levine rather than “Black 
Levine” or “Negro Levine” (Newton 120).  In this way my thinking aligns with Adam Zachary 
Newton’s argument, when he wonders why Levine’s Jewishness is so insubstantial in the story 
(120).  In dialogue with Ozick’s claim, Newton comments that if Jewish shabbiness is part of the 
natural elements of the story, then what Ozick means is that black poverty is part of the 
supernatural: “Those that ventriloquize the black everyday, on the other hand, translate it into the 
Black Fantastic, whether in synagogue or honkytonk, the story’s ‘blackness’ spoken by and 
through ‘Jewishness,’” and in fact, the narrative “is not at all offhand about its refashioning of 
blacks as Jews; a ‘miracle’ is precisely what is needed if literary black and Jew have anything of 
substance to say to each other” (120).  The trope of the fantastic enables this exchange to occur.  
Like Fidelman’s shift from rational to sensual modes of interpolation in “The Last 
Mohican,” “Angel Levine”’s recourse to fantasy tropes emphasizes the role of non-rational, 
spiritual sensibility intended to blur the logical distinction between these modes of experience.  
For example, Manischevitz realizes, “I think you are an angel from God” and then launches into 
a tautological rationalization: “If you said it it was said. If you believed it you must say it. If you 
believed, you believed” (55).  When Manischevitz decides to believe in Levine's divinity, he 
seems to invoke tautological rationalization, but his logical thinking is actually much more in 
line with Fidelman’s spiritual awaking and the spirit of art suggested by “The Last Mohican.”  In 
“The Will to Believe,” William James argues that under certain circumstances, it is rational to 
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believe propositions even if we have little or no evidence to support our beliefs.  Accordingly, 
beliefs can be determined by “passional considerations” which include “fear and hope, prejudice 
and passion, imitation and partisanship, and the circumpressure of our caste and set” (n. pag.).  
This is not limited to religious beliefs, but also ethical and political belief systems, as well as 
those “born of an intellectual climate” (n. pag.).  On most occasions “we find ourselves believing, 
we hardly know how or why,” James notes (n. pag.).  Thus James allows passional 
considerations a substantial role in determining the rationality of belief, arguing that it is rational 
to form beliefs without prior evidence of its truth (n. pag.).49 It is in this way that Manischevitz 
discovers he is a Jew because he believes, and not that he believes, so he must be a Jew; in so 
doing, the story inverts the grounds of rational tautology and emphasizes the vitality of passional, 
sensual experiences.   
As Malamud relies on fantasy to initiate his protagonists’ awareness of reality, inter-
ethnic dialogue complicates this trope.  If fantasy is one way of making commensurate the 
inconceivable recognition between post-war American and European Jews, fantasy also allows 
Malamud to triangulate these experiences of ethnic suffering that resonate across an American 
historical context, the history of the Holocaust, and Jewish American experience.  Positioning 
these stories together makes analogous intra-Jewish recognition (between American Jews and 
European Jews) and inter-ethnic recognition (Jews and African Americans; Jews and Native 
                                                
49In his speech, James defends the rationality of religious faith even lacking sufficient evidence 
of religious truth: “I have brought with me tonight. . . an essay in justification of faith, a defense 
of our right to adopt a believing attitude in religious matters, in spite of the fact that our merely 
logical intellect may not have been coerced”; his logic turns on the idea that access to the 
evidence for whether or not certain beliefs are true depends crucially upon first adopting those 
beliefs without evidence (n. pag.).  
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Americans); by enabling increased awareness of their realities, fantasy allows for this analogy to 
materialize for the Jewish American protagonists. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
ENCHANTED OBJECTS: “VIBRANT MATTER” AND THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF 
ABSENCE IN GREAT HOUSE AND EVERYTHING IS ILLUMINATED 
 
The Impossible Possession of History: “Real things” and Fantasy Tropes  
 Reporting on the meticulous work of preservationists at the Auschwitz-Birkenau State 
Museum for the New York Times, Rachel Donadio writes that  
to visit Auschwitz is to find an unfathomable but strangely familiar place.  After 
so many photographs and movies, books and personal testimonies, it is tempting 
to think of it as a movie-set death camp, the product of a gruesome cinematic 
imagination, and not the real thing. 
Alas, it is the real thing. (n. pag.)      
 
What does it mean to say that Auschwitz is both “unfathomable” and “strangely familiar”—both 
unknowable and knowable?  Donadio comments on the deluge of Holocaust representation in 
contemporary culture that has reached a critical reversal; no longer is “the real thing” 
immediately distinguishable from the imagination (n. pag.).  In Simulacra and Simulation, Jean 
Baudrillard provides us with the concept of the simulacrum to explain this phenomenon, 
remarking on the way that in postmodern culture we have become acclimated to “substituting 
signs of the real for the real” (2).  Or to quote the deceased philosopher Pinchas T of the 
European-set narrative in Everything Is Illuminated, “it would be possible, in theory, for life and 
art to be reversed” (Safran Foer 11).  Baudrillard goes on to argue that ontological confusion is 
the norm in a historical period where there is no longer a clear boundary between the Real and its 
representation, between the original and its copy, between the metaphysical and the physical 
(Simulacra 2).  In contemporary post-Holocaust narratives, ontological confusion and the play of 
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alienation remind the reader that “the real thing” is always already elusive (Donadio n. pag.).  
“The real thing” in Donadio’s formulation refers to Holocaust as referent (n. pag.).  Following 
material cultural history, constructed history in the form of texts, buildings, and archives, has 
thus come to stand in for the Real of history.50  Pierre Nora refers to these symbolic elements of 
memory as lieux de memoire or “sites of memory,” which have “no referents in reality; or, 
rather, they are their own referents—pure signs” (19).  As the artifacts of cultural memory that 
arise in these texts, the signs of material culture of the past contextualize a key question at the 
center of my project: At what point does the unknowable of Holocaust representation become 
knowable—and not just knowable, but overly familiar, to the extent that evidence of historical 
experience is obscured?51  Here knowability refers not only to the fact of history’s 
constructedness, but also to those elements of personal and collective trauma that obscure 
representation and construction.  To extend Donadio’s sentiment, it is tempting to resist critical 
engagement with traumatic history once we think we know this history through “so many 
photographs and movies, books and personal testimonies” (n. pag.).  But how do we know what 
we think we know of pre-Holocaust European life and its traumatic history?   
This question frames my approach to enchanted objects in third generation literature, as I 
investigate the debris, the material fragments linked to history, that possesses material traces of 
the past and foregrounds questions of historical knowledge.  While the symbolic weight of 
                                                
50As Pierre Nora conceptualizes, “Lieux de memoire” or “sites of memory,” exist because “there 
are no longer any milieux de memoire, settings in which memory is a real part of everyday 
experience” (1).  
 
51Some have critiqued Holocaust museum emphasis on relics as “sites of memorial hyperreality 
engaged in the obviation of Western and capitalist views of history” (Edwards 261).  In these 
terms, “the signifiers of loss are no longer connected to the event, but have been recreated as 
fetishes in a global memory market” (Edwards 261).      
106 
 
material objects are not necessarily new to Jewish-American literature (one needs only to think 
of the blanket in Cynthia Ozick’s “The Shawl” or Vladek’s glass eye in Art Spiegelman’s Maus), 
the mode in which they are introduced through play, or embody fantastical qualities, is specific 
to their emergence in third-generation texts.  These qualities entice the reader and substantiate 
my historiographical approach to these objects.  This “stuff” floats to the surface of 
contemporary Jewish American literature and structures meaning both on a formal or aesthetic 
level and in relationship to history.  From an analysis of objects in Nicole Krauss’s Great House 
(2010), and Jonathan Safran Foer’s Everything Is Illuminated  (2003), we will come to see how 
the inanimate, material, and non-sentient structure indeterminacy and juxtapose the knowable 
and unknowable of Holocaust representation.  As I use the term throughout my project, 
enchantment refers to the strange commensurability of the fantasy mode of storytelling and 
historical representation that delights and disturbs as it defamiliarizes historical events.  In this 
chapter, enchanted objects indicate the strange ways in which the material or inanimate animates 
narrative and history.  Presenting items otherwise lost to history, endowing them with agency 
that is both monstrous and extraordinary, these texts complicate Michael Saler’s definition of 
enchantment52 that signifies “both human delight in wonderful things and the potential to be 
placed under their spell, to be beguiled” (138).  Saler’s conceptualization intimates a critical 
reversal at the center of the interrelationship between knowledge, genre, and enchantment that I 
explore throughout this chapter.  In realist modes of representation,53 to possess an object or a 
                                                
52Saler’s definition of enchantment refers to Max Weber’s Disenchantment hypothesis.  
53The realist approach, explains Rothberg, characterizes the dominant scholarly methodology of 
historians and others who argue for an approach to the Holocaust through “scientific” means that 
may be inscribed within continuous historical narratives (versus the antirealist approach, which 
radically breaks from such historical narratives).  It emphasizes what is nameable and what can 
be translated, within existing methodology, into the mimetic universe (Rothberg 4).   
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narrative is to know it.  By enchanting objects (giving them agency; emphasizing their 
metaphysics; allowing them to signify) and making such objects incapable of being possessed, 
Krauss and Safran Foer underscore the impossibility for third generation writers to know and 
posess Holocaust history.  The magical objects in Great House entice the reader, signaling 
aporetic moments in the text, and individual characters attempt to make sense of traumatic 
histories and circumstances to which they are not privy by way of experience.  Nevertheless, 
there is an imperative to determine the limits of knowledge and representation by formulating 
new modes of storytelling that play with fantasy and reality; as Great House and Everything is 
Illuminated develop such practices, the texts become enchanted objects in and of themselves and 
frame the reader’s attempts and inability to possess this history.  
 Even without the proximity to generic codes of fantasy, a genre wherein objects are 
expected to function beyond rationale explanation or vis-à-vis the miraculous, human-object 
discourse already invokes something of the fantastic.  According to this field and the work of 
scholars like Jane Bennett and Bill Brown, objects have lives of their own, lives realized by and 
through literature when we take seriously “the secret life of things” and experience objects as 
“vibrant matter” (“Thing Theory” 5; Vibrant Matter xi).  In addition, these texts maintain a 
proximal relationship to genres of fantasy.  Part literary fantasy and part literary realism, Great 
House and Everything Is Illuminated, like Michael Chabon’s The Yiddish Policemen’s Union 
(2007), are estranged from clear-cut designations of genre.  And thus, this already precarious 
material is made more precarious through the lack of generic codes and conventions; the material 
that is the subject of this chapter is animated by absence, which Brian McHale refers to as 
“legitimate grounds for fabulation” in a realist text, and in part by the texts’ hybrid status and 
play with fantasy and realism (87).  In the same way that objects function as magic talismans 
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within and in relation to fantasy genres, objects in Great House and Everything Is Illuminated 
illuminate historical absence.  Just as the artifacts of science fiction or the magic amulets of 
fantasy function as plot devices and serve as sources of fascination and wonder, objects in these 
texts signal something beyond the material and temporal order of the present.54  As the desk 
shapeshifts across chapters, it remains the same material object but is perceived so diversely by 
the different narrators that the reader questions its likeness as the same desk.  Attention to the 
“thingness of things” in these novels reveals a wider exigency, outside the text, to engage with 
the material traces of history (“Thing Theory” 5).  This structure of storytelling reveals the task 
of the third-generation writer’s own relationship to history, one that becomes especially 
metafictional as these writers’ relationship to the past is mediated by objects, texts, and material 
fragments.  The fact that things are obtaining a new urgency in this literature and at the 
beginning of the twenty-first century thus responds to the loss of the aging population of direct 
witnesses.  
Objects in these texts are enchanted because of the extraordinary, sacred sensibility 
invoked by their ordinary, inanimate materiality; they inhabit a strange realm in between 
presence and absence, life and death, fantasy and reality.  Absent bodies become profoundly 
present in relation to these resurrected objects.  As one protagonist of Great House remarks of 
his dedication to recovering lost furniture, “It’s true, I can’t bring the dead back to life . . . but I 
can bring back the chair they once sat in, the bed where they slept” (275).  Work on objects in 
                                                
54The artifacts of science fiction do not just refer to any manufactured object, “but rather (in the 
more popular archeological sense) as a manufactured object embedding evidence of some 
specific (usually remote) time and place, and invested with some indeterminate value—be it 
material, pedagogical, or spiritual—to those who receive or discover it in some other time or 
place” (Wolfe 84).  Here, irreducible wonder refers to the sense of enchantment Tolkien explains 
in “On Fairy-Stories,” which I discuss in the Introduction.  
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Polish culture has led Boźena Shallcross to the formulation that physical remains (jewelry, shoes, 
clothes, hair) have become the Holocaust’s dominant metonymy and have come to stand in for 
human tragedy (1).  “Piles, not people, are the legacy of the Holocaust,” echoes Alison 
Landsberg (118).  Shallcross explains that these objects provide material evidence for the 
Holocaust: “these surviving objects attest to the fact of genocide, if one respects their 
authenticity; ordinary and humble, these objects are endowed with unique representational 
power: pillaged or exchanged for the victim’s life, they trigger numerous Holocaust narratives” 
(1).  And thus, preserved in museums and memorial sites and arranged by professional curators, 
these objects “now stand out as the Holocaust’s most persuasive and tangible reality” (1).   
What does it mean that they have also come to clutter the pages of contemporary Jewish 
American literature?  The turn to objects in these texts is significant for their relationship to 
historical representation.  Like Holocaust history itself, ontological confusion in the narratives 
renders the material unstable and the terms of its interpolation uncertain.  Thus, the 
preoccupation with objects reflects an impossible undertaking: the desire belatedly to understand 
what happened55 by sorting out the “real” remains of the past from the chaos of representation, a 
notion increasingly complicated by the directional flip between life and art.  The turn to objects 
also reflects the growing exigency and anxiety, both on and off the page, of the need to literally 
hold on to a past that is both heavily mediated and slipping away.  “Every year, as more 
survivors die, the work becomes more important,” Anna Lopuska, one of the conservators at the 
Auschwitz-Birkenau State Museum remarks (Donadio n. pag.). “Within 20 years, there will be 
only these objects speaking for this place” (Donadio n. pag.).  Through a mix of fantasy and 
                                                
55Amy Hungerford argues that Safran Foer finds himself belated in two ways: first, because the 
story of discovering the secrets of one’s parents’ history has been told, and secondly, because he 
is generationally distanced from the experience of the events in Europe (“How Jonathan” 611).    
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reality that calls into question modes of historical mediation, the texts themselves become 
another kind of enchanted Holocaust object that contain material traces of the past, illuminated 
through play and self-referentiality.     
Thus, these texts confront the paradox that objects cannot speak and yet carry this 
metaphysical burden.  The description of the “lost-articles room” in the basement of the 
Zamenhopf hotel in The Yiddish Policemen’s Union is emblematic of the mixed debris that we 
see in the other novels I investigate in this chapter (10):    
At the bottom of the steps, he [Landsman] passes through the lost-articles room, lined 
with pegboard, furnished with shelves and cubbyholes that hold the thousand objects 
abandoned or forgotten in the hotel.  Unmated shoes, fur hats, a trumpet, a windup 
zeppelin.  A collection of wax gramophone cylinders featuring the entire recorded 
output of the Orchestra Orfeon of Istanbul.  A logger’s ax, two bicycles, a partial 
bridge in a hotel glass.  Wigs, canes, a glass eye, display hands left behind by a 
mannequin salesman.  Prayer books, prayer shawls in their velvet zipper pouches, an 
outlandish idol with the body of a fat baby and the head of an elephant.  There is a 
wooden soft-drink crate filled with keys, another with the entire range and breadth of 
hairstyling tools, from irons to eyelash crimpers. (Yiddish 10) 
 
What is striking is that the mixed detritus of all three novels contrasts with the meticulously 
constructed piles of individual objects on display in Holocaust museums and memorials.  Such 
prosthetic limbs, eyeglasses, toothbrushes, suitcases, hair, etc., are what Alison Landsberg 
identifies as the “emerging iconography” of the Holocaust (118).  But the messy clutter of 
objects in The Yiddish Policemen’s Union, like the objects in Great House and Everything Is 
Illuminated, testifies to the inability to carefully curate history.  
Through this diverse array of materials that we confront repeatedly in third-generation 
Jewish American literature, there is an unmistakable reference to both “the body” and “culture” 
in a piecemeal reflection of the holistic Jewish cultural body lost to history.  As Shallcross writes, 
the Holocaust already exists at a temporal remove, its proximity diminishing into memory, where 
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“both its material vestiges and immaterial traces manifest their past immediacy mainly through 
metonymy, which allows these fragments to speak on behalf of past wholeness” (2).  The items 
housed in the lost-articles room emphasize the prosthetic dimension of history and the 
importance of metonymic representation.  Such prosthetic pieces, items like “wigs, canes, a glass 
eye, display hands left behind by a mannequin salesman” already signify bodies no longer 
present (Yiddish 10).  In addition, they invoke a gruesome sense of fragmentation that resonates 
with Holocaust trauma.  All are cultural artifacts, but the “trumpet,” the collection of “the entire 
recorded output of the Orchestra Orfeon of Istanbul,” the “prayer books, prayer shawls in their 
velvet zipper pouches” especially flesh out the rich textures and sounds of the cultural avant-
garde silenced by the Holocaust (Yiddish 10).  Embedded in prosthetic objects are the lost bodies 
and culture and structures of representation more broadly, those questions of how it is the third 
generation knows what they know about the past.  I explore how stuff grounds meaning in these 
texts through aesthetics and history: both the objects in the texts and the objects as texts.  
This example illustrates the way we experience, through the presence and proliferation of 
material objects, the profound absence of a community.  Like the piles, these scenes of mixed 
debris invoke “a death world where only the objects remain” (Landsberg 71).  But attempts to 
mix the objects, by reshuffling and reordering the “stuff” of piles, is also an attempt to 
restructure historical representation so what is on display is our inability to know, order, and sort 
history; these texts rely on objects to defamiliarize what we are accustomed to knowing about the 
Holocaust in order to perceive history in new ways.  As Brown explains, literary texts resurrect 
the thingness of objects56 via estrangement of routine reception (How to Do Things 937).  
                                                
56For Brown, things and objects belong together in a dialectical relationship.  It is important that 
Brown distinguishes “things” from the discursively contained “objects”: “we look through 
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According to Brown, in literature, objects become things in the way that language and literary 
tropes bestow meaning on an object (now a thing) so that the meaning is no longer reducible to 
that object (937).  As such, Brown explains, “literature might then serve as a mode of 
rehabilitative reification—a resignifying of the fixations and fixities of thing-ification that will 
grant us access to what remains obscure (or obscured) in the routines through which we (fail to) 
experience the material object world” (How to Do Things 937).  Here what is obscured is not 
necessarily the Marxist “reification” that Brown is referring to, but the individual social, cultural, 
and historical context of the thing that we miss when the object is part of the pile.  Because such 
objects have become so “iconic”57 in relationship to history, these authors play with 
representation strategies and risk debasing Holocaust memory to forge their own authentic 
encounters with the past.  “We might say that for the second generation, and more radically for 
the third, the only access to the Holocaust comes through objects, through the piles of objects left 
behind,” Landsberg writes (71).  The stakes of mixing debris and situating it in a play of 
ontological realities is humanization.  Extracting fragments of history from their usual context 
allows for a deeper connection to the individual, just as the metal conservator Andrzej 
Jastrzebiowski explains of his work with eyeglasses (Donadio n. pag.).  Jastrzebiowski spent 
three months cleaning all the eyeglasses in a vitrine to preserve their distressed state and prevent 
them from corroding further (n. pag.).  “When I saw the eyeglasses in the exhibition, I saw it as 
one big pile,” he said (n. pag.). But as Donadio writes, “in the lab, he began to examine them one 
                                                                                                                                                       
objects because there are codes by which our interpretation makes them meaningful, because 
there is a discourse of objectivity that allows us to use them as facts,” Brown writes (“Thing 
Theory” 4).  In contrast, things are tied to a specific ambiguity and refer to “the amorphousness 
out of which objects are materialized by the apperceiving subject” (“Thing Theory” 5). 
 
57The separation of use-value from exchange-value that renders labor invisible to the worker and 
consumer. 
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by one. One had a screw replaced by a bent needle; another had a repaired temple.  ‘And then 
this enormous mass of glasses started becoming people,’ Mr. Jastrzebiowski said.  This ‘search 
for the individual,’ he said, helps ensure that the work does not become too routine” (n. pag.).   
I begin from the vantage point that these texts are responding to the paradox Daniel 
Mendelsohn discovered while conducting interviews for his memoir.  Mendelsohn describes the 
phenomenon of “people who were rich in memories but poor in keepsakes,” whereas he “was so 
rich in the keepsakes but had no memories to go with them” (223).  The stories we discover in 
Great House and Everything Is Illuminated confront both sides of this paradox.  Furthermore, 
they suggest that even for those characters rich in both, the two exist in tension and struggle to 
tell different stories.  In Great House, George Weisz spends his entire life obsessively tracking 
down the keepsakes to “go with” his memories (Mendelsohn 223).  Other characters inherit 
objects without their full history; possessing the object, they find themselves entangled, often 
involuntarily, in quests to understand its origins.  In Great House, a giant multidrawer writing 
desk with a mysterious aura passes between characters—strangers—to one another.  As critics 
have commented of Great House, this desk that moves between characters who are also writers 
serves as a “symbol of the inescapable burden of a writer” (Berger and Milbauer 72).  As the 
desk is “passed on or passed down from one character to another” in Krauss’s own words, it 
implies the loss and inheritance that affects the second- and third-generations who grapple with 
traces of Holocaust history in their fiction (Uncertainty n. pag.).  Dispossessed by one character 
and possessed by another, the desk structures connections between two characters who would 
otherwise remain estranged and forges new connections even as it symbolizes dispossession.  In 
Everything Is Illuminated, Jonathan, the autobiographical protagonist, travels to Ukraine to learn 
the memory behind the photograph of his grandfather with Augustine, the woman presumed to 
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have saved his grandfather’s life.  Other characters, like Lista or “not Augustine,” are rich in 
both memories and keepsakes but remain isolated from history.  With no one to witness her story, 
Lista remains alienated from history and the objects that clutter her narrative remain outside of or 
lost to history.  These objects hold a privileged kind of history, where incorporating the story of 
lost or dispossessed objects into narrative thus becomes a way to access and incorporate 
narratives otherwise lost to history.  
Animating the Inanimate: Enchanted Objects in Great House  
One such dispossessed object is the multidrawer writing desk at the center of Great 
House.  Described as “the desk of a medieval sorcerer,” it allegedly belonged to Federico García 
Lorca (Great House 83).  An inanimate object that animates the story and connects otherwise 
disparate narrative threads, the desk structures impossible connections across history and the 
diaspora.  Echoing the dislocation characteristic of postmodern aesthetics, Great House does not 
cohere around a single chronology or telling, but rather the desk provides narrative momentum to 
the fractured narratives of four narrators. In fact, a coherent sketch of the novel can only be 
achieved by placing the desk at the center; it functions much like a protagonist.  The characters 
in Great House do not so much see the desk as an inanimate object as have vibrant, affective 
experiences of it and of themselves in relation to this piece of furniture.  Bound up with the role 
of the writer, the desk anchors communication, literally, as the work space for the writers in the 
text (Weisz’s father, Nadia, Lotte, and Daniel Varsky) and aesthetically, as each chapter is 
shaped around a storyteller and addressee.  
The novel opens with a chapter entitled “All Rise” and its narrator, Nadia, explains how 
she came to possess and dispossess the desk.  Nadia has traveled to Jerusalem in search of the 
desk, but she finds herself sitting in a hospital room at the bedside of an unconscious man—a 
115 
 
judge—whom she has just struck with her car.  Punctuated by the direct address, “Your Honor,” 
Nadia’s story recounts the burden of writing in solitude at the monstrous desk from her New 
York apartment.  Twenty-seven years earlier, Nadia had agreed to temporarily safeguard a few 
items of furniture for a new acquaintance while he, the talented poet named Daniel Varsky, 
returned to his native Chile.  But years later, after she learns that Varsky was brutally tortured 
and murdered by the Pinochet regime, Nadia is forced to part with the last remaining piece of 
Varsky’s belongings when Leah Weisz, a woman claiming to be Varsky’s daughter, comes to 
collect the desk on his behalf.  In “Lies Told by Children” and “Weisz,” we learn that the desk 
once belonged to the father of George Weisz, who lost his parents to the Nazi invasion of 
Budapest in 1944.  Weisz, who narrates the final chapter, is now a single father of the twins 
Yoav and Leah, who have grown up with both a cosmopolitan and sheltered existence as their 
father, an antiques furniture dealer, moved them around Europe tracking down the lost objects 
and possessions of the endless clients who request his services until he settles them in a home on 
Ha’Oren Street in Jerusalem.  In a letter to Isabel, her brother’s lover and the narrator of “Lies 
Told by Children,” it is Leah who explains, “For forty years my father labored to reassemble 
that lost room, just as it looked until that fateful day in 1944.  As if putting all the pieces back 
together he might collapse time and erase regret” (116).     
 In “Swimming Holes,” Arthur Bender, a scholar of Romantic literature at Oxford, 
narrates his relationship with his wife Lotte Berg, also a writer, who was forced to leave her 
home in Nuremberg when she was seventeen and received a visa to chaperone children on one of 
the first Kinderstransports to England in 1939.  For as long as he can remember, Arthur lived in 
perpetual fear of his wife’s desk, “that monstrous thing” that he knows to be a gift from his 
wife’s former lover, a subject of which she says nothing (103).  Addressing the story first to his 
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friend Richard Gottlieb, Arthur confesses that he believes Lotte gave the desk to Daniel Varsky 
when the young poet begins to visit his wife, and believes that the two were having an 
affair.  But as Lotte ages and develops Alzheimer’s, she accidentally betrays the secrets that 
surround her past.  Lotte had a child, Arthur learns, whom she gave up for adoption.  This child 
would have been around the same age as the poet Daniel Varsky, the recipient of the desk and in 
whom Lotte must have seen something of her lost child.  In “True Kindness,” we listen to Aaron, 
an aging father in Jerusalem who has just lost his wife, speak to his estranged son Dov.  A Judge 
who has returned home from London to attend his mother’s funeral, Dov is presumably the same 
man to whom Nadia addresses her story.   
Throughout the stories, the indirect, estranged mode of communication between 
characters (both those who are familiar and those who remain strangers) metafictionally reflects 
the way the story indirectly treats the Holocaust.  Like the beholder in the Holocaust museum, 
the reader approaches the desk in Great House and confronts the material legacy of the 
Holocaust “to read its metonymic configurations and, in so doing, to pose questions about its 
graspable meaning” (Shallcross 2).  As Berger and Milbauer note, “Great House is a meditation 
on post-Holocaust memory, the meaning of Jewish history after Auschwitz, and the impact of the 
catastrophe on Jewish identity” (75).  While I agree with this assertion, it is important to note 
that uncertainty is part and parcel of what Berger and Milbauer refer to as this “meditation on 
post-Holocaust memory” (75).  Objects are not the solution to a lack of “graspable meaning,” but 
in fact foreground the extent to which the impact of this traumatic history is, to borrow from 
Krauss’s novel, “and yet” unknown.   
Unlike the mythical locale of Trachimbrod in Everything Is Illuminated or the Yiddish-
speaking metropolis of Sitka, Alaska, in The Yiddish Policemen’s Union, Great House is 
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anchored in “our world.”  In fact, the locations of the protagonists in New York, London, 
Jerusalem, and Chile stress the varied geography of diaspora Jews that matches the contemporary 
historical moment.  Like Bernard Malamud’s short fiction, Great House is part of the substratum 
of fantasy literature denoted by Todorov’s fantastic; the text reveals the possibility of mystery 
and wonder that already exists in reality.  In this world, seemingly implausible feats are made to 
feel plausible, while the plausible or real is made to feel strange.  The magical appearance of a 
long-lost article of furniture or the intrusion of the seemingly unreal, like the ghostly apparition 
of Daniel Varsky that haunts Nadia in Israel, are made to feel unbelievable or strange not 
because the text is set in an “otherworld,” but because of unknown historical circumstances—the 
fact that we will never know what happened to Daniel Varsky, for example.  As a result, these 
“dark areas” of history become grounds for fabulation (McHale 87).  In contrast to Everything Is 
Illuminated, Great House does not flip-flop between discrete narrative worlds, but rather, 
multiple ontological possibilities for explanation and meaning-making present themselves at 
once.  This text is quintessentially fantastic in the way that Krauss inhabits and plays with the 
duration of uncertainty throughout the narrative (Todorov 25).  As Brian Edwards suggests, 
“possibility and multiplicity” are correlatives to “uncertainty” in narrative (195).  The horror of 
traumatic history renders present narrative events open-ended so that they inhabit a realm in 
between pure fantasy and realism58 (Zamora and Faris 167).  Because we don’t know what 
happened to Varsky, he may or may not be a figment of Nadia’s imagination, and the fantastic 
becomes an aesthetic response to mediate this unknown piece of traumatic history. Great House 
thus presents uncertainty as events exist at the border between the real (and may be explained 
                                                
58In this way, events are both potentially explained by realism and “irreducible,” in the sense that 
magic must account for their existence. 
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psychologically, for example) and the unreal (Varsky is a ghost).  Todorov explains the premise 
of ontological duality that has come to define magic realism: “in a world which is indeed our 
world. . . there occurs an event which cannot be explained by the laws of this same familiar 
world” (25).  As Wendy Faris elucidates, magic realist texts contain “‘an irreducible element’ of 
magic, something we cannot explain according to the laws of the universe as we know them” 
(Faris 167).  But in Great House, we choose whether or not we wish to apply the laws of “this 
same familiar world,” whether Leah and Yoav really have powers “borrowed from ghosts,” or 
whether we want to believe that the ghost of Daniel Varsky follows Nadia around Israel 
(Todorov 25; Great House 139).  With so many threads left untied, the magic of the novel is 
potentially resistant to rational explanation; Great House exists in a space between a realist and 
non-realist ontological worldview.  The novel’s ontological uncertainty is not a retreat from the 
historical but instead reflects that the novel’s perception of history is unstable.               
As Shallcross explains, in literature of the Holocaust and literature about the Holocaust, 
the relationship between humans and objects is already one in which these are not discrete 
realms as objects metonymically stand in for their lost possessors (11).  Shallcross makes a 
strong case for this metonymic relationship, especially in her attention to museum exhibitions.  
Enchantment extends her work by calling attention to the impossibility of the metaphor and the 
fact that the exact substitution of the thing for the possessor is of course an impossible one.  
Because enchantment incorporates play within a fantastic space, it includes a sense of 
impossibility as it foregrounds the metonymy between object and body so that Weisz, who 
cannot “bring the dead back to life,” can bring back the chair they once sat in, the bed where they 
slept” (275).  Thus, the descriptions of the desk in Great House animate an otherwise inhuman, 
material object, and the desk inhabits a strange, liminal space between the blurred realms of 
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humans and objects.  For as long as Arthur Bender has lived with his wife’s desk, he has lived in 
perpetual fear of this object that he knows so little of—only that it was a gift from a former lover 
(103).  “That is how she dealt with the past: in total silence,” Arthur remarks (103).  For Arthur, 
the desk “overshadowed everything else like some sort of grotesque, threatening monster, 
clinging to most of one wall and bullying the other pathetic bits of furniture to the far corner, 
where they seemed to cling together, as if under some sinister magnetic force” (83).  The desk is 
not simply personified, but overshadows, clings, and bullies—the desk is surrounded by a 
discourse of both monstrosity and silence.  “Grotesque” and “threatening,” monstrous and 
unspeakable, the desk becomes a metonymic marker for Holocaust trauma and the mode of 
“antirealist” representation (Rothberg 3-4).59   
Great House attunes the reader’s perception to the qualities of the desk that exceed its 
functional purpose as a writing tool, thus illuminating its fantastic quality.  Recounting how he 
described the desk to his friend Richard Gottlieb, who has not seen it, Arthur dismisses an 
object-oriented definition; rather, the desk constitutes a thing as it mediates characters’ 
relationships to themselves, to others, and to history.  Arthur notes, “to call it a desk is to say too 
little.  The word conjures some homely, unassuming article of work or domesticity, a selfless and 
practical object that is always poised to offer its back for its owner to make use of, and which, 
when not in use, occupies its allotted space with humility.  Well, I told Gottlieb, you can cancel 
that image immediately” (248).  To call it an “object” or a desk “is to say too little” because the 
desk defies its material function and exceeds its status as object (248).  Scholarship on object 
relations has already muddied the boundary between human and thing, and this boundary is 
                                                
59Finally confronting the desk in the storage unit in New York City, Weisz finds that “the 
tremendous desk stood alone, mute and uncomprehending” (289). 
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further complicated by strange fictional worlds and the metonymic relationships between bodies 
and things specific to Holocaust discourse.   
In order to contextualize the relationship between things and historiography, we must 
first consider the metaphysical properties of materiality itself. In theories of human-object 
relations, scholars theorize the animacy of the inanimate or the “presence” of things.  As Jean 
Baudrillard has observed, “human beings and objects are indeed bound together in a collusion in 
which the objects take on a certain density, an emotional value—what might be a presence” 
(System 24).  This density or “emotional value” is often defined vis-à-vis ownership, which 
Walter Benjamin considers the most important relationship among humans and their things 
(System 24).  Benjamin theorizes this relationship through the intimacy of possession.  As he 
writes while unpacking his library, possession is “the most intimate relationship that one can 
have to objects. . . not that they come alive in him; it is he who lives in them” (67).  The fact that 
Benjamin is unpacking his sacred library is also key to the symbolic power latent in the concept 
of possession as knowledge, a relationship Great House undermines as possession of the desk 
always already signals its dispossession.  
While Baudrillard and Benjamin do not differentiate between objects and things, 
discourses on materiality carefully distinguish the two.  Noting the ways that things act upon us, 
W.J.T. Mitchell writes,    
objects are the way things appear to a subject—that is, with a name, and identity, 
a gestalt or stereotypical template. . . . Things, on the other hand, . . . [signal] the 
moment when the object becomes other, when the sardine can looks back, when 
the mute idol speaks, when the subject experiences the object as uncanny and 
feels the need for what Foucault calls ‘a metaphysics of the object.’ (qtd. in 
Bennett 2)   
 
Defamiliarizing objects, making them feel strange or uncanny, is part of their transformation 
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from object-to-thing.  And the strangeness of things—their otherness—across third-generation 
Jewish American literature is persistently on display in order to foreground that which eludes our 
grasp.  Jane Bennett’s thing-power directs our attention to this nonhuman vitality as it describes 
“the vitality intrinsic to materiality” that “refuses to dissolve completely into the milieu of human 
knowledge” (3).  Things thus remain “out-side” our possession, functioning as an 
epistemological limit  (Bennett 3). 
  Bill Brown’s work, mentioned earlier, also analyzes the strange, metaphysical dimension 
of manufactured objects.  In between “objects” and “things” are our own projections, 
subjectivities, and interpretations.  Things, Brown reminds us, are “what is excessive in objects, 
as what exceeds their mere materialization as objects or their mere utilization as objects—their 
force as a sensuous presence or as a metaphysical presence, the magic by which objects become 
values, fetishes, items, and totems” (“Thing Theory” 5, emphasis mine).  This “magic” is enacted 
in Great House through the aesthetics of the fantastic and reorients our relationship to what lies 
beyond the material—memory.  As Isabel comments of the furniture cluttering the Weiszs’ 
apartment, objects merely highlight the burden of human memory and the gap between the 
inanimate and the human: “all of those objects had no power of memory themselves, just 
standing and gathering dust” (138).  In contrast, the fantastic things of history remind us that 
material traces sit at the center of signification.  
  Brown’s work emphasizes that the discourse surrounding things is one of indirection and 
uncertainty: “the thing seems to name the object just as it is even as it names some thing else,” he 
notes (“Thing Theory” 4).  His schemata draws out the potential for the fantastic elements in the 
transition of objects to things as he connects things with excess and irreducibility; things are by 
necessity liminal in nature and exceed the boundaries of realism.  Writing on the major features 
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of realist discourse, Phillippe Harmon argues, “realist discourse, always in search of 
transparency and the circulation of knowledge, will strive to reduce the imbalance that exists 
between the being and the appearance of objects or characters” (178).  Rejecting this realist 
discourse, Great House magnifies the distance between the “being” and the “appearance” of the 
desk and registers a failure of realism as a failure to possess knowledge of the desk and its 
history (178).  Realism, according to Marcel Proust, also fails to convey objects “truly” (113).  
While Proust is less interested in the fantastic than in the mnemonic functions of objects, his 
parsing of realism is instructive for the ways in which he argues that realist discourse is reductive 
when it comes to describing objects (113).  He writes that mimesis “impoverishes and saddens us 
the most,” isolating us from ourselves, past, present, and future: 
that literature which is satisfied to ‘describe objects,’ to give merely a miserable 
listing of lines and surfaces, is the very one which, while styling itself ‘realist,’ is 
the farthest removed from reality, the one that impoverishes and saddens us the 
most, for it sharply cuts off all communication of our present self with the past, the 
essence of which was preserved in those objects, or with the future, in which they 
stimulate us to enjoy the past anew. It is that essence which art worthy of the name 
must express and, if it fails to do this, one can even then draw a lesson from this 
failure (whereas one draws no lesson from even the successes of realism), namely, 
that this essence is in part subjective and cannot be communicated to others. 
(Proust 113) 
 
Thus, Proust intimates that something other than realism is required to capture objects as they 
exist in reality and in our subjective relationship to them, and for Krauss, this essence is located 
in the in-between of fantastic tropes.  
If the discourse on “thing theory” situates subject/object relations as interrelated and 
dialectical, then considering objects in the context of Holocaust studies further blurs the 
distinction between bodies and matter and reality and fantasy.  The desk, already anachronistic 
by virtue of its hulking bourgeois presence and survival in the postmodern present, furthermore 
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functions outside the emerging iconography of Holocaust objects.  As Shallcross explains, “at 
the point when the victims, forced to leave their homes, had to make quick and irrevocable 
decisions regarding what to take with them, their needs were indeed basic.  One took warm 
clothes, food, and symbolic mementos such as family pictures, but left behind furniture” 
(Shallcross 2).  But as a piece of furniture, the desk stands apart from the piles of discarded 
objects now central to the Holocaust’s iconography; it functions as the ur-object left behind by 
historiography.  This “left behind” status and the monstrous qualities that Arthur attributes to the 
desk draws out the abject qualities of the desk.  Existing on the border of object and thing, 
Kristeva explains that the abject is “neither subject nor object,” once again inciting the 
discussion of borders between the human and material that is central to both thing theory and the 
fantastic.  Kristeva defines abjection60 through that which is ultimately “cast off,” the refuse or 
corpses that confront one with the borders of one’s condition as a living being (Kristeva 3).  
Characterized as “what disturbs identity, system, order” and “what does not respect borders, 
positions, rules” the abject reveals the “fragility of the law,” Kristeva explains, thus providing 
the basis for her reading of Auschwitz through an abject lens (4).  
Similar to the objects of the lost-articles room, a bourgeois culture lost to history 
materializes through the “tremendous body” of the desk.  Arthur describes his fear and “strange, 
inexplicable jealousy” that overtakes him when Lotte opens the door “and there, hovering behind 
her, threatening to swallow her up, was that tremendous body of furniture” (84).  Furthermore, in 
comparison to its strength, the desk reveals only Arthur’s helplessness and recourse to delusion.  
                                                
60As a psychoanalytical concept, the abject delineates how social and cultural boundaries are 
constructed and maintained. What is abject is literally that which is “cast off,” or that which 
disturbs identity; it is the human reaction of horror to a threatened breakdown in meaning caused 
by the loss of distinction between self and other (Kristeva 13).   
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Arthur remarks that the desk stood “pretending to be inanimate but, like a Venus flytrap, ready to 
pounce on them and digest them via one of its many little terrible drawers” (248).  Facing an 
unknowable monster, he transfers his perception of his wife’s deceit onto the properties of the 
desk itself as it “pretends” to be something that it is not. 
 The small fact of the desk’s origins becomes the grounds for Arthur’s fantasy and 
exposes his feelings of insecurity that overwhelm his relationship with Lotte.  He experiences the 
desk’s “thingness” as if it is a direct affront to his masculinity, even noting, “it was, I always 
thought, a very masculine desk” (83).  Through Arthur’s relationship to the desk, his resentment 
swells into a paranoia about Lotte’s past that remains unchallenged (until his wife’s Alzheimer’s 
betrays her secret).  The following remains concealed from both the reader and Arthur: Lotte’s 
history, Lotte’s relationship to Varsky, and Varsky’s past.  As a result, Arthur’s desperation over 
not knowing spirals into fabulations that ultimately fill in the “dark spaces” of history (McHale 
87).  When Varsky appears on the Benders’ doorstep, Lotte’s silence morphs into Arthur’s 
twisted delusion about an affair between his wife and the young, mysterious poet.  So Arthur 
“began to form a plan,” and fabricates a story about needing to attend a conference in Frankfurt 
in order to leave the couple alone together as a test: “I would remove myself, the tiresome 
obstacle in their way, and give Lotte every opportunity to betray me with this swaggering youth 
with his leather and his tight jeans and his lines from Neruda, which no doubt he tossed off 
breathlessly with his face inches from hers” (91).61  In Frankfurt, Arthur tortures himself with 
daydreams of the affair, dreaming up scenarios replete with agonizing fantasies of their adultery.  
In addition, the chapter’s title emphasizes the deep historical trauma at stake in the preset; 
                                                
61By this time Arthur knows enough to see his fantasy clearly: “As I write this all these years 
later, in the long shadow of that boy’s tragic fate, it sounds ridiculous, but at the time it felt real” 
(91).  
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“Swimming Holes” is a reminder of the uncertain depths of historical trauma that disturb the 
present.  The title refers to the Benders’ daily ritual of walking to the three ponds on the Heath 
where Lotte swims, momentarily disappearing into the dark water while Arthur holds his breath 
until she reappears.  Describing how, “in a flash, she’d disappear into the blackness,” Arthur 
wants to cry out but bites his tongue (77).  Once, he asks Lotte “how deep does it go?” but “she 
claimed not to know” (77-8).  The question of depth emphasizes measurement, highlighting 
Arthur’s desire to know the extent to which Lotte suffers rather than the nature of the trauma 
itself.       
As a thing with an animacy all its own, and irreducible to its status as “object,” the desk 
invokes discourses surrounding the structure of impossibility in fantasy, that which remains 
irreducible and apart from rational explanation.  It is not uncommon in fantasy for objects to 
serve a significant role as a plot device or character.62  The desk has a force and presence that 
exceeds its structure or function; instead, it seems to have a life of its own that changes shape 
depending on the context and possessor.  When Nadia first acquires the furniture from Daniel 
Varsky in the novel’s opening chapter, she invests the materiality (iron, wood, upholstery), the 
simple materials that define its status as object, with “the chance to a new life” (8).  Surveying 
                                                
62Some of the relevant contexts surrounding object relations in fantasy include the “artifact” in 
SF studies, when a mysterious relic of the past is uncovered, usually one that harbors 
technological advantage or offers connections to previous (alien) population (see Wolfe’s 
chapter, “The Artifact as Icon in Science Fiction,” in Evaporating Genres 83-99).  In fantasy 
texts, it is not uncommon for an object to structure the narratives, telepathically link characters, 
or provide passageways between narrative worlds.  It is also interesting to point out that Philip K. 
Dick’s science fiction is credited with the breakdown of subject/object relations.  As Alexander 
Dunst comments, “more than any other US-American author in the twentieth century Dick broke 
down the boundaries between what we consider authentic and inauthentic, human or machine, 
what appears to be an object and what claims existence as a subject. What we have come to 
mean when we speak of Dick’s science fiction is precisely this breakdown of subject and object 
as stable opposition” (Dunst 1).   
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what she can see of the pieces under a mess of papers, she perceives “a sofa, a large wooden 
desk with lots of drawers, some big and some small, a pair of bookshelves crammed with 
volumes in Spanish, French, and English, and the nicest piece, a kind of chest or trunk with iron 
braces that looked as if it had been rescued from a sunken ship and put to use as a coffee table” 
(8).  Lonely, bereft of her ex-lover’s companionship and his furniture, Nadia sees in Varsky’s old 
furniture the opportunity to remake herself as she projects her emotional state—sad, in need of 
rescue—onto the exchange.  She continues, 
He [Varsky] must have acquired everything secondhand, none of it looked new, 
but all the pieces shared a kind of sympathy, and the fact that they were 
suffocating under papers and books made them more attractive rather than less.  
Suddenly I felt awash in gratitude to their owner, as if he were handing down to 
me not just some wood and upholstery but the chance to a new life, leaving it up 
to me to rise to the occasion. (8)   
 
Surely the desk, the aggressive bully ready to pounce like a Venus flytrap, is not one of these 
“sympathetic” secondhand pieces, now gendered feminine and rendered innocuous? This is the 
thing that Arthur describes as the “desk of a medieval sorcerer” (83)?  A few weeks later, when 
the movers bring the desk to Nadia’s apartment, she calls attention to its ability to shapeshift:63 
“It was so much larger than I remembered, as if it had grown or multiplied (had there been so 
many drawers?) since I’d seen it two weeks earlier in his apartment” (201).  Embodying Nadia’s 
contradictory subjectivity as a writer and her own uncertainty (“had there been so many 
drawers?”), the sight of the desk every morning both renews in her “a sense that a potential” had 
been acknowledged and emboldens her self-doubt, reminding her that “I was only an accidental 
caretaker who had foolishly imagined that she possessed something, an almost magical quality, 
                                                
63Shapeshifting is a prominent motif of folklore, speculative fiction, and mythology more 
broadly.  
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which, in fact, she’d never had” (203).  For Nadia, the “thingness” of the desk compounds her 
accidental role as history’s caretaker with the writer’s self-doubt, figured through her constant 
questioning of her special quality and the self-imposed emotional isolation that she privileges as 
its requisite way of life.  
As I have explored, the mode of the fantastic often marks the objects’ “thingness” in 
Great House, often effacing the boundary between inanimate and animate.  Leah remembers 
hiding in fear of the long-lost pieces of furniture arriving at the house in Ha’Oren Street.  She 
recalls a state of anxiety, describing the arrival of furniture as “tense and somber events that had 
terrified her so much that as a small child she would sometimes hide in the kitchen when the 
crates were pried open, in case what popped out were the blackened faces of her dead 
grandparents” (115).  And when her friend Paul arrives to tell Nadia that Varsky had disappeared, 
“we both turned at the same time to stare at the towering desk, as if at any moment our tall, thin 
friend with the big nose might leap out, laughing, from one of the many drawers” (203).  In a 
play of metaphysics, these pieces of furniture seem to “have lives” of their own.  As Schwenger 
parses, “absorbing the psychic investments of their owners, things paradoxically possess 
something of their possessors” (Schwenger 75).  In Great House, we see how “things 
paradoxically possess something of their possessors” as Nadia experiences the loss of Daniel 
Varsky through the desk (Schwenger 75).  These objects signal the “potential to be placed under 
their spell,” (Saler 138) where the strange play of fantastic tropes in a realist frame symbolizes 
loss and displacement constitutive of enchantment.  The individual, subject experiences of the 
characters (here Leah and Nadia) in relation to the pieces of furniture reveals how, for these first-
person narrators, enchantment is their mode of interacting with aporias of history.  Reversing the 
logic of ownership, Great House thwarts characters’ attempts to possess what remains outside 
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the bounds of history.  
 Like the circumstances of the pending reversion in The Yiddish Policemen’s Union, 
strangeness and dispossession are tied together in Great House.  In The Yiddish Policemen’s 
Union, we are reminded of what happens when the Jews get “too comfortable,” and the dangers 
when starting to “forget a little bit,” feeling at home, leads to disaster: “Egypt. Spain. Germany,” 
Landsman says, “I guess that’s how it always goes” (Yiddish 380).  The text presents the play of 
genre and aesthetic displacement as a narrative exploration of this predicament.  The constant 
disruption of assimilation and alienation in both form and content questions the role of the 
Holocaust in relation to the Jewish state and diaspora, where discomfort and alienation serve as 
Jewish memorial practice.  And in Great House, alongside the characters, the reader finds herself 
at once at home and alienated.  Here too aesthetics become a mode of refracting historical 
experience.  As it shapeshifts across distinct narratives, alters in gender, size, and perceived 
demeanor, the desk is perpetually caught in a series of defamiliarizations that privileges 
uncertainty and estrangement itself as a way of knowing and mediating historical circumstances.  
Always the same object, the desk is never the same thing.  As such, its strange familiarity across 
unfamiliar circumstances asks the reader to consider the nature of its interpolation, how it has 
come to be possessed and dispossessed, and how it signifies in relation to its possessor.  
 The desk and the orphaned pieces of furniture in the Weiszs’ apartment sit at the center 
of ways of knowing the past; reading the interaction of characters with the object world becomes 
a way to interpret relationships to historical knowledge more broadly.  Yoav and Leah’s 
purposeful ignorance, carelessness, and disrespect exist at one extreme, while  Weisz’s obsession 
with care and precision sits opposition his children’s attitude.  Problematic for Weisz and his 
family, the desire to amass evidence of traumatic history is not necessarily transferred from one 
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generation to the next.  In comparison to their father’s meticulous obsession with furniture, 
Isabel describes how different is her relationship to the furniture from Yoav and Leah’s: “No 
matter how much I came to know, I could never master the grace and ease with which Yoav and 
Leah moved among all of those antiques, nor their strange combination of sensitivity and 
indifference” (138).  Knowledge is not necessarily a strategy for mastery, Isabel expresses.  
Isabel’s family has a different ontological relationshiop with furniture and circles around these 
objects at some remove; taught that she might inflict damage on her family’s antiques, she 
expresses, “I was raised to move carefully around the furniture, not so much to live with it as to 
live alongside it, at a respectful distance” (139).  In a symbolic gesture of American removal 
from Holocaust history, Isabel is instructed not to know the furniture in any intimate or familiar 
way, but to use physical space as a way to distance herself from the antiques.  In contrast, Yoav 
and Leah’s carelessness reveals their lack of desire, perhaps even respect, for knowledge of the 
past.  The lack of physical space intimates a very different relationship with Holocaust history; 
for Europe or Israel, distance is not an option.  When Isabel lives with the siblings in their 
apartment in London, she remarks on the way they live “with” the beautiful antiques that filled 
the apartment but remain uninterested: “they rested their bare feet and glasses of wine on 
Biedermeier coffee tables, left fingerprints on the vitrines, napped on the settees, ate off the Art 
Deco commodes, and occasionally even walked atop the long dining tables when it was the most 
convenient way of getting from one place to another in a room crowded with furniture” (139).  
For Yoav and Leah, marked by indifference, such pieces are reduced to the status of objects.  
While the activities of daily life, eating, sleeping, resting, and moving occur on or with the 
objects, the siblings have an uncanny ability to avoid leaving a physical trace—to live 
“alongside.”  Like their father, the siblings are described as having an otherworldly presence: 
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“but no matter how careless they were, they seemed never to leave behind a mark or trace.  At 
first I took this to be the grace of those brought up to consider such furniture their natural habitat, 
but once I knew Yoav and Leah better I began to think of their talent, if one can call it that, as 
something borrowed from ghosts” (139).  Always already haunted by the history of their family 
and the events of Kristallnacht, Yoav and Leah’s ghostliness does not necessarily indicate their 
connection to these historical remains of the Holocaust; Yoav and Leah’s daily and physical 
interaction with the furniture reveals their emotional isolation from the past and their treatment 
of such pieces as merely objects. 
 Weisz stakes his career on bridging past and present connections for his clients and 
himself. To the same degree that his children are indifferent, Weisz is obsessed with locating and 
retrieving his father’s and his clients’ lost objects.  As Leah says, our father was “burdened with 
a sense of duty that commanded his whole life, and later ours” (115).  In this context the act of 
creation is intimately bound up in the retrieval of lost objects: “maybe all exiles try to re-create 
the place they’ve lost out of their fear of dying in a strange place,” Isabel contemplates (110).  
Re-creation by way of recovering lost furniture is tied to both historical and personal narratives. 
The missing objects provide a physical shape and space to the unrepresentable historical “dark 
areas” that threaten to swallow the characters (McHale 87), continuously signaled in the text 
thematically through holes.  When Isabel is walking through Cloudenberg64 at night, she 
stumbles upon a painting by Breughel of a man who had fallen through ice.  In the scene 
depicted in the painting, no one notices the man except for a small boy offering him his stick 
                                                
64Weisz sends Yoav, accompanied by Isabel, to Brussels to retrieve a chess table from a Mr. 
Leclercq, who bears a strange resemblance to Himmler.  Cloudenberg mirrors the historical site 
Coudenberg, the remains of the residential palace in Brussels on Coudenberg hill that once 
served as a residence of Charles V and was destroyed by a fire in 1731.      
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(152).  But the stick was offered and “not yet taken” Isabel perceives, and the “whole scene 
suddenly tilted toward that dark hole that waited to swallow it” (152).  So too are the characters 
tilted towards “dark holes,” including the “gaping hole” in the study on Ha ‘Oren street where 
the elder Weisz’s desk remains missing.  As Leah writes to Isabel, “the only thing missing in the 
study on Ha’Oren Street was my grandfather’s desk—where it should have stood, there was a 
gaping hole.  Without it, the study remained incomplete, a poor replica” (116).   
 As they are found, these objects physically present the past.  This act is also key to 
narrative creation, which is the purpose of the interactions that Weisz has with his clients when 
he miraculously retrieves and presents a piece of lost furniture for a client. In these business 
dealings Weisz functions more like a psychotherapist than an antiques dealer.  The resurrected 
object allows the client to talk about his or her past and then breathe relief and let go of the pain 
the client has harbored.  Interestingly, it doesn’t matter if the furniture is the exact piece the 
client lost—it seems more important that the prosthetic piece stands in for the authentic in order 
to provide a structure for the client to tell her story and be witnessed or heard.     
 The nearness of Weisz’s family to the Freud museum in London and the parallel 
trajectories of the two men corroborate Weisz’s ad-hoc role as psychotherapist in his dealings 
with his clients.  Like Sigmund Freud, Weisz obsessively reestablishes his father’s study in the 
house on Ha ‘Oren street.  While in London Isabel frequents Freud’s house, which is now a 
museum, and her reflections detail the similar ways in which their studies are reconstructed in 
exile.  Isabel details, “when Freud fled Vienna almost all of his belongings were crated up and 
shipped to the new house in London, where his wife and daughter lovingly reassembled, down to 
the last possible detail, the study he’d been forced to abandon at 19 Bergasse.  At the time I 
didn’t know anything about Weisz’s study in Jerusalem, and so the poetic symmetry of the 
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house’s nearness to Freud’s was lost on me” (110).  The fact that the Freud family’s pursuit is 
now preserved as a museum reveals the historian’s impulse, its empiricism and exactitude, 
behind Weisz’s meticulous undertaking that is aligned with the dominant scholarly methodology 
of the realist approach to Holocaust narratives (Rothberg 4).  Weisz has inherited this approach 
from his own father, a scholar of history who taught Weisz “that the absence of things is more 
useful than their presence” (287).  It is only at the end of his life that Weisz questions this 
approach: “Useful for what?,” he wonders (287).  The empty hole in Weisz’s study reflects a 
failure of the historian’s mode of inquiry, especially as it is linked to his tragic death.  And as 
Emily Miller Budick argues, “so long as Weisz tries to physically repossess the literal desk, his 
children will remain ‘prisoners. . . locked within the walls of their own family’” (287).  The 
historian’s method, like its antirealist counterpart, fails.  Because the desk is locked in a storage 
unit in New York City, the study remains incomplete and Weisz’s failure ends in suicide.  
Emulating the historian’s quest for verisimilitude becomes impossible; re-creating the past 
through an exact assemblage of inanimate objects, perfectly reassembled in the Freud museum or 
Weisz’s study, falls short.  
 In this way, Great House reveals the failure of the realist mode both narratively and 
historically.  Brian Edwards summarizes the way that the social realist mode, relying on mimesis, 
traditionally privileged history (261).  However, after poststructuralists began to challenge the 
mimetic contract underlying the texts of classic realism, the relationship between mimesis and 
fantasy itself became negotiable (Edwards 221).  Extending this idea, J. Hillis Miller writes that 
after structural linguistics, we should not take for granted “the notion of a literary text which is 
validated by its one-to-one correspondence to some social, historical, or psychological reality” 
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(287).65  As such, we should not take for granted the inability for a text to be validated by this 
correspondence; what Great House reflects is the way the realist framework, based on a “one-to-
one correspondence to some social, historical, or psychological reality” becomes impossible 
when “gaping holes” characterize all aspects of that reality.  Both the historical circumstances 
and the language utilized to render these events communicable are uncertain.  As Edwards 
explains, “If what is usually held to be ‘real and normal’ is uncertain, and even more its 
representation in writing, so too are decisions about fantasy that depart from ‘consensus reality,’ 
or for which explanation is radically problematic” (221).  On the narrative level, Great House 
attests to a yawning gap between objects and things; on a historical plane, there is a rift between 
knowledge and experience.  And as the pairing of Weisz’s and Freud’s narratives indicates, their 
approaches to overcoming historical absence through meticulous re-creation lead to tragedy.  
 Late in the novel, Weisz commits suicide, thus presenting a series of questions about 
the relationship between temporality, things, and enchantment.  In Weisz’s final prophetic vision 
and the desk’s implied futurity, the text presents alternatives to the realist mode and to 
chronological or empirical epistemologies.  Weisz foresees that Isabel and Yoav will marry and 
have a child named David, a name that invokes the ultimate prophecy in Judaic tradition—that 
the messiah will descend from the Kingdom of David.  This child, envisions Weisz, will inherit 
the key to the storage room in New York City that contains the desk (289).  The privileging of 
prophecy and messianic time through the agency of Weisz’s imagination signals a powerful 
contrast to the science of exactitude that has governed his career and his study.  This beautiful 
                                                
65According to Miller, this is especially important after structural linguistics because “meaning in 
language rises not from the reference of signs to something outside words but from differential 
relations among the words themselves,” where “’referent’ and ‘meaning’ must always be 
distinguished” (287).  
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prophecy comes not from the study’s completed arrangement as the outcome of Weisz’s 
fastidious globetrotting, with the desk finally back in its place, but out of its absence.    
 In these gaps, often signaled to the reader through moments of arrest and 
defamiliarization, enchantment takes shape.  Only after Weisz commits suicide in June of 1999 
does this time ironically “collapse.”  Leah writes to Isabel that the maid found him in his study 
on the day following his suicide.  Weisz has obsessively tried to track and control the past, but he 
has failed.  Weisz has maintained the small collection of watches that had belonged to his own 
father, winding them since his father’s arrest in Budapest in 1944 (113).  Leah notes, “while he 
was alive, the watches had accompanied Weisz wherever he traveled so that he would be able to 
wind them on schedule.  When the maid arrived, Leah wrote, all of the watches had stopped” 
(113).  All along Weisz has operated systematically, “as if by putting all the pieces back together 
he might collapse time and erase regret” (116).  History, in the form of chronological time, is 
tied to the material; its function is contingent on Weisz’s methodical winding. These “pieces” of 
the past—Weisz’s client’s objects, his family’s furniture, and his father’s collection of watches—
are the enchanted objects that animate Weisz and his client’s relationship to history, revealing 
that history is both contingent and material.  
The Wreckage of History in Everything Is Illuminated   
 “Memory is the mantra of all the institutions that reckon with the Holocaust, but memory is an 
inaccurate term.  For anyone who wasn’t there, on either side of the barbed wire, Jew or German, 
thinking about the Holocaust is really an act of imagination.  All we know is how little we know” 
–Melvin Jules Bukiet (qtd. in Floreani 140)  
 
“The complete absence I found in Ukraine gave my imagination total freedom” –Jonathan Safran 
Foer  
 
If the social realist mode is one that traditionally privileges history (Edwards 261), then it 
should come as no surprise that Krauss and Safran Foer rely on the fantastic and fantasy, 
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respectively, to call attention to historical absences.  As I have been arguing through the 
discourse of enchantment, for the third-generation writer or reader, any Holocaust genre—
testimony, novel, history—is to a certain degree already a fantasy text.  As writer Melvin Jules 
Bukiet iterates, imagination in third generation literature structures our relationship to “how little 
we know” (qtd. in Floreani 140).  The title of Everything is Illuminated provides the reader with 
her first indication of the impossible logic of the text,66 one that constantly works to revise and 
critique itself by way of the conflicting impulse to undermine and illuminate its narrative.  Given 
what we know now about the troubling and traumatic constructions of knowledge in Holocaust 
narratives, for “Everything” to be illuminated is not just impossible, but an absurd undertaking, 
encapsulating the impulse of the absurd that I will explore in Nathan Englander’s work.  “And 
yet,” to borrow a frequent phrase from Great House, the text self-consciously attempts to do just 
that.  
Like Great House, the novel unfolds across distinct narrative strands and narrators, but 
unlike the former, it transgresses the bounds of “this world” to transport us to the fictional 
wonder of an eighteenth-century shtetl, Trachimbrod.  The novel opens with the awkward albeit 
charming and funny voice of Alex, a teenager who serves as the protagonist’s tour guide and 
clumsy interpreter along with his grandfather and “seeking-eye bitch.”  The author’s 
fictionalized protagonist, Jonathan, a young Jewish American writer, has arrived in Ukraine on a 
typical “heritage tour” (the name of his grandfather’s company) searching for the German 
woman named Augustine who helped his grandfather Safran escape from the German massacre 
of the Jews in his village.  But the trip does not occur in real time on the page; rather, the story 
                                                
66This is reinforced by the author’s dedication, which reads: “Simply and impossibly: FOR MY 
FAMILY”  
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unfurls after the trip when Jonathan and Alex exchange letters and together reconstruct the 
events.  Thus, the novel contains three narrative strands: the quest narrative, the Trachimbrod 
story, and Alex’s letters.   
Alex has chronicled Jonathan’s trip in his broken English and has sent excerpts to 
Jonathan seeking his input; these pieces of text detail what I will refer to as the journey or quest 
narrative.  Thus, while we are not privy to Jonathan’s letters we infer his suggestions via Alex’s 
own reflections on Jonathan’s comments.  Jonathan’s narrative concerns what critics like Jenni 
Adams, Tracy Floreani, and Irmtraud Huber have commonly deemed the novel’s “magical realist” 
strand, or what I will refer to as the Trachimbrod narrative.  The story of Jonathan’s ancestry 
begins in the eighteenth century and details the extraordinary events that befall the Jewish 
community until the destruction of Trachimbrod within the fantasy story collides with the 
historical reality of the German massacre.  Like Great House, the novel circles around a poetics 
of indirection and estrangement that foregrounds questions of knowing and communicating.  
Grandfather, Jonathan, and Alex set off to locate Augustine, but instead, meet Lista (the woman 
the three men refer to as “not Augustine”) and discover the secret history of grandfather; 
absences and gaps in historical knowledge, the absence of Augustine, for example, are not meant 
to be overwritten but signal meaning and serve as a source of imaginative creation.  In addition 
to indicating historical gaps, fantasy pinpoints the contemporary generation’s estrangement from 
history; the text’s aesthetics of enchantment illuminate multiple levels of historical alienation.  
Similar to the function of the disparate narrative threads in The Yiddish Policemen’s Union, the 
distinct narratives of Everything is Illuminated operate in relation to different narrative 
ontologies of estrangement—while we are naturalized into the wonder and impossibility of the 
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Trachimbrod story without question, the very purpose of the quest narrative (narrated and 
translated by Alex) is to question possibility and determine with exactitude what can be known.       
Objects, too, sit at the center of Everything is Illuminated, propelling the plot and 
inhabiting a space between narratives.  As in Great House, objects take on a precarious 
sensibility because of their symbolic and metaphysical weight for the storyteller and reader.  
Critics like Irmtraud Huber argue that the novel doesn’t deconstruct certainties with the aim of 
revealing an underlying absence (118).  Rather, Huber notes, “such absence becomes the origin 
of narrative” (118).  Building on this concept, I place the material traces of such absence at the 
fore of the text’s construction.  Like Krauss’s text, Safran Foer’s novel is a meditation on making 
meaning through material traces as a third-generation writer.  In a text that obsessively 
interrogates its own origins, one suspicious of claims to beginnings and ends, there is a clear, 
material marker of inspiration for the Trachimbrod narrative: the box of items marked “IN CASE” 
that Jonathan receives from Lista are the same items that spill from the wagon onto the page67 as 
the Trachimbrod narrative begins, interpolating a lost history in their wake.  Across the fantasy 
and mimetic narrative worlds of the text, enchanted objects that signify meaning in all possible 
worlds reveal the interrelationship between both modes as valuable to historical interpolation.   
Many critics have commented on the fact the magical feats of the novel are confined to 
the Trachimbrod narrative, meaning that the potential for fabulation does not encroach on 
knowable history.  Jenni Adams, for example, suggests that because the Trachimbrod narrative 
occupies a gap in the historical record, since all traces of the shtetl were destroyed during the war, 
this narrative occupies a historical dark area and as such, legitimate grounds for fabulation (30).  
                                                
67These material traces that structure the narrative are also symbolically depicted on the page by 
the small graphic that opens the chapter.  
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Trachimbrod has literally been wiped out without a trace, evinced in Jonathan’s bags of earth 
collected at the site.  Alex describes of this moment,  
I implore myself to paint Trachimbrod, so you will know why we were so 
overawed.  There was nothing except for two houses, and some wood on the 
ground, and pieces of glass, and children’s toys, and photographs.  When I utter 
that there was nothing, what I intend is that there was not any of these things, or 
any other things. [. . . ] ‘How could anything have ever existed here?’ (184)   
 
Thus, Adams contrasts the fabulation with those elements of the past that, in contrast, are 
accessible as objects of knowledge: the personal histories of Alex, Jonathan, and Grandfather. 
Adams argues that the novel draws a clear distinction between the two forms, “in this sense 
affirming the existence of a realm of knowable history by refusing to allow magical or 
transgressive elements to exceed the elaboration of historical ‘dark areas’” (30).  Irmtraud Huber 
echoes this kind of reading as she notes, “the past is indeed opened to creative interpretation, but 
only as long as the latter remains within the self-declared bounds of fiction” (117).  These critics 
contend that fantasy risks imagining history only where there are gaps, thus adding a caveat to 
Bernard Malamud’s contention that “Fantasy, since it is out of bounds of the ordinary, invites the 
writer to take chances, . . . to play with fire and magic. . .  safely because controlled by art” (50).  
What these critics draw attention to is that to take chances “safely” means to do so only outside 
the boundaries of knowable history.  But how do we approach the actual material objects of 
history, those pearls, strings, rings, books, papers, and maps that exist across narrative ontologies 
and storylines?     
Those items in the “IN CASE” box cross the disparate narrative threads and question the 
confinement or “safety” of both modes of mediation—mimetic and fantastic.  Meaning is created 
in the narrative interplay; objects become enchanted because of their relationship to both the 
“made-up” and “authentic” narrative strands.  In Everything Is Illuminated, the functions of 
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fantasy and mimesis are not as neatly confined to the individual chapters as Adams and Huber 
make them out to be.  In the Trachimbrod narrative, for example, the twins Chana and Hannah, 
just like the Book of Dreams and The Book of Antecedents, or the Slouchers and the Uprighters, 
are a pair that plays with notions of fantasy tropes and mimetic tropes.  And in the journey 
narrative, Grandfather, Alex, and Jonathan are wedded to the delusion that Lista is Augustine, 
even though they know this is impossible.  In this way fantasy tropes function as a kind of 
metafiction.  Like the materiality of Great House, the novel and its distinct narrative modes 
becomes the thing that mediates the “middle ground” between history and reality, fantasy and 
realism, the affective and unemotional.  As Landsberg attests, “for the event to become 
meaningful enough to retain as part of our intellectual and emotional archive—the archive on 
which our future actions might be based—it must be significant on a cognitive level and palpable 
in an individual, affective way” (138).  Part of this work occurs as the thingness of the text as a 
whole comes into focus.  Structural metaphors embedded in the title of Great House—a house of 
the mind, Jewish learning, temple worship, family—provide a material scaffolding for the novel.  
In Everything Is Illuminated, textuality itself signifies material presence.  By including language, 
notes, charts, translation, ellipses, silences, names, books-within-books, letters, maps, and labels, 
different typographies, etc., the novel objectifies language and emphasizes its material 
representation.  Alex’s translations also reflect the way that language has a tangible, traceable 
quality.  In this way, the novel’s self-reflexivity draws attention to the materiality of various 
textual discourses and the intellectual and emotional threads that are required for memory and 
meaning.  The purpose is not to construct an alternative history but to suggest various modes of 
knowing that are already intertwined and essential to accessing the past.    
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The juxtaposition of the Trachimbrod and journey narratives coupled with their 
mediation through Alex’s letters enchants the historical record; they reflect the strange ability of 
both the fantasy and mimetic modes to mediate historical representation.  While the narrative 
worlds are separated by their relationship to reality indicate, their construction is significantly 
interdependent and messier than critics like Adams and Huber suggest.  Alex initially resists 
Jonathan’s description of the Ukrainians “who were known for being terrible to the Jews” 
because “it does not say this in the history books,” but by reading the Trachimbrod story Alex 
comes to acknowledge a different version of the historical record and confesses that he is both 
“angry” and “grateful” for Jonathan’s imaginative diary (62; 160).  Neither narrative is thus 
sufficient on its own terms; moving back and forth creates the “unheimlich (uncanny) feeling of 
being disrupted out of one’s default sensory psychic-intellectual disposition” central to 
enchantment (Bennett 5).   
Throughout the novel excavating the past occurs primarily through a play of objects and 
origins.  As soon as the Trachimbrod narrative opens with the tumble of Trachim B’s double-
axle wagon into the river, ways of accounting for the accident multiply and undermine their own 
authenticity.  Simultaneously, debris that spills from the wagon both accumulates on the surface 
and sinks to the bottom of the murky “deep green water” (10).  As the reader orients herself to 
this fantasy shtetl and lost world, we must also orient ourselves to uncertainty about knowing; 
even as events unfold right before our eyes, we are not privileged to know or not know, but 
rather, we inhabit an uncertain, imaginary space where the wagon “either did or did not pin him 
[Trachim B] against the bottom of the Brod River” (10).  The proliferation of things that rise and 
those that sink cannot be determined from the murky water, and neither can Yankel’s death.  
Much of the accident remains shrouded in mystery.  When Shloim dives in to recover Yankel’s 
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body, the narrator remarks, “the rising wreckage became increasingly dense, until he couldn’t see 
his hands in front of him.  Where? Where?” (11).  The citizenry are not even sure if Trachim B 
had a wife, nor if there were any witnesses to the event.  Instead, the narrator introduces what 
becomes a familiar structure of meaning throughout the Trachimbrod narrative, a chain of 
linguistic signifiers that obscure origins and privilege deferral and distance. The young twins, 
Chana and Hannah, are silenced because of their age: “Did the girls see anything? Asked Avrum 
R” (12).  Sofiowka responds, “The girls saw nothing.  I saw that they saw nothing” (12). “I saw 
that they saw” creates an analogous structure to Safran Foer’s role as a writer removed from 
direct witness in an already ambiguous accident set in a marvelous narrative frame (12).68  And it 
is out of this wreckage that Brod, Jonathan’s great-great-great-great-great-grandmother, is 
miraculously born: “In the middle of the string and feathers, surrounded by candles and soaked 
matches, prawns, pawns, and silk tassles that curtsied like jellyfish, was a baby girl, still mucus-
glazed, still pink as the inside of the plum” (13).  Brod is born from a womb of lost culture and 
into a play of genealogy.  There is no single origin story privileged and presented in this chapter; 
rather, Brod is one item among the wreckage of material traces to which the Trachimbrod 
narrative gives life.   
Impossibility in this space that is already removed from our world and set in a secondary 
world (or otherworld) becomes double-coded as it also refers to epistemologies; the usual marker 
of the fantasy mode to which we are accustomed as narrative ontology—impossibility—makes a 
comment about historical knowability.  The narrator describes,           
                                                
68In this way, my reading tends to agree with that of Katrim Amiam, who argues that the text “re-
opens the past to a Pynchonesque realm of creative guesswork and endless (re-) interpretation, 
severely shaking what referential foundations the culture of Holocaust remembrance may 
continue to cherish” (156).  
142 
 
It was March 18, 1791, when Trachim B’s double-axle wagon either did or did 
not pin him against the bottom of the Brod River.  The young W twins were the 
first to see the curious flotsam rising to the surface: wandering snakes of white 
string, a crushed-velvet glove with outstretched fingers, barren spools, schmootzy 
pince-nez, rasp-and boysenberries, feces, frillwork, the shards of a shattered 
atomizer, the bleeding red-ink script of a resolution: I will. . . I will. . . (8) 
 
As an introduction to a Yiddish culture lost to history, these objects are imprinted with traces of 
former human life; the “outstretched fingers” of the glove, the spools barren with use, the pince-
nez “schmootzy” with handling, literal human waste, all seem to have been snatched from bodies 
in motion and moments of utilization as they proliferate as evidence of the bodies of the past (8).  
Like the discarded things left behind in the lost-articles room of the Zamenhopf hotel, these 
objects point to the threads and highly textured fabric of a collective cultural body.  Figured 
through the abject and random waste that spills from the illustration of Trachim B's wagon and 
onto the page, traces of this community as one of a larger community “beyond” mark a 
transcendent quality of Trachimbrod and connect the objects to history as well as the diaspora.  
The objects amass alongside interpretations of what happened, thus their “thingness” in 
Brown’s terms is enabled through their relationship to epistemologies.  Chana, “the younger and 
less cautious twin,” is delighted: “It’s turning up the most unusual things! Chana laughed, 
splashing at the mass that grew like a garden around her.  She picked up the hands of a baby doll, 
and those of a grandfather clock.  Umbrella ribs.  A skeleton key.  The articles rose on the 
crowns of bubbles that burst when they reached the surface” (9).  She exclaims, “. . .  Look at 
this! . . . And this! Chana shrieked with joy, holding up a faded map of the universe” (9).  But her 
sister Hannah, the “older and more cautious” one, “watched from the shore and cried” (9).  
Chana and Hannah’s twinned reactions present two contradictory responses to the question, what 
do we do with the wreckage of the past? Respond with joy and openness in an all-out embrace? 
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Or do we remain wary, trapped in mourning and sadness? Here the age difference of the sisters, 
the older, cautious Hannah in contrast to the younger, ebullient Chana, reflects the generational 
divide as they present two extremes: a wary vigilance and its opposite, a boundless optimism in 
all things.  
The floating debris of the first chapter foreshadows the bodies that float to the surface of 
the river at the end of the novel when Trachimbrod is bombed and destroyed by the Nazis (273).  
The scene has already been prophesied by Brod and chronicled in The Book of Recurrent 
Dreams.  As a young soldier tosses the volumes onto the bonfire, one of the pages detailing her 
premonition comes loose: “. . . hundreds of bodies poured into the brod that river with my 
name. . . and it was not the explosions or scattering shrapnel that would be our death not the 
heckling cinders not the laughing debris but all of the bodies flailing and grabbing hold of one 
another. . .” (273).  It is amidst this chaos that Safran and Zosha’s child is born, but pulled under 
and trapped by its umbilical cord, the child dies attached to Zosha (273).  Like Brod, Safran is 
born from tragedy and amidst the clutter of debris.  The connection of these two scenes makes 
manifest the presence of absence attached to the object-world of text.  As Shallcross reminds us, 
it is the piles and objects that have become the “dominant metonymy” of the Holocaust, where 
these things in the text indicate not actual memories but the structure of metonymic 
remembrance that dictates our relationship to the past.  
While we may not have access to the central event in the novel, we do have access to its 
material traces, and figuring out how to make meaning from such traces structures the narrative, 
drives its plot, and intimates its overarching message (117).  Shallcross describes the process 
through which victims were divested of belongings, noting that things “have served as material 
evidence that the Holocaust was not a figment of some collective imagination”; things provide 
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material evidence of the impossible (Shallcross 2).  The debris that spills onto the first pages of 
the novel refers to those items that Alex, Grandfather, and Jonathan receive from the “IN CASE” 
box when they visit Lista or not Augustine.  Like George Weisz, Lista is mired in mystery.  As 
the three men struggle to determine whether or not the beautiful old woman they meet is 
Augustine, Alex writes, “she was so beautiful, like someone who you will never meet, but 
always dream of meeting, like someone who is too good for you” (149).  The mysterious and 
uncertain sensibility surrounding Lista is one way to consider the “fantasy” and “mimetic” 
narratives as uncannily similar rather than distinct, complicating the basis for critical arguments 
proposed by Adams and Huber.   
The objects in the “IN CASE” box, which they remark are similar to the “REMAINS” 
box in Augustine’s house, also thread together these distinct worlds.   The labeling of “IN CASE” 
also reflects, similar to Weisz’s father’s watch collection, the notion of history that is contingent 
upon the material—whether that take the form of texts or objects.  When the three men arrive at 
Lista’s house and she pulls out the boxes, Alex describes how “she moved her hands through the 
things in the box, like the things were water,” collapsing the distance between the debris of the 
Brod river pictured in the opening scene of Jonathan’s story and the substance of the present 
(152).  As they reach their hands in, the men excavate the same items that inspire Jonathan’s 
writing and spill across the opening pages: the pearl necklace, “the map of the world,” the piece 
of white string, The Book of Past Occurrences, and the photograph of Jonathan’s grandparents 
with Herschel and Grandfather.  Jonathan comments that the necklace seems dirty, like it had 
been buried.  Alex inquires, “what does it mean buried?” and Jonathan responds, collapsing the 
distinction between bodies and things, “put in the ground, like a dead body” (222).  
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As they rummage through the box, each takes a turn choosing an item.  Alex declares, “I 
should choose something,” because he desires “to discover how he would answer to the notion 
that Grandfather and I had the same privilege as he did to investigate the box” (222).  Alex’s 
reference to privilege and the conscientious effort made to take turns raises the question of who 
owns the past and the requisite consciousness involved in overcoming privilege.  The scene 
comments on, and subsequently deconstructs, the hierarchy of access to Holocaust history, 
turning it into shared, communal play as the scene transforms into a game with unwritten rules: 
“we did not say it, but it was part of our game that you could not view in the box when you were 
selecting the thing to excavate” (223).  In this memory game, we are reminded of the importance 
of play to contemporary historiography: “In consideration of the problematics of position and 
selection, together with the slippages in language itself, history is seen as an always divided 
construct and not a seamless record of the actual” (Edwards 261).  Alex comments on an 
experiential knowledge he gleans from feeling the outlines, textures, and shapes of the past; 
while this is a knowledge that is not witnessed (the men “could not view in the box when you 
were selecting the thing to excavate” [223]), it is knowledge nonetheless: “some of the things 
that my hand touched were smooth, like marble or stones from the beach.  Other things that my 
hand touched were cold, like metal, or warm, like fur.  There were many pieces of paper.  I could 
be certain of that without witnessing them” (223).  Instead, Alex notes, “I was witnessing 
Jonathan while my hand investigated.  A soft thing.  A round thing” (225).  “There are so many 
things,” Grandfather comments, that they don’t know how or what to choose.  Sometimes the 
thing is grasped because of size and proximity (“I excavated what I excavated because it was the 
largest thing in the box” [223]), and once excavated, examined even out of boredom: Jonathan 
looks at the photograph “not because he was an interested person, but because there was nothing 
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else to do at the moment while I searched the box” (225).  Yet others are excavated because of a 
preconceived relationship with the thing.  Grandfather is disappointed when he chooses the 
photograph, for example: “ah a simple one,” he says, “too unfortunate.  I thought it felt like 
something different” (224-5).   
It is this haphazard experience that unearths the critical narrative of Herschel’s murder.  
There are two key photographic objects that, like the desk in Great House, both drive the plot 
and trigger memory—the first is the photograph of Augustine that motivates the fictional 
Jonathan’s journey to Ukraine, the second is the found photo of grandfather as a young man with 
his family and his friend Herschel.  As Marianne Hirsch describes the way the motif of 
photographs functions in Art Speigelman’s Maus, she reveals that these visual relics share with 
Holocaust objects the same quality of “in-betweenness”: “It is precisely the indexical nature of 
the photo, its status as relic, or trace, or fetish—its ‘direct’ connection with the material presence 
of the photographed person—that intensifies its status as harbinger of death and, at the same time 
and concomitantly, its capacity to signify life” (qtd. in Floreani 141).  It is in this way that we 
can think of the objects, alongside the photographs, as both memorial and postmemorial objects.  
Hirsch continues, family photos related directly or indirectly to the Holocaust “connect . . . the 
past and the present, . . . because these family photographs are documents both of memory (the 
survivor’s) and of what I would like to call postmemory (that of the child of the survivor whose 
life is dominated by memories of what preceded his/her birth)” (qtd. in Floreani 141).  The 
impact of the postmemorial photograph can be seen in the narrative shift of Alex’s translation.  It 
is the photograph in the box marked “IN CASE” that propels grandfather to tell the story of 
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Herschel’s murder.69  At first, Alex narrates Grandfather’s narrative; however, Alex switches to 
directly translating grandfather’s story—Alex’s “I” becomes the “I” of grandfather as 
generational distance collapses.  The intergenerational transfer of objects begets the 
intergenerational transfer of narrative; or, as the Trachimbroders comment during the memory 
plague, “memory begat memory” (258).     
As we have seen, these novels use objects to invoke the presence of absence in the 
intergenerational transfer of memory.  As Landsberg’s work reminds us, “we experience the 
objects as the sensuous trace of an absence” (135).  When Alex, Grandfather, and Jonathan visit 
Augustine’s house, the boxes “overflowing with items” trigger a profound, overwhelming 
presence of absence (Foer 147).  Noting the piles of shoes and clothing of various sizes and 
fashions stacked from floor to ceiling, Alex describes, “all of the clothing and shoes and pictures 
made me to reason that there must have been at least one hundred people living in that room.  
The other room was also very populous” (147).  Given Alex’s propensity for mistranslation, the 
reference to “populous” conflates both the definition of “full of people; having many inhabitants; 
densely populated” with the more literal description of the boxes and items as “numerous” or 
“abundant” (OED).  In the play of language made manifest through objects, the scene’s boxes 
and labels70 conjure the lost presence of the Trachimbrod inhabitants and their livelihood.  As 
                                                
69Reading photographs-as-objects through the lens of Bill Brown’s “thing theory,” Julia 
Breitbach highlights the strange, mythical power embedded in this enchanted materiality. She 
comments that “endowed with such mythical prowess, photos—especially those that are very 
dear or disturbing to their beholder—then radiate with a haunting, uncanny presence.  A sense of 
transcendence or enchantment becomes oddly concrete when looking at such images, with the 
photograph indeed evoking some ‘balmy elsewhere’” (58).     
 
70The labels are also invested in a sense of play: “WEDDINGS AND OTHER 
CELEBRATIONS,” “PRIVATES: JOURNALS/DIARIES/SKETCHBOOKS/UNDERWEAR,” 
“SILVER/PERFUME/PINWHEELS,” “WATCHES/WINTER,” 
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there are no longer people to care for, Lista cares for their objects with the same obsessiveness 
that Weisz shows for his clients and their lost items.  As Landsberg explains of the piles of debris 
in the Holocaust Museum, these objects offer an “unmediated proximity” to the past precisely 
because of the strange interrelationship of the material with the immaterial trace (119).  
Landsberg writes, “if the experience of the Holocaust is precisely the experience of the loss or 
absence of people, then the objects stand in for this absence” (Landsberg 119).  One’s 
relationship to them becomes uncertain as one develops an “odd sense of spatial intimacy with 
those people who are at an unbridgeable distance, who are conspicuously absent” (Landsberg 
133).  Set in the realist frame of the novel, the objects initiate the experience of the “duration of 
uncertainty” characteristic of Todorov’s fantastic, where the strange, otherworldy circumstances 
of historical trauma animate this aesthetic mode (25).  
The objects in this scene, while part of the mimetic narrative frame, are no less enchanted.  
One such object is Rivka’s ring, which is endowed with a sense of agency in order to remind the 
reader that relics of history provide the meaning out of which narrative is constructed.  Jonathan 
assumes that Rivka, one of the murdered Trachimbroders, hid the ring as proof of her existence.  
Alex translates Lista’s response in this strange and enchanted moment: “’No,’ she said. ‘The ring 
does not exist for you.  You exist for the ring.  The ring is not in case of you.  You are in case of 
the ring’” (192).  Jonathan falsely assumes that the past exists for us to create meaning, but 
Augustine corrects him: the ring does not exist for us to discover it, to use it to signify meaning 
and memory as Jonathan presumes, but rather, the ring and material fragments of history create 
meaning for us—they have the agency, and in this way they are enchanted as humans are de-
                                                                                                                                                       
“HYGIENE/SPOOLS/CANDLES,” “FIGURINES/SPECTACLES,” “DARKNESS,” and 
“DEATH OF THE FIRSTBORN” (147).   
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centered and the “REMAINS”71 of history signify.  The “You” exists to retrieve and receive the 
material traces of the past, where a sense of inevitability is built into the intergenerational 
transfer of objects and memories.  Jonathan’s narrative is not a way to impose meaning on the 
past but to testify to these objects’ own ability to signify.  The enchanted object in this scene 
testifies to the unbearable—what Jonathan cannot experience; the passing of the ring between 
Lista and Jonathan is the passing of a history that does not belong or “exist for” Jonathan but that 
he must nonetheless grasp and witness.  
The Novel as Enchanted Object   
 Like the objects within the texts, the novels themselves are a kind of thing whose 
poetics of indirection constantly elude our possession.  In this section I will focus on metafiction 
in Great House in order to consider those elements that contribute to the novel’s thingness, and I 
will gesture to the presence of absence in both texts that in part accounts for this materiality.  In 
Great House, metafictional attention to writers, the narrative framing of individual chapters, and 
the overall aesthetic structure highlight textuality and pose questions of how to objectify history 
that reflect Krauss’s larger concerns.  The “thingness” of writing is also emphasized through the 
metafiction of Everything Is Illuminated, especially the process of writing and revising that 
occurs in Jonathan and Alex’s exchange of letters.  While they do not depict Holocaust trauma 
directly, Krauss’s narrators often refer to fragmented pieces of Holocaust history and thus, a 
series of Holocaust-adjacent narratives indirectly unfolds.  The use of indirection or substitution 
of authenticity as a means to access or express the authentic is a theme of the novel and of 
writing in the text.  In this way, the text relies on indirection as a mode of authentic 
communication.  Driving across Europe with Yoav, Isabel relays the value of indirect 
                                                
71A name of another box in Lista’s apartment.  
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communication in their relationship: “it was impossible to talk to Yoav directly about anything to 
do with our relationship, whereas indirectly he could talk about the most raw and intimate things, 
the most dangerous things, the most painful and inconsolable but also the most hopeful” (145).  
Indirection in this description is a form of vital, authentic communication punctuated by the 
“most” or deepest emotional integrities, even though Isabel and Yoav are not discussing 
“anything to do with our relationship” (145).  Isabel’s reflection on the relationship between 
intimacy and indirection is also a comment on how the aesthetics of Great House rely on 
indirection to communicate Holocaust trauma; In Isabel’s meditation on Yoav’s ability to access 
emotional authenticity by indirect means, she suggests the way that the emotional inheritance of 
traumatic experience may be communicated obliquely.  Jenni Adams reads the indirect 
communication of Holocaust survivors depicted in third-generation literature as a means of 
expressing “the truth of one's own inarticulable experience,” and it is this mode that is inherited 
by Leah and Yoav (46).  Curiously, indirection also offers the most hopeful outlook, a theme that 
relates not only to Yoav and Leah’s communication but to the way the end of the novel closes 
around a hopeful, forward-looking moment through the prophecy of Yoav and Isabel’s child 
(145).  Only in the most in-between or indirect spaces does traumatic destruction intertwine with 
creation and redemption, reminding us of Malamud’s first use of fantasy as a way to explore 
Holocaust trauma “safely because controlled by art” (Talking Horse 50). 
 The larger context of Krauss’s role as author is reflected in her characters’ struggle to 
communicate and complicated by questions of how to make another’s story one’s own.  In a 
metanarrative gesture, for example, Nadia’s doubt about her abilities as a writer is coupled with a 
moral doubt (203).  She borrows the stories of others, like the story she hears the dancer (whom 
she barely knows) tell at a dinner party of the murder of his childhood friends, but questions her 
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culpability when she runs into him years later and the interaction is tinged with the dancer’s 
condescension (30).  Moving outward to Nadia’s narrative framing signifies deeper historical 
questions surrounding guilt and storytelling.  Looming in the background of Nadia’s relationship 
to the desk, to herself, and to writing are questions of Nadia’s complicity in relation to other 
traumas. As Nadia addresses her story to an unknown judge—“your honor”—her story embodies 
a confessional nature.72  “Talk to him,” float the nurse’s words, italicized, through the chapter.  
But to whom is she speaking? To Dov? To God? To the reader? And what exactly is the nature 
of her confession?   
 The story of Nadia’s relationship to the desk and to Daniel Varsky, relayed through the 
confessional poetics of “All Rise,” mimics the indirection of Malamud’s stories as Nadia too 
invokes the structure of multidirectional memory to reframe Holocaust trauma.  This “other” 
history of 20th century violence surrounds Varsky’s disappearance, torture, and murder, 
presenting the question of how to mourn a man Nadia barely knew, but whose objects and story 
she has literally come to possess.  The metatext makes analogous Krauss’s task as an inheritor of 
traumatic history who constructs a Great House in its wake.  In this way the desk—alongside the 
novel—symbolizes the strange paradox of “possession” and “dispossession”: what is it like to 
own something that carries with it the mark of dispossession of an entire population?  What does 
it mean to “possess”—by writing—a story that is not your own?  By way of indirection, Great 
House reveals the self-doubt and moral confusion of Krauss’s own burden as a writer in 
possession of and possessed by fragments of Holocaust history.    
 Conceptualizing the novel-as-object also undermines a purely realist orientation 
                                                
72By the end of the novel, we presume Nadia is speaking to Dov, the judge and son of Aaron (the 
narrator of “True Kindness”), who has just returned to Israel after his mother’s death.  
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towards the historical.  This occurs through a dark sense of play in the form of a riddle that, like 
the desk, connects the disparate narratives.  In addition to a quandary, there is also something 
innocent about the structure of a riddle, as it is commonly associated with children’s games and 
wordplay.  As a form of play, the riddle reflects the text’s poetics of uncertainty more broadly.  
Brian Edwards offers a preliminary definition of play as “the principle of energy and difference 
which unsettles arrangements, promotes change and resists closure” (xiii).  He continues, play 
“affirms freedom and possibility against restriction, resignation and closure, thus blurring 
distinctions between observation and participation, and between spectators and collaborators, 
distinctions which are far from clear” (Edwards 17).  Alongside the desk, play structures the 
interrelation of disparate narrative threads, historical events, and otherwise disconnected 
characters.  The desk, too, is implicated in riddles.  Looking around the room at Varsky’s 
furniture, Nadia contemplates, “I would be filled with a crushing despair, and sometimes just an 
oblique sadness, and sometimes I would look at it all and become convinced that it amounted to 
a riddle, a riddle he had left me that I was supposed to crack” (13).  Involving Nadia without her 
consent, the riddle presumes a dialectical relationship that ends in a solution.  And extending to 
the reader, play implicates those outside the novel’s immediate frame as they, too, become 
accidental caretakers of history. 
 The central riddle opens the very last chapter of the novel, which is also significant as 
the first chapter narrated by Weisz.  He begins by posing the following:   
A Riddle:73 A stone is thrown in Budapest on a winter night in 1944.  It sails 
through the air toward the illuminated window of a house where a father is 
writing a letter at his desk, a mother is reading, and a boy is daydreaming about an 
ice-skating race on the frozen Danube.  The glass shatters, the boy covers his head, 
                                                
73Riddles were a popular form of amusement for the early Hebrews, and the Talmud contains 
many riddles, some which have never been settled.  
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the mother screams.  At that moment the life they know ceases to exist.  Where 
does the stone land? (283)  
 
Opening the final chapter, the riddle invokes the unnamed event of Kristallnacht and indirectly 
communicates the essence of Weisz’s childhood trauma and his own inarticulable history.  Like 
the riddle of the furniture that implicates Nadia’s story in a larger historical context, the riddle 
and the question “Where does the stone land?” implicates the reader as the narrative frame of 
enchantment entangles the reader in the uncertain poetics and events of the novel as a whole.  
Later in the chapter Weisz offers additional context for solving the riddle by delivering the 
prophecy narrative in the context of this play.  “One day a child will be born,” he declares, “A 
child whose provenance is the union of a woman and a riddle,” meaning Isabel and Yoav, who 
has inherited this riddle from his father (289).   
 Calling attention to the riddle as a mode of play, Hasan-Rokem and Shulmam parse 
how the enigmatic form of the riddle is both disruptive and transformative:  
the riddle’s form is dialogic, requiring the interaction of self and other.  Two 
levels are joined in the question, only to be disentangled in the answer.  The 
process involved is inherently enigmatic and also transformative: the transition 
effected leaves reality changed, restricted, its basic categories restated, recognized, 
affirmed.  This is no less true for the inner reality of consciousness than for any 
external, ‘objectified’ world.’ (30) 
   
In Great House, what is transformed in this dialogic interplay? The story of the riddle itself 
emphasizes the intersection of realist and antirealist approaches to the Holocaust.  The riddle 
centralizes the trajectories of the desk and the stone to connect characters across temporalities, 
gaps, and historical narratives; it is through this materiality that the text itself metafictionally 
becomes a “great house.”  Using the stone, the reader links the destruction of the first Temple in 
Jerusalem to the events of Kristallnacht and the broken window scene in Arthur’s apartment 
(which I will turn to shortly), where it lands, finally, in the otherworldly space of David’s 
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bedroom as prophesied by Weisz.  And relying on the desk, the reader develops a chronology 
that begins in Budapest, 1944, when the Nazis confiscate the desk from the Weiszs’ apartment.  
As Arthur notes, Lotte Berg then receives it as a gift from a former lover sometime before she 
gifts it to Daniel Varsky in 1970, who then places it in Nadia’s care in 1972.  Nadia watches over 
the desk for twenty-seven years, until Leah collects it from Nadia in 1999 and secures it in a 
New York storage facility.  Across these trajectories, the novel’s play with realist and antirealist 
modes draws the reader into its already dialogic frame.  As Rothberg explains, traumatic realist 
texts “search for a form of documentation beyond direct reference and coherent narrative but do 
not fully abandon the possibility for some kind of reference and some kind of narrative” (100-1).  
Attempting to solve the riddle, the reader is drawn into this dialogic frame and enters into a 
textual covenant with the “great house” of the novel itself.       
Riddles have an ancient history in the context of Jewish textuality.  The first Jewish 
riddle is attributed to the biblical narrative about Samson, in which the answer reveals an 
unbridgeable distance between the personal experience of Samson and the Philistines, who have 
no way of knowing the answer except by bribery.  Samson poses the following to thirty 
Philistine guests at his wedding-feast, promising thirty sheets and thirty changes of clothing if 
they could answer: “Out of the eater came forth food, and out of the strong came forth sweetness” 
(Judges 14.14).  The Philistines bribe Samson’s wife (also a Philistine) for the answer, and she 
tells them that he is describing his personal experience slaying a lion and discovering a 
honeycomb inside.  The solution is something the Philistines never could have known by way of 
logic—they would have had to actually go out and find the lion.  Knowledge of the answer is 
thus divorced from experience.  Echoing through Weisz’s riddle, the Samson story reflects the 
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impossibility of fully knowing—by experience—even if we are already implicated in locating 
the origin of the stone and following its historical trajectory.  
The riddle immediately conjures the scene of the broken window in Arthur’s apartment, 
affirming the already strange suspicion that the stone thrown through Arthur’s window is not 
innocent of historical weight and exists in relation to other characters and narratives.  After 
Arthur has gone to visit Mrs. Fiske, the woman who adopted Lotte’s child, he returns to London 
to find that the front window of his house has been smashed.  It is not merely coincidence that 
this event occurs directly after Arthur’s attempt to make sense of his and Lotte’s past, as 
enchantment—for the first person narrator—mediates uncertainty.  Arthur describes,  
From the large hole a magnificent, delicate web of cracks radiated outwards.  It 
was something to behold, and a feeling of awe came over me.  On the floor inside, 
lying among the broken glass, I found a rock the size of a fist.  Cold air filled the 
living room.  It was the special stillness of the scene that shook me, the kind that 
comes only in the wake of violence. (271)74 
 
For the reader, the bizarre description of the broken glass at once signifies a clue to solving the 
riddle and indirectly invokes the horror of Kristallnacht.  The language of this scene immediately 
shifts to a different register as if to catapult the reader out of her “default sensory-psychic-
intellectual disposition” (Bennett 5).  From the cracks radiating outward the reader senses the 
vectors of history that continue to influence the present, and at its core—the gaping hole—Arthur 
perceives something “magnificent” and experiences “awe”; he describes being transfixed under a 
                                                
74As Berger and Milbauer argue, Krauss’s novels “avoid the realities of concentration camps 
with crematoria chimneys belching out human ashes; or ghettos encircled by barbed wire and 
high walls to reinstate and reinforce the millennia-old practice of separating Jews from the rest of 
humanity. . .” (65).  In other words, the experiences and iconography, such as the concentration 
camp universe, that have come to define first-generation authors and the literature of survivors 
are absent from Krauss’s novels.  What Krauss does, however, is embed archetypal events and 
symbols of the Holocaust into her stories.   
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“spell” that breaks only when he sees a spider crawling across the wall (271).  Thus, for Arthur, 
the moment of enchantment occurs through defamiliarization; the awe stops time before the 
presence of the spider breaks the spell and jolts Arthur back into the present.  Emphasizing an 
emotional inheritance divorced of experience, this strange description that indirectly refers to 
Holocaust trauma is couched in the language of wonder and enchantment.  The “broken glass” 
both refers to Kristallnacht and does not; the transfixed, magnificent description of such a violent 
event as “something to behold” attaches an experience of wonder, in the present, to an imagined 
history of atrocity (271).  Enchantment marks the loss of authentic experience that registers an 
unconscious emotional inheritance of trauma, thus becoming a stand-in or substitute for lived 
memory that invokes that strange combination of delight and disturbance.  
The narrative’s fixation with the window continues after it has been repaired; that is, the 
window may show no damage cosmetically but arrests Weisz’s attention nonetheless.  When 
Weisz knocks on Arthur’s door a few days later, the glazier has fixed the window but there is a 
strange sense of recognition of something larger that transpires.  Arthur describes, 
We sat in silence. That window, he said at last, gazing behind me.  How did it 
break?  I was surprised.  How did you know? I asked. For a moment I wondered 
whether there was not something sinister I’d missed in him.  The glass is new, he 
said, and the caulking is fresh.  Someone threw a stone through it, I told him.  His 
sharp features became softened by a thoughtful expression, as if my words had 
awakened a memory in him. (275)   
 
While history remains shattered, broken, and unfixable, this moment of resonance attempts 
repair alongside the glazier’s handiwork.  In the late 1980s and early 1990s Jean-François 
Lyotard objected to coherent narrative modes of representation; instead he favored “allusive, 
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oblique, and broken models” (5).75  Similarly, Geoffrey Hartman warns, “popular representations 
emerge that are uncomfortably close to fantasies that may have played their part in the genocide” 
(qtd. in Kaplan 5).  Both Lyotard and Hartman argue that “to avoid forgetting one must always 
allow the rumble of the past to persist through fragmentation and disruption” (qtd. in Kaplan 5).  
In this scene that serves as an oblique reference to Kristallnacht, the mode of enchantment 
encourages the reader, alongside Arthur, to grapple with the question of what and how we 
perceive the past, a question that illuminates the distance and displacement of the original event.  
Weisz’s awareness is just barely perceived across his face, and the reader is further alienated 
from his direct memory through our perception of Weisz’s recognition.  The scene does not 
provide an oblique or broken model of the original event, but rather, it frames Weisz’s 
perceptions and implicates the reader’s own unstable recognition of pieces of history in the 
process.    
The key to solving the riddle is located in the story of ben Zakkai and one of the 
meanings of the “Great House,” that is, the transformation of Jewish material sacrifice into 
intellectual study and the world of ideas.  Just as Yoav will inherit this riddle from his father, 
Weisz has inherited one from his own. “Great house” refers to the name of the school that the 
great first-century rabbi Yochanan ben Zakkai constructed in Yavne after the Romans besieged 
Jerusalem.  As Weisz tells Arthur, in return for his prophecy of Roman victory ben Zakkai was 
permitted to go to Yavne to open a school:   
Later, in that small town, he received the news that Jerusalem had burned.  The 
Temple was destroyed.  Those that survived were sent into exile.  In his agony, he 
                                                
75Lyotard insists that “it cannot be represented without being missed, being forgotten anew, since 
it defies images and words. . . It is to be feared that word representations (books, interviews) and 
thing representations (films, photographs) of the extermination of the Jews and of ‘the jews,’ by 
the Nazis bring back the very thing against which they work unceasingly” (qtd. in Kaplan 5).    
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thought: What is a Jew without Jerusalem?  How can you be a Jew without a 
nation?  How can you make a sacrifice to God if you don’t know where to find 
him?  In the torn clothes of the mourner, ben Zakkai returned to his school.  He 
announced that the court of law that had burned in Jerusalem would be 
resurrected there, in the sleepy town of Yavne.  That instead of making sacrifices 
to God, from then on Jews would pray to Him.  He instructed his students to begin 
assembling more than a thousand years of oral law. 
 
Day and night the scholars argued about the laws, and their arguments became the 
Talmud, Weisz continued.  What is a Jew without Jerusalem? Scholars forgot 
about this question until, after he died, his answer slowly revealed itself:  Turn 
Jerusalem into an idea.  Turn the Temple into a book, a book as vast and holy and 
intricate as the city itself.  Bend a people around the shape of what they lost, and 
let everything mirror its absent form. Later his school became known as the Great 
House, after the phrase in Book of Kings: He burned the house of God, the king's 
house, and all the houses of Jerusalem; every great house he burned with fire. 
(279) 
 
In order to resurrect the presence of Jerusalem and the Temple, ben Zakkai rebuilt what was lost 
by turning places into ideas and arguments so that Jewishness becomes embedded in thoughts, 
aesthetics, and textuality.76  The proliferation of the text’s holes, the stories around which the 
characters “bend,” deepen to include the first destruction.  The temple is not immediately 
resurrected with the meticulousness of a historian or architect, but rather, an ontological shift 
marks the movement of a world centered around the material and sacrificial to one that revolves 
around the theoretical and textual.  It is the novel’s poetics of uncertainty that ultimately register 
this shift.  But neither can we exist in the realm of ideas without any conception of its origins in 
                                                
76In Kabbalistic teachings, the idea of the void or emptiness is linked to creation.  Krauss reflects 
on this idea that regeneration or “enhancement” comes out of nothing in interviews: “I think 
these abysses that they find themselves in give up this opportunity for revelation, for 
transcendence, I think, for transformation. I'm attracted to them not for their darkness, ultimately, 
at all. I think everything I write, strange to say this, but I feel hopeful about all the potential. I 
feel hopeful about the magnitude of life and all we're given to feel. I'm not shy about touching 
and talking about how painful it is. But I have this hope that somehow, in dwelling in all that, 
there's this opportunity for some kind of enhancement” (“Interview” n. pag.).  
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the material; meanings of Great House thus bring full circle the relationships between materiality 
and metaphysics, objects and things.  Signifying both a physical/material and 
spiritual/immaterial presence, the title “Great House”77 immediately indicates a slippage between 
what is knowable and unknowable.      
In Everything Is Illuminated, objects and letters also signal a slippage between stable 
ways of knowing as they undermine the title’s fantastical implication that “everything” is 
capable of illumination and gesture towards the text itself as an object.  In a pivotal scene from 
the Trachimbrod narrative, which is of course aligned with the mode of fantasy, Brod converses 
with her surroundings as she objects to the inability of these items to signal meaning beyond 
themselves.  In the fantasy realm, objects customarily perform in wondrous capacities and are 
performative in the Tolkinian sense as they cast spells and enable magical feats (60).   However, 
objects in Brod’s life actively resist signification, failing to embody the same kind of agency as 
we saw Rivka’s ring perform in the journey narrative.  As such, the narrative realms reveal 
inconsistencies over ways of knowing and interpolation.  In this particular scene, Brod yearns for 
magic and release but feels stymied by the world “that was not for her” (83).  The narrator 
describes: 
She felt as if she were brimming, always producing and hoarding more love inside 
her.  But there was no release.  Table, ivory, elephant charm, rainbow, onion, 
hairdo, mollusk, Shabbos, violence, cuticle, melodrama, ditch, honey, doily. . . 
None of it moved her [. . .] to each she would have to say, I don’t love you.  Bark-
brown fence post: I don’t love you. Poems too long: I don’t love you. Nothing felt 
                                                
77There are a proliferation of meanings implied by the title that I would also like to connect to 
this slippage. In biblical Hebrew, words often had multiple meanings and house or “baayit” 
refers to family as well as a dwelling, so the “family” that makes up the novel’s “great house” 
gestures to communal history rather than a family connected by blood ties.  The title also implies 
the “great house” of the mind, and the novel references Freud to solidify this definition.  In some 
of the first conceptualizations of how memory works, the idea of the mind as a house is also 
referenced. 
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like anything more than what it actually was.  Everything was just a thing, mired 
completely in its thingness. (80)   
 
Here thingness is not, as it appears in Brown’s formulation, a metaphysical property but rather 
what Brown would actually classify in terms of objects.  Unlike Weisz’s clients who feel a sense 
of release when they come in contact with the objects of the past (or rather, their surrogates), 
Brod does not feel any connection or release in relation to the objects that make up her world, the 
“table, ivory, elephant charm, rainbow,” etc. (80).  Where is the hidden otherness in these objects, 
that metaphysical excess that constitute “thingness” in Brown’s terms and the way that things are 
made to feel strange and unfamiliar in the opening scene as similar objects spill into the river?  
This dimensionality emerges from “a particular subject-object relation” (“Thing Theory” 4), but 
here that subject-object relation is inaccessible; Brod’s love literally has no object and she 
declares “I don’t love you” to the various items (80).  The prose’s exactitude accounts for the 
items exactly as they present themselves to Brod; that is, in failing to account for the presence of 
absence, which is crucial to meaning-making throughout the novel, no love transpires.  
 Brod and Yankel reveal the paradox underlying this lack of connection as they 
“reciprocated the great and saving lie—that our love of things is greater than our love for our 
love of things” (83).  Their attachment to their “love for our love [of things]” (83) privileges the 
endless chain of signifiers central to Baudrillard’s formulation that opens this chapter—the 
concept that “substituting signs of the real for the real” prevails in postmodern culture (2).  Thus, 
this kind of meaning-making comes at a cost and one that implicates and undermines the 
recourse to the fantasy elements in the novel as a whole: Brod lives in isolation, “in a world 
once-removed from the one in which everyone else seemed to exist” (80).    
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Structuring narratives around enchanted objects or attesting to the material traces of 
history through leftover debris directly addresses the historical gaps and the legacy of loss that 
haunt third-generation writers.  Things, precisely because they have been “deprived of their 
ability to speak,” address the emotional inheritance of absence and loss (Landsberg 139).  As 
Landsberg suggests, if an iconography of the Holocaust is emerging, “an iconography that is all 
about objects and the disembodied and the dispossessed, about things that have been deprived of 
their ability to speak, then it might help us find ways to address our local traumas, our national 
différend” (139).  Attending to things as narrative structure and locations of affective experience 
mediates cataclysmic loss.  As Adorno writes, these things attest to what has been left out of the 
historical register: 
If Benjamin said that history had hitherto been written from the standpoint of the 
victor, and needed to be written from that of the vanquished, we might add that 
knowledge must indeed present the fatally rectilinear succession of victory and 
defeat, but should also address itself to those things which were not embraced by 
this dynamic, which fell by the wayside—what might be called the waste products 
and blind spots that have escaped the dialectic.  It is in the nature of the defeated 
to appear, in their impotence, irrelevant, eccentric, derisory. What transcends the 
ruling society is not only the potentiality it develops but also all that which did not 
fit properly into the laws of historical movement.  Theory must deal with cross-
gained [sic], opaque, unassimilated material, which as such admittedly has from 
the start an anachronistic quality, but which is not wholly obsolete since it has 
outwitted the historical dynamic.  This can most readily be seen in art. (151, 
emphasis mine) 
 
Remarking on the role of the “defeated” in history, Adorno argues that it is art that sees into the 
blind-spot of written history.  Furthermore, he remarks that it is the “things. . . which fell by the 
wayside” that even the “dialectic” has ignored—the “impotent, irrelevant, eccentric, derisory”—
that should interest the theorist (Adorno 151, emphasis mine).  There is a strategy of resistance 
embedded in the object iconography that spans these texts.  A conservator who oversees the 
long-term master plan for preserving the site of the Auschwitz-Birkenau State Museum remarks, 
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“We are doing something against the initial idea of the Nazis who built this camp. . . They didn’t 
want it to last.  We’re making it last” (Donadio n. pag.).      
Great House takes as its subject the “waste products” that are not waste or refuse as we 
might commonly think, but waste that in that sense that for Adorno has escaped the dialectic.  
The objects that Weisz devotes his life to repossessing are some of those that were loaded on to 
the Nazi Gold Train the SS used to evacuate Jewish possessions as the Soviet troops advanced 
toward Hungary (114).  The “hulking mass” (22) that is the multidrawer writing desk is a symbol 
of bourgeois solidity that was not supposed to have survived, just as the objects of Trachim B’s 
wagon were intended to remain buried alongside the village of Trachimbrod.  Invoking both the 
monstrous and unspeakable, the desk signifies the larger impossibility of knowing and 
representing the Holocaust; at the same time, as the protagonist and metonymic marker of 
Holocaust trauma, it necessitates such knowing.  And the refuse that gives rise to the narrative 
creation in Everything Is Illuminated are those would-be buried objects of the Trachimbroders, 
unearthed by chance and imagination.  As a protagonist or origin of narrative creation, these 
fictionalized objects defy the historical trajectory intended by the Final Solution that aimed to 
destroy the physical and cultural presence of European Jewry. 
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CHAPTER 3 
  
 “STRANGE TIMES TO BE A JEW”: THE REDEMPTION OF MEYER LANDSMAN 
IN THE YIDDISH POLICEMEN’S UNION 
 
In the first edited volume devoted wholly to Michael Chabon’s oeuvre, the editors note 
that in comparison to his contemporaries (David Foster Wallace, Junot Díaz, or Jonathan 
Franzen), Chabon has been overlooked (Kavadlo ix).  In comparison to his contemporaries, he is 
considered a less serious writer (Kavadlo ix).78  This belief betrays the characteristically un-
serious genres (SF, fantasy, detective fiction, romance) Chabon mixes into his novels.  Critics 
like Ruth Wisse use playfulness as a way to deride the political nature of Chabon’s work, calling 
his political opinions about the state of Israel “frequently sophomoric” and genre-mixing a poor 
cover-up for a “limp human drama” (“Yiddish” n. pag.).  As we have seen, as early as Malamud, 
Jewish writers turned to fantasy as a means of illuminating reality.  The playful code-switching 
of The Yiddish Policemen’s Union raises serious questions about the construction of history, 
specific historical narratives, and perceptions of reality.  In this space, genre-mixing is not 
                                                
78Academic scholars who attend to The Yiddish Policemen’s Union do so by positioning it 
alongside another of a similar genre.  These scholars look to Chabon to explore new avenues of 
allohistorical or detective fiction and consider Chabon’s language almost as an afterthought.  
Very few published essays on Chabon’s work centralize his prose.  For example, the excellent 
essay by Adam Rovner, “Alternate History: The Case of Nava Semel’s IsraIsland and Michael 
Chabon’s The Yiddish Policemen’s Union” (2011) beautifully theorizes the novel, but it is 
ultimately Rovner’s concept of allohistory that is on display.  Or, more recently, Theodore 
Martin’s “The Long Wait: Timely Secrets of the Contemporary Detective Novel” (2012) turns to 
The Yiddish Policemen’s Union and Vikram Chandra’s Sacred Games (2006) to show how the 
novel revises temporality at work in the detective genre.  In these instances, the text itself is 
subjugated to the loftier aims of scholarship that refashions generic codes. 
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merely additive, but rather, the intersections of generic codes constitute a space in between genre 
and history.  As Chabon attests, “many of the most-interesting writers of the past seventy-five 
years or so have, like Trickster, found themselves drawn, inexorably, to the borderlands,” by 
which he means “the spaces between genres, in the no man’s lands” (Maps and Legends 13).79  
For a Jewish American writer, these no man’s lands resonate in stories of biblical exile and 
dispersal.  
The strange premise of the novel has roots in allohistory,80 a genre that posits a changed 
outcome for a historical event and uses narrative techniques to speculate on the aftereffects 
(Ransom 60).  The genre shares with science fiction or fantasy the secondary world-making of 
these dystopian or utopian literatures (Ransom 60).  Allohistory is itself a genre blurred at the 
edges, one suspended between imaginary and actual historical experience.  In Chabon’s 
particular scenario, the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki never happened; instead, they are 
replaced by a single strategic atomic bombing of Berlin to end the war quickly.  The U.S. 
Government, sobered by the slaughter of two [sic] million Jews in Europe and the plight of the 
refugees of Palestine and Europe, grants the Sitka Settlement “interim” status as a federal district 
(29).  Subsequently, the immigrant Jews set up a semi-autonomous republic amidst the 
indigenous Tinglit tribe, creating enormous cultural conflict; despite that conflict, Sitka develops 
                                                
79In his essay “Trickster in a Suit of Lights: Thoughts on the Modern Short Story” published in 
his first book of essays Maps and Legends (2008), Chabon remarks on the affinities between the 
writer and the Trickster of mythology, dazzlingly distilled in his view by Lewis Hyde’s Trickster 
Makes This World (1997).  As summarized by Chabon, Hyde’s work concerns the trickster of 
mythology—Hermes among the Greeks, the Northmen’s Loki, the Native Americans’ Coyote 
and Raven and Rabbit, the Africans’ Eshu and Legba and Anansi, Krishna, the peach-stealing 
Monkey of the Chinese, and Satan (Maps and Legends 12).   
 
80Also referred to as counterhistories, alternative histories, uchronias, counterfactuals, 
parahistories, or what-ifs (Rovner 132).   
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into a major Yiddish-speaking metropolis with five million residents who now face the 
upcoming Reversion.  The Yiddish Policemen’s Union is set in late 2007 in the chaotic last few 
weeks before the Reversion, the date when the American government will reclaim possession of 
Sitka, Alaska and the second-generation Jewish settlers will be dumped once again into the sea 
of diaspora. 
 “Strange times to be a Jew,” the narrator refrains throughout Michael Chabon’s The 
Yiddish Policemen’s Union (2007).  So if these are strange times for Landsman and the Jews of 
Sitka, they are stranger still for the reader who finds herself navigating a mashup of generic 
codes run amok. Additional feats of genre-bending accentuate the strangeness of the 
allohistorical premise.  Embracing the pulpy style of the hard-boiled detective genre, the story 
opens with a murder of a young, unknown Jew who has been shot in the head in the same 
flophouse hotel where Landsman has been living.  If there is a central narrative momentum to the 
story, it is organized around Landsman and his half-Tinglit, half-Jewish partner and cousin 
Berko Shemets’s search for the killer as they investigate the case. Landsman and Shemets soon 
discover that the dead yid is Mendel Shpilman, son of the corrupt mafioso-esque Villain, 
Orthodox Verbovor Rabbi Hesker Shpilman.  Mendel Shpilman was a genius child, a chess 
prodigy and scholar who could read Hebrew, Aramaic, Judeo-Spanish, Latin, and Greek by the 
time he was eight or nine.  He was thought to be the Tzaddik Ha-Dor, the righteous man of his 
generation, the messiah sent to redeem the world.   
As the narratives unfold, so too does the ancient story of biblical belief that the sacrifice 
of a red heifer will bring about the coming of the messiah.  But in this version, biblical narratives 
are intertwined with a terrorist plot orchestrated by the Verbover Jews and backed by U.S. 
interests to blow up the sacred Muslim shrine in Jerusalem Qubbat As-Sakhrah (the Dome of the 
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Rock) and reclaim Eretz Yisrael.  Forcing their American-backed hand into history, the Verbover 
Jews have engineered a red cow to compel the coming of the messiah.  In this unstable landscape, 
affixing meaning leads to dangerous repercussions.  When Landsman cracks the case, he finds 
his own Uncle guilty of murder; but here the reader uncovers a slippery sign designed to entice 
and elude.  Even the murder is not a murder, but a “mercy killing,” carried out at Mendel’s 
request: “He didn’t want to be what he wasn’t, he didn’t know how to be what he was” (404).  
And all along, romance unfolds.  Landsman ruminates on his failed marriage, the still-tender loss 
he suffers for his aborted child, and his lingering feelings for his ex-wife Bina, who has just 
returned to Sitka as his new supervisor to oversee the closing of any outstanding cases before the 
bureau will shut down in just a few weeks. 
“Nothing is clear about the upcoming Reversion, and that is why these are strange times 
to be a Jew,” clarifies the novel’s protagonist, Meyer Landsman, a hard-boiled, down-and-out 
detective who has just arrived at the scene of a crime  (6).  In Sitka, times are strange because the 
future of the Jews is uncertain.  But Sitka is already a strange non-reality, a fictional space made 
possible only in the map of Chabon’s imagination.  What if, Chabon posits, Anthony Dimond, 
the Alaskan Delegate to the House of Representatives—who was on his way to killing the 
Alaskan Settlement Act—was himself accidentally killed by a drunk taxi-driver? (27).  In this 
antireality,81 the Alaskan Federal District of Sitka Islands becomes an asylum for the large 
number of Jewish Holocaust refugees after the newly-formed Republic of Israel is invaded by 
Arab armies in 1948 and collapses (29).   
 There are many ways that strangeness bears meaning and carries interpretive weight 
throughout the novel, and this chapter examines why strangeness sits at the center of Chabon’s 
                                                
81Antireality is a term I use to describe the purposive function of secondary-world fiction.  
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project.  Strangeness in part describes the exceptional experiences of the Sitkaites given their 
uncertain circumstances.  But also, strangeness describes the idea of genre, and its governing 
rules, as estranged from itself;82 genre-bending also foregrounds the strange, unfamiliar space of 
the novel’s textuality suspended between romance, allohistory, high fantasy, and detective 
fiction.  This chapter illustrates what it means to estrange the strange, by which I mean to upend 
the characteristics of narrative estrangement as they customarily exist in distinct domains of 
genre.  As Simon Spiegel explains, “to truly see things again we must overcome our ‘blind’ 
perception, and this is only possible when they are made strange again” (369).  Here we return to 
Shklovsky’s concept of defamiliarization, except that it is history made to appear strange by 
dismantling the established habits of perception (779).    
 Postmodernism presses questions of ontology and estrangement to the fore; questions 
already embedded in secondary-world fiction and allohistory become doubly significant in a 
narrative environment whose premise is instability and fractured histories.  As such, the reader is 
dislodged from expectations—regarding defamiliarization, Holocaust literature, and historical 
narratives—as she must navigate the total instability of the novel.  In Great House, Krauss 
embeds archetypal events and symbols of the Holocaust into her stories to highlight the burden 
of emotional inheritance for the third-generation.  Chabon’s text similarly draws on known 
historical narratives, but to different ends.  The strange commensurability of fantasy genres 
combines to shatter the predictability of historical narratives, thus creating space for 
marginalized histories that are either long forgotten, overwritten, or marginal to mainstream 
                                                
82Following Fredric Jameson, I refer to genre as a tacit agreement or contract that describes the 
expectation between reader and text.  In the mid-seventies Jameson began to detect a resurgence 
in plot and subsequently turned to the history of the romance genre in order to formulate this 
position.  He writes that genres have customarily been described as “contracts” between a writer 
and his reader.  
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accounts.  These narratives are integrated into the novel’s hybrid form alongside familiar 
narratives of the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, the trauma of two million [sic] 
Jewish victims, and the context of diaspora.  In turn, the surprising combinations “delight and 
disturb” the present, offering alternatives (sometimes correctives) to familiar tropes of 
international politics, ethnic and national identities, and the broader interpolation of histories. For 
example, the long-forgotten story of the King-Havenner bill reveals the self-interest of a U.S. 
wartime government with little interest in offering humanitarian support to European Jewish 
refugees (Berman 271-2).  The plot of Zionist terrorists unmasks the need to remember 
narratives of Jewish violence carried out by Jewish extremists alongside narratives of Holocaust 
trauma, revealing that such memories are not mutually exclusive but multidirectional.       
 As I will go on to explore, genre-mixing in the novel results in ontological strangeness:  the 
reading experience and the characters inhabit a hybrid or liminal zone between genre, reality, 
history, and time open to enchantment.  Chabon plays with the meaning of estrangement as he 
blends what are usually distinct ontologies of genre: the function of a detective plot is to detect 
the strange; the function of the sf/fantasy genre is to normalize the strange; the function of 
allohistory is to estrange history.  In this borderland, tropes of the detective novel invested in 
epistemological questions (how we know what we know) “tip over”83 into ontological questions 
central to postmodernism and fantasy genres (what is a world?) and vice versa.  Throughout this 
chapter I will show how estrangement and enchantment are much more aligned than dissimilar in 
nature, and how this alignment mediates the reader’s relationship to the past.  In the mashup of 
                                                
83McHale writes, “push epistemological questions far enough, and they ‘tip over’ into 
ontological questions.  By the same token, push ontological questions far enough and they tip 
over into epistemological questions—the sequence is not linear and unidirectional, but 
bidirectional and reversible” (11).  
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allohistory and detective fiction, the reader is estranged from the globalized, normalizing 
function of estrangement that usually occurs in secondary-world fiction.   
 Etymologically, “strange” refers both to persons, language, or customs that are foreign or 
alien and to the “unfamiliar, abnormal, or exceptional to a degree that excites wonder or 
astonishment” (OED).  In the concept of “strange times” used throughout The Yiddish 
Policemen’s Union, Chabon collapses the derivation of strange as foreigner (someone who is 
alienated or does not belong) and wonder (in the sense of amazement and astonishment).  
Foreignness and alienation beget wonder and astonishment, so that what results is the 
transformation of an alienated, unfeeling detective to an almost-romantic hero.  In its mashup of 
strangeness and reality, religion and detection, wonder and incredulity, the “slipstream” nature of 
Chabon’s text foregrounds aesthetic enchantment to defamiliarize historical narratives.  
 As I have described earlier, Malamud turns to fantasy to reveal reality as it really is, 
upending rationality as a privileged mode of meaning-making, “making strange” the worlds of 
the protagonists, and blurring the boundary between the “real” psychological responses of the 
protagonists and the “fantastic” nature of the ghosts and apparitions.  Here I relied on the model 
of defamiliarization that describes the way perception and defamiliarization work in Tolstoy’s 
fiction (also Todorov’s fantastic), which Shklovsky turns to as an example.  But ostranenie does 
not remain stable across genre.  In high fantasy, for example, entire worlds like Narnia or 
Middle-earth are built out of the fabric of strangeness.84  In secondary-world fiction governed by 
                                                
84The concept of estrangement has been significant for fantasy and science fiction ever since 
Darko Suvin defined SF as the “genre of cognitive estrangement” in his Metamorphoses of 
Science Fiction (1979), based on earlier theories of ostranenie developed by the Russian 
formalist Victor Shklovsky and German author Bertolt Brecht’s concept of the estranging effect 
that he called Verfremdungs Effekt (Spiegel 369).  See Darko Suvin Metamorphosis of Science 
Fiction (1979).  
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the laws of fantasy (science fiction, fantasy), strangeness is normalized; that is, given the 
fantastic premise of Middle-earth, the reader remains open to the ontology of fantasy, comes to 
expect the appearance of hobbits, elves, and a magic ring, and needs not question their existence.  
This is essentially the reverse in the narrative world of detective fiction, where ordinary objects 
take on extraordinary significance as the reader, alongside the detective, canvasses the 
storyworld for hidden and potential meaning.  Strangeness is supposed to be normalized (fantasy, 
sf) and on full display (detective, mystery); thus, because the novel inhabits realms of both sf and 
detective fiction, Chabon’s play with “strangeness” results in a constant narrative tension 
between the strange and the familiar.   
 For example, the heightened display of strangeness characteristic of the detective genre 
describes how meaning is made in a story where a detective surveys the narrative world for 
anything out of place; in this world that is characteristic of The Yiddish Policemen’s Union, all 
items in the victim’s room are “made strange” as potential clues.  Take Landsman’s initial 
inspection of Shpilman’s room: he identifies the chess set, the creased copy of Three Hundred 
Chess Games, and of course, the tefillin that served as Shpilman’s “tourniquet of choice” when 
shooting up as valuable clues (23).85  Regarding the world of detective fiction, Peter Hühn 
explains, “the assumption of, and the search for, a hidden story inscribed in everyday reality has 
the effect of transforming the world of the novel into a conglomeration of potential signs” (454).  
This means that “all phenomena may lose their usual automatically ascribed meanings and 
                                                
85Tefillin are Jewish phylacteries, a set of small black leather boxes containing scrolls of 
parchment inscribed with verses from the Torah.  They are worn by observant Jews during 
weekday morning prayers and are affixed and bound tightly to the body on the head and arm 
with leather straps.  
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signify something else: a curried dish for supper might be a cover for a poison” (455).  Hühn 
continues, “by effectively deautomatizing signification and making things ‘strange,’ the enigma 
of the murder endows the everyday world with a rich potentiality of unsuspected meanings” 
(455).  However, in the Yiddish Policemen’s Union, the sf genre, the historical circumstances of 
Reversion (these are “strange times”), the ethnic particularity of the novel (“strange times to be a 
Jew”), has already cued the reader’s expectation of uncertainty.  In the mashup of allohistory and 
detective fiction, thematic and generic estrangement, the text obscures the origins of strangeness 
and privileges uncertainty.  
 In addition to being the constant reminder of “strange times,” the detective function of the 
text precludes the imaginary and imaginable histories from becoming fully naturalized into the 
framework of the story. The atmosphere when the story begins is self-consciously, deliberately 
attuned to strangeness.  As he leads Landsman to the dead yid in room 208, the night manager of 
the Hotel Zamenhof twice admits that he had a “funny feeling” when he first met Lasker.  A few 
moments later, when Landsman calls Shemets to relay the news, his partner remarks, “You 
sound a little off, Meyer . . . ” (7).  Amidst this off-kilter mood Landsman and Shpringer, his 
number two, check out the hotel basement and the room for any valuable clues.  Looking around, 
Landsman discovers Lasker’s tefillin, which the detectives deduce from the marks on Lasker’s 
arm was his preferred strap for tying off his heroin habit (23).  The story stages a moment of 
ostranenie as Shpringer, inspecting the tefillin, “pulls it out of the zip and holds it up between 
two fingers as if it might bite” (23).  Chabon takes great care in presenting the object as one out 
of place with its surroundings; Shpringer’s tentative grasp, its suspension in mid-air, and teeth-
like quality all present the object at an unwelcome distance from the downtrodden, secular space 
of the murder scene.   
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 As it takes on new significance in the detective plot, the tefillin becomes doubly estranged: 
it is an important clue, and a sign of religious devotion made odd as it is divorced from its 
context as a commandment binding Jews to God.  It is a signifier made extraordinary through its 
absence of religious significance (in this particular context) and distance from its original, 
signified meaning.  Tefillin house small slips of paper on which a scribe has carefully copied 
four passages from the Torah, “but there is nothing inside the box on Emanuel Lasker’s prayer 
strap.  It’s just the thing he chose to dilate the vein in his arm” (23).  As a “valuable clue,” it 
signifies Lasker’s former ties to the Verbovers and propels Landsman’s discovery of Lasker’s 
identity as Mendel Shpilman (21).  Like the enchanted objects in Krauss’s and Safran Foer’s 
narratives, the tefillin also functions as an inanimate object that animates narratives (the detective 
plot, for one; the role of Orthodox Jewry in Sitka, for another).   
 This play of familiar meanings in strange contexts would not be possible if it were not for 
the weird and already off-beat surroundings of Sitka as a hybrid space of secular and orthodox 
worship, fantastic and imagined histories; that is, the tefillin would not register as a significant 
object in an undoubtedly orthodox narrative.  The tension between distinct modes of strangeness 
reveals Landsman’s detached, sardonic disbelief, one always seeking rational explanations, in 
comparison to a religious orthodoxy whose belief in God is all the logic one requires.  That is, 
tucked away within the tefillin is belief in the divine and the possibility of enchantment, a mode 
of meaning-making foreign to Landsman’s nature.  Relayed through the third-person indirect 
discourse of the narrator, Landsman considers the practice of wearing tefillin silly, if not outright 
ridiculous, because of its symbolic relationship to blind faith: “Each morning the pious Jew 
twines one of these doodads along his left arm, ties another to his forehead, and prays for 
understanding of the kind of God Who obliges somebody to do something like that every damn 
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day of his life” (23).  Landsman has little patience for such implausible behaviors and irrational 
religious affairs.   
 This dramatic tension attached to objects also moves beyond the text.  As strangers in a 
strange land, the Jews face Reversion and an exile to be continued somewhere else.  The 
omniscient narrator describes this feeling as part and parcel of Jewish history when he notes, 
“Nineteen forty-eight: Strange times to be a Jew.  In August the defense of Jerusalem collapsed 
and the outnumbered Jews of the three-month-old republic of Israel were routed, massacred, and 
driven into the sea” (29).  “Strange times” within the text make for a familiar history of exile and 
diaspora without, thus confusing the ontology of reality and fantasy both internal and external to 
the text.  If it is “strange” to be a Jew even in the fictional antireality where strangeness is 
expected and built into the premise of the world itself, then when is it ever not “strange times to 
be a Jew”?  Thematizing strangeness in an ontological framework constructed out of the strange 
means that the Jews of Sitka are denied a permanent status in Sitka and genre, as the text’s 
aesthetics raise question about the status of Jews.  “Strange times” refuse the Sitka Jews a 
narrative status where they might be free not to question their own right to exist.  Their own alien 
status is far from naturalized in this otherworldly reality, and in fact, this is further dramatized by 
their quest to secure green cards.  The novel presents itself as a rhetorical exercise on Jewish 
survival, working out over the course of its pages the question of how to live in uncertain times 
in an uncertain space as a Jew.  
Unsettling the Strange Space of Sitka: Slipstream Storytelling  
 Such strange and surprising encounters between genres mimics the mood of engagement 
that Jane Bennett discusses in The Enchantment of Modern Life, one that proposes a view of the 
contemporary world awash with wonder, surprise, and affective attachments.  Bennett explains,  
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  the mood I’m calling enchantment involves, in the first instance, a surprising  
  encounter, a meeting with something that you did not expect and are not fully  
  prepared to engage.  Contained within this surprise state are (1) a pleasurable feeling 
  of being charmed by the novel and as yet unprocessed encounter and (2) a more 
  unheimlich (uncanny) feeling of being disrupted out of one’s default sensory 
  psychic-intellectual disposition.  The overall effect of enchantment is a mood of 
  fullness, plenitude, or liveliness, a sense of having had one’s nerves or circulation or 
  concentration powers tuned up or recharged—a shot in the arm, a fleeting return to 
  childlike excitement about life.  (5)    
 
In the novel, these surprising encounters are enabled by the proliferation of strangeness across 
genres and historical circumstances.  The interrelationship between strangeness, fantasy tropes, 
and genre play result in the aesthetics of enchantment in Chabon’s novel.86  
 In its attention to the unheimlich, Bennett’s work foregrounds an aesthetics of 
defamiliarization central to what I am calling enchantment.  In his project on the uncanny in 
twentieth-century thought, Nicholas Royle writes that the uncanny (as we think of it developed 
by Freud) haunts and is haunted by innumerable other texts, including those by the Russian 
formalists like Victor Shklovsky and German theorist Bertolt Brecht.87  Shklovksy’s 
                                                
86According to Bennett, ethics are at stake in the “fleeting return to a childlike excitement about 
life” (5).  Michael Saler’s work also underlines the ethical parameters of in-between fictional 
universes.  Saler pinpoints the ethical stakes of working at the intersection of literature and 
enchantment. He writes that imaginary worlds “challenge their inhabitants to see the real world 
as being, to some degree, an imaginary construct amenable to revision.  As a result of 
collectively inhabiting and elaborating virtual worlds, many become more adept at accepting 
difference, contingency, and pluralism: at envisioning life not in essentialist, ‘just so’ terms but 
rather in provisional, ‘as if’ perspectives” (7).  
 
87According to Royle, the uncanny has been a focus of critical, literary, philosophical and 
political reflection from at least the mid-nineteenth century to the present (3).  He counts among 
these thinkers: Karl Marx, Friedrich Nietzsche, Martin Heidegger, Ludwig Wittengstein, Jacques 
Derrida, Victor Shklovsky, and Bertolt Brecht (40).   
 
175 
 
defamiliarization or Brecht’s alienation effect (or A effect)88 do not specifically pair ostranenie 
and uncanny, but all of these concepts overlap with the ways in which they forge “new 
alienations” (Royle 5).  As we have seen in A Serious Man, political potential resides in this 
liminal space.  As Brecht explains, “new alienations are only designed to free socially 
conditioned phenomena from that stamp of familiarity which protects them against our grasp 
today” (qtd. in Royle 5).  Reading and writing practices that foster “new alienations” allow us to 
comprehend the already-familiar as if it is not so; they jostle us into otherwise untapped 
awareness of new potentiality. Brecht was interested in the experience of the unhomely or 
sudden homelessness, and like Shklovsky’s formalist interest in defamiliarization, his concern 
lay in political, transformational, and revolutionary possibilities of making the familiar strange 
(Royle 5).   
This freedom that comes from loosening the grasp of familiarity is further extended by 
the in-between status of the Sitka Jews who find themselves in between historical predicaments, 
belonging to an in-between geographic space, and literally expressed in-between language, all as 
Landsman serves as arbiter in between the religious and secular communities in order to solve an 
ongoing case of an in-between status.  On one hand, the premise of “you never know” (13) 
connotes the uncertain future of the Sitka Jews—what will happen after Reversion? Where will 
they go? But on the other, the closing down of certainty opens the possibility that anything can 
happen in the present—and this is where, through the play of genre, Chabon’s text makes room 
for wonder and enchantment.  In a text as “slipstream” as Chabon’s, this occurs through the 
                                                
88Brecht’s term “alienation-effect” is derived from Shklovksy’s idea of the “device for making 
strange” (Royle n. 17 28).  
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crossed wires of genre and what is generated at the thresholds, borderland, or the “the spaces 
between genres, in the no mans lands” (“Trickster” 13). 
In their introduction to a slipstream anthology aptly titled Feeling Very Strange (2006), 
James Patrick Kelly and John Kessel build on the term first introduced by Bruce Sterling in 
1989.89  They characterize slipstream as a renunciation of specific genre identity and above all 
the quality of “feeling very strange” (xiii).90  While labeled a genre by some, slipstream is more 
clearly defined as a set of literary effects that violate the tenets of realism, and it is as a set of 
effects rather than a distinct genre that I refer to it here (Kessel xiii).  As Kelly and Kessel point 
out, slipstream is a playfully postmodern form: “the stories often acknowledge their existence as 
fictions, and play against the genres they evoke.  They have a tendency to bend or break 
narrative rules” (xiii).  This postmodern play that Kelly and Kessel are struggling to describe 
seems to me the play of estrangement that results from genre-mixing when genres already have 
                                                
89The term was originally coined by Bruce Sterling in a 1989 column he wrote for a fanzine 
called Science Fiction Eye and has been used to describe the way that literary or “mainstream” 
fiction and genre elements have begun to merge.  Sterling was attempting to understand a kind of 
fiction that he saw increasingly in science fiction publications and as he wrote in the original 
article, “This genre is not category SF; it is not even ‘genre’ SF.  Instead, it is a contemporary 
 
kind of writing which has set its face against consensus reality.  It is fantastic, surreal 
sometimes, speculative on occasion, but not rigorously so.  It does not aim to 
provoke a “sense of wonder” or to systematically extrapolate in the manner of 
classic science fiction.  Instead, this is a kind of writing which simply makes you feel 
very strange; the way that living in the late twentieth century makes you feel, if you 
are a person of a certain sensibility.  We could call this kind of fiction Novels of a 
Postmodern Sensibility…for the sake of convenience and argument, we will call 
these books ‘slipstream.’ (emphasis mine, viii) 
 
90Kelly and Kessel’s anthology includes work by Bruce Sterling, Aimee Bender, Kelly Link, 
Jonathan Lethem, George Saunders, and Michael Chabon, among others.  Slipstream is described 
as an effect rather than a genre in the same way that Junot Diaz has discussed magical realism as 
a narrative effect.   
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distinct relationships to the ontology of estrangement.91  Kelly and Kessel explain, “the hardest 
thing to put a finger on is the strangeness that Sterling identifies as the essence of slipstream, but 
that all commentators have been at pains to define.  It has been called a matter of making the 
familiar strange or the strange familiar” (xiii).  What these literary critics are “at pains to define” 
refers to the fact that in a slipstream text, making the familiar strange is possible alongside 
making the strange familiar; that is, genre-mixing does not necessitate a structure of either/or but 
both/and.      
Slipstream texts use many techniques to estrange us and unsettle our expectations of 
genre, but they do so in a mode of serious play that Victor Turner theorizes is key to liminality.  
In anthropological terms, the seriousness of human play refers to the chaotic interlude or in-
between space that marks the period between an individual’s separation from a group and before 
her reincorporation; according to Turner, these natural occurring processes of separation, limen, 
and reincorporation make up a series of initiation rites (232).  For example, we are reminded of 
Larry Gopnik’s pre-tenure state of liminality, or his son Danny’s bar mitzvah.  In Chabon’s 
novel, the concept of the limen applies to both the formal aspects of slipstream and the situation 
of the Sitka Jews. Turner writes, “‘meaning’ in culture tends to be generated at the interfaces 
between established cultural subsystems,” and in this way we can think analogously about the in-
betweenness of genre, or the way meanings are mapped on or through a play of genres, as a way 
the text generates meaning (41).  Benjamin Rosenbaum has praised slipstream for “playing with 
tropes such that the reader’s awareness that you are playing, but playing seriously, is part of the 
                                                
91As I mention earlier, Chabon plays with the meaning of estrangement as he blends what are 
usually distinct ontologies of genre: the function of a detective plot is to detect the strange; the 
function of the sf/fantasy genre is to normalize the strange; the function of allohistory is to 
estrange history. 
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story’s joy. . . .” (qtd. in Kelly and Kessel xiii).92  When play turns to the seriousness of 
traumatic histories, narratives of displacement, and violence, as it does in Chabon’s novel, the 
story also reveals the notion of dark malaise as part of enchantment.   
 In the unfamiliar framework of Chabon’s genre and the precarious Jewish condition in the 
novel, the uncertain present is reanimated with possibility. Consider the epigraph to the text, 
“And they went to sea in a Sieve,” excerpted from “The Jumblies,” a mock epic by Victorian 
poet Edward Lear.93  “The Jumblies” tells of a brazen and absurd group of voyagers (the 
Jumblies) who ignore their friends’ common-sense warnings—“You’ll all be drowned!”—and 
set out to sea in a flimsy sieve-boat (Poetry Foundation).  At the end of the poem, everyone is 
amazed to learn that the Jumblies returned after twenty years at sea and with knowledge of the 
world.  The text is of course the sieve-boat in the reader’s hands that will journey through the 
fantastic. As a nonsense poem, “The Jumblies” outlines the unstable passageway into what lies 
ahead, however untrustworthy or flimsy it may appear, and the imaginative work required of the 
reader.  Requesting this kind of faith in the uncertain future of the text highlights the reward for 
this kind of imaginative risk.  When the Jumblies return, everyone remarks on their worldliness 
and maturation: “How tall they’ve grown!”, those who have remained behind exclaim (Poetry 
Foundation).  In The Yiddish Policemen’s Union, the stakes are similarly invested in rewarding 
the reader’s imaginative risk.  
 The text’s in-betweenness signifies across genres; the play of the in-between is also 
                                                
92Kelly explains this concept of play through the following characteristics: “they use allegory, 
borrow forms from nonliterary sources, literalize metaphor, inject genre elements into decidedly 
nongenre milieus, play metafictional games, invent faux-autobiography, incorporate pastiche, 
parody, or collage, or externalize psychological and ontological distress; they play with older 
genre forms” (xiii). 
 
93The trend was later extended most famously by Lewis Carroll.   
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invoked metaphorically by the detectives’ recurring references to “middle game,” the mystery of 
the unsolved chessboard Landsman discovers in the hotel room next to the body of Mendel 
Shpilman.  Surveying the room, Landsman comments that “it looks like he had a game going, a 
messy-looking middle game. . .” and remarks,  
 “I’m weak. . .I have no feel for the middle game.” 
 “In my experience, Detective,’ Tenenboym says, ‘it’s all middle game.”  
 “Don’t I know it,” Landsman says. (5)   
 
As Landsman eventually divines, the solution to Shpilman’s murder is bound up in his 
realization that Shpilman was not playing an ongoing game of chess with an opponent when he 
died.  Rather, Shpilman staged an unsolvable chess problem called Zugzwang, which describes 
the condition of being “forced to move” when a player is stuck in between two moves that both 
lead to checkmate.94  In other words, because neither option is preferable, Zugzwang reveals a 
paradox: choice is an illusion and a certain outcome is already inevitable.  The attention to the 
“middle game” of chess highlights the waiting, calculating, and decision-making of chess 
strategy.  It is not the checkmate that wins the game, but the strategic play of middle game.  It is 
only when Landsman is able to view the state of “middle game” laid out on the board anew, 
when he successfully cedes his grasp on the familiar, that he solves the murder.  In this way 
Zugzwang becomes an apt metaphor for the way that textuality here is all invested in the play of 
middles in order to generate meaning and enchantment.  The Zugzwang paradox in The Yiddish 
Policemen’s Union dovetails with the state of the schlemiel’s uncertainty in the Coen brothers’ A 
Serious Man.  In this way, revisiting historical narratives like the founding of the state of Israel 
in 1948; the failed U.S. bill that would have resettled European Jews to Alaska; terrorist attacks 
                                                
94For more on the function of Zugzwang as it relates to the text, see Kravitz.  
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on a global scale, and upending the logics upon which they are constructed (genre-mixing) 
revises a historical trajectory where such events are inevitable.  Instead, the novel reveals a series 
of “superpositional crux points” to indicate that like the events in Gopnik’s life, at each point in 
this story, things could have gone differently. 
 The detective genre doubly reinforces the emphasis on “middle game.”  Rather than the 
end (the solution to the crime), Theodore Martin argues that the sense of the wait is the real point 
of detective fiction: “the genre of the detective novel is thus shaped not by the assurance of the 
end but by the uncertain distance between expectation and fulfillment, the persistent gap that 
makes waiting—and reading—take place” (168).  Martin’s argument is valuable for the way in 
which he aligns the reading structure of detective fiction and Jewish religious experience or 
cultural belief.  He explains that in Chabon’s novel the disappointment that accompanies the 
solving of the crime is a built-in element of religious belief itself (172 n. 7).  Landsman asks 
Berko if he believes what Zimbalist the boundary maven told them about Mendel—that he had 
the power to perform wonders and miracles: 
 “That stuff the maven was just telling us about Mendel. The wonders and miracles.  
Berko, you believe any of that?” 
 “You know it’s not about believing for me, Meyer.  It never has been.” 
 “But do you—I’m curious—do you really feel like you’re waiting for Messiah?” 
 Berko shrugs, uninterested in the question, keeping his eyes on the track of the black 
galoshes in the snow.  “It’s messiah,” he says.  “What else can you do but wait?” (127) 
 
Here Martin comments that Jewish messianism is defined by deferral and it is the wait rather 
than an imagined arrival that defines Jewish faith (172 n. 7): “the principle, thinks Landsman, 
that every Jew has a personal Messiah who never comes” (331).  Disappointment would reside in 
the fulfillment of this messianic hope.  Landsman considers, “a Messiah who actually arrives is 
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no good to anybody.  A hope fulfilled is already a disappointment” (349).95  Jameson reiterates, 
“the non-Jews imagine that Jews think of Messiah as a promise and a future certainty: nothing 
could be farther from the truth” (qtd. in Martin n. 7). 
 I find myself in agreement with Martin’s reevaluation of the temporal structure of reading 
detective fiction.  However, in his approach to the novel, Martin emphasizes the detective genre 
and thus ignores the strange ontological confusion that accompanies the mixed-genre narrative.96 
Instead of emphasizing the “wait” and the temporal structure of the detective genre, an emphasis 
on the “middle game”—the play with multiple genres—makes for multiple “solutions” to the 
plots.  While Berko’s father is revealed to be the murderer, the criss-crossing of narratives 
creates meaning in additional generic frames essential to the outcome of the story—like Bina and 
Landsman’s reconciliation and the fulfillment of the romance genre, for example.    
 This sense of play is already built into the world of detective fiction inasmuch as the genre 
has been singled out for its unique treatment of fabula (story) and sujet (plot), and for the way 
that stories narrated in detective novels are already imbued with a sense of metafictional play.97  
Of the metafictional quality that characterizes this environment, Hühn writes: “the stories that are 
narrated in detective novels can profitably be described as stories of writing and reading insofar 
                                                
95As Litvak writes, “every Messiah fails. . . The moment he tries to redeem himself” (335). 
 
96In the introduction to their slipstream anthology, Kelly and Kessel argue that slipstream is the 
literature of cognitive dissonance and of strangeness triumphant  (xi). By cognitive dissonance, 
Kelly and Kessel mean that literature creates competing and contradictory cognitions for the 
reader, which can take the form of assumptions, emotions, values, etc.  The difference is that in 
non-slipstream genres, the narrative creates psychic dissonance that we want to reduce, but 
slipstream embraces cognitive dissonance rather than trying to reduce it (xi). 
 
97Originating in Russian Formalism, the terms fabula and sujet describe two different aspects of 
narrative events.  The fabula is the sequence of events as the characters experience them, while 
the sujet describes the sequence of events as they are presented to the reader (Schmid 184).  
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as they are concerned with authoring and deciphering ‘plots’” (451).  Tzvetan Todorov writes of 
fabula and sujet that “detective fiction manages to make both of them present, to put them side 
by side” (46).  In “The Typology of Detective Fiction,” Todorov explains the dual structure of 
the classic detective story, which has become known as double narration by Peter Hühn.  This 
means that the plot of the classical detective story superimposes temporally distinct narratives: 
the first story (the crime) happened in the past and is hidden or absent from the present, while the 
second story (the investigation) occurs in the present and consists of uncovering the first story.  
In terms of double narration, Todorov explains, “we might further characterize these two stories 
by saying that the first—the story of the crime—tells ‘what really happened,’ whereas the 
second—the story of the investigation—explains ‘how the reader (or the narrator) has come to 
know about it’” (45).  The two-story structure also signals relationships important to 
historiography: the first story thus details the event of the crime, or the historical event itself, 
whereas the second story becomes analogous to historical narrative.    
 Because the story of the crime has already been written, the temporal juxtaposition of 
double narration means that the reader must work backwards (alongside the detective) from 
effects to their causes.  For Bina, the ability do this kind of detective work is likened to being a 
good storyteller: “Bina will never lose her detective’s appetite for people’s stories, Landsman 
thinks, of puzzling her way back through them from the final burst of violence to the first 
mistake” (168).  Bina “does not solve cases so much as tell the stories of them,” Landsman 
muses (158).  The attention to “puzzling” invokes the classical sub-genre of detective fiction that 
“presents crime as a puzzle to be solved through a ‘who-why-how-when-where’ chain of 
questions that the detective poses,” otherwise known as the “whodunit” (Routledge 103).  But in 
detective story the rules governing this sub-genre fail to apply; the nineteenth-century 
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antecedents of detective fiction invested in the new technology of forensic science and 
calculation are dismissed (Thomas 3-4).98  The way in which Bina approaches these plots is 
distinct from the more analytical modes of “solving” that emphasize the solution.  With her 
“detective’s appetite,” Bina has a physiological need for relaying people’s histories; her 
approach centers on a hunger for the process, on the “middle game” of “puzzling her way back” 
from end to origin (168).  Bina’s mode of epistemological inquiry (she solves) is rooted in the 
colloquial, oral tradition of storytelling; there is a serious element to the artistic or folk tradition 
attributed to Bina’s experience of navigating and explaining her world through storytelling.  In 
part because she is aligned with the position of the writer, creator, or originator of the events, 
Bina embodies the role of author; for Bina, detective work is personal and the story serves as her 
mode of puzzling and exploring her way through the uncertainty of plots.99 
 If Bina is associated with storytelling, aligned with a personal investment in authorship, 
then Landsman is significantly detached from agency and authorship.  In fact, his relationship to 
the crime is presented as that of a reader struggling to piece together the facts of the case; unlike 
Bina, Landsman’s approach has nothing to do with a physiological need to tell stories.  When 
Landsman and Berko go to the Einstein Chess Club to investigate, “Landsman reads the story,” 
because it is his job (88).  As a detective, Landsman has been trained to read for details and 
abnormalities ⁠, a process that for him is articulated through rote, automated reliance on memory; 
                                                
98As Stephen Bernstein explains, the genre, and its concern with reading social detail, arose at a 
time of mass urban growth during the nineteenth century (138). 
 
99In his metafictional detective novel, City of Glass, Paul Auster has written that the writer and 
the detective are involved in a similar project: “The detective is the one who looks, who listens, 
who moves through this morass of objects and events in search of the thought, the idea that will 
pull all of these things together and make sense of them.  In effect, the writer and the detective 
are interchangeable.  The reader sees the world through the detective’s eyes, experiencing the 
proliferation of its details as if for the first time” (qtd. in Malmgren 2). 
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Landsman is aligned with reading and remembering in a way that allows him to detach from the 
personal aspect of the story—he is hard-boiled, after all.  His ability to detect and catalogue 
reality’s abnormalities is the job of a detective, an area in which he excels.  Landsman “rarely 
forgets a detail of physical description” and has an impressive “gift for recollection” (3).  And 
while physicians, psychologists, and his former spouse warn that alcohol will diminish his 
memory, “his vision of the past remains unimpaired,” he professes (4).  Because memory is 
Landsman’s mode of detection, the act of remembering estranges (in the way that the detective 
fiction is supposed to work, by “deautomatizing signification and making things ‘strange’”) and 
alienates him from that world.  He keeps his memories sealed apart from himself in symbolic 
“plastic bags,” and engages them at voluntary intervals when he can control his emotional 
distance from the past (Hühn 454).  Retiring to his room after he first learns about Shpilman’s 
murder, Landsman undresses, showers, and lies down,  
for half an hour with his eyes wide open, taking memories—of his little sister in her 
Super Cub, of Bina in the summer of 1986—out of their plastic bags.  He studies 
them as if they are transcriptions, in a dusty book stolen from the library, of bygone 
checkmates and brilliancies.  After half an hour of that useful pursuit, he gets up and 
puts on a clean shirt and tie, and goes down to Sitka Central to file his report. (25) 
 
The “useful” nature of this activity is of course ironic for Landsman.  Landsman surveys his own 
past in the same forensic, detached mode of discovery usually reserved for detective work, 
except here it is Landsman’ broken life in need of solving.  He deliberately handles these relics 
in the present but distances himself from their emotional significance.  They too, are clues, keys, 
codes, redolent with affective significance and potential meaning—brilliancies or 
illuminations—that remain untapped, untold, and sealed up in plastic.  
 This self-regulating detachment estranges Landsman from his own history; he does not 
allow himself to feel too comfortable in the present lest he forget or succumb to the 
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overwhelming emotion of the past.  But as Bina and Landsman acknowledge, it is human to 
forget.  The modus operandi of detective work for Landsman is emotional alienation, which 
serves a particular social function for the Jews of Sitka: survival.  As Bina and Landsman crawl 
through the underground tunnels from the Zamenhof to the Blackpool hotels where they suspect 
Alter Litvak is hiding out (Litvak is a key suspect in the case and hired by the Verbovers to 
mastermind the terrorist plot), they discuss what it means for the Sitka Jews to forget. Landsman 
laments the sad fate of the Holocaust survivors like his father who arrived in Sitka and fought for 
control of the District only to be betrayed (by their hope in the future, U.S. Operatives, or one of 
Uncle Hertz’s endless schemes) (380).  But Bina remarks that “not all of them,” meaning the first 
generation Jews of Sitka, felt betrayed:  
 “Some of them just got comfortable here.  They started to forget a little bit.  They felt 
at home.” 
  “I guess that’s how it always goes,” Landsman says.  “Egypt. Spain. Germany.” 
  “They weakened.  It’s human to weaken.  They had their lives.  Come on.” (380) 
 
Landsman and Bina acknowledge a feeling of resignation among the Sitkaites who started to feel 
“at home” (380).  The heimlich quality of settling into a temporary status by forgetting its 
temporariness, or feeling at home in the present by forgetting history, is cause for concern as 
much as it remains inevitable; in other words, there is a double-bind inherent to this 
desirable/undesirable heimlich orientation as diaspora becomes the condition for remembering.   
  Moreover, getting comfortable and forgetting one’s impermanent status, and by extension 
the history behind that status, leads to a betrayal of history, albeit unintentional.  The names of 
countries—“Egypt. Spain. Germany”—invoke histories of persecution (380).  The curt list 
invokes narratives of trauma and suffering without their stories, revealing how a dictum like 
“never again” could become known yet divorced from historical specificity. These are not 
Landsman’s own memories, or even the collective memory of the Sitkaites who fled persecution 
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in Europe; rather, they are historical fragments.  In this way they are similar to Shimon 
Susskind’s response to Fidelman in “The Last Mohican”:  “I’m always running,” Susskind says, 
where else but from “Germany, Hungary, Poland” (Magic Barrel 156).  In The Yiddish 
Policemen’s Union, the text draws on a broader history to distill the succinct and deliberate 
succession of periods of Jewish exile, slavery, and torture from Biblical times through the 
Spanish Inquisition to the more recent history of the Holocaust.     
 Feeling at home draws on the ideas both of being naturalized (as citizens) and of 
succumbing to a textual universe where ostranenie is no longer the norm.  Literally feeling at 
home in a geographic and historical moment describes an affective process of becoming 
absorbed (here: weakening) into the present with dangerous repercussions: the recapitulation of 
Exile, Inquisition, and Holocaust.  Not remembering the details of the crime for Landsman, 
becoming too comfortable at home or in the narrative, positions Landsman and his fellow Jews at 
great risk.  The heimlich experience also blocks the unheimlich (uncanny) feeling of being 
disrupted out of one’s default sensory psychic-intellectual disposition” (Bennett 5).  The lesson 
here seems to be that Jews, historically, textually, must not get too comfortable; however, an 
alienated, unheimlich sensibility leaves open the possibility of enchantment.  One must remain 
sufficiently alienated from the past in order to view it through a constantly refreshed, estranged 
perspective, but become too alienated—like Landsman at this point in the story—and one risks 
what Bennett refers to as an anesthetized relationship to experience characteristic of 
disenchantment.  The goal is to locate that space of the middle game where Landsman remains 
estranged enough to remember but still capable of reading the clues of history with a fresh 
perspective.  One must be sufficiently alienated (textually, geographically, historically) or 
experience not feeling at home in order to be open to enchantment.  
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  In addition to the threat of a recurring traumatic history, sinking in to the homeliness of 
the present situates forgetting as a loss of imaginative potential.  There is a sense in which 
forgetting the past precludes any future imaginative investment.  Landsman notes that Berko tells 
stories about life in the Indianer-Lands, but he never tells stories of his (Indian) mother, who he 
later discovered was murdered in a massacre probably instigated by his (Jewish) father: “He 
[Landsman] supposes that he always knew there had to be some kind of cost to Berko in turning 
himself inside out the way he did, some kind of heroic feat of forgetting.  He just never bothered 
to think of it as a loss.  A failure of imagination, a worse sin in a shammes than going into a hot 
place with no backup.  Or maybe it was the same sin in a different form” (357).  The cost of 
conscientiously forgetting in order to block the pain of the past is the logical equivalent of a 
failed imagination and a thwarted detective career.  This is especially problematic for a Jewish 
detective.  The idea that there is no “worse sin in a shammes”100 than a failure of imagination 
knits together the tropes of memory and storytelling into the fabric of successful detective work, 
where the religious and Yiddish inflections of “sin” and “shammes” connote that this loss is 
particularly shameful for a Jew.  Thus, the text’s enchanted aesthetics engage with Jewish 
memory; affectively disengaging from the past, forgetting, registers as the failure of Jewish 
imagination.   
  Landsman’s own journey is defined through his affective orientation towards his 
imagination. When Cashdollar, the evangelical U.S. Federal agent and facilitator of the terrorist 
plot, arrives in Sitka to interrogate Landsman, he signifies a singular history of U.S.-backed 
terrorist intervention abroad with no room for narrative revision.  He has arrived to interrogate 
                                                
100A shammes refers to a sexton in a synagogue or the candle used to light the menorah during 
Hannukah.  Part of his own creation of yiddishkeit, Chabon uses it as slang for cop.  
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Landsman, and in doing so, Cashdollar recounts how his old supervisor used to say to him, “‘We 
are telling a story, Cashdollar. That’s what we do. . . Tell them a story, Cashdollar. That’s all the 
poor suckers want.’ Only he didn’t say ‘suckers’” (364).  But this is not the same story that Bina 
hungers for as she carefully, affectively performs her role as detective.  Through this 
conversation, “story” is corrupted and becomes a slippery concept (mirroring slipstream itself) in 
relation to the narrative as a whole; in this context “story” becomes a stand-in for coercive 
narrative tactics, and given the broader terrorist agenda, manipulated histories.   
  Thus, Cashdollar claims no responsibility for Mendel Shpilman’s death.  But after 
Cashdollar apologizes for Landsman’s sister Naomi’s death, one that came at the cost of aiding 
Shpilman, 
        he gives his head a gentle shake.  
   “But we aren’t telling a story.” 
   “No?”  
   “Huh-uh.  The story, Detective Landsman, is telling us.  Just like it has done from the 
   beginning.  We’re part of the story.  You. Me.” (365) 
 
And just then, Cashdollar lights a cigarette, flashing a book of matches from a place in 
Washington, D.C. with the name of Hogate’s Seafood, “the very restaurant, if he [Landsman] 
remembers his history, in front of which Delegate Anthony Dimond, prime opponent of the 
Alaskan Settlement Act, was run down by a taxicab . . .” (365).  When Cashdollar asserts that 
“the story. . . is telling us,” he invokes the idea of a grand teleology with no room for himself, or 
Landsman, to insert their own telling (365).  Landsman and Cashdollar are trapped together in 
Jewish and Christian eschatology; historical teleology; rote historical narratives; and even this 
novel.  When Cashdollar refers to “this story,” he indicates the evangelical belief in messianic 
redemption prophesied by the Book.  Of course, the reader is aware that this “prophecy” has 
been manipulated by a US covert operation that sent one million dollars to Verbover scientists to 
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genetically modify a red heifer and orchestrate the terrorist plot (295).  Laying bare the 
constructedness of international politics, as Cashdollar attests, the authors of this “story” have 
specific agendas tied to their military backgrounds or business training (364).  The only 
possibility for authenticity resides in the space between such narratives that quickly turn 
fantasies into historical realities.  Landsman summarizes that Cashdollar wants him to keep his 
mouth shut, to not reveal anything about the evangelical-backed plot to blow up the Dome of the 
Rock.  Landsman avers, “just until you lay these facts down on Jerusalem.  Move some Arabs 
out and some Verbovers in.  Rename a few streets” (366). Cashdollar agrees, adding “. . .And 
then get busy, you know.  Fulfilling what is written” (366). 
 From this perspective inside the narratives, the characters cannot see reality for what it 
really is.  But at the same time, Cashdollar flashes a sign of historical contingency—the lighter—
and reminds the reader of the very event that set in motion the telos of this counterhistorical 
mythology.  It is Landsman’s recollection of the name on the matchbook that unsettles the 
ideological premise that the story is telling “us” (365).  For Landsman, these signs are all part of 
the detective’s discovery, and as such, part and parcel of the detective plot.  While the events 
register to the reader as allohistory, to Landsman they are part of a crime story; the mixing of 
genres thus defamiliarizes historical crimes alongside Mendel’s murder.  As one of the 
perpetrators who “sponsor[s] terrorist attacks on Muslim holy places,” Cashdollar is triply guilty 
of killing Landsman’s sister, Mendel Shpilman, and innocent Muslims.  Landsman’s memory 
never fails him, but only when detective and allohistory cede space to romance does Landsman 
become his story’s own teller.  Even with all of these pre-set tropes, the fact that “the story is 
telling us,” there are moments of interruption and transcendence to unsettle predetermined 
genres.  In fact, the novel closes as he calls Brennan, the journalist who has been nagging him all 
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along for a story, and says, “I have a story for you” (411).101  How does he get here?     
Plotting Histories: The Grim Reality of Jewish Terrorism  
 Ever hard-boiled and a critic of Verbover religiosity, Landsman is a tough guy who has 
been called “hard-boiled and foolhardy, a momzer, a crazy son of a bitch” (10); a man who spites 
himself, “because spiting himself, spiting others, spiting the world is the pastime and only 
patrimony of Landsman and his people” (11).  Landsman embodies the rough nature of his 
generic trope and the familiar discourse of the self-hating Jew; in addition to the former, the 
latter serves as another way in which pre-determined tropes and genres direct Landsman’s 
character.  By aligning the two tropes Chabon obscures their origins—is Landsman a self-hating 
Jew because he is so callous and hard-boiled? Or is he so callous and hard-boiled because he is a 
self-hating Jew?  Crafted out of layers of caricatures, at this point in the story Landsman is a 
stand-in for himself.  Colloquially he could be any fellow Jew, as his name indicates, but not 
until the overlapping generic codes reach their pitch does Landsman have the freedom to narrate 
his own story and attach to his own history. 
 Landsman lives in a world where everything is potentially made strange by Shpilman’s 
murder, yet simultaneously, his orientation is rooted in those seemingly disenchanted forms of 
rationalism and forensics that explain away any pretense of wonder or belief.  Landsman’s 
attitude towards victims is much like his attitude towards religion: detached. When feelings do 
crop up, they are quickly dismissed.  About victims, he muses, “sometimes he can’t help feeling 
sorry for them, but it’s better not to get into the habit” (6).  He keeps his memories sealed away, 
and for good reason—the past is painful.  So much of the unexpected and the unfathomable has 
                                                
101“I have a story for you” implies that Landsman will tell all and not stick to the grounds of the 
contract he made with Cashdollar—that he would keep quiet in exchange for getting to stay in 
Sitka after Reversion (411).  
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occurred in this antireality that “nowadays one never knows,” remarks the narrator, distilling the 
present state of uncertainty that leaves Landsman increasingly jaded, disconnected, and unmoved 
(13).  
 Anger, disbelief, uncertainty, and incredulity overrun Sitka after the Verbovers hatch the 
terrorist plot, bringing to fruition the idea that nothing is too extreme or too dangerous to be 
inconceivable for Jewish history or futurity.  The Verbover terrorism plot is rooted in a number 
of real historical narratives linked to Jewish terrorism: the King David Hotel bombing of 1946, 
carried out by the Zionist paramilitary group Irgun; the Jewish Underground, a group of violent, 
pro-settlement extremists who developed a plot to blow up the Dome of the Rock in the 1980s; 
and the contemporary Temple Mount Faithful movement, whose objective is to rebuild the Third 
Temple on the Temple Mount and reinstate ritual sacrifice.  If enchantment refers to the strange 
commensurability of the fantasy mode of storytelling and historical representation that “delights 
and disturbs,” the mixing of these historical narratives collapses distinctions between ontological 
realities within and outside the text.102  And through the mixing of narratives, the grim realism of 
the terrorist becomes available to the reader.   
In Chabon’s universe, this newfound clarity orients us toward the ugliness in our own 
world and points to the limits of enchantment in the text precisely because it is intertwined with 
historical reality outside the text.  In so doing, enchantment that closes the gap between fantasy 
and reality suggests that autonomous imaginary worlds may be a relic of the past.  After the 
                                                
102As Tolkien suggested, fantasy aspires to enchantment, and “enchantment produces a 
Secondary World into which both designer and spectator can enter, to the satisfaction of their 
senses while they are inside; but in its purity it is artistic in desire and purpose” (“On Fairy-
Stories” 45).   
192 
 
Verbovers bomb Qubbat As-Sakhrah (the Dome of the Rock) in Jerusalem, Ester-Malke 
describes the chaos ricocheting around the world:      
All those people rioting on the television in Syria, Baghdad, Egypt? In London? 
Burning cars.  Setting fire to embassies. Up in Yakovy, did you see what happened, 
they were dancing, those fucking maniacs, they were so happy about all this 
craziness, the whole floor collapses right onto the apartment underneath.  A couple of 
little girls sleeping in their beds, they got crushed to death.  That’s the kind of shit we 
have to look forward to now. Burning cars and homicidal dancing. I have no idea 
where this baby is going to be born. . . (406) 
 
The attention to Zionist fanaticism literally crushes Jewish children and puts the fate of Bina’s 
baby at risk.  With Jewish futurity in jeopardy, Ester-Malke refers to Syria, Baghdad, Egypt, and 
London to invoke the potential apocalypse latent in the ongoing Arab-Jewish struggle, one that is 
fundamentally real regardless of the narrative world we choose to inhabit.   
Of course, as the Jews terrorize Muslims, we may also read a reversal of the historical 
premise of 9/11.  The fantastical narrative reveals an uncomfortable similarity in the real world 
outside the text: the fact that some Jews share violent ideologies with radical Islamic terrorists.  
This is not a restoration of wonder that is typical for fantasy literature, but more so, an indication 
of the limits of enchantment in our twenty-first-century present.  If we read enchantment as a 
representation of the way that Sitka is “inextricable from ordinary life and interpersonal 
engagements” (Saler 7), and we note that the strange is now familiar across text (Chabon’s 
universe) and reality (reader’s universe) and in fact, cannot be made strange, then in this way the 
ontological premise of Chabon’s secondary world approaches that of a reality-oriented text and 
indicates the way that the dark, traumatic historical premise resists enchantment.   
Cashdollar’s scheming-as-storytelling manifests the creation of historical narratives 
publically produced to control the narrative of the Jewish-Arab world.  When Tenenboym asks 
Landsman if he has heard about what happened, Landsman responds somewhat uncertainly, “I 
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saw it on the television,” but the narrator qualifies, “though the memory feels secondhand, 
fogged-over, a construct that his interrogators implanted through persistent questioning” (370).  
This is the story that will be soon be captured on television, immediately memorialized by the 
media as an “image that will soon be splashed across the front page of every newspaper in the 
world” (358).  The image of the “hilltop in Jerusalem . . . the broad empty mesa of paving stone. 
The jagged jawbone of burnt teeth. The magnificent plume of black smoke” simultaneously 
conjures the image of the twin towers on 9/11 (358).  Margaret Scanlon remarks of this moment, 
“Not only does this icon [magnificent plume of black smoke] evoke the famous shot of the 
second plane hitting the South Tower, but Sitka’s triumphant Jews dance in the street, just as 
Palestinians were alleged to have done on 9/11” (523).  And in the novel, the narrator describes 
how just after the attack, the US president immediately pledges to send in support in response to 
“some Arabs making bombs in a tunnel under the Temple Mount” (370).  The reversal of the 
9/11 narrative reveals the uncomfortable proximity between Jewish extremism and Arab 
extremism, on the one hand, and on the other, situates narratives of Jewish terrorism alongside 
the innocence of lost-and-recovered yiddishkeit and the invocation of the Holocaust.  As these 
narratives de-essentialize the framework for Jewish terrorism within the novel, they work against 
the grain of an essentialist framework for Islamic terrorism outside of it.   
The Evolution of Meyer Landsman: Romancing the Hard-boiled  
As the plots cede their ground to romance, the tropes of the hard-boiled and narratives of 
the past begin to change shape.  The integration of the romance plot into the novel liberates the 
fixed temporality of the already told stories of allohistory and the detective plot and turns the 
story’s orientation toward the as-yet-untold future.  In so doing, they make room for fantasy 
tropes linked to transcendence and the otherworldly—to the presence of the dead Yid Mendel 
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Shpilman’s impossible communication with Landsman.   
What is it that Landsman feels near the end of the novel in the marvelous, unreal, magical 
touch of Shpilman?  In this exchange, what is communicated through Mendel’s presence?  When 
Landsman and Berko first visit the Rabbi’s house to inform him of Shpilman’s murder, 
Landsman feels something in the air that begins to challenge his disaffected worldview.  
Zimbalist the boundary maven cries out with anger and grief, “Idiots. . . They’re here about 
Mendele!” to get the attention of Rabbi Shpilman’s handlers.  The sound of “Mendele” 
reverberates:   
The air seems to shatter like a world of tiny windows with a tinkling sound.  
And Landsman feels something that makes him want to put a hand to the back 
of his neck.  He is a dealer in entropy and a disbeliever by trade and inclination.  
To Landsman, heaven is kitsch, God a word, and the soul, at most, the charge 
on your battery.  But in the three-second lull that follows Zimbalist’s crying out 
the name of the rebbe’s lost son, Landsman has the feeling that something 
comes fluttering among them.  Dipping down over the crowd of men, brushing 
them with its wing.  Maybe it’s just the knowledge, leaping from man to man, 
of why these two homicide detectives must have come at this hour.  Or maybe 
it’s the old power to conjure of a name in which their fondest hope once 
resided.  Or maybe Landsman just needs a good night’s sleep in a hotel with no 
dead Jews in it. (Chabon 131) 
 
As Landsman apprehends an atmospheric change in the air, he reels off a flurry of associations, 
mantras that leave little room for feeling and sensing.  Landsman deals in entropy, meaning that 
he has no say or control in the automatized, systematic degradation of the universe.103  He 
discounts the mystical meaning embedded in the soul, rendering it through the mechanized, 
electrochemical “charge on your battery” (131).  And noting that “God” is equivalent to a word, 
Landsman flattens out the enchantment-bearing capacities of language and reduces them to their 
                                                
103Entropy concerns the irreversibility of the laws of systems of thermodynamics (OED). 
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crudest version of random semiotics. 
 Historically, in both biblical belief and fantasy texts, language and magic were one and the 
same.104⁠   Ancient Jews refused to speak God’s name out of fear and awe of its power.105⁠  It is 
this narrative of disenchanting language that Chabon draws on when Landsman reduces the 
conception of God to “a word”—a random amalgam of letters, not performative in the way in 
which enchanted language customarily functions (131).  In contrast, the grief-stricken cry of 
Mendele’s name invokes just a performance of enchantment on par with narratives of belief.  
Feeling the brush of a wing, Landsman wonders if maybe it is this “old power to conjure of a 
name” which still bears the possibility for hope (131).  Or maybe Landsman is just exhausted, so 
jaded and overworked that he’s begun to unravel.  At the moment this possibility arises, 
Landsman questions its existence and attempts to explain it away, but fails.   
Wolfe explains that contemporary fantasy “must engage in an implied compact between 
                                                
104For Tolkien and the fantasy writers who followed, language and magic are one and the same.  
It is in the original enchanted language of genesis that the world is created through a word: “And 
God said, ‘Let there be light,’ and there was light. God saw that the light was good, and he 
separated the light from the darkness. God called the light ‘day’ and the darkness he called 
‘night.’ And there was evening and there was morning—the first day” (Gen. 1:3-5).  The creation 
of light is also the first act of naming in the Garden of Eden, where naming is an action that calls 
light into being. 
 
105Foucault describes the disenchantment of language in The Order of Things.  In the beginning, 
when given to men by God, language was “an absolutely certain and transparent sign for things, 
because it resembled them. The names of things were lodged in the things they designated, just 
as strength is written in the body of the lion, regality in the eye of the eagle, just as the influence 
of the planets is marked upon the brows of men: by the form of similitude” (36).  But in the early 
twentieth century Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure emptied language of the final traces of 
enchantment by splitting the concept of the sign into signifier + signified, and then by assigning 
to words the powerless attributes of arbitrary and differential meaning.  Beginning in the 17th 
century, when the sign is thought to be understood to be the union of a significant and a signified, 
the sign is linked to the object through either representation or signification and thus leads 
Foucault to state that “the profound kinship of language with the world was thus dissolved” (43). 
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author and reader—an agreement that whatever impossibilities we encounter will be made 
significant to us, but will retain enough of their idiosyncratic nature that we still recognize them 
to be impossible” (70).106  When Landsman feels Mendel’s spirit through the brush of a wing, 
regardless of its impossibility or Landsman’s own doubts, we believe it to be true; it is in this 
way that despite the limits of fantasy’s ontological wonder-bearing capacity in the present, 
Chabon privileges belief over knowledge.  For Wolfe, “belief is what enables genuine emotions 
to be aroused from impossible circumstance” (77).  In doing so, Wolfe also indicates another 
way in which the seriousness of play enables emotional sincerity.  This holds true for both the 
reader in her investment in the allohistorical premise of The Yiddish Policeman’s Union and 
Landsman’s character.  Wolfe asserts, “affect and tone transform such ideational constructs into 
events and beings that are fully consistent with the author’s created universe” (77).  Similarly, 
Simon Spiegel writes, “in the world where the irrational is made plausible, we have no problem 
at all identifying which ‘magical’ disappearance belongs to the world of the fairy tale and sf” 
(Spiegel 372).  A witch is unquestionably part of the fairy tale iconography, for example, just as 
a time machine is assuredly part of the universe of science fiction.  But what about a chess 
prodigy and child genius with a messianic gift of healing?  It is easy to dismiss Mendel 
Shpilman’s supernatural abilities as subject to the whims of the ultra-Orthodox Verbover 
fanaticism and explained away by extreme desires to believe.  But Mendel’s spirit does not reach 
Landsman because Verbover fanaticism forced him to believe; instead, the clash of narratives 
creates a space where a workaholic, depressed, drunk, spiritless, and lonely Landsman begins to 
see the world anew. 
                                                
106Because we are already situated in the secondary-world, this notion of belief is distinct from 
Coleridge’s “willing suspension of disbelief” (Wolfe 77).   
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It is not the world of Sitka that changes throughout the course of the novel, but rather, 
Landsman’s perception of it.  Through the play of ostranenie in the narrative, Landsman 
becomes open to modes of sensing and seeing that are free from detached, impersonal irony and 
distinct from his past modes of perceiving.  How, then, do we characterize Landsman’s renewed 
feeling and the way that he begins to disidentify with hard-boiled tropes that have defined his 
character?  This transformation is in part due to the Romance genre built into the slipstream 
world and the ways in which through the liminal and the space between genres, Landsman 
becomes open to joyful attachment in the present.  It is only through the unsettling of plots, the 
criss-crossing of detectives and romancers, that serious play gives rise to surprise.  Bennett 
describes the extraordinary that exists amidst the everyday as part and parcel of the project of 
enchantment, which begins from the assumption that “the world has become neither inert nor 
devoid of surprise but continues to inspire deep and powerful attachments” (4). Landsman’s own 
inspired thinking, evinced through his redemptive and magical turn of thought, is made possible 
through love.107  
With the integration of romance and the ascension of the marriage plot, the affective 
detachment of the hard-boiled becomes unsettled from itself.  Although The Yiddish Policemen’s 
Union embodies a down-and-out detective of the Chandler-esque variety, the text also embraces 
                                                
107Caroline Rody’s work on magical realism in contemporary Jewish American fiction has begun 
to highlight this trend in Jewish American Literature, although she focuses on the thematization 
of love rather than the way it functions in the narrative.  Still, her direction is one to note, and she 
writes that in Jonathan Safran Foer’s Everything is Illuminated, the book within-a-book structure 
helps “effect a profound movement in the narrative from historical grief to a communion of love” 
(55).  In Rody’s reading, love is positioned as the essence of the Jewish culture and tradition that 
grieving descendants claim to recover (55).  Love is the second thing, after writing, that can 
overcome time and death in the text, Rody claims (55).  She explains, “the essential act that 
magical writing is imagined to perform is the recovery of transcendent love from a history of 
violence” (55).  I more fully explain Rody’s argument in my introduction, including where our 
projects diverge and converge.   
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the essential elements of the romance genre.  It is within this hybrid narrative space that 
Landsman’s hard-boiled nature softens as the possibility of reconciliation with Bina grows.  
Historically, romance has roots in the bringing together of both fantasy and emotion.  In fact, 
discussions of the romance genre centralize the role of fantasy and emotion alongside narrative 
structures like love and the happy ending (Regis 20).  Here, the romance genre also serves a 
function in relation to historiography: genre-mixing allows for any sentimentalism to be 
attributed to the romance plot rather than nostalgia for a lost Jewish world. 
In A Natural History of the Romance Genre (2007), Pamela Regis dates “romance” in the 
broadest sense to the Greeks in the fourth century who told stories of passionate love, separation, 
and triumph (20).  According to Northrop Frye, the conventions of the romance are stable and 
have not changed since its advent in Grecian times.  Regis explains that for Frye, the essence of 
romance is the “idealized world” it embodies in its texts (qtd. in Regis 20).  She writes, “all 
popular genres—mysteries, thrillers, horror, science fiction, and, of course, the romance novel 
itself—are romances in this broader sense” (20).  Jean Radford thus refers to romance in this 
general sense when she defines the romance as “a non-mimetic prose narrative focusing on 
emotion” (qtd. in Regis 20).  Lastly, Regis quotes Kathleen Gilles Seidel, who refers not to the 
text but to the reader, writer, and their experience.  Seidel claims that “fantasy is the most 
important element in the appeal of popular fiction” (qtd. in Regis 159).  Combining these 
definitions, Regis summarizes, “we have the romance presenting an ideal world, whose 
representation takes considerable liberties with verisimilitude (mimesis) and focuses on emotion” 
(20).  Furthermore, incorporating Seidel, Regis writes, “the idealized world, the non-mimetic 
representation, combined with the focus on emotion, becomes ‘fantasy’” (20).  These definitions 
of romance in the most generalized sense focus on the depiction of an idealized world and its 
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status as fantasy in the minds of authors and readers (20).108⁠  It is when critics consider 
“romance” alongside “novel” that they begin to focus on the characteristics most associated with 
the popular romance novel: love and the happy ending (Regis 21).  Defining the romance novel 
along these lines, John Cowelti explains, “the crucial defining characteristic of romance is not 
that it stars a female but that its organizing action is the development of a love relationship, 
usually between a man and a woman. . . . The moral fantasy of the romance is that love is 
triumphant and permanent, overcoming all obstacles and difficulties” (Adventure 41-2; emphasis 
mine).  In Regis’s definition, she departs slightly to centralize narrative rather than thematic 
elements: “a romance novel is a work of prose fiction that tells the story of the courtship and 
betrothal of one or more heroines,” and further explains that without the happy ending, there is 
an incomplete rendering of genre (22).  Heroines and heroes in love conduct a courtship (action 
of love) and this action of love leads to the universally happy ending that always promises 
betrothal, even if the wedding is omitted (22).  Thus, “if the narrative elements are present, a 
given work is a romance novel” (22).  
 Considering romance as part and parcel of Chabon’s slipstream text, I wish to emphasize 
the sincerity of emotion within the text as Landsman and Bina reconcile.  As Landsman and Bina 
prepare to leave the Shemets’ apartment, Ester-Malke notes that the pair is leaving together, an 
event so “strange” it appears on par with the global unrest erupting from Yakovy to London, the 
uncertainty of her family’s future, her murdering, suicidal father-in-law asleep in the other room 
(406).  Turning to Bina and Landsman, she remarks, “meanwhile, I’m getting this very strange 
vibration from the two of you.  So let me just say that if you and Bina are planning to get back 
                                                
108“This ancient, ideal, non-mimetic fantasy world can be represented in verse, either dramatic or 
narrative, or in prose,” Regis writes (20). 
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together, excuse me, but that’s all I need” (406).  For the first time in the text, Landsman seems 
open to a present awash with possibility; in a moment of transcendent thought, Landsman 
contemplates his own alternative realities: 
  Landsman considers this.  Any kind of wonder seems likely.  That the Jews will pick 
up and set sail for the promised land to feast on giant grapes and toss their beards in 
the desert wind. That the temple will be rebuilt, speedily and in our day.  War will 
cease, ease and plenty and righteousness will be universal, and humankind will be 
treated to the regular spectacle of lions and lambs and cohabiting.  Every man will be 
a rabbi, every woman a holy book, and every suit will come with two pairs of pants.  
Meyer’s seed, even now, may be wandering through darkness toward redemption, 
striking at the membrane that separates the legacy of the yids who made him from 
that of the yids whose errors, griefs, hopes, and calamities went into the production 
of Bina Gelbfish.  (406-7) 
 
The wonders of the bearded Jews feasting on giant grapes are certainly exaggerated in 
Landsman’s imagination, and the “goodness” of humankind too far-reaching and universal to be 
real, obtainable constructs.  But what does not feel exaggerated is the sentiment of entertaining 
the possibilities—better, impossibilities—of a present awash with hope and a future so porous 
that it is open to the chance Bina could be pregnant.  (Django had a fifty percent chance of 
genetic abnormalities, an outcome so fearful that Landsman and Bina decided to abort their 
unborn child, leaving Landsman full of sorrow and grief).  If we think about the novel as a 
whole, we can consider this as analogous to how Chabon refuses to foreclose the potential of 
multiple genres through a slipstream text.  In this superpositional crux point of Bina and 
Landsman’s romance, there is an unfolding and still undetermined sense of possibility.  
Allohistory for Chabon does not require the privilege of an alternative, fantastic teleology over 
another.  Nor does it entail the privilege of one generic, guiding interpretive mode over another.  
Through Landsman’s contemplation of wonders, we see Chabon layering alternative histories 
within the larger frame of allohistory; the premise of an alternative history is defined through the 
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uncertain, shifting circumstances of the present.    
 In the juxtaposition of Landsman and Bina’s marriage—their fallout, its reconciliation—
alongside the “strange times,” one sees that each and every future is an uncertain one.  But 
characters like Bina have found a much easier time feeling at home in the unknown uncertainty 
of life in Sitka.  Bina has always believed in Landsman and in this way it was her faith in 
Landsman, or in their marriage, that remained unrequited rather than love: 
  Once Bina Gelbfish believed in Meyer Landsman.  Or she believed, from the  
  moment she met him, that there was a sense in that meeting, that some detectable 
  intention lay behind their marriage.  They were twisted like a pair of chromosomes, 
  of course they were, but where Landsman saw in that twisting together only a tangle, 
  a chance snarling of lines, Bina saw the hand of the Maker of Knots.  And for her 
  faith, Landsman repaid her with his faith in Nothing itself. (170)   
 
When Bina visits Landsman to bar him from the case, he is overwhelmed by self-pity and 
attached to meaninglessness; here the narrator intuits Landsman’s preference for an existential 
faith in nothing itself:  “He is off duty today, but duty means nothing, today means nothing, 
nothing means anything but a clean suit, three fresh Broadways, the wobble of the hangover just 
behind his eyes, the murmur of the brush against the whiskey-brown felt of his hat.  And, all 
right, maybe a trace in his hotel room of the smell of Bina, of the sour collar of her shirt, her 
verbena soap, the marjoram smell of her armpit” (172).  Landsman struggles to maintain his 
distance from sensing the present, wanting only to hold on to the thought that “today means 
nothing” (172).  But Landsman fails to protect himself from the sensory experience that is the 
trace of Bina, a failure that over the course of the novel amounts to a sincere restoration of his 
own emotions rather than those that belong to predetermined tropes of the hard-boiled detective.  
Landsman cannot help but notice the familiar scent of Bina, and through his memory of Bina, he 
begins to reconnect to himself.  Out of resignation—“And, all right, maybe,” he submits—
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Landsman allows himself to connect to the intimate knowledge of her smell.  Through 
submitting to this experience, Landsman allows himself a momentary respite in heimlich 
territory.  Landsman, in fact, has never felt at home in divorce: “she is getting old, and he is 
getting old, right on schedule, and yet as time ruins them, they are not, strangely enough, married 
to each other” (59).     
 The more estranged Landsman becomes from the hard-boiled tropes, the more connected 
he feels to himself and to Bina.  And it is not only romantic love, but also familial that enchants 
Landsman’s experience.  Landsman becomes flooded with feeling after a night of sleeping in the 
Shemets’ home and sharing a bed with the two children.  Asleep in the Shemets’s family bed, 
Landsman struggles to remain unaware of Ester-Malke’s tenderness towards him: “He doesn’t 
care.  Why should he care?  At last Landsman realizes that he has lost his struggle not to care 
about anything lie the paradoxical seeds of defeat: So, all right, he cares” (193).  Landsman’s 
apathy fails him because he has been thrust into the Shemets’ family bed and forced to perceive 
and see his own dejected isolation in its wake.  The next morning, Landsman observes his 
wounds, aches, and moods, sits up and “feels oddly settled.  More present, somehow, in his limbs 
and skin and senses.  Somehow, maybe, a little more real.  He has not shared a bed with another 
human being in over two years” (193).  Taking stock of his newly recharged emotional register, 
Landsman exudes a “mood of fullness, plenitude, or liveliness, a sense of having had one’s 
nerves or circulation or concentration powers tuned up or recharged” that for Bennett 
characterizes  enchantment (5).  As I mentioned earlier, Bennett writes that contained within this 
state of wonder are “(1) a pleasurable feeling of being charmed by the novel and as yet 
unprocessed encounter and (2) a more unheimlich (uncanny) feeling of being disrupted or torn 
out of one’s default sensory-psychic-intellectual disposition” (5).  Landsman’s default sensory-
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psychic-intellectual disposition, the estranged, hard-boiled, momzer, begins to connect to 
himself: “so all right, he cares” (193).  Moreover, the phrase “paradoxical seeds of defeat” 
registers this failure of not caring at the same time that it gestures toward Meyer’s own “seed” 
and his complicated struggle with Django’s death.  Soon, his seed will be perceived again, and 
Landsman will marvel at his own possibility for procreation in that “Meyer’s seed, even now, 
may be wandering through darkness toward redemption” (407).  What is a child if not the 
ultimate sign of hope for the future?    
 In this novel, what it means to estrange strangeness, to inhabit the in-between or liminal 
zones  between genre, reality, history, time, results in enchantment.  When unheimlich, estranged 
isolation is the norm, feeling at home and returning to oneself constitutes enchantment.  Saler 
explains, “In its use from the middle ages, enchantment signified ‘delight’ in wonderful things 
and the potential to be placed under their spell, to be beguiled.  It was not either/or, but both/and: 
the price of living with enchantment was the possibility of being captivated by it, an outcome 
that might be prevented precisely through being aware of this possibility” (138).  The experience 
of being “placed under their spell,” the potential “to be beguiled” can be dangerous for the Jews 
of Sitka because it carries with it the potential of forgetting, embodied by the historical 
trajectory, “Egypt. Spain. Germany” (380).  But being awakened from one’s unheimlich state is 
not equivalent to forgetting, getting too comfortable in the present so that one forgets, “Egypt. 
Spain. Germany” (380); it is not “either/or” but the potential for “both/and” (Saler 138).  When 
Landsman finds himself once again in Bina’s bedroom, a place he has not been for some time—
since before they were married,  
Landsman begins to drift across the surface of her bed and of the susurration of 
Bina’s breath.  In her arms, in the scent of her on the bed linens—a strong but 
pleasant smell like new leather gloves—Landsman feels safe for the first time in 
ages.  Drowsy and content.  Here you go, Landsman, he thinks.  Here is the smell and 
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the hand on your belly that you traded for a lifetime of silence.  (397) 
 
Landsman takes refuge in the rhythm of Bina’s breath, her scent, the presence of her hand on his 
belly; he finds safety and comfort in her companionship, in his faith not in “nothing” but in the 
tactile pleasure of the sensory experience that is knowing Bina.    
 It is the space between genres—detective, romance, allohistory—where meaning is made. 
In this moment of enchantment, the detective-cum-romancer decodes the case.  Suddenly, amidst 
the infantile dream-state in Bina’s childhood bedroom, “he sits up. . .discontentment gathers like 
ball lightning around the chessboard in the pocket of his coat” (397).  Landsman begins to circle 
through the details of Shpilman’s room, his thoughts like a “tornado,” re-creating the scene in his 
imagination (397-8).  He thinks,  
maybe it’s the context at once familiar and strange, the painted bedstead, the 
daisy lamp, the daisies on the wallpaper, the dresser in which top drawer she used 
to keep her diaphragm.  Or maybe it’s the lingering traces of endorphin in his 
bloodstream.  But as Landsman stares at the chessboard, staring at a chessboard, 
for the first time in his life, feels good. . . Moving the pieces in his mind, seems to 
slow or at least to dislodge the needle inking over the black spot in his brain. 
(emphasis mine, 398) 
 
“At once familiar and strange” is of course the unheimlich feeling of Landsman’s return to 
Bina’s childhood bedroom, but it is simultaneously the overall effect of enchantment that 
constitutes the break in the murder case—Shpilman must have had an opponent, a visitor, 
Landsman realizes (398).  As Landsman solves the case and feels “the touch of Mendel 
Shpilman,” aesthetic enchantment and affective enchantment intertwine.109  As he gets up to 
                                                
109Mendel allowed others to realize their self-worth. The rebbe tells Landsman,  
 
Mendel had a remarkable nature as a boy.  I’m not talking about miracles.  
Miracles are a burden for a tzaddik, not the proof of one.  Miracles prove nothing 
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leave, “Landsman feels it then.  A hand laid on his legs, two degrees warmer than normal.  A 
quickening, an unfurling like a banner in his thoughts.  Before and after.  The touch of Mendel 
Shpilman, moist, electric, conveying some kind of strange blessing on Landsman.  And then 
nothing but the cold air of Bina Gelbfish’s childhood bedroom” (399).  Again, the ineffable, 
strange presence of Shpilman enters Landsman’s purview and charges his sensory experience—
Landsman is attuned to heat, air particles, his own experience of time; Landsman’s default mode 
of seeing is tuned up, shaken, and present-oriented as he receives “some kind of strange 
blessing” (399).  “Nothing but the cold air” signals the distance from Landsman’s earlier faith in 
“nothing”; rather, the “touch of Mendel Shpilman” cements Landsman’s faith in possibility as 
“nothing” is proof of the now-evacuated trace of Shpilman’s presence.        
Landsman may have an automated mechanism for cataloguing reality and archiving 
memory, but unlike Bina, he has had no need, no desire to tell stories.  When we meet Landsman 
again, after he has spent the night with Bina, felt the touch of the Shemets’ children, when his 
suspicions of Mendel Shpilman and Verbover fanaticism have all been disrupted, amidst all of 
these challenges to Landsman’s default “sensory-psychic-intellectual disposition,” he 
experiences the wonder of possibility (Bennett 5).  In these liminal spaces, Landsman locates the 
freedom to construct his own narratives; he is no longer limited by what has been proscribed 
through genre that relies on tropes, formulas, and plots, or even narrative writ large—“the book” 
                                                                                                                                                       
except to those whose faith is bought very cheap, sir.  There was something in 
Mendele.  There was a fire.  This is a cold, dark place, Detectives.  A gray, wet 
place.  Mendele gave off light and warmth.  You wanted to stand close to him.  To 
warm your hands, to melt the ice on your beard.  To banish the darkness of a 
minute or two.  But then when you left Mendele, you stayed warm, and it seemed 
like there was a little more light, maybe one candle’s worth, in the world.  And 
that was when you realized the fire was inside of you all the time.  And that was 
the miracle.  Just that. (141)   
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of God, of corrupt American governance, of religious extremism.  With a indignant sense of 
urgency,  
 ‘Fuck what is written,’ Landsman says. ‘You know what?’ All at once he feels 
weary of ganefs and prophets, guns and sacrifices and the infinite gangster weight 
of God.  He’s tired of hearing about the promised land and the inevitable 
bloodshot required for its redemption.  ‘I don’t care what is written.  I don’t care 
what supposedly got promised to some sandal-wearing idiot whose claim to fame 
is that he was ready to cut his own son’s throat for the sake of a hare-brained idea. 
I don’t care about red heifers and patriarchs and locusts. A bunch of old bones in 
the sand. My homeland is in my hat. It’s in my ex-wife’s tote bag.’ (368)  
 
“Fuck what is written,” Landsman says, rejecting perhaps the grandest teleological premise the 
text offers:  God’s covenant with Abraham, enmeshed in the story of messianic redemption. 
“Fuck what is written” blasphemes Jewish textuality, Jewish belief, and the Jewish covenant 
with God.  Red heifers and guns, gangsters and God—these are proof of the forced hand of 
Verbover extremism and of a life taken too soon from Mendel Shpilman.  Some are clues to 
solving the murder of Mendel Shpilman (the red heifer) and as such, these signs are 
simultaneously imprinted with Jewish history, made meaningful in this story through a twisted, 
extreme rendering of four thousand years of Jewish belief.  But Landsman turns away from this 
narrative that supposedly dictates his fate.  “Fuck what is written” is a metafictional cry that 
crassly, resoundingly rejects what Cashdollar has already told Landsman regarding the outcome 
of Sitka: “The story, Detective Landsman, is telling us.  Just like it has done from the beginning.  
We’re part of the story.  You. Me” (364).  But a space of sincerity opens up between genres and 
narratives and the blasphemous cry, “fuck what is written,” so much so that Landsman picks up 
the phone in the last line of the text and begins to tell his own story: “I have a story for you,” 
Landsman says into the receiver (368).   
 When the hard-boiled detective Meyer Landsman senses Mendel’s presence and feels at 
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home in the space of his ex-wife’s tote bag, Chabon deliberatively problematizes narrative 
iconographies and obviously subverts the hard-boiled plot.  Amidst the play of fantasy and the 
imagination, there is a turn toward sincerity, materiality, and objects.  Landsman’s homeland is 
in his hat, his ex-wife’s tote bag (368).  Landsman’s is a faith dictated not by some “sandal 
wearing idiot,” but rather, through his connection to materiality in the present.  Landsman’s 
process of reconnecting is one of becoming at home with a narrative of uncertainty.  All of the 
promises of redemption, whether religious, historical, or political in nature are red herrings and 
empty signifiers, stirred up by the Verbovers’ hubris that they can usurp the place of God and 
wield the coming of the messiah.  But for Landsman the narrative is much less grand—it is about 
his connection to the here and now, to finding self-acceptance and being at home in the 
conditions of the unknown.  Remarking on Landsman’s realizations, the narrator explains,  
But there is no Messiah of Sitka.  Landsman has no home, no future, no fate but 
Bina. The land that he and she were promised was bounded only by the fringes of 
their wedding canopy, by the dog-eared corners of their cards of membership in an 
international fraternity whose members carry their patrimony in a tote bag, their 
world on the tip of the tongue. (411)   
 
Here Jewish homeland is considered apart from geopolitics, constructed entirely through the 
present of personal relationships, and determined through the materiality of objects with known, 
delimited borders—a turn to the real and the present amidst layers of fictionality.  While the 
reader knows that the Verbovers successfully carried out their attack, she does not know if they 
will otherwise succeed, return to the promised land, etc.  Even in a fantasy space, the future is 
uncertain; the only stability is offered through meaningful relationships with personal objects.  
 Enchantment in The Yiddish Policemen’s Union is not simply a return to a pre-modern 
belief system characterized by wonder or the privileging of religious zeal couched in marvel and 
mystery.  In other words, the narrative does not simply reenchant a disenchanted modernity, a 
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premise that my overall project challenges.  The Yiddish Policemen’s Union is about finding the 
middle ground between heimlich and unheimlich orientation toward life, where one is agitated 
enough to remember but not awash in suffering or the flip-side, comfort, so that one forgets.  It 
also reorients the reader toward objects over and above textuality.  Through Meyer’s recharged 
perception he has become estranged from the most reductive version of himself: “Look at 
Landsman,” the text requests,  
one shirt-tail hanging out, snow-dusted pork pie knocked to the left, coat hooked to a 
thumb over his shoulder.  Hanging on to a sky-blue cafeteria ticket as it’s the strap 
keeping him on his feet.  His cheek needs the razor.  His back is killing him.  For 
reasons he doesn’t understand – or maybe for no reason – he hasn’t had a drink of 
alcohol since nine-thirty in the morning. (146)   
 
Here Chabon invokes the reader and directs us to our own perception.  But one looks only to 
discover a clichéd version of the hard-boiled detective; in this space one fails to perceive the 
significance of the “snow-dusted pork pie,” the mark of his connection to his detective brethren 
that binds Landsman to himself, his community, and Bina.  The narrative instructs that finding 
meaning in Bina’s tote bag and Landsman’s pork-pie hat is crucial to Jewish futurity, to survival 
in a narrative of “strange times” and uncertain futures.  
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CHAPTER 4 
  
STORIES FROM A POSTMODERN CHELM: THE ABSURD LOGIC OF HISTORY IN 
THE COEN BROTHERS’ A SERIOUS MAN AND  
NATHAN ENGLANDER’S “THE TUMBLERS”  
 
“The films of the Coen brothers seem to take place in a postmodern Chelm, displaced 
chronologically and geographically”—Lee Weston Sabo, film critic 
 
“Laughter and trembling are so curiously mingled that it is not easy to determine the relations 
between the two. At times the laughter seems simply to restore the equilibrium of sanity; at times 
the figures of the story, or parable, appear to invite or encourage the trembling with the secret 
aim of overcoming it by means of laughter”—Saul Bellow, introduction to Great Jewish Short 
Stories (12) 
 
 Nathan Englander’s “The Tumblers” (1999) and the Coen brothers’ A Serious Man 
(2009) may initially seem like strange bedfellows—their genres, content, and approach to 
narrating history could not be more distinct.  But the ways in which these two texts yoke together 
humor and the grotesque to achieve a Kafkaesque sensibility, play with narrative conventions of 
diverse genres, and rely on the Yiddish trope of the schlemiel110 to question a cosmic presence in 
a post-Holocaust world, provide substantial common ground to consider their rich intersections 
and how the schlemiel survives when confronted with evil.  Of all the texts in this project, A 
                                                
110Now part of American vernacular and defined in English-language dictionaries as “an 
awkward, clumsy person, a blunderer; a ‘born loser’; a ‘dope’ or ‘drip,’” the Yiddish schlemiel 
was thought to originate in the Talmud before becoming a stock character of nineteenth-century 
Yiddish literature (such as Menahem Mendl of Sholem Aleichem’s stories), migrating to 
America through the fiction of Isaac Bashevis Singer and popularized by his short story, 
“Gimpel the Fool” (1953).  Typically, the schlemiel is naïve, weak, and bungling, but shows 
inner strength and when confronting the worst, he retains an uncanny belief that good will 
triumph over evil (Wise 5).  As Wisse notes, “the schlemiel is neither saintly nor pure, but only 
weak.  The sleight of hand of his comedy is intended to persuade us that this weakness is 
strength” (5).   
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Serious Man is least obviously connected to Holocaust representation, while “The Tumblers” 
forges a direct representational link, yet both play with the Yiddish trope of the schlemiel to 
problematize historical narratives.  Extending my analysis of narrative ontology in The Yiddish 
Policemen’s Union (2007), and objects in Great House (2010) and Everything Is Illuminated 
(2002), this chapter turns to the open-endedness of uncertainty specifically in relationship to 
Jewish literary tropes as genre-mixing continues to disrupt historical narratives.  
 In the invocation of the Chelm story and its symbols, this play with play is important to 
both the trope of the schlemiel and the genre-mixing in each text.  These texts explore how, in a 
world deprived of order and meaning, play becomes increasingly important as a mode of 
narrative as well as life.  I will continue to rely on the definition proposed by Brian Edwards, 
who argues that play is “the principle of energy and difference which unsettles arrangements, 
promotes change and resists closure” (xiii).  Play “affirms freedom and possibility against 
restriction, resignation and closure,” characterizing A Serious Man’s refusal to privilege certainty 
and “The Tumblers’” carnivalesque sensibility (Edwards 17).   
 This pair of texts shares a connection to the logic of absurdity.  In the opening to Nathan 
Englander’s short story “The Tumblers,” (2000) the narrator tells us that this story is “an absurd 
undertaking.  But then again. . . No more unbelievable than the reality from which they’d 
escaped, no more unfathomable than the magic of disappearing Jews” (99).  Similarly, Larry 
Gopnik of A Serious Man searches for meaning only to discover that we live in an absurdist 
universe.  The film questions how we are to “be good” in a world flipped inside-out, where, 
thanks to the instructive lyrics of Jefferson Airplane that come to stand in for Talmudic wisdom, 
all that we believe to be true is found to be lies.  This is a world in which the lecherous, 
hypocritical character in the image of Abel—Sy Abelman—steals the wife of a duped Cain in the 
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form of Larry Gopnik.  In life and death Abelman is honored as “a serious man,” while the 
dutiful, kind husband is mocked.   
 As critic Mark Conard summarizes, this is a world in which there is “no reliable 
relationship between good actions and good fortune or wickedness and punishment” (291).  The 
attempt to make sense of Larry Gopnik’s universe proves just as futile to understanding the 
“magic of the disappearing Jews” in “The Tumblers” (43): the nature of cosmic uncertainty is at 
stake in both texts.  What is it all for? Why are we here?  What are our choices? How are we to 
survive? the characters wonder.  While the stakes of history and the circumstances of survival 
could not be more distinct across the 1960s Jewish American suburbs and the wartime Jewish 
ghetto in which the stories are set, both texts foreground questions of how to read a world and 
determine meaning under absurd circumstances.  In neither A Serious Man nor “The Tumblers” 
are we—the reader, alongside the characters—able to pinpoint stable logic or faith.  Characters 
struggle with how to “be good” when the gauge for measuring that morality is entirely out of 
whack—Gopnik has no recourse to rational or religious affirmations; neither is the Holocaust-
inflected world of “The Tumblers” privy to proof of logic of a rational or cosmic sort.  These 
texts ask, how do Jews live and interpret the universe without recourse to reliable signs and 
modes of meaning? The mixed-genres narrative’s turn to uncertainty becomes a privileged mode 
of mediating history.  Like Chabon’s project, these texts are invested in shattering the certainty 
through which we determine histories or modes of being; however, where Chabon substitutes a 
concrete fantasy (we are reminded of the redemption of Meyer Landsman) for a plunge into the 
uncertainty, the Coen Brothers and Englander leave characters unmoored, or even disfigured by 
the chaos.  
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 Both texts are invested in a play of genre that destabilizes the various historical 
narratives invoked in each.  When film critic Lee Sabo comments that the films of the Coen 
brothers, collectively, seem to take place in a “postmodern Chelm,” he is referring to the reversal 
of logic—where wise men behave foolishly—that occurs in the landscape common to Yiddish 
folklore.  As Englander’s stories intuit four millennia later,111 for the Wise Men of Chelm, the 
flip-flopped logic was necessary for survival.  In “The Tumblers,” the narrator recounts the many 
stories passed down through the generations that testify to this logic.  One such tale details the 
events of the great sour cream shortage as the narrator notes “how Gronam had declared that 
water was sour cream and sour cream water, single-handedly saving the Feast of Weeks from 
complete and total ruin” (Englander 27).  Story after story, the seemingly haphazard foolishness 
of the Chelmites distills and disguises the unbelievable logic of the Jews’ survival.  Sabo 
explains, “Chelm served as sort of a symbolic place where all Jewish foolishness could be 
pointed at and ridiculed, and the Coens’ movie universe serves the same purpose among the 
genres they emulate and mock.”  In fact, the Coen brothers have devoted their career to 
inhabiting American genre films (Western, noir, gangster thriller, screwball comedy) and turning 
them into dark, ironic mockeries (Sabo).  The Coen brothers frequently occupy a particular genre 
or borrow from multiple genres to expose foolish tropes, relying on satire and ridicule to create 
new contexts.  
But in these texts, the insular quality of Chelm—timeless, self-contained, and usually set 
apart from history—is opened to historical narratives, and those stock characters of the fools of 
                                                
111While some scholars link the schlemiel to biblical narratives, he is most commonly thought to 
be a product of nineteenth-century Yiddishkeit. Recent work by Ruth von Bernuth suggests that 
the story of the Chelm fables actually begins not with Jewish in Poland, but with Christians in 
Germany in 1597 and the Schildburg tales (Friedman).  
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Chelm, the schlemiels, are put towards different ends.  In A Serious Man, the Chelm space posits 
historical alternatives to the 1967 narrative in which the story is set, while “The Tumblers” tests 
and exhausts the limits of the Chelmites’ logic in a post-Holocaust world.  The schlemiels of 
Jewish jokes and stories already embody the strange commensurability between fantasy tropes 
and traumatic reality.  As Wisse explains, they “are simpletons, provoking our recognition that in 
an insane world, the fool may be the only morally sane man” (Wisse 4).  Both texts play with 
genre and Chelm to stress the ways in which we must reevaluate interpretive modes.  In so doing, 
the texts reveal that the binary logic of disenchantment/enchantment is both insufficient to 
interpret ontological questions—“But WHY?” is Larry Gopnik’s signature refrain—in addition to 
proving much more aligned than dissimilar.  Placing the schlemiel and the fools of Chelm in a 
historical context illustrates the mode of enchantment that I have been developing throughout 
this project—the fantasy mode of storytelling and historical representation that “delights and 
disturbs” as it defamiliarizes historical events.   
The Postmodern Schlemiel 
 Larry Gopnik, the protagonist of A Serious Man, is a modern-day Gimpel the fool:  
cuckolded by his wife (and forced to pay for her lover’s funeral); used by his brother; bullied by 
his anti-semitic neighbor; extorted by his son (and corporate America); threatened by his failing 
student; and ignored by his rabbis (all three of them).  In one of the opening shots of the film, the 
frame perfectly captures the paradox of the bumbling brilliant professor.  From the side, we 
watch Larry scribbling across a chalkboard; the medium low-angle shot catches Larry crouching 
so awkwardly that his yogic squat, high-water length trousers, and toothy overbite signal only 
that he must be clueless.  How do we read the stock characters of Yiddish folklore—those 
foolish schlemiels—in this contemporary Chelm space?  Interested in how to situate the 
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schlemiel in a post-Holocaust world, Ruth Wisse turns to what she calls “the political potential” 
of the schlemiel.  Historically, Yiddish literature and folk culture have often relied on the 
schlemiel’s naiveté to mock what otherwise remains unbearable.  As the following joke from the 
opening of Ruth Wisse’s The Schlemiel as Modern Hero112 illustrates, the logic that was used to 
protect from harm and to confront the most difficult and otherwise insufferable things is the logic 
of the faithful simpleton, Gimpel the fool, the schlemiel.  This joke is set during the height of 
Battle of Tannenberg, fought at the start of World War I between the armies of Germany and 
Russia, at a moment when a czarist officer attempts to prepare his troops for battle (Wisse 6):  
“The moment has come!  We’re going to charge the enemy.  It’ll be man against man in 
hand to hand combat.”  
In the company was a Jewish soldier who was not fond of the czar or his war.   
“Please sir, show me my man!” he cried, “Perhaps I can come to an understanding with 
him.” (Wisse 6) 
 
 The Jewish soldier in this scenario is the quintessential schlemiel, Wisse explains; clearly 
a fool, his absurdity stems from his suggestion that reason (“an understanding”) is a logical 
weapon (Wisse 6).  The joke mocks the Jew’s foolishness but it also works to reveal that the 
impulse to fight is similarly foolish, both at odds with Jewish intellectualism and by extension, 
an insult to the czarist general’s modus operandi and the larger gentile context of which he is part.  
Thus, the Jew is mocked, but also, he is put towards subversive ends as he reveals the inanity of 
the surrounding cultural and historical context—war.  Wisse argues that the schlemiel is a 
                                                
112In The Schlemiel as Modern Hero, Wisse asks how our perception of the schlemiel, “the victor 
in defeat,” changes after the Holocaust (60).  “How does one retain the notion of psychic survival 
when its cost has been physical extinction?,” she asks (Wisse 60).  In Eastern Europe, the 
schlemiel served as a reflection of Jewish life; the shtetl Jews “saw the schlemiel’s ineptitude as 
an extended metaphor for their socioeconomic plight” (Pinsker 13).  Wisse’s argument centers 
on the distinction of the European versus the American schlemiel: whereas the European 
schlemiel’s dilemma is metaphysical, in an American context, the schlemiel knows that life is 
futile but refuses to let it suppress his joy in living (Wisse 60).  
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resilient character who suffered “vicious, unrelenting harassment” but “whose continuing ability 
to experience frustration without yielding to desperation or defeatism may be reason enough for 
winning our interest” (Wisse 4).   
 In her seminal study, Wisse thus redefines the schlemiel in terms of his transgressive 
qualities.  Locating the schlemiel’s political potential in his intransigence, she explains:113  
Outrageous and absurd as his innocence may be by the normal guidelines of 
political reality, the Jew is simply rational within the context of ideal humanism.  
He is a fool, seriously—maybe even fatally—out of step with the actual march of 
events.  Yet the impulse of the joke, and of schlemiel literature in general, is to 
use the comical stance as a stage from which to challenge the political and 
philosophical status quo. (3) 
 
This reading provides a platform from which to situate the schlemiels of the disparate texts I 
juxtapose in this chapter.  Because the Chelm of A Serious Man and “The Tumblers” is no longer 
removed from historical contexts, these twenty-first century schlemiels, and the mixed-genre 
texts of which they are part, employ (to borrow from Wisse) the comical stance as a stage from 
which to challenge historical status quo.  While Gopnik seems unable to act—“But I didn’t DO 
ANYTHING”—it is this space of inaction that closely links him to his fellow Gimpels and 
manifests the political potential of the “not yet.”  And it is play—as both a narrative mode and 
survival strategy—in “The Tumblers” that captures their desire to transcend a historical order at 
odds with their logic.   
 “Accept the Mystery:” The Play of Uncertainty in A Serious Man  
 A Serious Man opens with a prologue set in a winter shtetl of nineteenth century Europe 
(while the setting is nondescript, one critic remarks that it has the feeling of a nineteenth-century 
Poland) (Zemmelman 24).  Staged entirely in Yiddish, the scene depicts Velvel and Dora, a 
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married couple, as they try to determine whether the old Hasid Velvel has just encountered in his 
travels is or is not a dybbuk.114  The hybrid generic qualities of the opening scenes underscore the 
film’s premise to “accept the mystery,” and invocations of curses and dybbuks in the opening 
parable mysteriously spill into the film’s central frame, resonating with the evil monsters that 
populate classic horror films and Jewish folk culture, further obscuring the film’s genre.115  The 
film opens by presenting the text of a quote attributed to Rashi, “receive with simplicity 
everything that happens,” which is playfully undermined by the seriousness with which Larry 
approaches the meaning of life, God, and the universe.116 Snowflakes fall across the black night 
sky of the shot, obscuring first the sky and then the text.  The quotation coupled with the 
heaviness of the night sky masquerades as a serious worldview that is soon mocked by the 
philosophical quandaries that perplex Dora and Velvel of the parable, Larry, and the viewer.  
While at first the snowflakes fall on the viewer’s perspective from a low-angle shot, the frame 
switches to a God’s eye-view of the snow-covered village.  Thus, the film opens and at once 
signals God’s viewpoint, but the snow and the change in camera angles indicates that the viewer 
has lost a sense of perspective.  The foreignness of the first words we hear, spoken in Yiddish, 
increases the sense of mystery, while their meaning points to a cosmic uncertainty.  The rosy-
cheeked Velvel leads his horse towards his home in the blizzard, repeating the refrain, “What a 
marvel, What a Marvel,” and the language of enchantment teases the viewer amidst the 
mysterious context.  Returning from his errand selling geese late at night, a wheel falls off 
                                                
114In Jewish mythology, a dybbuk (from the Hebrew dāḇaq meaning “adhere” or “cling”) 
is an evil spirit which enters into a living person and “clings” to his soul (Jewish Virtual Library). 
 
115In fact, there are Jewish roots to the evil spirits of the horror genre.  Paul Wegener’s Der 
Golem (1914, Ger.), an adaptation of the Golem myth, is considered one of the first early horror 
films that influenced the later Frankenstein monster films of the 1930s. 
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Velvel’s cart, and as luck would have it he meets a traveler on the road who assists him, whom 
he invites for soup.   
When Dora accuses the visitor, Reb Groshkever, of being a dybbuk, his deep, sinister 
laughter foreshadows the bleak, Kafkaesque humor that follows.  The camera pans back and 
forth between Dora and Velvel in a medium shot from Groshkever’s perspective, presenting the 
alternate and gendered perspectives of Dora, who believes in dybbuks, and Velvel, who is “a 
rational man.”  Groshkover chuckles loudly and uncomfortably, his laughter peppered with 
disbelief as he shakes his head and wonders aloud at the accusations: “dybbuk?” “corpse?” Like 
Larry, Reb Groshkever is a passive spectator in the scene before him as Dora and Velvel 
represent the competing worldviews that will decide his fate; he observes the couple’s lively 
argument as they debate the circumstances of his death and whether or not he is dead or alive.  
The grotesque farce comes to a head as Dora plunges the ice pick into Groshkever’s chest and he 
staggers out, bleeding but seemingly unharmed—or is he?  Velvel chides, “Dear wife.  We are 
ruined.  Tomorrow they will discover the body.  All is lost!” And Dora responds: “Nonsense, 
Velvel. Blessed is the Lord. Good riddance to evil.” Is Groshkover a dybbuk or not? Uncertainty 
about Reb Groshkever’s fate is complicated by the seeming reality of the shtetl, which the reader 
has no way of authenticating; the fact that the scene is delivered entirely in Yiddish; and the 
mixing of farce, the grotesque, and realism.  Critics disagree over this question and debate both 
the meaning of the parable in and of itself and its relationship to the seemingly disconnected 
story that follows.  What is certain is the way in which the scene foreshadows the qualities of 
uncertainty and unresolvability that characterize the film as a whole. 
The rest of the film chronicles two weeks in the life of Larry Gopnik (Michael Stuhlbarg), 
a physics professor facing tenure review.  At the university, Larry’s department has informed 
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him that an anonymous letter-writer is attempting to sabotage his promotion.  In addition, a 
disgruntled Korean student, Clive Park (David Kang) tries to bribe Larry for a higher grade on 
his mid-term exam, and when Larry refuses, the student’s father threatens Larry with a 
defamation suit.  But Larry’s troubles at the university are just one set of dilemmas in the 
maelstrom that has recently overtaken his formerly peaceful middle-class suburban life, now 
falling apart before him.  Out of the blue, his wife Judith (Sari Lennick) asks for a divorce so that 
she can marry Sy Abelman (Fred Melamed), a self-important family friend. At home, Larry’s 
domestic life is further complicated by his brother Arthur (Richard Kind), who, unemployed, 
moves in to the Gopniks’ home.  When not at work on his magnum opus, his notebook of 
sprawling hand-scrawled signs and equations titled “The Mentaculous” (which in fact turns out 
to be pages of meaningless gibberish), Arthur can be found hogging the family’s singular 
bathroom where he drains his cyst.  As if it could get any worse, Sy and Judith suggest that Larry 
(along with Arthur) move out of the Gopniks’ home and into a seedy hotel nearby called the 
Jolly Roger.  Arthur, who has a penchant for gambling, is then arrested for sex solicitation, and 
Larry must add to the costs of his divorce attorney representation for his brother. In an ironic 
twist of schlemiel-like fate, Sy is killed in a car accident and Larry is somehow roped into paying 
for his funeral even as we discover that Sy has been the mysterious letter-writer aiming to derail 
Larry’s promotion.  And as if it really could not get any worse, in the last scene Larry receives a 
call from the doctor that confirms his worst suspicions— it is cancer, probably, but not certainly.  
In the final frame of the film, as Larry assesses his mounting debt he caves to the financial 
pressure and finally takes action and changes Clive’s grade from an F to a C-.  Just as he erases 
the grade, a tornado blows into town and heads directly for Danny’s Hebrew school as the 
children evacuate.        
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 In A Serious Man, intertextual play is left ambiguously open-ended, both overdetermined 
(specific textual resonances are obviously indicated) and underdetermined (there is no clear way 
to read or evaluate the textual precursors that so obviously appear).  This section explores the 
mixed-genre quality of the film as a way to position the theme of liminality.  Coupled with the 
schlemel’s inaction, this space of in-betweenness problematizes essentialist dogmas—religious, 
countercultural, historical—and encourages the viewer to occupy a space of uncertainty.  Like 
History, counterculture is a meta-discourse all the same, one that whole-heartedly rejects the 
concept of culture.  And as Larry comes to discover, any single mode of thought, whether it be 
quantum physics or religion, is sufficient proof for our existence; in Larry’s ontological quest, 
both scientific inquiry and conventional religion are both found lacking.  The only way forward 
is to “accept the mystery,” as Mr. Park says to Larry, both affirming and denying the possibility 
of the cash bribe Clive leaves on Larry’s desk.       
This strange both/and quality defines both the hermetic, ahistorical quality of the Coen 
brothers’ film and their obsessive recreation of suburban Minneapolis.  Most critics tend to 
discount the Coen brothers’ films as altogether ahistorical.  Commentators like Emanuel Levy 
lament that their films are “detached from contemporary concerns and lack social relevance” 
which is a direct result of “their creating sealed universes that have few references outside the 
world of cinema” (qtd. in Adams 2).  But there is something of a paradox at play as Adams refers 
to their films as remarkably “a-historical” and “period films” obsessed with re-creating the past.  
In A Serious Man, this paradox comes into crisp focus topically, as the film is about the 1960s 
and Jews—two subjects that are seemingly impossible to divorce from questions of history—yet 
set in a suburban enclave that is apparently immune to the political climate of both present and 
past.  In the context of A Serious Man and the “new freedoms” of the 1960s, Larry’s cry—“But I 
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didn’t DO ANYTHING”—is both perversely ahistorical and potentially historical, even political.  
As a schlemiel, Larry both resists the countercultural movement (because he fails to act), where 
this failure reflects the movement’s ideological pull as just another false sign of ontological 
certainty.  While some historical narratives of the 1960s are directly invoked, particularly the 
“new freedoms” (quoted or invoked directly by many of the characters), drug culture (Larry’s 
son is rarely present independently of smoking pot), and psychedelic rock (Jimi Hendrix and 
Jefferson Airplane are intricately woven into the plot), many key narratives are conspicuously 
absent: the U.S. involvement in Vietnam, the Six-Day War (an absence all the more obvious 
given the Jewish content of the film), mounting racial tensions and race riots breaking out across 
the U.S. (including Minneapolis), and ongoing Cold War-tensions.  Absent are the familiar 
monikers of the decade, like Summer of Love, Swinging Sixties, and Decade of Disillusionment.  
Their absence is all the more conspicuous through Larry’s quest for meaning and context, 
especially as we would expect Larry’s metaphysical questions to evoke the period’s cultural and 
ideological upheaval: Why is this happening to me? What does it mean? What do I do? What are 
my choices?    
While Sabo’s remark about the Coens’ oeuvre’s likeness to a postmodern Chelm does not 
specifically refer to A Serious Man, if there is a geographic location that resonates most sharply 
with Chelm it must be the Minnesota of the Coens’ youth, which  serves as the backdrop to a 
number of their films (Fargo; No Country for Old Men).  Just as paradox is key to the logic of 
Chelm, it is central to A Serious Man, and in fact signaled in one of the opening scenes of the 
film that immediately invokes the paradoxical logic of Chelm and frames Larry as a schlemiel. 
Larry is finishing up a lecture on Schrödinger’s paradox, scribbling awkwardly on the 
chalkboard as he turns and affirms to his class, “Right?  Am I right? Is the cat dead, or is the cat 
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not dead?” It is in the confusing language we detect the affirmation—“Right”—of the 
uncertainty paradox that sets up the logic of the entire film.  Designed by Austrian physicist 
Erwin Schrödinger in 1935, Schrödinger's paradox (or Schrödinger's cat) illustrates the nature of 
wave particles in quantum mechanics. In this famous experiment, a cat is placed in steel box with 
a Geiger counter, a vial of poison, and a radioactive substance (Kramer et al.).  When the 
radioactive substance decays (and there is no way to predict when this will happen), the Geiger 
senses it and triggers the release of the poison, which then kills the cat (Kramer et al.).  The cat’s 
fate is linked directly to whether or not the atom has decayed, but the paradox is that until the 
box is opened, the observer is unsure whether the cat is alive or dead and must treat the cat as if 
it is doing all possible things (Kramer et al.).  That is, the cat must be assumed to be alive or dead 
at the same time, which Larry sums up for the class in the form of his rhetorical statement 
(another form of paradox—a question that does not require an answer).  Attention to the 
uncertainty paradox illustrates one of the key critiques, voiced by Weber himself, of the 
enchantment/disenchantment binary—that science in and of itself is mysterious and 
enchanting—and the affirmation of Larry’s faith in the proof of mathematics, which I will return 
to later, is immediately undercut.  In addition, the liminal state of the cat, its potential to be 
both/and before we open the box, is also invoked the threshold or liminal spaces of the film.  As 
a schlemiel, Larry’s passivity and his recourse to inaction also reside in a space that is both/and, 
mediating against determining or fixing possible historical outcomes; because nothing has been 
done, all possibilities are still at play—just like the (dead) cat.  
Narratives of quantum physics, alongside the opening parable, cue the viewer in to the 
multiplicity of narrative ontologies that characterize A Serious Man.  The mixing of uncertainty 
and mathematics, Job and Larry, fantasy and reality, Chelm and 1967 Minnesota extends 
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questions of potentiality, underscoring the myriad directions that Larry’s life (and its context) 
could take.  Like Chabon’s The Yiddish Policemen’s Union, the Coen brothers’ films defy easy 
categorization and are packed with various stylistic and narrative structures.  As Palmer 
comments, “all Coen films are adaptations of other texts, from which are confected diegetic 
worlds, or perhaps better, ontological modes that usually engage complex intertexts” (57).  
Michael Chabon’s hybrid genre in the form of the novel—and the way this play critically places 
his work in the space of the “no man’s land” between generic forms—comes closest to 
describing the generic hybridity and ontological play of horror, farce, fantasy, and realism in the 
film.  Across the Coen brothers’ oeuvre, narrative ontologies are in constant tension but no single 
mode is privileged.  Aligning the Jobian character with quantum physics, the film’s mixing of 
ontology mocks Larry’s quest to locate proof of Hashem’s existence.     
Sometimes described in terms of their “neo-noir”117 sensibility, which is in part a hybrid 
of noir characteristics from the 1940s and 1950s, the Coens’ filmmaking consistently pursues 
inconsistency rather than developing a singular hybrid genre over time.  As Adams summarizes, 
“the Coens prefer to work in impersonal generic forms, changing styles with each new film” and 
thus, “one of the few consistent patterns in their development as filmmakers has been a desire to 
do something different in each film” (2).  The pattern of “certain uncertainty” thus defines both 
the formalist and thematic elements of A Serious Man.  But as Robert C. Sickels (2008) insists, 
“any discussion of the Coens’ work must start with an examination of genre classification, as all 
of their films are firmly rooted in one or more traditional genres” (116).  As Carolyn Russell 
echoes, their world “utilizes a mesmerizing amalgamation of generic paradigms,” imparting to 
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their films an entertaining quality of “postmodern bricolage” and “fervid absurdism” (42-4).118
 In one A Serious Man delivers its Kafka-inflected message by way of Jewish folklore and 
biblical narratives.  According to Adams, the Coens’ style is quintessentially Bakhtinian in 
nature,119 and a key element of the film’s hybridity is thus the mixing of literary and cinematic as 
their films display the dual influences of film noir and pulp fiction (Adams 8).  The dark comic 
visitation of Reb Groschkover that opens the film notably reflects the parabolic writings of Franz 
Kafka, an influence that marks almost all of the Coens’ films (Adams 183).120 Adams explains 
the particular resonances between Josef K., the protagonist of The Trial, and Gopnik, as he 
remarks that Josef K. too is a “serious man,” one who seeks knowledge of the court and 
justification for his trial (185).  The convoluted bureaucracy, however, precludes Josef K.’s 
learning the truth, just as the Gopniks’ search for the truth to Hashem’s logic proves futile.  The 
Trial and A Serious Man share the same structure, where an allegorical parable precedes the 
longer, central narrative.  If Kafka’s parable “Before the Law” (the precursor to The Trial) 
instructs that the human mind is unable to comprehend truth, which cannot be communicated in 
ordinary, rational terms but may only be perceived when illustrated in the form of the parable 
(Adams 185), then the Coens complicate this concept through the play of the opening parable, 
itself a lesson in uncertainty, and its unstable connections to the rest of the film.  In A Serious 
                                                
118This includes but is not limited to the prison movie genre, the crime docudrama, apocalyptic 
science fiction/horror, the slapstick/screwball, comedy of manners, romantic comedy, the 
criminal-couple subgenre, and social satire (Redmon xii). 
 
119In Dialogic Imagination, Bakhtin examines the “intentional dialogized hybrid,” a pastiche 
within which a mixture of “languages and styles actively and mutually illuminate one another” 
(76). 
 
120The Coens have admitted to introducing a “Kafka break” into their films, which often 
surprises viewers as it veers away from the main plot line without warning (Adams 183). 
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Man, the parable-narrative structure renders commensurate disparate experiences of absurdity: 
the horror of shtetl life and the uncertain fate of the dybbuk is no more absurd than life in a 1967 
middle-class suburban Jewish community, albeit we are conditioned to think differently.   
The biblical intertext is on display at various points throughout the film.  Larry is clearly 
Jobian, and through his perils the viewer is reminded of how Job withstands tremendous torment, 
physical pain, and loss of his family and wealth, only to ponder the injustice of God as he allows 
wicked people to prosper and the innocent to suffer.  (Also, Gopnik and Abelman’s relationship 
resonates with the story of Cain and Abel, and Mrs. Samsky’ s nude sunbathing tempts Gopnik 
just as Batsheva tempts King David).  Larry’s assimilated middle-class lifestyle of course 
parallels Job’s comfortable status.  But Sanford Pinsker and Harry Moore remind us that while 
Job is perhaps schlimazl, he is not a schlemiel, the difference being that while the schlimazl is not 
responsible for his bad luck (indeed Job’s circumstances are directly charged to God), the 
bungling schlemiel, in part, is (9; 2).  Job is also more active than Gopnik—the bulk of the 
biblical Job story is composed of Job arguing with three friends as they contemplate Job’s 
afflictions and disparage God’s injustice, and while Larry visits three rabbis, symbolizing the 
three friends, he is much more a passive listener than a skilled rhetor.   
In fact, Larry barely gains permission for an audience with each one, and even that effort 
is stalled.  Larry wants to see the wisest, oldest Rabbi Marshak first, but instead is forced to visit 
them—Rabbi Scott, Rabbi Nachner, and Rabbi Marshak—in the order of youngest and least 
experienced to oldest and most devout.  As the rabbis provide mini-lessons attesting to the 
complexity of God’s decision-making, the advice only becomes more obscure before it reaches 
silence: Rabbi Marshak refuses to see Larry as he is busy “thinking.”  The rabbis remind him that 
it is presumptuous of Larry even to try to understand God and that the best he can hope for is to 
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“help others,” Rabbi Nachner counsels.  In the biblical story, God finally interrupts out of 
whirlwind to reveal Job’s limited power in the face of God’s limitless omnipotence; he belittles 
Job’s complaints, and when Job submits to God’s power, his livelihood is replenished.  The 
tornado that threatens Danny’s Hebrew school as the film closes parallels the biblical whirlwind.  
However, unlike in the biblical narrative, God does not respond to Larry in A Serious Man.  
We may not know how to decipher the parable, exactly, in relation to the film, but maybe 
that’s not the point.  All along, the film teases Larry and the viewer with the interpretive power 
of signs—of which genre tropes may be the most obvious—only to show their limitations and 
failures.  In this way, A Serious Man becomes a sort of inversion of Susan Sontag’s camp 
sensibility; while equally invested in parody, where camp takes the mundane or frivolous 
seriously, A Serious Man renders frivolous any attempts to live or render meaning seriously.  The 
film mocks Larry’s attempts to grasp stable meanings, and further ironizes these efforts through 
the instability of signs.  Larry’s brother Arthur’s “Mentaculous,” for example, a complex and 
cryptic mathematical equation that constitutes Arthur’s life’s work, is supposedly “a probability 
map of the universe,” but amounts to little more than nonsensical doodling and scribbles.  When 
Sy Abelman visits Larry to discuss his interest in marrying Judith, he instructs Larry that the 
recent events (namely his coupling with Judith) “are signs and tokens.” Waving a bottle of wine 
under Larry’s nose as a “peace offering,” he closes in a few imposing inches from Larry’s face, 
instructs him to “open the wine, let it breathe,” and hugs him so tightly that in this moment Larry 
lacks for air.  Peace offerings are clearly not to be trusted and we will never know the fate of the 
dybbuk.  But through the homage to Kafka’s own parable-mixing, what we do know that is that 
parable as an interpretive mode alongside the rational must mean something—and that one, 
independent of the other, is insufficient.  This is reinforced by the parallel structure of Larry’s 
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lecture on Schrödinger’s paradox, which is part fable and part math.  When a disgruntled Clive 
shows up in Larry’s office for his failing grade on the midterm, Clive claims to have understood 
the parable of Schrödinger’s paradox, but not the math.  Larry stresses, “you cannot do physics 
without mathematics.”  Clive responds, “but I understand the physics.  I understand the dead cat,” 
to which Larry responds, “you can’t really understand the physics, without understanding the 
math, the math tells how it really works—that’s the real thing—the stories I give you in class are 
just illustrative, they’re like fables, say, to help give you a picture.”  Larry scoffs, “I don’t even 
understand the dead cat.”  Like Clive, Larry’s singular worldview misses the mark, revealing that 
recourse to either/or—fable or math—is seemingly limited.     
 The film’s dark humor and affinities to horror (a genre intimately connected to the 
fantastic) also underscore these hybrid, paradoxical interpretive frameworks.  A.O. Scott of The 
New York Times described A Serious Man as written and structured like a farce, and shot and 
edited like a horror film.  The combination of farce and horror brings together the cousins of fear 
and laughter in homage to Kafka and invokes Saul Bellow’s famous categorization of the 
“laughter and trembling” of Jewish humor (12).  As Sabo remarks, “the Coens hardly see a 
difference between horror and farce, and if they do, A Serious Man has them in such balance that 
it’s impossible to separate them.”  The aesthetics of horror infiltrate the many scenes that 
position Larry amidst shadows and sharp lighting contrasts, often occurring at night or at dawn; 
the deep sonic booms that accompany scene shifts; askew camera angles;121 or the painfully slow 
shots that zoom-in on long hallways, building suspense and mirroring Larry’s perspective of 
uncertainty as he attempts to figure out causes of events.  
                                                
121A notable example is the angle that frames Larry’s reaction to the parable of the Goy’s teeth. 
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 The hetereogeneity of the horror genre has led to conflicting positions over its cinematic 
devaluation, but nevertheless some representations of the genre remain lodged in debates over 
“low status” (Jancovich 152).  Part of this low status is due to its affinity to fantasy.  As Robin 
Wood explains in his seminal essay on the genre, “the clearly fantastical nature of many horror 
plots presents a problem: fantasy is often seen as mere escapism, a refusal to deal with ‘reality’, 
and hence inherently unserious,” a problem frequently addressed by the psychoanalytic turn as a 
way to “reinvest horror with seriousness” (Jancovich 22).  In this way A Serious Man comes to 
mock not only the seriousness with which Larry attempts to determine meaning in his life, but 
also, perhaps the attempt to construct serious art.   
 If, as Jason Mittell argues, genre is a “cultural category” that defines cosmologies of 
human experience, then we should read seriously the interplay of horror and farce that the 
parable introduces (xiv).  As Palmer summarizes, “the conventions of noir serve as ‘a readymade 
set of coordinates for texts that can then respectfully repeat, cannibalize, transform, or subvert 
those conventions in some fashion, thus utilizing the ‘already said’ to say something new” (47).  
Placing the horror genre in a wider context, Worland notes, “the horror genre typically confronts 
universal philosophical and moral questions about human mortality and the nature of evil; 
emphasizes the psychological processes reflected in or stimulated by frightening narratives; and 
may suggest allegories of contemporary social and political ideology (3).  The film relies on the 
schlemiel to reveal the horror of mundane suburban life or the price of inclusion in a 
conservative Jewish community: the petty harassment by Dick Dutton of the Columbia Record 
Club, for example.  A Serious Man is not just “shot” like a horror film, but also invokes horror 
thematically in its recourse to Larry’s nightmares, vulnerability, alienation, and the irrational bad 
luck in which he is somehow partially at fault.  As Kawin suggests, “the horror film can bring 
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uncomfortably close the worst that could ever happen—to a character or to ourselves” (2).  By 
relying on Worland’s conceptualization of horror as a context in which to understand the farce, 
the film presents the horror of the banality of middle-class Jewish suburbia in the 1960s, isolated 
and alienated from the lively context of social change.122 
 One example of generic code-switching occurs just after the parable in the opening 
sequence.  When the parable switches to Danny’s Hebrew school classroom in Saint Louis Park, 
Missouri, the shift first marks an uncertain relationship between the parable’s relationship to the 
rest of the film—is Saint Louis Park just a 1960s shtetl facing the same philosophical 
quandaries? The film provides no clear answer, instead privileging the mode of play as a way to 
connect the parable with the rest of the film. Like the opening shots obscured by the snow, as the 
scene switches to St. Louis Park of 1967 the viewer again loses her sense of orientation.  The 
close-up shot travels down a pitch-black tunnel and the beginning of Jefferson Airplane’s music 
beats loudly.  As the shot zooms out from a spec on Danny’s tiny earphone, we realize we have 
been traveling through his ear canal as he listens to his radio; to further shake up our frame of 
reference, the scene cuts to a close-up of a doctor inspecting Larry’s ear canal somewhere across 
town.  In the sterilized space of the doctor’s office, the music abruptly stops; in contrast, the 
hums of the doctor’s office are magnified (the crinkle of the exam table paper, the whir of the 
medical imaging machine).  Both stylistically and thematically, ambiguity and multiplicity 
unfold.  The Hebrew school teacher paces the room and conjugates the verb sequence, “Ani 
                                                
122And while there is arguably little of the graphic violence or grotesque trauma that we 
customarily expect from horror in A Serious Man, the film much more subtly suggests themes 
attuned to the horror of bodily decay and mortality.  I am thinking particularly of the close-up 
shots of the ear hair of the elderly principal who inspects Danny’s transistor radio; the dead deer 
strapped to the top of the anti-Semitic neighbor’s car; and most notably, the close-up shots (and 
gurgling sounds) of the machine that drains Arthur’s sebaceous cyst.     
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holechet a baiyta,” (“I go home,” “you go home,” etc.).123  Like the Yiddish in previous scenes, 
the Hebrew phrases, left untranslated and without subtitles, add to the viewer’s confusion.  
Searching for someone to conjugate, the teacher asks, “Me Yodeah?” (“Who knows?”) stopping 
beside Rivka’s desk.  “Rivka, At Osa? (Do you know?),” he asks, but Rivka has no idea, and in 
fact, even her uncertainty is punctuated incorrectly as the teacher must correct her response “Ani 
lo yodeah (I don’t know/masculine)” to the grammatically correct feminine ending, “Ani lo 
yodahaat (I don’t know/feminine).”  Not knowing is both the subject of communication and 
denotes the confused mode of communication.  Across town in the doctor’s office, the viewer 
wonders if this is a routine checkup or if something might be really wrong.  From the opening 
scenes, the film relies toys with the assumptions of human knowledge and understanding, which 
will in turn comment on how we have come to know and understand the historical decade the 
film distills.      
The logic of the disparate scenes is linked through association as the sequence continues 
to cut back and forth.  A medium shot with a focus on a sleepy student’s eyes glazed over in the 
Hebrew school classroom, for example, corresponds to a close-up shot of Larry’s physician 
inspecting his eyes.  The question of whether something is seriously wrong with Larry’s health is 
transposed onto the scene in the classroom; in what sense might culture—Jewish, insular—be 
diseased?  As Larry’s doctor inspects and prods, the elderly teacher in the adjacent scene makes 
an unusual discovery that highlights the shocking disjunction of old and new.  As the elderly 
teacher discovers that Danny is listening to his transistor radio and the class erupts into chaos, 
the camera stays focused on the teacher’s reaction, “Ma Zeh? Ma Zeh? Ma Zeh?”  Translating to 
                                                
123All translations my own. 
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“what’s this?,”124 the teacher’s reaction, the repetition of the question in Hebrew, is less a 
comment on Danny’s transgression during class than the nature of the new technology itself 
disrupting ancient (and now irrelevant) modes of Jewish expression or the tradition of sending 
one’s child to Hebrew school to prepare for his or her bar mitzvah.   
The transistor radio comes to illuminate the generational divide, the cultural rift, and the 
general dis-ease between old and new as we see Danny sitting across from an even older man in 
the principal’s office, the transistor radio placed on the desk between them.  It’s clear the 
principal is intrigued with the device, and not knowing how it works, Danny leans forward, about 
to speak up to instruct—but as he opens his mouth the principal barks, “EVREEET!,” meaning 
that Danny may only speak if he communicates in Hebrew, and Danny sits back, silent and 
defeated.  The degree to which the new technology befuddles the elderly instructor corresponds 
to the strangeness of learning Hebrew for Danny and his classmates.  As the principal figures out 
how to use the radio, the close-up shot of the earphone in the principal’s ear mirrors the earlier 
close-up that introduced us to Danny; but barred from communicating, the two sit, in silence, 
estranged from one another and the common experience—Jefferson Airplane—that defines this 
particular historical moment.   
The sounds of the doctor’s exam room (squeaky chair; doctor’s dubious “hmm)), the odd, 
incorrect Hebrew of the religious school classroom, and stilted conversation in the principal’s 
office offer a corrective to universal brotherly love—in this community, no one seems to get one 
another.  The cutting highlights the overall instability of the film and characters’ isolation.  The 
directors have inserted a universal narrative of 1960s culture into an uncertain, unstable frame; 
                                                
124With the exception of the English subtitles in the opening parable, none of the Yiddish or 
Hebrew words are translated for the viewer. 
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the message of Jefferson Airplane is not communicated cross-generationally, but rather, only 
experienced through the isolation of the individual.  This lack of community in experience is 
reinforced by the individual and parallel shots of a single ear—one young, one old and hairy— 
listening through the earbud.  
 In addition to the specific reflections on cultural narratives, the liminal spaces of genre in 
the film in the sequences that blur the distinction between dreaming and reality reflect a reality 
that very well could be not what it seems.  Before the dreams are revealed to be dreams, these 
sequences trick the viewer into thinking events may have turned out differently; the enchantment 
of genre-mixing indicates that perhaps the distinctions between dreaming and reality are less 
stark than we think.  As Edwards reminds us, the fictional is used to show that “the actual world 
is more inconclusive, more open to refigurings, discoveries and new combinations than it is 
sometimes held to be.  Complex and heterogeneous, it invites and resists attempts at settlement” 
(260).  Likewise, Doreen Maitre writes that when the fictional presents worlds which in part 
invite us to mistake them for the actual, these spaces “make us aware of both the continuities and 
the discontinuities between the actual and the possible” (qtd. in Edwards 260).  Horror films are 
frequently cited for developing this trope as they break down clear distinctions between the 
waking world and the dream world (Worland 33).  And as Adams points out tropes of “sudden 
shifts from the real to the unreal” are common occurrences in Kafka’s stories, where waking and 
dreaming are often “indistinguishable and interchangeable” (183).   
In the first dream, a close-up shot once again finds Larry teaching, and this time frames 
Larry’s hand as he verbalizes the final steps of a complicated equation—Heisenberg’s 
uncertainty principle.  Because the viewer immediately recalls the earlier scene of Larry 
teaching, she immediately registers this scene, too, as part of the film’s reality.  Thus, “the 
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process of presupposition and reversal” that is characteristic of Kafka’s writings (Adams 183) is 
directly transposed onto the film and the viewer’s assumption of reality is undermined when she 
learns it was a dream.125  Punctuated in a tone of frustration, Larry’s voice echoes, “the 
uncertainty principle. It proves that we can’t ever really know what’s going on.”  As he makes 
this assertion, the perspective shifts to a high-angle long shot of Larry, his small frame 
diminished by the huge scale of the chalkboard crammed with graphs and equations.  “But even 
though you can’t figure anything out, you will be responsible for it on the midterm,” Larry calls 
out as the students file out, leaving only Sy Abelman in his baby blue golf attire staring down 
and with authority at Larry.  It is at this point that Sy’s clothes, the same he wears en route to the 
golf course when he makes the impetuous left turn that kills him, signal that this cannot, in fact, 
be happening.  The camera cuts back and forth between Sy (high angle medium shot) and Larry 
(medium close-up), as Sy lectures Larry on the futility of mathematical proof for deciphering 
“this world”:  
 “Now I can see that it’s subtle, clever, but at the end of the day, is it convincing?” 
“Well yes it’s convincing, it’s a proof. It’s mathematics.” 
“Now excuse me, mathematics is the art of the possible.” 
“Eeeh I don’t think so. The art of the possible, that’s” and Larry squeezes one eye shut as 
he trails off, thinking, “I can’t remember, that’s something else.” 
“I’m a serious man, Larry.” 
“I know that, so if I’ve got it wrong.” 
 
                                                
125Like this scene, two additional dream scenes are seamlessly integrated into the film before the 
viewer belatedly realizes they are part of Larry’s nightmares, and as they violate the tenets of 
reality, they also point to spaces where transgressed behaviors are sanctioned: In the second 
dream, Larry is having sex with the bohemian neighbor Mrs. Samsky; in the final dream, Larry 
sends Arthur off in a Canoe, on his way to a peaceful refuge in Canada with Clive’s cash bribe 
before the anti-Semitic neighbor (from a hiding spot in the woods) first murders Arthur, then 
Larry.   
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“So simple, see Marshak,” Sy retorts with another dismissive wave of the hand, as if he is talking 
to an imbecile.  The conversation quickly devolves into Sy’s pummeling Larry into the 
chalkboard and screaming at him to see Marshak when Larry wakes up in a cold sweat, breathing 
heavily, in the Jolly Roger to the sound of Arthur’s machine as he drains his cyst in the bathroom. 
Like Schrödinger’s paradox, the equation casts doubt on knowledge and enchants 
disenchantment as it explains the imprecise nature of knowledge according to quantum physics, 
the moment when position and momentum cannot be determined simultaneously.  The already 
unstable dreamscape similarly reveals the imprecise nature of knowledge. Sy Abelman’s 
wagging hand gesture to something else at work “in this world,” something that the proof of 
mathematics or all of quantum physics fails to fully grasp.  It is not mathematics that is the art of 
the possible, but “politics,” as Otto von Bismarck, German Chancellor from 1871-1890, 
famously stated.  The slippage between mathematics and politics mocks Larry’s faith in this 
mode of “proof” as it marks the space between what Larry thinks he can calculate and what is 
beyond his control.126  Perhaps this something else is the Hashem that Larry so desperately 
wishes to reach, but the shot that showcases Larry’s diminutive body in front of the vast equation 
emphasizes the hubris underlying Larry’s entitlement to knowledge—whether by calculation or 
otherwise.  The off-kilter proportions and failed interpretive frameworks, expressed in an already 
unstable dream space, indicate that our recourse to science or religion is also flawed and unstable.  
                                                
126In Heidegger’s gloss on this famous line, he explains that “possibility” denotes not chance but 
destiny imposed from above.  Heidegger explains, “What is meant by possibility, here, is not just 
any one, that might be thought up by chance, but the one possible, the only possible.  Politics for 
Bismarck is the capacity to see and achieve what must spring forth of essential necessity from a 
historical situation . . . ” Politics results not from freedom of choice but exists as “the sole 
possible” that must “by essence and necessity spring from a historical situation” (Faye 129).  
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And the strange commensurability of the dream sequence (the fantastic) and the real enchants 
and arrives at this paradoxical truth.     
Larry may play the fool, but there is still meaning to be gleaned from his pathetic failings.  
Wisse reminds us that the schlemiel is “out of step with the actual march of events,” but 
following Wisse’s argument, this does not necessarily make him politically or historically 
irrelevant (3).  The schlemiel’s recourse to inaction (non-military) rather than overt resistance 
(anti-military) constitutes the schlemiel’s political grounds, meaning that “the responses [of the 
schlemiel in the military jokes] are not in the spirit of conscious rebellion, but the naïve, wholly 
spontaneous question of a different culture” (Wisse 4).  The quintessential schlemiel inaction is 
of course exemplified by Larry’s plea, often screamed out in a desperate naiveté: “BUT I 
DIDN’T DO ANYTHING!”  And once again, paradoxically, Larry might be closer to some 
version of the truth than it appears; being “out of step with the march of events” signals 
possibilities, potentialities, the both/and of Schrödinger’s paradox.  
Regarding the historical narratives that fail to appear, A Serious Man is remarkable for its 
juxtaposition of Larry Gopnik’s pathetic failings to act (“BUT I DIDN’T DO ANYTHING!”) 
with a decade of revolutionary social change—of which Gopnik remains alienated.  Larry’s baby 
boomer brethren and their Jewish, Midwestern enclave represent a doubly alienated, insular 
community at odds with the revolutionary counterculture signaled by the film’s recourse to 
music and drugs.  The historical narratives that are present noticeably lack political context, a 
message that is often delivered through the play of different filmic elements.  For example, the 
music of Jimi Hendrix is heard not as the backdrop to the sixties Zeitgeist but rather as a 
strangely accurate (the beats of the music punctuate the plot as Nachner tells it) non-diegetic 
melody that accompanies Rabbi Nachner’s meaningless story of the goy’s teeth.  The 
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countercultural music scene turns capitalist as Larry dodges and eventually must answer calls 
from the annoying Dick Dutton.  The emissary of the Columbia Record Club leaves Larry 
countless messages requesting payment for records like Santana Abraxas (1970), as underground 
rock becomes above ground and corporatized (it turns out that Danny has signed up for the 
service without Larry’s knowledge).  He receives this calls in the form of messages taken by his 
secretary at the University, a dynamic that points to conventional gender norms in another space 
that has been stripped of any political potential and instead delivered in a sanitized, ahistorical 
frame.    
The generational clash of the opening sequence that I previously mentioned persists 
throughout the film and is exemplified by the futuristic sound of the new age rock of the Santana 
Abraxas (1970) album in contrast to the sadly melodic music of a Yiddish past.  Mark 
Warshavskhy’s (1845-1907) “Dem Milners Trern” plays in the background during a brief 
moment of respite as Larry relaxes in his living room with his brother Arthur.  Larry may be 
fatally “out of step with the actual march of events,” but, following Wisse, the schlemiel instructs 
that we may need to adjust our perception of the events in the first place (Wisse 3).    
 One of the ways in which the film gestures to alternative perceptions of history is through 
the constant positioning of Larry in liminal spaces, on the cusp of tenure, for example, in 
doorframes, or in the shadows.127  The idea of a postmodern schlemiel further captures the sense 
of outsiderhood embedded in the liminal.  In a film that is already situated between genres, 
Larry’s tsuris makes him an outsider even to his own Jewish community.  Like the function of 
liminality in Chabon’s Yiddish Policemen’s Union, liminality also encapsulates the film’s 
                                                
127The fact that Larry’s son is about to be a bar mitzvah gestures to the ritual processes that are 
part of Turner’s conceptualization of liminality. 
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existence “betwixt-and-between” genres, a “neither this-nor-that domain” (Turner 40).  I am 
referring to the sense of the liminal as it relates to Victor Turner’s interest in the seriousness of 
human play, where limen, which stems from the Latin for “threshold” (41), indicates “an 
interval, however brief, of margin or limen, when the past is momentarily negated, suspended or 
abrogated, and the future has not yet begun, an instant of pure potentiality when everything, as it 
were, trembles in the balance” (44).  The schlemiel, by not acting, by playing the fool, inhabits a 
realm of “in-between” where anything is possible; or, in the logic of Schrödinger’s paradox, we 
have not yet opened the box, and so the cat is both dead and not dead.  All possibilities are still at 
play.  Philip Neel reads the concept of historical contingency through Larry’s individual agency.  
He remarks that the “superpositional crux points” indicate the moments in the film where, “if 
Gopnik had chosen to act, he could have altered the outcome of events. . . but throughout, the 
directors are hinting at the chance that at each point, things could have gone differently” (173).128   
 Extending Neel’s reading of the “super positional crux points” to the wider political 
context or the “ahistorical” frame means thinking through Larry’s inaction in relation to the 
absence of historical references and similar to the threshold space in which he finds himself as 
the threshold spaces of history.  Like the dream sequences, these threshold spaces tests our own 
process “of presupposition and reversal” that occurs with our knowledge of history (Adams 183).  
Most relevant to the film’s Jewish context is the cusp of the 1967 six-day war that will take place 
in June, but also the beginning of the Vietnam conflict and the presence of American troops in 
South Vietnam; or even the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and the rise of civil 
                                                
128Neel makes this comment in passing in a larger argument centered on the somewhat strange 
and tangential connection of Gopnik’s state of mind to Dominic Fox’s idea of “militant 
consciousness” and the artistic potentiality of a depressive state of mind. 
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unrest that would occur in April, 1968.  But in A Serious Man, this history still has the potential 
to unfold.         
The threshold spaces in which Larry is physically staged throughout the film reinforce 
this sense of in-betweenness as he desperately searches for meaningful signs through which to 
interpret his life.  A number of scenes position Larry in or near doorways as if to emphasize 
various possibilities behind what we would otherwise read as the doomed fate of the schlemiel.  
That is, lurking in the liminal is a sense of historical contingency that has larger repercussions for 
the somewhat ahistorical film as a whole.  The entire narrative of Larry’s tenure review is staged 
with Arlon leaning against the frame of Larry’s office doorway, emphasizing the precarity of his 
status in the university.  A few of the doorway scenes interestingly gesture to potentially 
transgressive behaviors.  After he converses with Mrs. Samsky, who remains partially obscured 
from view behind her screen door, Larry partakes of the “new freedoms,” smokes a joint, and 
dreams of having sex with his neighbor.  Similarly, Larry protects Arthur from the police when 
he is wanted for sex solicitation; they wait somewhat impatiently outside Larry’s front door as 
the Gopniks sit shiva for Sy Abelman.  These scenarios all gesture to the threshold space as one 
in which Larry’s character is tested, signaling the larger anthropological conception of the limen 
as a period in which one’s identity is at stake (80).           
 The doorframes and liminal spaces of the film’s aesthetic enclose Larry, physically, and 
gesture towards the space outside the film’s formalist universe.  Besides the music of Jefferson 
Airplane, considered a pioneer of counterculture-era psychedelic rock, there are few references 
to the historical “outside” that contextualize the backdrop of 1967.  Tyree writes,  
In the 1967 world depicted in A Serious Man . . . we see the satirical television 
war comedy F Troop, but the escalating war in Vietnam gets no air time.  This 
absence of history itself could be read not so much as a flaw than as a gap that 
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forms an acid comment about the dreamlike detachment of Middle America from 
any consciousness of what’s happening in the wider world. (39)   
 
J.M. Tyree’s attention to the film’s ahistoricity leads him to conclude that the film is a revision 
of sixties ideology and “the liberating perspective of social change,” instead presenting a 
counter-mythology to the 1960s and “ripostes to Baby Boomer self-congratulation” (33).  But 
Tyree does not state what this counter-mythology is, exactly, and I would disagree that the film 
is wholly ahistorical. Tyree does not account for the open-endedness of the schlemiel’s 
potentiality as a reflection of historical possibility that has yet to unfold.  It is not just Middle 
America that is detached, but its Jews as the emblem of Middle America.  With the exception of 
the Gopniks’ neighbors (and they are the token anti-Semites), everyone they know is Jewish.  
Larry sees a Jewish doctor, hires a Jewish lawyer, and socializes with members of his Shul.  
Even Arlon, his colleague at the university, is Jewish and a member of the congregation, just as 
the dentist and the criminal attorney are.  The ethnic particularity of the Minnesotan enclave is 
comically insular; except in this detachment that Tyree pinpoints we find an entire population of 
schlemiels—a liminal people living in the threshold of Middle America—and perhaps also a 
wider context through which to challenge our perception of the status quo.  
One of the most prominent absent narratives in the film is America’s involvement in 
Vietnam; the absent politics become present through the narrative that defines nearly of Larry’s 
interactions with his son.  As Tyree points out, the Vietnam conflict is signified obliquely by the 
satirical television war comedy F Troop.  As David Desser writes of 1960s television, “certain 
genre deconstructions may fairly be said to have been symptomatic of the stirrings of 
dissatisfaction in the culture at large” (133).  Citing “F Troop” (1965-1967) amidst others, he 
notes that these shows “began to tweak the mythos of the mainstream” (134) as F Troop put a 
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different spin on frontier life than John Ford’s cavalry films ever imagined (134).  When Larry is 
at the lawyer’s office, Danny calls, interrupts and Larry is alarmed (“Danny, what’s wrong?:), 
but the problem is only that F Troop is fuzzy and he needs his father to come home and fix the 
aerial.  Later, when Danny calls Larry—this time interrupting him at the office—Danny assumes 
that he is after the same-old request, but this time a “real” emergency has occurred: Sy 
Abelman’s death.  What is really wrong here, of course, lies outside the frame in the story’s 
intertexts: the emergencies abroad in the wider world that never come into focus.  
Tyree’s revisionist readings find traction in the three rabbis’ advice to Larry.  Mixing 
high and low, authority and counterculture, these rabbis spout nonsensical 1960s ideologies as a 
comment on the omnipotent—and in this case, empty—doctrine of the new freedoms.  
Disrupting these historical narratives offers a corrective to the sense of historical progress and 
reveals that in isolation, they will be no more successful than quantum physics or religious 
orthodoxy as a path towards understanding.  For example, the film mocks Rabbi Scott’s advice 
to Larry to take in all that the parking lot has to offer, counseling him to “embrace a new 
perspective.”  In the kooky rhetoric espoused by Sy Abelman, Rabbi Scott, and Rabbi Nachner, 
J.M. Tyree reads a “1960s vocabulary of universal brotherhood, the power of good vibes, and the 
parable-making of religious gurus” that amounts to nothing more than gibberish (37); this is just 
another version of Arthur’s mentaculous, seeming brilliant advice delivered by the sagest of 
rabbis that is quite empty.  But what, exactly is the nature of this counter-narrative?  And why is 
it constructed through a Jewish context?  In Gopnik’s 1967, we discover an assimilated, insular 
Jewish community that communes only within itself and remains shut off from the wider world 
of political agitation.  In fact, the way in which rock lyrics are put to subversive ends occurs in 
the final, climactic moment of the film when we are finally allowed to see Rabbi Marshak up 
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close.  As Danny the bar mitzvah boy is granted his audience with the famed rabbi, Marshak’s 
congratulatory speech is none other than the Talmudic wisdom of Jefferson Airplane that we 
have been hearing all along: “if the truth is found to be lies and all the hope within you dies, then 
what?” he asks Danny, as he proceeds to list the members of the band by name before he returns 
the transistor radio and sends Danny on his way with the advice to “Be a good boy.”  In the 
mixing of high and low culture, new and old technologies, music and text, foolishness and 
wisdom, the lyrics of Jefferson Airplane seamlessly stand in for  logic of the highest religious 
order.  This is one example of how ontological mixing renders chaotic the hierarchies of meaning 
through which Larry lives his life and how the sixties signal to a present-day audience.  That 
Marshak appropriates Jefferson Airplane clearly mocks the recourse to any dogma—whether it 
be one’s commitment to psychedelic rock or quantum physics—as a mode of determining 
meaning.  Mixing ontologies, tropes, and signs mocks the seriousness with which Larry reads his 
life, endlessly searching for meaning in the surrounding tokens, gestures, and language.  To place 
the lyrics of Jefferson Airplane and 1960s rock and roll as the bedrock of Marshak’s Talmudic 
wisdom is to mock the entire history of Jewish intellectualism at the same time that it questions 
the notion of 1960s ideologies.  
These liminal spaces, and their in-between, uncertain qualities, come to characterize the 
film’s genre, many of the frames’ mis-en-scene, and Larry’s life trajectory.  Ultimately, they test 
Larry’s faith in a world where, as the ultimate paradox of truth, Hashem’s existence does not 
need to be explained.  Like Job, throughout his trials Larry maintains his faith.  The ultimate test 
occurs during his visit to Marshak’s office and the subsequent scene where Arthur accuses Larry 
of being handed a better lot in life.  When he finally arrives to see Marshak, Larry is met with 
silence and remains stuck in a threshold space outside the office door.  A medium shot frames 
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Larry, in the foreground, and paintings of religious Jews on the wall in the background perch just 
so that they are literally peering over Larry from behind each shoulder, somewhat like the 
“good” versus “evil” quandary of medieval morality plays.  The frame communicates the moral 
weight of Larry’s actions, as if he is being judged, like Job, as the goodness of his life evaporates 
and his frustration swells—Marshak cannot see him, he is busy “thinking.”  With the weight of 
his ancestors looming on his shoulders, Larry pleads with Marshak’s unexpressive gatekeeper—
his non-responsive secretary.  At this point in the film, Larry has departed significantly from the 
serenity that initially characterized his interactions.  Instead, with his voice breaking and his 
hands nervously fluttering in and out of the frame, he desperately manages to sputter the 
following plea:  
. . . I’ve already talked to the other rabbis, please. . . It’s more about myself, I’ve 
had quite a bit of tsuris, lately, marital problems, professional, you name it, this is 
not a frivolous request.  This is a ser—I’m a ser—I’m uhhh, I’ve tried to be a 
serious man.  You know? Tried to do right, be a member of the community, raise 
the ki—Danny, Sarah—they both go to school, Hebrew school, a good breakfast, 
well, Danny goes to Hebrew school, Sarah doesn’t have time, she mostly washes 
her hair, apparently there are several steps involved but you don’t have to tell 
Marshak that just tell him I need help, please—I need hheelp.  
 
At the moment Larry tries to say “kids,” the camera cuts to the gatekeeper’s evaluative glance 
over her glasses perched skeptically at the end of her nose, as if signaling Larry’s internal guilt 
(Is he really a serious man—a good father?) and need to clarify.  And when she opens her mouth 
to relay that, “the rabbi is busy,” the voice is deep, masculine, and echoes with the presumed 
power of the rabbi’s chamber so that Larry’s, high-pitched, squeaky, “But he doesn’t look busy!” 
makes him all the more schlemiel-like.     
But as the horrendous events in Larry’s life unfurl without end, Larry, unlike Arthur, 
does not renounce Hashem or give up on his search for meaning, even though Arthur’s version 
242 
 
of events—“It’s all shit!, Larry”—is much closer to the truth.  Occurring in succession, the 
scenes placed outside Marshak’s office and the empty pool of the Jolly Rodger gesture to an 
emotional climax of frustration and inaction for both Arthur and Larry.  And yet, Larry does not 
sway from trying to be a “serious man.”  At this crucial moment in the film, Larry wakes in the 
middle of the night to find his brother standing confusedly in the middle of their room sobbing. 
Turning on the light, he tries to console Arthur, “It’ll be OK, Don’t worry” before Arthur runs 
out the door. Larry, framed for a moment by a close-up shot of him in the doorway (again, the 
emphasis is on the threshold space) listening to the wails of his brother and his bare feet slapping 
the pavement, runs after him.  Sitting at the edge of the empty pool, a sobbing Arthur bemoans, 
“It’s all shit Larry, it’s all shit.” Larry remains calm as he assuages his brother, trying but 
missing the mark as he offers misplaced guidance and tells Arthur “not to use that word.”  Arthur 
continues, rocking and wailing,  
“It’s all fucking shit! Look at all that Hashem has given you, what has he given me? He 
hasn’t given me shit.”  
Larry responds, soothingly, “Arthur, what do I have? I live at the Jolly Rodger.”  
“You have a family. You have a job. Hashem hasn’t given me shit. He hasn’t given me
 bubkus,” Arthur moans.   
 
But instead of becoming angry at his brother for lashing out at himself, Larry takes the moral 
high ground—he protects God—and his words resound with Jobian undertones: “It’s not fair to 
blame Hashem, Arthur, please, sometimes, please calm down, you have to help yourself.”  When 
Arthur refuses to relent, the camera shows Larry leaning down to hug and comfort a crying 
Arthur, saying “it’s OK,” embracing him as if to illustrate that “when all the joy within you dies / 
and the truth is found to be lies,” we all just “want somebody to love.”  In the next scene, Larry 
wakes up and wonders if it was all a dream: “Arthur, were we out at the pool last night?”   
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 One scholar, Walter Metz in Americana, reads A Serious Man through Johan Huizinga’s 
Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play Element in Culture (1944).  While his argument really centers 
on Paul Thomas Anderson’s Punch-Drunk Love, Metz’s work on Huizinga lauds the Coen 
brothers (alongside Anderson) for restoring the “ludic function” of civilization.  Huizinga, whose 
work serves as a precursor to Victor Turner’s work on liminality and play,129 wrote Homo Ludens 
in 1938 when he was a Dutch history professor at the University of Leiden and the text was 
published in Switzerland in 1944.  As Metz avers, Huizinga titled the book Homo Ludens, Man 
the Player, because “civilization arises and unfolds in and as play” and argued for naming man 
after what he “could be, not what he had become in the 1930s” as fascism brewed in Europe (qtd. 
in Metz).  In fact, Huizinga criticizes the “false play” of the Nazis and ends his text with the 
word “silence,” which for him means failing to rescue civilization from Nazi “seriousness” (qtd. 
in Metz).  This reading of Huizinga leads Metz to conclude that “the misanthropy of the films of 
Stanley Kubrick and the Coen Brothers is one possible response to the fascist turn of the 
twentieth century.”  Huizinga calls for a return to play as a defining human characteristic, as an 
opposite response, but one equally critical of the fascist reduction of humanity (Metz).  So 
maybe, the film’s sense of play—while considered “ahistorical” by most—politicizes the 
seemingly random, ill-fated events of Larry’s life, it resists the closed nature of historical 
inevitabilities aligned with fascism in favor of open-ended historical potentialities.  On the one 
hand, leveling out the “meaninglessness” of religious totems and the guiding insights of quantum 
physics—the directors allow neither to take central stage, dictate plot, or determine meaning—
                                                
129Huizinga defines play as an “activity that proceeds within certain limits of time and space, in a 
visible order, according to rules freely accepted, and outside the sphere of necessity or material 
utility” (qtd. in Metz 132).  He continues, “the play mood is one of rapture and enthusiasm, and 
is sacred or festive in accordance with the occasion.  A feeling of exaltation and tension 
accompanies the action, mirth, and relaxation follow” (qtd. in Metz 132-3). 
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mocks our impulse to ask the question, “why” because as their work reveals, it’s all arbitrary 
anyways.  But on the other hand, this flattening of the world to parodic intertextuality levels the 
playing field.  Like the inaction of the schlemiel, the film’s detachment recognizes all 
potentialities (the cat is both dead and alive, as Larry instructs of Schrödinger’s paradox) without 
having to privilege a single mode of meaning or interpretive framework.  In addition to the 
potentialities that reside in the schlemiel’s inaction, the film uses the liminal spaces that mix 
fantasy and reality to undermine a sense of historical determinism or a single interpretive 
framework.      
“Hup! Hup! We must Tumble!”: Survival and the Carnivalesque in “The Tumblers” 
 
“It was an absurd undertaking.  But then again, Mendel thought, no more unbelievable than the 
reality from which they’d escaped, no more unfathomable than the magic of disappearing Jews.  
If the good people of Chelm could believe that water was sour cream, . . . then why not pass as 
acrobats and tumble across the earth until they found a place where they were welcome?” (43)  
 
“The Tumblers” makes overt the underlying quality of parable that characterizes A 
Serious Man, bringing to the fore the tropes of Yiddish folklore as the fantasy story imagines the 
fate of the Chelmites on the eve of the Holocaust.  Like the Jewish suburban enclave of St. Louis 
Park, Chelm is typically constructed as self-contained, impervious to the historical or logical 
elements that categorize the world outside the text.  In addition to geographical isolation, Chelm 
is a place where logic is upended.  As Wisse explains, “stories of Chelm. . . usually follow a 
single pattern—when a problem must be solved, the Chelmites come up with a formula that is 
theoretically correct, but practically absurd” (10).  While the absurd logic of Chelm has 
traditionally been set apart from reality, Englander’s tale reverses the trope of historical isolation 
while maintaining the logic of the absurd.  Integrating history into the narrative through an 
uncomfortable laughter and a grotesque sense of play, the upended logic of “The Tumblers” 
embodies a carnivalesque sensibility that alludes to the way in which the Holocaust itself has 
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come to constitute a transgression of reality.  In so doing, the story pinpoints the strange way the 
absurdity of history is made commensurate with the foolishness of Chelm, revealing the dark 
malaise at the center of enchantment.  As Alexis Wilson comments, though “The Tumblers” is a 
Chelm story, it veers away from the customarily redemptive endings and the triumph of good 
faith over evil (119).  “The Tumblers,” she notes, “is no longer a children’s story, and it is no 
longer redemptive in the sense that a problem is solved, an injustice is reversed, and a comical 
solution is offered” (Wilson 119).   
The Chelmites are divided into two groups of varying religious fealty.  Much like the 
Slouchers and the Uprighters of Jonathan Safran Foer’s Trachimbrod, the Mekyls and the 
Mahmirim are lenient and stringent, respectively, in their religious devotion.  When two trains 
arrive in Chelm both groups (each with their own Rabbi) must decide what to do.  The Mekyls 
gather up their most precious belongings, while the Mahmirim are instructed to shave their hair 
and strip themselves of their religious garb.  The groups randomly board different trains: while 
the Mekyls are sent to a concentration camp, the Mahmirim board a train full of circus 
performers bound for Germany and en route to entertain high-level Nazi officials. When the 
protagonist, a former Mekyl-turned-Mahmir by the name of Mendel, reports this news to the 
group, the “Rabbi sat in silence for some minutes, considering the mystery of the last years and 
the mystery of all those who had disappeared before them” (40).  Ultimately, faced with their 
situation, the Rabbi decides that they have no other choice: “we must tumble.”  In this way the 
tumblers place their faith in the practice of acrobatics and art (in this case the performance of 
tumbling) becomes a vital mode of survival.   
Play enters the text through the folkloric nature of the Chelm narrative and the circus 
trope.  As Mendel steals bits and bobbles from the “real” acrobats so that Raizel may sew their 
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costumes, the Mahmirim do their best to perfect their new art on the train.  Clad in rags, 
awkwardly rehearsed, feeble in their athleticism, the Jews take the stage.  As they tumble 
clumsily, ankles cracking, limbs akimbo, a voice from the highest of the high-level audience 
members calls out and highlights the twisted sense of mockery at the center of the tragedy-
comedy: “Look. . . they are as clumsy as Jews,” the official remarks, laughing.  “More,” called 
the voice, before another—a woman’s voice—chimes in, “Yes, keep on, . . . More of the Jewish 
ballet” (54).  The story closes to the sound of the Rebbe’s foot.  He begins to tap, as if to cue the 
tumblers, but in a silent gesture Mendel waves him away and steps forward.  The narrator 
remarks, “he [Mendel] reached out past the footlights into the dark, his hands cracked and 
bloodless, gnarled and intrusive.  Mendel turned his palms upward, benighted.  But there were no 
snipers, as there are for hands that reach out of the ghettos; no dogs, as for hands that reach out 
from the cracks in boxcar floors; no angels waiting, as they always do, for hands that reach out 
from chimneys into ash-clouded skies” (55).  Miraculously, the Mahmirim have escaped the 
horror of the death camps, but in this unresolved ending, Mendel’s “benighted” palms reflect his 
complicity in the circus act and a shame in having survived (55).   
Jews disguised as aerialists, the Mahmirim do not anticipate that they will be mistaken 
for gentiles performing as Jews.  Like the uncertainty that undergirds the whirlwind that sweeps 
into the final scene of A Serious Man, there are myriad interpretations of Mendel’s final 
movement, raising questions but few answers: Is Mendel’s gesture a wish for suicide? A desire 
for forgiveness?  Such uncertainty reveals that the logic of Chelm is no longer impervious to 
historical trauma.  While Wisse posits that the schlemiel is possible in a post-Holocaust 
American Jewish context, Menachem Feuer and Andrew Schmitz comment that, “ultimately, a 
naïve, schlemiel-like response to the world, one that denies it, is no longer tenable when it comes 
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to history” and Chelm comes face-to-face with a horrific historical context.  In this story, the 
threshold space of the circus allows for what Bakhtin refers to as the “temporary liberation from 
the prevailing truth and from the established order”—the Jews survive, the Nazis are fooled—but 
the result is not what Bakhtin would have expected.  The “gay” spectacle of “becoming, change, 
and renewal” does not end in rebirth, but only in ambiguity.         
As I indicate in my introduction, it is the strange commensurability of seemingly 
incompatible modes that is the basis for my conceptualization of enchantment.  This story opens 
by attesting to the strange pairing of Chelm and history as modes seemingly at odds: “Who 
would have thought that a war of such proportions would bother to turn its fury against the fools 
of Chelm? Never before, not by smallpox or tax collectors, was the city intruded upon by the 
troubles of the outside world” (27).  Chelm symbolizes the ideal, fantasy image of the shtetl 
(Wilson 121).  No one ever leaves nor arrives in Chelm, nor is it affected by pogroms (Wilson 
121).  The juxtaposition of an ahistorical, fictional homeland with the reality of historical trauma 
reveals that fools of Chelm are no longer isolated from history.  The question defamiliarizes 
incredulity as the dark tone reverberates with the reminder of loss.  Concerned with the 
relationship between history, aesthetics, and the ethical, Feuer and Schmitz locate the post-
Holocaust denial of omnipresent reality of evil in this juxtaposition of Chelm with history (9).  
And Behlman explains that in this pairing of Chelm and the historical, Jewish folklore does not 
simply play the part of “conventional” narrative that is torn apart by the incursion of the darker, 
anarchic force of Holocaust reality; nor is it problematically “seamless” and merely 
“aesthetically pleasing,” in Sue Vice’s terms (qtd. in Behlman 161).  Instead, Behlman notes, “it 
maintains its own disruptive, dark comic powers and existential profundity, resources that Kafka 
and Isaac Bashevis Singer famously drew upon in fashioning their own fictions” (Behlman 161).  
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That is, “The Tumblers” does not just reiterate the insular nature of Chelm, but draws on 
enchantment to reveal its logic and limitations as a mode of survival.  
As we have seen from Larry’s role in A Serious Man, the schlemiel is set apart from 
reality in order to problematize reality rather than simply negate it (Wisse 3).  In “The Tumblers,” 
the schlemiel’s comic stance and challenge to the status quo are compounded by a carnivalesque 
sensibility, which contributes to the disruptive power of the story as it extends the story’s mode 
of serious play.  For Bakhtin,130 the carnivalesque is both the description of a historical 
phenomenon and a literary aesthetic, and it is the latter sense of the term that is relevant to this 
analysis.  Drawing on the tradition of folk culture in medieval carnival, Bakhtin writes that 
carnival celebrates the “temporary liberation from the prevailing truth and from the established 
order,” during which time everything is susceptible to the “peculiar logic of the inside out, of the 
‘turnabout,’ of a continual shifting from top to bottom, from front to rear, of numerous parodies 
and travesties, humiliations, profanations, comic crownings and uncrownings” (Rabelais 11).131  
In “The Tumblers,” this “turnabout” describes both the tumbling bodies of the acrobats and the 
inversion of the historical order.  Like the serious play that comes to define A Serious Man both 
aesthetically and thematically, the sense of the carnivalesque applies to both the peculiar logic of 
Chelm and the circus trope in “The Tumblers,” where the irruption of traumatic history into the 
story problematizes conceits of wisdom and foolishness.  The result is mixed: the Mahmirim 
                                                
130Lachmann et al. reveals that Bakhtin’s goals were twofold.  First, Bakhtin wanted to correct 
the misreadings of Rabelais by placing it within the cultural and semantic context of the 
Renaissance during which “folk culture and high culture converge” (115-6). Second, he wanted 
to reconstruct folk culture in its “verbal, gestural, and ritual manifestations” through an analysis 
of Rabelais’s novel (Lachmann et al. 116).  
 
131The central ritualistic act was customarily a coronation of the fool, clown, or slave.  
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survive, but at a cost—the schlemiel is no longer insulated from history, and the irony and 
foolish faith in the triumph of good over evil is tinged with trauma and sadness.      
This carnivalesque spirit is one that “revives and renews,” ultimately offering “the chance 
to have a new outlook on the world, to realize the relative nature of all that exists, and to enter a 
completely new order of things” (Rabelais 34).  As Shanti Elliot explains, images of reversal 
twist through many folklore traditions and are especially central to the carnivalesque, which 
manifests in the language of the Chelmites as “The Tumblers” begins (130).  As is customary of 
Chelm, this new order, the chance at a new outlook, resides in the inversion of wisdom and 
foolishness:  
Gronam’s logic was still employed when the invaders built the walls around a 
corner of the city, creating the Ghetto of Chelm.  There were so many good things 
lacking and so many bad in abundance that the people of the ghetto renamed 
almost all they had: they called their aches ‘mother’s milk,’ and darkness became 
‘freedom’; filth they referred to as ‘hope’—and felt for a while, looking at each 
other’s hands and faces and soot-blackened clothes, fortunate. . . potatoes were 
treated as gold, and a sack of gold might as well have been potatoes . . . (28)  
 
Renaming encapsulates the logic of absurdity in Chelm, where the normal order of language is 
completely upended.  But the reversal of logic here reaches its limit at the reality of death: “it 
was only death that they [the Chelmites] could not rename, for they had nothing to put in its 
place. This is when they became sad and felt their hunger and when some began to lose their 
faith in god” (28).  In “The Tumblers,” death alters the language of Chelm as it is equated with a 
literal loss of language and great gaps of silence enter this previously insular community.  When 
the Mahmirim board the train and the Rebbe counts his followers according to the Psalms, he 
does not know how to account for the violent death of the young woman Yechoved: “he counted 
his followers with a verse of Psalms, one word for each person, knowing already that he would 
fall short without Yocheved.  This is the curse that had befallen them.  Always one less word” 
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(38).  In the loss of language, the violence of history is transposed onto aesthetics.  The chaos of 
the historical trauma becomes manifest in the blundering logic of the Chelmites as they rename 
and revise reality, but death leaves them only a void.  
Like the aesthetic paradox of pleasurable fear that emanates from the horror genre 
invoked in the filmic techniques of A Serious Man, Englander’s story couples the pleasure of 
laughter with the darkness of historical anxiety, revealing deeper emotional responses beneath 
the surface.  Monica Osborne comments that grounded in the story’s larger historical and cultural 
narratives is “a laughter under which horror resides, and never completely surfaces in the ways 
we expect it to” (130).  For Bakhtin, the laughter evoked by carnivalesque humor has “a deep 
philosophical meaning, it is one of the essential forms of truth concerning the world as a whole” 
(Rabelais 66).  Adams actually attributes a grotesque carnivalesque laughter to the Coen brothers’ 
oeuvre, and in “The Tumblers” it resonates with ambivalence (6).  In the laughter that was 
celebrated by Renaissance folk culture in the carnival, as a spectacular feast of inversion and 
parody of high culture, Bakhtin sees the possibility of a “complete withdrawal from the present 
order” (Rabelais, 275), where another world in which “anti-hierarchism, relativity of values, 
questioning authority, openness, joyous anarchy, and the ridiculing of all dogmas hold sway, a 
world in which syncretism and a myriad of differing perspectives are permitted” (118).”132  Like 
absurdist language, this carnivalesque sense of laughter is also critical to the reversal of logic 
                                                
132According to readings that historicize Bakhtin’s concept of the carnivalesque, the carnival 
laughter applied not only to the Renaissance, but was also, under Stalinism, a subversive attack 
on “the perverted concept of folk culture that prevailed in the Stalin era, a culture that was 
decreed from on high and that in reality offered no alterative to the official one” (Lachmann et al. 
118).  Carnivalistic laughter likewise is directed toward something higher—toward a shift of 
authorities and truths, a shift of world orders.  Laughter embraces both poles of change, it deals 
with the very process of change, with crisis itself.  Combined in the act of carnival laughter are 
death and rebirth, negation (a smirk) and affirmation (rejoicing laughter).  This is profoundly 
universal laughter, a laughter that contains a whole outlook on the world” (Dostoevsky 127).    
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immediately present in “The Tumblers,” deepening the sense of disbelief over the war that has 
reached the Chelmites.  When the story opens, the narrator describes a global laughter rising in 
response to the tales of Mendel’s grandfather, Gronam the Ox: “In the Fulton Street Fish Market 
the dockworkers laughed with Yiddish good humor upon hearing how Gronam had tried to 
drown a carp.  At a dairy restaurant in Buenos Aires, a customer was overcome with the hiccups 
as his waiter recounted the events of the great sour cream shortage” (28).  “The Tumblers” is also 
a story that will invoke “good humor” and joyful “hiccups” as the Chelmites learn to tumble, but 
like language, the laughter fails to overcome historical trauma.    
At first, the laughter, like the logic of language, is quintessentially carnivalesque, 
grounded in subversion, ambivalence and becoming (Elliot 130).  The Mahmirim begin to 
practice their acrobatics: “Who knew that Raizel the widow had double-jointed arms, or that 
Shmeul [sic] Berel could scurry about upside down on hands and feet mocking the movements of 
a crab.  Falling from a luggage rack from which he had tried to suspend himself, Mendel, on his 
back, began to laugh.  The others shared the release and laughed along with him” (41).  There 
was a “real and heartfelt delight” among the Mahmirim, and “they laughed as the uncondemned 
might, as free people in free countries do” (42).  But the invocation of the carnivalesque, once 
again, does not end as expected.  The “joyous anarchy” that momentarily questions authority in 
Bakhtinian terms is only temporary, and the quality of the official’s laughter at the end of the 
performance undermines the intent to ridicule (Rabelais 118).  When the official identifies the 
clumsy Jews, “there was a pause and then a singular and boisterous laughter. The laughter 
echoed and was picked up by the audience, who laughed back with lesser glee—not wanting to 
overstep their bounds” (54).  A key feature of the carnivalesque is the elision of boundaries as 
high and low mix and mock authority.  But the tentative laughter of the crowd that responds with 
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a “lesser glee—not wanting to overstep their bounds” reinforces that the boundaries temporarily 
transcended by the tumblers remain more or less intact.   
The circus trope deepens the absurdist logic of Chelm.  Like the mixing of high and low 
that constitutes the carnivalesque, the circus has traditionally been positioned as a hybrid, 
transgressive space.  In an analysis of Australian circus acts of the late 1900s, one scholar found 
that “the circus was popular because these individual circus bodies were perceived as ‘low-
Other,’” allowing her to conclude that entry into the circus tent invoked suspension of social 
laws so that the circus can be seen as inheriting the Bakhtinian site of the carnivalesque (qtd. in 
Stoddart 173).133  But as Stoddart explains, the concept of the circus embodies a paradoxical self-
image: “it promotes an idea of itself in the popular imagination as embodying a lifestyle 
unfettered by conventionality or by social and legal restraint; a freedom which was echoed in 
performances which foregrounded the illusion of ease” (175).  And though it promoted this 
atmosphere of freedom from social restraint, traditionally, spectators perceived themselves as 
more masculine than the gendered-female lithe bodies of the acrobat/aerialist, and with regards 
to class, morally superior (173).134  
 Part of the line that is blurred between the Chelmites and the performers is that between 
performance and identity; as the Mahmirim wish to be seen as Jews performing as non-Jews, 
they are ironically mistaken for gentiles performing as Jews.  This is not a space in which the 
                                                
133To complicate the reading of the circus as carnivalesque, Stoddart remarks that many 
spectators perceived themselves to be morally and intellectually superior to both the performers 
and in some cases, the rest of the audience, and if the circus were a truly carnivalesque space, 
such divisional hierarchies would be overturned in favor of a “free and familiar contact among 
people” (174).  Stoddart comments that the spectator “is a voyeur, always importantly to him, in 
both sexual and class terms” (174).    
 
134In aerial performances, men were performing as acrobats and aerialists, but also overtly 
performing femininity.  
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carnivalesque logic follows its usual reversal-to-rebirth trajectory, but one in which the Jews end 
up imitating themselves and the logic of Chelm is made foolish.  While the space in which they 
perform is characterized as a “theater,” the fools have undergone multiple transformations in 
order to fully dupe their audience.  The first form of play with identity that the reader encounters 
is the Mahmirim’s shedding of their religious clothing, as Jewish signs here are physically 
discarded.  When they first receive orders to pack up their things for transport, “the Mahmirim 
rushed back to their cramped flats, the men shedding their gabardines and ritual fringes, the 
women folding their frocks and slipping them into drawers” (32).  The men shave their beards 
and the women leave their kerchiefs behind (32).  No longer marked as Jews, they draw on the 
trope of performing identity (borrowed from the carnivalesque) to survive. As Stoddart explains, 
“circus performers tend, perhaps with the exception of clowns, to present acts and physical stunts 
through which they are defined (the lion tamer, the magician, the acrobat, and so on) rather than 
perform dramatic roles” (59-60 Stoddart).  This kind of collapse between naming and reality and 
the literalization of metaphors, as we have seen, is quintessential to the typical logic of the 
Chelm story.   
When the Mahmirim appear on the back of the train, the narrator makes an important 
correction as he tells the story—that the Mahmirim are perceived as acrobats, not clowns 
(Englander 38).  As the gentile entertainers notice the new travelers, “they turned in their seats, 
laughing out loud at these shaved-headed fools, these clowns without makeup—no, not clowns, 
acrobats.  They could only be acrobats in such bland and colorless attire—and so skinny, too.  
Just the right builds for it.  Lithe for the high wire” (38).  The same characteristics that invoke 
the thin, bland, colorless bodies of Jews in concentration camps constitute their identification as 
acrobats: it is precisely “in this way, [as acrobats] the Mahmirim successfully boarded the train” 
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(38).  Clowns, since Charles Dickens’s Hard Times (1854), have often been associated with 
death and “morbid speechlessness,” their humor tied to a failure to make themselves understood 
(Stoddart 131).  In contrast, the Mahmirim reflect a clear desire to be understood as gentiles.  
Embedded in the concept of the circus aerialist, acrobat, or “tumbler,” however, is a certain 
degree of transcendence.  As Stoddart demonstrates, “the capacity of the human body to perform 
beyond its normal or even imagined limitations in forms which are entertaining, astonishing and 
beautiful has always constituted the very core of the circus” (166).  For the acrobatic aerialist 
acts this would demonstrate human transcendence over the natural elements, like gravity and 
fire; machinery, like wires, bicycles, and cannons; “and over the possibility of death itself,” a 
risk that is extended to the reality of historical circumstances in the story (Stoddart 166).   
Like the nature of Chelm, the concept of the carnivalesque is transformed as “death 
defying” circus tropes take on new significance.  This power of transcendence is invoked by 
what may seem  an “incongruous set of attributes describing the powerful bodies involved as 
light, often weightless, flying or even transcendent of the physical body” (Stoddart 166).  The 
ambitions and fantasies of the circus are legible on these bodies, and also, “such bodies are 
frequently reinscribed within subsequent texts about the circus with further more specific 
meanings which may have little or nothing to do with circuses” (Stoddart 166).  In their initial 
debuts, aerialists “were held to be representative of the suspensions of place, time, and social 
relations which is the fantasy offered by the circus and encapsulated by the trapeze artist” 
(Stoddart 176).135  Both within the frame of the story and in the larger historical context of the 
Holocaust, embedded within the aerialist trope is the desire to transcend place, time and relations 
                                                
135As Tait describes, the fantasy implied in the trapezist’s art “is the desire of physical bodies to 
defy the gravity of social categories, before returning to familiar territory when he or she halts 
the free fall and reinstates gender identity and the material order of bodies” (qtd. in Stoddart 175). 
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of history.  Of course, the aerialists perform great risk—tumbling down into the real of history 
and to their deaths.  
There is a tension between the performance of Tumblers, how they have come to embody 
and exist in this transcendent, carnivalesque space, and how it approximates the logic of Chelm 
as Chelm transforms into something else.  The twists and turns of the Chelmites’ language and 
acrobatic moves, as they begin to practice, extend the carnivalesque as they borrow from 
authoritarian ideology and transform into the performers.  From watching the circus as a boy, 
Mendel recalls the secret to convincing the other performers that they were acrobats: “The secret 
was nothing more than an exclamation.  It was simply, a ‘Hup!’ Knowing this, the Mahmirim 
lined the corridor and began to practice” (41).  Like death, for which there is no expression, the 
Chelmites must invent a new language to describe their circumstances.  “Hup” is not really a 
word but better described as a grunt or sound through which the Chelmites’ language is degraded.  
Mendel instructs, “you must clap your hands once in a while as well” (41).  “Hup” is the first 
beat of a 4/4 military cadence, which commands the lead-off step in a march or another action, as 
the Mahmirim—the highest on high of the religious Jews—use the logic of the third Reich 
against itself.  But something disturbs the Chelmites in the process.  The comfortable Chaos of 
Chelm dissipates and starts to embody a rigidity that disturbs Mendel.  As the procession filed 
[sic] in to the theater, Mendel notices the preparations of the performers and “went cold with 
terror, watching, trying to isolate what in these innocuous preparations was so disturbing” (51).  
Realizing to “what his great terror was due,” he notes:  
It was the efficiency displayed by each and every one, the crack hop-to-it-ness, 
the discipline and order.  He had seen it from the start, from the day the intruders 
marched into town and, finding the square empty, began kicking down doors, 
from for the instant meticulousness demanded that a war of such massive scope 
make time to seek out a happily isolated dot-on-the-map hamlet-called-city where 
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resided the fools of Chelm.  It was this efficiency, Mendel knew, that would catch 
up with them. (51)  
 
In this efficient and calculated mode, the Chelmites joke that they can reach up and pull the 
endless ropes and pegs to control the weather: “Which one to pull for rain?” Feitel asks, or a 
“good harvest?”. . . “’And which for redemption?’ the Rebbe said—his tone forlorn and as close 
as he came to despair” (51-2).  Before the “crack hop-to-it-ness” that defines an efficient, 
disenchanted system of order, the Chelmites were full of faith and mystery: “there are secrets 
behind everything that God creates,” the Rebbe notes as he nudges Mendel to remember his faith 
in God’s mysterious ways, but such a worldview has been emptied out as the Rebbe despairs 
over the loss of disorder (43).   
 On the one hand, the Rabbi’s usurping of the logic of orderliness offers a powerful sense 
of Jewish reclamation in the face of horror.  On the other, when Mendel remarks that he knew “it 
would catch up with them,” his reflection reveals that this reclamation is fleeting and antithetical 
to the Chelmites way of life.  There are other ways in which the story’s enchantment relies on a 
metafictional magic to reverse the logic of the Aktion.  When the French horn player shares a 
drink with Mendel on the train, he also reveals the rumor of “unmatched feats of magic being 
performed with the trains.  They go away full—packed so tightly that babies are stuffed in over 
the heads of the passengers when there’s no room for another full grown—and come back empty, 
as if never before used” (39).   Mendel asks, “And the Jews? . . . What trick is performed with 
the Jews?” “Sleight of hand,” the horn player responds, “A classic illusion.  First they are here, 
and then they are gone” (40).  
Mendel’s horrific feeling of disturbance—that this would “catch up with them”—recurs 
as he tries to teach the Mahmirim how to perform the Full Twisting Volta.  In poetry, the volta, 
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or turn, signals a rhetorical shift or dramatic change in thought or emotion.136  In the performance, 
the twists and turns result in a grotesque carnivalesque and point to an off-kilter mood that 
couples exaltation with fear: 
Mendel, glorious Mendel, actually executed a springing Half-Hanlon and, with 
Shmuel Berel’s assistance (his only real task), ended in a Soaring Angel.  Feitel, 
off his mark, missed his wife as she came toward him in a leap.  Zahava landed on 
her ankle, which let out a crisp, clear crack.  She did not whimper, quickly 
standing up.  Though it was obvious even from the balcony that her foot was not 
on right. (54)  
 
It is after the silence that follows this moment that crowd laughs.  Zahava and Feitel’s twisted 
limbs and jumps that miss the mark reveal a sense of the “the freakish or the abnormal,” drawing 
on a carnivalesque sense of the grotesque body (176).137  Such images echo the traumatized, 
disfigured, grotesque bodies of those Jews hidden from the story’s view.    
Nona Fienberg locates the story’s power in the metaphor of the acrobatics, the newly 
learned skills, and the risk-taking of the tumblers, but is only through a closer look at the reversal 
of logic that “The Tumblers” power becomes clear (78).  Crowned the orchestrator of the 
tumbling routine, the Rebbe is the quintessential carnivalesque “fool”; the carnivalesque lowers 
everything that is the “high, spiritual, ideal, abstract,” “to the material level, to the sphere of 
earth and body” (Rabelais 19-20).  But the spiritual degradation is more than just the cracking of 
limbs, where the shift from the language of the Psalms and the Chaos of the shtetl to the 
                                                
136Paul Fussell refers to the volta as indispensible to poetry, explaining that “the turn is the 
dramatic and climactic center of the poem, the place where the intellectual or emotional method 
of release first becomes clear and possible. Surely no sonnet succeeds as a sonnet that does not 
execute at the turn something analogous to the general kinds of ‘release’ with which the reader’s 
muscles and nervous system are familiar” (115-6).    
 
137The degradation of the body (eating, drinking, defecating, fornicating) are central to the 
carnivalesque (Rabelais 19-20).  
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terseness of the circus cues and the orderliness of the performers also performs the loss of Jewish 
cultural and spiritual practice. This is most apparent in the rich wisdom of Rebbe that is reduced 
to the curse language of the circus: “He tapped out a four beat with his foot. ‘Hup,’ he said. 
‘From the top,’ he said, exhausting all of the vocabulary that he had learned” (53); and later, “to 
your marks” (53).  This is a world in which the rich chaos of Jewish folklore has been 
diminished.  
Wisse positions Gimpel the fool’s struggle as a metaphysical one; that is, Singer is 
providing a metaphysical purpose for Gimpel’s struggle and not merely reducing it to a 
psychological condition (66-7).  By extension, Wisse offers, Gimpel’s suffering was not in vain; 
the trope can endure in America simply because Americans did not experience the Holocaust” 
(66-7).  Because Americans have not endured the same history, she continues, they have an 
ability to believe in his sense of belief—a concept she refers to as the schlemiel’s “saintliness,” 
akin to that status of a “lamid vovnik” (65).  But the Mendel who literally steps outside “the 
actual march of events” is not one in whom we can locate a “saintly optimism,” aregue Feuer and 
Schmitz (105).  As the narrator comments, initially Mendel’s “hands were huge, befitting his 
lineage.  Gronam’s own were said to have been as broad as a shovel’s head.  Mendel’s—
somewhat smaller, had always been soft, ungainly but unnoticed.  The ghetto changed that.  It 
turned them hard and menacing” (36) and when he reaches out past the footlights, his hands are 
“cracked and bloodless, gnarled and intrusive” (55).  In the movement from the clumsy 
immaturity of the “soft, ungainly but unnoticed” depiction of Mendel’s hands to their “bloodless, 
gnarled and intrusive” description, it is as if Mendel has lived an entire lifetime.  The grotesque 
body again echoes the cracked limbs of the tumblers and the disfigured bodies of those Jews 
disappeared by the trains.  As the story traces the change in Mendel’s hands, those that he raises 
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“benighted” and into the darkness, it alters the lineage of the Chelm tales, mixing the logic of 
absurdity across fantasy and reality.      
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Conclusion: 
Enchantment-as-Mode: A Metafictional Structure of Feeling  
  
In this chapter, I ask what have we learned from approaching fantasy tropes and genre 
mixing in Jewish American literature? What kinds of historical narratives and approaches to 
knowing history have we begun to see anew?  The question of “why fantasy?” that Malamud 
asked in 1966 still begs to be answered, especially because of the ways in which fantasy tropes 
have become a central mode of contemporary Jewish American storytelling.  Whereas Malamud 
relies on fantasy to make commensurate otherwise disparate experiences of history for postwar 
American and European Jews, the contemporary set of authors turn to fantasy—often embedding 
it within mixed-genre narratives—with a similar aim: to place otherwise incomparable 
experiences on the same representational plane.  As Robert Alter notes of Malamud’s use of the 
Beilis story in The Fixer (1966), the story provided “a way of approaching the European 
Holocaust on a scale that is imaginable, susceptible of fictional representation”  (Jewishness 38).  
It was not just the Beilis story, but also the dreams and hallucinations of the novel that allowed 
the European Holocaust to be made “susceptible of fictional representation” (Jewishness 38).  As 
both a narrative strategy and thematic concern, fantasy tropes level the representational playing 
field, allowing writers to bring together histories, traumas, and geographies that would otherwise 
remain isolated from one another.    
For the contemporary set of writers, fantasy makes the strangeness of historical trauma 
approachable across otherwise unbridgeable gaps in time, space, and language, thus providing a 
way in to exploring questions of knowability and unknowability that linger in the present. 
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Structurally, enchantment privileges the mixing of fantasy and reality tropes as a way to self-
consciously mark the third-generation’s lack of direct experience with the Holocaust.  In so 
doing, it becomes this generation’s way in to mediating Holocaust memory and representation 
that touches, albeit through the poetics of indirection, the historical event.  Fantasy thus becomes 
a “structure of feeling” that makes no claim to direct experience; as such, it is a way to extend 
Gary Weissman’s idea of “fantasies of witnessing” into the present.  The idea of enchantment 
metafictionally attunes the reader to multiple meanings of impossibility: the trauma’s 
inconceivability in the first place; the contemporary writers’ lack of direct connection 
complicated by their relationship to the event through representation, memory, writing, and 
objects; the imperative to “never forget” an even that one did not experience directly; the always 
already yawning gap between history and representation.  Fantasy is already a space where the 
otherwise impossible becomes conceivable.  When paired with postmodern aesthetics critical of 
grand narratives and authenticity, postmodern fantasies favor open-ended approaches to 
mediating Holocaust history that ask the reader to consider how she knows alongside what she 
knows.  
In the Introduction to this project, I began to carve out a space to theorize enchantment, 
and illustrated how the term converges and diverges with existing models.  Because this 
schemata may refer to narratives set in “our world” (A Serious Man; Great House; Malamud’s 
short fiction); narratives set in otherworlds (A Yiddish Policemen’s Union; “The Tumblers”); and 
those texts that fall in-between (Everything Is Illuminated), enchantment functions across 
definitions of Todorov’s “fantastic” and Tolkien’s “fantasy.”  For the purposes of this project, 
fantasy includes mixed-genre narratives that incorporate fantasy genres (sf, high fantasy); 
fantastic tropes that occur in fictional universes set in “our world”; and fantasy tropes that occur 
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in fictional universes set in otherwords.  I thus use fantasy as an all-inclusive term for both 
fantasy and fantastic tropes.  By collapsing these distinctions, I mean to illustrate how fantasy is 
a mode employed across genres and narrative worlds rather than define fantasy as a particular 
genre.  Fantasy-as-mode thus opens up the analysis of play within and between genres, styles, 
and narrative worlds, and one that recognizes strangeness (and play with strangeness) as a key 
feature.   
Methodologically, this project draws on genre theory, anthropology of human play, 
narrative theory, and Holocaust studies.  Surveying the concept’s reach, I note a range of 
definitions and approaches to enchantment since its emergence in Max Weber’s famous binary to 
contemporary work by literary theorist Rita Felski, political scientist Jane Bennett, and historian 
Michael Saler.  My takeaway was the interrelationship between theories of reading practices that 
jolt one out of a default, automatic and thus dulled experience of perception to one in which 
objects, historical narratives, relationships, genres, register as new but not necessarily redemptive 
or restorative.  That is, enchantment may also stir up feelings of malaise or discontent.   
As a theoretical trope, enchantment straddles the middle ground between genre and 
history as it dismantles the idea that Holocaust history falls squarely into categories of 
“knowable” and “unknowable.”  Some critics, like Lee Behlman, Derek Parker Royal, and 
Caroline Rody, have begun to note the prevalence of fantasy in third-generation Jewish 
American literature.  These analyses successfully identify the broad intertextual influences and 
fantasy tropes of contemporary Jewish American literature, but they stop short at analyzing the 
function of fantasy.  Case in point is Caroline Rody’s “Jewish Post-Holocaust Fiction and the 
Magical Realist Turn.  As I mentioned in the Introduction to this project, Rody argues that the 
magical moments in contemporary Jewish American literature serve “the imaginative will to 
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reanimate buried histories, to memorialize and resurrect the dead” (9).  But is this turn to fantasy 
purely recuperative? Surely not, given the uncomfortable histories that rise to the surface in 
Malamud’s and Chabon’s stories.  Rody’s argument seems to me an overly nostalgic conception 
of the use of magic as she argues that these texts “rewrite death in a vision that celebrates the 
power of love” (56).  Her claim links together magic and redemption, or magic and recuperation, 
without questioning why or how that magic is useful to and/or critical of historical narratives.  In 
this way, Rody’s work does not account for the ways that fantasy tropes also operate 
metafictionally and at a critical distance from the object of recuperation.  While there are 
certainly elements of nostalgia at work in some of the texts in this project, these tropes are 
subordinated to the function of magical or fantastical tropes and the authors’ investment in 
exploring more complicated relationships to history.  For example, we are immediately reminded 
of Malamud’s early short fiction and the ways in which fantastic tropes highlight the tendency of 
postwar American Jews to insulate themselves from the experiences of postwar European Jews.   
The fantasy in Malamud’s early short fiction questions certain historical narratives as it 
deepens the conversation about post-Holocaust Jewish American silence.  While historians like 
Peter Novick have argued that cold war tensions made the Holocaust a taboo topic of 
conversations in the postwar period, Hasia Diner’s research on local memorials, Jewish 
community events, and Jewish newspapers during this period allows her to revise arguments 
about postwar silence.  Evinced in the title of her work, We Remember with Reverence and Love: 
American Jews and the Myth of Silence after the Holocaust, Diner questions Novick and others’ 
prevailing claims to postwar silence.  Turning to fantasy, Malamud’s work mediates these two 
historical positions; while “silence” may be too strong a word to characterize postwar American 
Jewish reaction, there is recognition without little “reverence and love” in Fidelman’s immediate 
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contempt for Susskind, the Holocaust refugee: “my first hello in Rome and it has to be a 
schnorrer,” he laments (Magic Barrel 157).  Without fantasy, the experiences of postwar 
American and European Jews would remain incommensurable, thus left unexplored, in 
Malamud’s work.  But through fantasy, Malamud is able to explore the personal and historical 
consequences of the American Jewish protagonists who travel to Italy and disavow their Jewish 
histories.   
Malamud’s early turn towards fantasy reveals the trope’s ability to defamiliarize the 
reality of his protagonists, showing them the truth of reality hidden in plain sight, so-to-speak.  
The instructive scene that opens “Angel Levine” positions Manischevitz reading “but not truly 
reading” and poised to get “the shock of his life” when Angel Levine interrupts the scene (45).  
This is a doubly enchanted moment, as Levine literally interrupts the reality-oriented scene (one 
that takes place in “our world”) and metafictionally reveals that Manischevitz no longer reads the 
world or its news with a clear view (not to mention the fact that Levine is a black Angel).  The 
angel jolts Manischevitz out of oblivion and sets him on path to self-discovery so that he may 
read the world as it really appears.  The Italy stories, in comparison, use fantasy to reveal the 
context of self-conscious oblivion that characterizes American Jewish middle-class life.  Thus, 
these stories show that as a literary trope and mode of mediating historical trauma, fantasy is no 
less real than the protagonists’ psychological delusions and conscious willingness to “unsee” 
their place in Jewish American history.  Malamud eschews the boundaries between fantasy and 
reality that will later come to characterize Krauss’s work and the Coen brothers’ filmic world, 
works that allow us to defamiliarize Weber’s disenchantment binary itself.  And as I mentioned 
previously, considering the stories in a broader context of post-war Jewish American history 
allows the reader to juxtapose various arguments concerning post-war Jewish American “silence.”  
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One aspect that comes into sharp focus is the American Jewish desire not to see the reality of 
European Jewish survivors, a narrative that is distinct from both discourses on silence and 
reverence.         
As we jump to the contemporary archive and turn to objects in Chapter 2, seeing 
historical reality becomes problematic as we must sift through layers of representation, distance, 
and a deluge of “. . . photographs and movies, books and personal testimonies” (Donadio n. pag.).  
Fantasy tropes in Krauss’s Great House and Safran Foer’s Everything is Illuminated animate the 
inanimate, self-consciously calling attention to the texts’ impossible logic.  Nevertheless, the 
metaphysics of things allows us to approach the third-generation protagonists’ inherited 
experiences of trauma, the protagonist/survivor’s first-hand experience, and characters who 
haphazardly bump into traumatic representations to which they have loose cultural or historical 
ties.  If fantasy in Malamud’s work is a kind of nodal point that allows for distinct and diverse 
experiences of trauma to intersect, for Krauss and Safran Foer these tropes similarly enable 
characters with disparate relationships to both each other and the Holocaust to meet.  Fantasy 
seems to draw together stories and characters that would otherwise have no common 
intersection; as such, otherwise incompatible experiences (whether generationally, 
geographically, or even those separated by degrees of trauma) are placed together on the same 
representational plane.   
Enchanted objects in these novels indicate the strange ways in which the material or 
spiritless animate narrative and juxtapose the knowable and unknowable of Holocaust 
representation.  In realist modes of representation,138 to possess an object or a narrative is to 
know it.  In contrast, by enchanting objects (giving them agency; emphasizing their metaphysics; 
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allowing them to signify) and making such objects incapable of being possessed, novelists like 
Krauss and Safran Foer underscore the impossibility for third generation writers to know and 
posses Holocaust history.  Objects in these texts are made to feel strange in order to foreground 
that which eludes our grasp.  To be clear, objects are not the solution to a lack of “graspable 
meaning,” but in fact foreground the extent to which the impact of traumatic history may be 
unknowable.  Nevertheless, there is an imperative to determine the limits of knowledge and 
representation by formulating new modes of storytelling that play with fantasy and reality.  In 
Great House, embedded within these strange pieces of furniture is a discourse of enchantment 
that reveals the reality of characters’ lack of direct experience.  As the protagonist-desk 
shapeshifts across the disparate narratives, not only does it invoke the trope common to sf or 
fantasy literatures, but also, its instability reflects its current possessor’s relationship to history.  
For example, without knowledge of Lotte’s past, Bender’s insecurity becomes a projected onto 
the desk’s monstrosity; the furniture that crowd the Weisz children’s home, and their 
indifference to it, comes to stand-in for their complicated relationship to their inherited trauma.   
Because these novels include multiple narrators, and in the case of Safran Foer’s work, 
multiple kinds of writing and narrative ontologies, genre mixing materializes as a mode of 
mediating different characters’ relationships to history as well as specific historical narratives.  
The turn to the folkloric in the Trachimbrod narrative is extended in Chabon’s Sitka; in The 
Yiddish Policemen’s Union play and uncertainty become metafictional strategies explicitly tied 
to allohistory.  Chabon genre-bends and weaves together allohistory, detective fiction, romance, 
and the secondary-world status of high fantasy and science fiction literatures.  In so doing, 
Chabon’s metafictional text deliberately plays with the meaning of estrangement as he blends 
what are usually distinct ontologies of genre: the function of a detective plot is to detect the 
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strange; the function of the sf/fantasy genre is to normalize the strange; the function of 
allohistory is to estrange history.  Through genre play, Chabon’s novel asks questions about the 
shaping of twentieth-century Jewish American history; and it is amidst the interplay of 
strangeness, defamiliarization, and genre, that he asks, why have certain narratives come to 
dominate others, and to what ends?  By including the Jewish terrorist plot orchestrated by the 
Verbovers to blow up the Dome of the Rock, Chabon’s point seems to be that one cannot choose 
to remember Jewishness within the context of the Holocaust without considering the broader 
contexts of Jewish diaspora.  Without this multidirectional frame, historical narratives become 
essentialized or un-perceptible; genre mixing thus serves a historiographical purpose as it works 
against the absorption or naturalization of certain historical narratives.  Another interesting effect 
of genre mixing and the inclusion of romance in this space is the story’s relationship to nostalgia.  
Because the sentimental elements—Bina and Landsman’s reconciliation; Landsman and Berko’s 
familial love—are part and parcel of the genre, they are divorced from historical memory and 
instead rooted in the specific codes of romance.  
If Chabon’s project aims to distort how Jewish American literature perceives and 
positions Holocaust history, then the Coen brothers’ movie A Serious Man thematizes the 
impossibility of knowing in any possible world.  Even though the film does not take up 
Holocaust themes, it dismantles the binary structure of disenchantment and the premise that 
rational logic (math and physics, for example) or fantastical parables (dybbuks and dreams) are 
sufficient grounds upon which one “can know.” And it is absurd, the film cautions, to stake 
certainty on one or either of these epistemologies.  While seemingly unrelated to Holocaust 
themes, the film’s play with horror and farce provides a way to critique the structure of 
seriousness inherent to fascist ideology.  In this reading, genre play’s connection to 
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anthropological play also creates political potential.  That Larry’s inaction, his consistent state of 
uncertainty, resists a definitive course of events leaves open his life’s potential and gestures 
toward a broader sense that history is not necessarily teleological.  The film does suggest certain 
revisions of 1960s ideological freedoms.  Rabbi’s Scott’s advice to take in the new perspective of 
the parking lot mocks the movement’s spiritual awakening, for example, and Dick Dutton’s calls 
to Larry’s office suggests that countercultural rock is not free of mainstream capitalism.  But it is 
the film’s mixing of horror and farce that most surprises the viewer’s perception of post-war 
Jewish suburbia as it represents the horrific reality of the Jewish community’s insularity.   
In “The Tumblers” the foolish logic of Chelm is both a narrative and survival strategy as 
Chelm is no longer insulated from traumatic history; the story exhausts the innocence of Jewish 
foolishness as well as the transcendence embedded in the Bakhtinian carnivalesque.  And while 
the Mahmirim survive the tumble, their future, just like the Jews of Sitka, is uncertain.  This is 
also a spce in which the literary tropes of the carnivalesque and the logic of Chelm ultimately fail.  
These final readings of A Serious Man and “The Tumbers” test the limits of Yiddish folklore in a 
twenty-first century present; while Ruth Wisse argues that the schlemiel’s innocence is possible 
in a postwar American Jewish framework (the trope is not, however, viable in a postwar 
European context), Larry Gopnik and Mendel are two schlemiels who contradict Wisse’s claim.  
When Larry erases Clive’s failing grade in the final scene of the film and changes the mark to a 
passing grade, the schlemiel fails to exist; similarly, Mendel’s disfigured body and the figurative 
implications of his “benighted palms” indicate that the schlemiel is no longer innocent and 
outside history.          
There are a significant number of mixed genre narratives that I did not have space to 
include in this project, and future studies of the interrelationship between fantasy, history, and 
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enchantment in Jewish American literature would include analysis of the following: Boris 
Fishman’s A Replacement Life (2014); Gary Shteyngart’s The Russian Debutant’s Handbook 
(2002); Michael Chabon’s The Amazing Adventures of Kavalier and Clay (2002) 
Rebecca Goldstein’s Mazel  (2002); Thane Rosenbaum’s Golems of Gothem: A Novel (2003). 
While this project investigates the intersection of hybrid genres and historiography in 
contemporary Jewish American literature, this move toward mixed-genre fiction is characteristic 
of the larger trends in American multiethnic literature could be explored as a natural extension of 
my current project. Moving beyond a Jewish American frame, a comparative project could 
consider multidirectional memory in a multiethnic American context and this inter-ethnic 
research would broaden the context of enchantment.  Relevant texts could include Colson 
Whitehead (The Intuitionist), Junot Díaz (The Brief Wondrous Life of Oscar Wao), and Karen 
Tei Yamashita (I Hotel). By analyzing the mixed-genre characteristics across texts by African 
American, Latino, and Asian American writers alongside discourses on enchantment and genre 
mixing, I envision conceptualizing the increasing genre-hybridization of the novel as a reflection 
of the structures of feeling that resituates contemporary postmodern theory. 
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